Isaac v. Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services et al

Filing 18

RULING: The 9 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Louisiana Department of Children & Family Services and Suzy Sonnier, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the LA Department of Children & Family Services, is DENIED. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 7/6/2015. (JDL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
STEWART ISAAC

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
NO. 15-00013-SDD-RLB
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES AND SUZY SONNIER,
SECRETARY, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES

RULING
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.1
Plaintiff, Stewart Isaac, has filed an Opposition2 to which Defendants have filed a
Reply.3 For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion shall be denied.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In this disability action, Stewart Isaac (“Isaac”) has asserted claims arising under

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(“RA”) against the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) and
Suzy Sonnier, in her official capacity as Secretary of DCFS.

According to his

Complaint4, Isaac has Crohn’s disease, a gastrointestinal disorder, which causes him
frequent, painful attacks of diarrhea. Due to his disability, Isaac is unable to work and
receives assistance though the federal program, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (“SNAP”), which is administered by DCFS.5 In November of 2013, DCFS sent

1

Rec. Doc. 9.
Rec. Doc. 11.
3
Rec. Doc. 12.
4
Rec. Doc. 1.
5
Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶9. SNAP benefits are commonly referred to as “food stamps”.
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Isaac a Notice of Expiration of his SNAP benefits which explained that he would need to
participate in a telephone interview on December 5, 2013.

Additionally, Isaac was

instructed to complete an on-line application prior to his scheduled telephone interview,
or the interview would not occur. Isaac, however, did not have access to a computer.
Therefore, he contacted DCFS and was told that he could pick up a paper application
and mail it to DCFS.6 Isaac contends he complied with these instructions.
Approximately one month lapsed during which time Isaac was never contacted
by DCFS and his food stamps expired. Hence, on January 10, 2014, Isaac went to the
DCFS office in LaPlace, Louisiana, where he was informed by a DCFS employee that
his application had not been received.7 This same employee gave Isaac another paper
application and told him that he could take the application home, complete it, and then
return it to the LaPlace DCFS office.

Again, Isaac complied. However, when Isaac

returned with his completed application on January 14, 2014, a different DCFS
employee refused to accept his application, insisting in an allegedly rude and loud
manner that the application had to be completed on-line. When Isaac informed her that
he did not have access to a computer, the DCFS employee told him he could wait and
someone would assist him in filing his application on-line.
Isaac alleges that the DCFS employee’s rude treatment caused him immediate
embarrassment, stress, nervousness, and anxiety, and within five minutes of their
interaction, he began to experience sharp pains that had, in the past, preceded
episodes of incontinence. Visibly upset, Isaac explained to the DCFS employee that he
could not wait any longer due to his Crohn’s disease. However, the DCFS employee

6

In his Complaint, Isaac claims that the woman’s name was Michelle. Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶11.
According to his Complaint, the DCFS employee’s name was Ms. Stewart. Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶12.
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did not acknowledge or inquire further about his statement regarding Crohn’s disease.
Instead, she instructed him to continue to wait and someone would be with him shortly.
Before anyone could assist Isaac, he soiled himself and left without being permitted to
submit his SNAP application.

As a result, Isaac did not have SNAP benefits until

sometime in April of 2014.8
Isaac filed the instant lawsuit against Defendants for failing to adopt policies and
procedures to effectively accommodate disabled persons in accessing and maintaining
their eligibility for SNAP benefits. He further alleges that Defendants failed to train
DCFS staff regarding the rights of individuals with disabilities to such accommodations
in the process of accessing and maintaining eligibility for SNAP benefits, programs, and
services. Due to Defendants’ alleged failures, Isaac claims he was denied meaningful
access to SNAP benefits and that his ability to access SNAP benefits in the future
remains in jeopardy.

Isaac seeks various forms of relief, including compensatory

damages, a permanent injunction, and declaratory relief.
Defendants now move for dismissal of Isaac’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6), which
Isaac opposes.
II.

LAW
A.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all wellpleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”9
However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
8

According to his Complaint, Isaac’s attorneys sent a letter to DCFS and, thereafter, his application was
accepted and his benefits were reinstated. Rec. Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶21.
9
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Martin K. Eby Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324 (5th Cir.1999)).
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complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”10
“Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to
find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’”11 Rather, “[t]o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’”12 In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”13 “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”14
Furthermore, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of
his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”15 On a motion to dismiss, the
court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, ‘documents incorporated into
the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.’”16

10

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (hereinafter “Iqbal”) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, at 555 (2007) (hereinafter “Twombly”).
11
Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (S.D. Tx. May 3, 2012)(quoting
Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)).
12
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570).
13
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
14
Id.
15
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and brackets omitted).
16
Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011)(quoting Dorsey v.
Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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B.

ADA and RA Claims

Congress enacted the ADA “[t]o provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”17
Under the ADA, “[n]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.”18 Similarly, under the RA, “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability …
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”19 A qualified individual with a disability is “an
individual with a disability, who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices….meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.”20
Public entities include “[a]ny State or local government” and “[a]ny department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government.”21
The elements of a prima facie claim under the ADA or the RA are generally the
same, such that “jurisprudence interpreting either section is applicable to both.”22
Therefore, in order for a plaintiff to state a claim under the ADA or the RA, a plaintiff
17

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
19
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
20
A person has a disability when he has “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as
having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
21
42 U.S.C. §12131(1).
22
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. ), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 959 (2000). See also, Kemp
v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 234 ((5th Cir. 2010)(“[t]he RA and the ADA are judged under the same legal
standards, and the same remedies are available under both Acts”).
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must demonstrate: “(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability within the
meaning of the ADA; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or being denied
benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or
is otherwise being discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability.”23 Notably,
“[t]he only material difference between the [ADA and the RA] lies in their respective
causation requirements.”24 “Under Title II of the ADA, “‘discrimination need not be the
sole reason’” for the exclusion or denial of benefits to the plaintiff, while the
Rehabilitation Act requires a plaintiff to show that he or she was discriminated against
“‘solely by reason of her or his disability.’””25
In addition to claims for denial of benefits, disabled persons can also bring
“reasonable accommodation” claims under the ADA.26 “The regulations implementing
the ADA require that ‘[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination
on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
activity.’”27 “If modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination, the ADA and [RA]
‘impose

upon

public

entities

an

affirmative

accommodations for disabled individuals.

obligation

to

reasonable

Where a defendant fails to meet his

affirmative obligation, the cause of that failure is irrelevant.’”28
23

make

Moreover, “[t]he

Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2004).
Van Velzor v. City of Burleson, 43 F.Supp.3d 746, at 752 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
25
Id. (citing Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005)(29 USC §794(a)).
(internal quotations omitted).
26
Id. (quoting Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454-55 (5th Cir. 2005)).
27
Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(7)).
28
Id. (quoting Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454-55 (5th Cir. 2005)).
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accommodations must be sufficient to provide a disabled person ‘meaningful access to
the benefit’ or service offered by a public entity.”29 In order to establish a reasonable
accommodation theory of discrimination, the second and third prongs of the disabilitybased discrimination prima facie case are slightly modified. “Specifically, a plaintiff can
satisfy the second and third prongs of the prima facie case of disability discrimination by
establishing that the public entity has failed to make reasonable accommodations for a
disabled person who uses the services provided by the public entity.”30
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Has Isaac Stated a Viable Claim Under Title II and the RA?

Defendants are essentially seeking dismissal of Isaac’s claims arguing he cannot
satisfy the second and third elements of his prima facie case. Defendants contend that
Isaac has failed to allege any facts that indicate that he was treated differently than any
other non-disabled individual attempting to obtain SNAP benefits. They further argue
that Isaac’s claims fail to show that he was denied access to the SNAP program
because of his disability. Lastly, Defendants assert that the allegations themselves
indicate that DCFS provides reasonable accommodations to persons with Crohn’s
disease and that Isaac ultimately received his SNAP benefits. The Court finds that
Defendants’ arguments fail under the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss analysis.
Considering that the parties are in agreement that Isaac has sufficiently pled that
he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA, the Court turns its attention to
the second element of the prima facie ADA and RA case.

29

Id.
Borum v. Swisher County, 2015 WL 327508, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015).
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30

First, as correctly pointed out by Isaac in his brief, a plaintiff need not show that
his alleged denial of benefits is due to disparate treatment on the basis of disability. In
Van Velzor v. City of Burleson, the district court noted that “ADA jurisprudence does not
focus solely on this comparison-type evidence.”31 Instead, “[c]ourts have found that a
‘public entity is not only prohibited from affording to persons with disabilities services
that are not equal to that afforded to others, or not as effective in affording equal
opportunity,’ but also the public entity ‘cannot prevent a qualified individual with a
disability from enjoying any aid, benefit, or service, …regardless of whether other
individuals are granted access.’”32 For this reason, the Court finds that the absence of
disparate treatment allegations in Isaac’s Complaint is not fatal to Isaac’s claims.
In this case, Isaac has alleged that the Defendants’ discrimination stems from
their failure to make reasonable modifications to DCFS policies that would have
provided him with meaningful access to the SNAP program’s benefits. “A core element
for reasonable modification, whether under Title I, II, or III, is that the plaintiff has been
denied meaningful access to public places, benefits, or services, i.e., the kind of access
that would be ‘necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.’”33
Therefore, the fact that Defendants provided other means for Isaac to submit his SNAP
application and that Isaac “ultimately” received SNAP benefits, does not necessarily
defeat Isaac’s claims.

Rather, the question for the Court is whether Isaac has

sufficiently pled facts to show that he was denied meaningful access to Defendants’
SNAP benefits and that a reasonable modification in Defendants’ policies could have
prevented such denial.
31

Van Velzor v. City of Burleson, 43 F.Supp.3d 746, 755 (N.D.Tex. Sept. 4, 2014).
Id. (quoting Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 274 (2d Cir. 2003)).
33
Van Velzor v. City of Burleson , 2013 WL 3579339, at *4. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).
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32

Construing the allegations of the Complaint in a light most favorable to Isaac, the
Court finds that he has sufficiently pled a denial of “meaningful access” to a benefit or
service provided by DCFS. Isaac has alleged that DCFS administers the federal
program SNAP, which provides benefits known as “food stamps.” In his Complaint,
Isaac claims that, when he attempted to comply with the alternative methods for
submitting his SNAP application—by regular mail and in person—they proved to be
ineffective.

His first application sent through the regular mail system was never

received by DCFS. On his second attempt to submit his SNAP application in person to
the DCFS office, it was refused and he was told that all applications had to be submitted
on-line. During this latter incident, Isaac informed the DCFS employee that he had
Crohn’s disease, which at the time had started to flare up, and, therefore, he could not
wait for assistance in submitting his application on-line. Although Isaac attempted to
comply with the alterative filing options, on both occasions, his application was never
submitted, resulting in an interruption to his SNAP benefits. As pled, the alternative
means or accommodations offered by Defendants for submitting SNAP applications
were arguably insufficient to provide Isaac, a disabled person, with access to the SNAP
program.

Therefore, the Court further finds that Isaac has sufficiently alleged that

Defendants failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation or modification of
their policies to allow Isaac meaningful access to the services or benefits of the SNAP
program for which the Defendants were responsible.
As for the third element, Isaac has alleged that his access to SNAP benefits was
diminished on account of his disability--Crohn’s disease.

In his Complaint, Isaac

alleged that, on his final visit to the DCFS office, he had eaten prior to leaving his home
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because he had expected to simply drop off his application. When Isaac learned from
the DCFS employee that his hand-written application would not be accepted, and that
he would have to wait to meet with someone to properly file his application on-line, he
began to experience a Crohn’s attack. Isaac told the DCFS employee he could not wait
any longer because he had Crohn’s disease, but she allegedly made no additional
inquiries about his disability to determine if a disability accommodation was appropriate.
Ultimately, Isaac left without being permitted to submit his SNAP application. At this
stage, the Court accepts all well-pled facts as being true.

Therefore, based on the

foregoing, Isaac’s access to SNAP benefits, as pled, was diminished due to his
disability.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Isaac has satisfied the third element

necessary to support his Title II and RA claims.
Based on the foregoing, the Defendants’ Motion shall be denied to the extent
they seek dismissal of Isaac’s Title II and RA claims.
B.

Injunctive Relief

Defendants argue that Isaac has failed to allege sufficient facts to support his
claim for injunctive relief. A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate:
“(1) that he has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.”34 At this stage in the proceeding, Isaac must set forth factual
allegations that support his claim for injunctive relief. Here, Isaac has pled that the
Defendants’ policies and failure to properly train their employees has resulted in the
34

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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denial of his SNAP benefits and will continue in the future without injunctive relief. The
Court can reasonably infer from the allegations that Isaac’s need for SNAP benefits,
and any interruption to such services or benefits, would be an extreme hardship to him
and cause him further injury.

While it may be “apparent” to the Defendants “that

monetary damages would be sufficient to compensate Plaintiff for any loss of benefits,”
in order for the Court to make such a determination would require the consideration of
evidence which is inappropriate at this stage in the proceeding.35

Therefore, after

reviewing the factual allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds that Isaac has
satisfactorily pled a claim for injunctive relief.
C.

Claims for Compensatory Damages

Within the Fifth Circuit “[a] plaintiff asserting a private cause of action for
violations of the ADA or the RA may only recover compensatory damages upon a
showing of intentional discrimination.”36 Additionally, “[t]he Fifth Circuit has made it
clear that a defendant’s failure to make reasonable accommodations to the needs of
disabled persons can constitute intentional discrimination under the ADA and the
[RA].”37 As discussed herein, the Court has found that Isaac has asserted viable claims
under Title II of the ADA and the RA based on Defendants’ alleged failure to provide
reasonable accommodations to Isaac on account of his disability. In his Complaint,
Isaac alleged that he informed the DCFS office employee of his Crohn’s disease and
became visibly upset, ultimately soiling himself when she denied his request to submit a
hard-copy of his SNAP application. These factual allegations, taken as true, allow the

35

Rec. Doc. 9-1, p. 12.
Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., Tex., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002). See also, Tatum v. Bd. of
Supe’rs for Univ. of La. System, 9 F.Supp.3d 652 (E.D.La. 2014).
37
Borum v. Swisher County, 2014 WL 481451, at *10 (N.D.Tex. Sept. 29, 2014).
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36

Court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendants’ employee may have acted
with intentional disregard to Isaac’s disability and that she may have intentionally failed
to provide him with a necessary and reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, the Court
finds that, at this stage in the case, Isaac has sufficiently pled a claim for intentional
discrimination.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss38 filed by Defendants,

Louisiana Department of Children & Family Services and Suzy Sonnier, in her official
capacity as the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Children & Family Services, is
DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 6, 2015.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

38

Rec. Doc. 9.
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