Thomas v. Hercules Offshore Services, LLC et al

Filing 42

RULING : The 18 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on Maintenance and Cure Claims is GRANTED. The 17 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability is GRANTED. The 34 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on Maintenance and Cure is DENIED as moot, and 35 Motion to Strike and 36 Motion for Expedited Hearing are each DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 7/26/2017. (LLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DENETRA THOMAS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

15-33-SDD-EWD

HERCULES OFFSHORE SERVICES,
LLC., ET AL.

RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Liability1 filed by Defendants, Hercules Offshore Services, LLC., et al. (“Defendants”).
The Plaintiff, Denetra Thomas, (“Thomas”) has filed an Opposition2, to which Defendants
filed a Reply.3 For the following reasons, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Liability4 should be GRANTED.
Also before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Maintenance and Cure Claims.5 Thomas has filed an Opposition6, to which Defendants
filed a Reply.7 For the following reasons, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Maintenance and Cure 8 should be GRANTED.

1

Rec. Doc. 17.
Rec. Doc. 20.
3
Rec. Doc. 23.
4
Rec. Doc. 17.
5
Rec. Doc. 18.
6
Rec. Doc. 21.
7
Rec. Doc. 22.
8
Rec. Doc. 18.
2

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I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND9
This case presents seaman injury claims under the Jones Act. The Plaintiff,

Thomas, was hired by Defendants to work as a galley hand on board the Hercules 264
(“Hercules”) in November of 2012. According to Thomas, on May 26, 2013, around 10:00
p.m., she left her stateroom on the Hercules and went to the adjoining bathroom. As she
was attempting to return to her stateroom, she tripped over the threshold of the door
connecting the bathroom to the stateroom. The threshold in question was approximately
two inches in height.10 Thomas stated in her deposition: “After I used the bathroom, I
turned the light off, my left foot hit the threshold and I fell on my right side.”11 Thomas
returned to her bed and awoke with right hip and leg pain the following morning. She
informed the Office Instillation Manager (“OIM”) and medic on the Hercules that she was
in pain due to her fall the previous night.
Thomas filed suit on January 26, 2015, alleging that she suffered severe injuries,
including possible ruptured discs, nerve damage, and other tissue damage as a result of
her May 26, 2013 fall on the Hercules.

Thomas alleges that the Hercules was

unseaworthy and that the Defendants were negligent. Thomas

filed

an

Amended

Complaint12 against Defendants on January 27, 2015, to which the Defendants filed an
Answer.13 On September 3, 2015, Defendants sought and received leave of Court to file

9

The Court bases the factual background on Rec. Docs. 1, 2, 17, 20, 23.
Rec. Doc. 17-3.
11
Rec. Doc. 17-4, p. 17, “Page 67”, ll. 5-7.
12
Rec. Doc. 2.
13
Rec. Doc. 7.
10

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an Amended Answer and Counter-Claim.14 In their Counter-Claim, Defendants allege
that they had no maintenance and cure obligation to Thomas because she failed to
disclose prior injuries on her employment application, and “[t]he non-disclosed facts were
material to Defendants’ decision to hire the Plaintiff.”15 Thomas does not dispute that she
was injured in 2008 and 2009.16
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”17 “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all
of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”18 A party moving for summary judgment “must ‘demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant’s
case.”19 If the moving party satisfies its burden, “the non-moving party must show that
summary judgment is inappropriate by setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence
of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.’”20 However, the
non-moving party’s burden “is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a

14

Rec. Docs. 12 and 13.
Rec. Doc. 14, p. 7.
16
Rec. Doc. 21, pp. 1-2.
17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
18
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).
19
Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, 246 F.Supp.2d 488, 494 (M.D. La. 2003)(quoting Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2552)).
20
Rivera v. Houston Independent School Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Morris v. Covan
World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
15

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scintilla of evidence.”21
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”22 All reasonable factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.23 However, “[t]he Court has no
duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the summary
judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate precisely
how this evidence supports his claim.”24 “Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific
facts … will not prevent the award of summary judgment; the plaintiff [can]not rest on his
allegations … to get to a jury without any ‘significant probative evidence tending to support
the complaint.”25
The parties have sought a bench trial in the present case.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “a district court has
somewhat greater discretion to consider what weight it will
accord the evidence [presented on a motion for summary
judgment] in a bench trial than in a jury trial.”26 If a “[bench]
trial on the merits will not enhance the court’s ability to draw
inferences and conclusions, then a district court properly
should ‘draw his inferences without resort to the expense of
trial.’”27 However, the Fifth Circuit has cautioned that “a district
court must be aware that assessments of credibility come into
sharper focus” at the time of trial, therefore, “even at the
summary judgment stage a judge in a bench trial has the
21

Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995)(quoting Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
22
Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
23
Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
24
RSR Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
25
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir.
1994)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249)).
26
Turner v. Pleasant, 10-cv-7823, 2013 WL 823426 at*7 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2013).. (quoting In re Placid Oil
Co., 932 F.2d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 1991)).
27
Id. (quoting Placid Oil Co., at 398 (quoting Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir.
1978)).

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limited discretion to decide that the same evidence, presented
to him or her as trier of fact in a plenary trial, could not possibly
lead to a different result.”28
The Summary Judgment Motions before the Court are analyzed in accordance with this
standard.
B. Jones Act Legal Standard
The Jones Act29 governs the present case and “allows an injured seaman to sue
his employer for personal injuries suffered as a result of the employer’s negligence.”30
Thomas’ claim turns on whether the height of the threshold presented an unreasonable
risk of harm, or that the threshold rendered the Hercules unseaworthy. As the United
States Supreme Court has long held, “what has evolved in our case law [] is the complete
divorcement of unseaworthiness liability from concepts of negligence.”31 Accordingly, the
Court will analyze Thomas’ unseaworthiness claims and negligence claims separately.
i. Unseaworthiness
Defendants posit that, “[t]he mere existence of a raised doorframe in a doorway,
measuring approximately two inches high by three and a half inches wide, does not render
the vessel unseaworthy, especially when it serves to keep the vessel safer.”32 According
to Plaintiff, “the crux of the issue in this case is, instead, indeed whether the doorway was,
‘deficient or in need of repair’ because of the obstruction which existed; the point of fact
is that there are no rules or regulations which require a raised threshold in this location.”33

28

Id.
46 U.S.C. § 30104.
30
Park v. Stockstill Boat Rentals, Inc., 492 F.3d 600, 602-03 (5th Cir. 2007).
31
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499, 91 S.Ct. 514, 517, 27 L.Ed. 2d 562
(1971)(internal citations omitted).
32
Rec. Doc. 17-1, p. 9.
33
Rec. Doc. 20, p. 5 (emphasis original).
29

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In support of their argument, Defendants cite to United States Coast Guard (“USCG”)
Rules and Regulations, as well as the “conventional practices” articulated by the
American Bureau of Shipping (“ABS”) which permit interior thresholds to measure two
inches in height.34 According to Defendants, “[t]he undisputed fact that there are no other
recorded incidents of tripping over this doorway is proof enough that this doorway was
reasonably fit for their purpose and that it did not present an unreasonable risk of harm.”35
To establish her unseaworthiness claim, Thomas “must prove that the [vessel]
owner has failed to provide a vessel…which is reasonably fit and safe for the purposes
for which it is to be used.”36 The Fifth Circuit in Lett v. Omega Protein, Inc. stated, “[a]
vessel can be unseaworthy if its gear [is] defective, its appurtenances [are] in disrepair,
or its crew [is] unfit.”37 The Lett court further held, “[t]o establish causation, a seaman
must prove that the unseaworthy condition played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing the injury and was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the unseaworthiness.”38
Thomas contends that the threshold “may also render the vessel unseaworthy, in
that the [threshold] was not safe for its intended use and the obstruction was a substantial
factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injuries.”39

The evidence before the Court

establishes that the Hercules was a USCG inspected ship.40 The United States Supreme

34

Id. at p. 6.
Id. at p. 9.
36
White v. Fla. Marine Transporters, Inc., 11-cv-1161, 2012 WL 1438268 at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 25,
2012)(quoting Boudreaux v. United States, 280 F.3d 461, 468 (5th Cir. 2002)).
37
487 Fed. Appx. 839, 844 (5th Cir. 2012)(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Usner v. Luckenbach
Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. at 499).
38
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1354 (5th Cir. 1998)).
39
Rec. Doc. 20, pp. 8-9.
40
Rec. Docs. 23-2, 23-3, 23-4.
35

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Court in Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., held “…OSHA’s regulations have been preempted with respect to inspected vessels, because the Coast Guard has broad statutory
authority to regulate the occupational health and safety of seamen aboard inspected
vessels.”41 Thomas provides no evidence that the threshold in question was a violation
of USCG regulations. Instead, Thomas argues, “there are no rules or regulations which
require a raised threshold in this location.”42 The absence of a requirement of a raised
threshold does not render the presence of a raised threshold “defective.”
The Fifth Circuit in In re Cooper/T.Smith held that a plaintiff’s claim for
unseaworthiness could not survive a motion for summary judgment when plaintiff’s only
evidence was her own subjective opinion.43 The summary judgment evidence before the
Court, like the record in In re Cooper, demonstrates that Hercules complied with USCG
regulations. Like the plaintiff in In re Cooper, Thomas presents no evidence, other than
her own opinion, that the threshold was defective and, thus, unseaworthy. Thomas’
subjective opinions that the threshold was defective and unseaworthy fail to create a
genuine issue of material fact. Conclusory, unsupported assertions are insufficient to
create a material issue of fact or defeat a motion for summary judgment.44 Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment of Thomas’ unseaworthiness claim is
GRANTED.

41

534 U.S. 235, 122 S.Ct. 738, 740, 151 L.Ed.2d 659 (2007).
Id. at p. 5.
43
939 F.2d 1073, 1078 (5th Cir. 1991).
44
See, e.g., Clark v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1997)(“Unsupported
allegations or affidavit or deposition testimony setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of
law are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”) Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 44
F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995)(“conclusory allegations unsupported by concreate and particular facts will not
prevent an award of summary judgment”); Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 889 F.2d 1435, 1449 (5th Cir.
1993)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)(summary judgment is appropriate if “nonmoving party
rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation”).
42

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ii. Negligence
The Jones Act allows “[a] seaman injured in the course of employment to sue his
employer for personal injuries suffered as a result of the employer’s negligence.”45
Hercules is held to the standard of care of ordinary prudence under the circumstances.46
The Lett court held:
An employer has a continuing duty to provide a reasonably
safe place to work and to use ordinary care to maintain the
vessel in a reasonably safe condition. Because the amount
of care exercised by a reasonably prudent person varies in
proportion to the danger known to be involved in what is being
done, it follows that the amount of caution required, in the use
of ordinary care, will vary with the nature of what is being
done.47
Thomas’ “burden of proving causation in a Jones Act negligence claim has been deemed
slight, as a seaman must only show that his employer’s negligence is the cause, in whole
or in part, of his injury.”48
Under the Jones Act, “a seamen’s employer is liable for damages if the employer’s
negligence caused the seaman’s injury, in whole or in part.”49 “To prevail in a Jones Act
negligence claim, the plaintiff must present some evidence from which the fact finder can
infer that an unsafe condition existed and that the vessel owner either knew, or in the
exercise of due care should have known, of the condition.”50

45

Lett, 487 Fed. Appx. at 843 (internal quotations omitted)(citing 46 U.S.C. § 30104).
See Id. (internal quotations omitted)(citing Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 338 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
47
Id. (internal citations omitted).
48
Id. (internal citations omitted).
49
Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1997)(en banc).
50
Martinez v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 481 Fed.Appx. 942, 945, 947 (5th Cir. 2012)(citing Perry
v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 528 F.2d 1378, 1379 (5th Cir. 1976)).
46

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Defendants again argue that Thomas’ claim for negligence is “only supported by
her own testimony.”51 Because “there will be no expert testimony to support Plaintiff’s
argument that Hercules was negligent…,”52

Defendants aver they are entitled to

summary judgment. As with her unseaworthiness claim, Thomas’ only support for her
negligence claim is her subjective opinion that the threshold was an unsafe condition.
Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendants knew or should have known of the unsafe
condition. To the contrary, Defendants presented unrefuted summary judgment evidence
that “there are no other recorded incidents of tripping over this doorway”.53 Thomas again
cites no USCG regulation and provides no expert testimony that the threshold presented
an unsafe condition.
The plaintiff in In Re Cooper also asserted a Jones Act negligence claim.

The

Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s negligence claim failed because, as with her
unseaworthiness claim, she provided no evidence, “circumstantial or otherwise,”54 other
than her opinion regarding the vessel owner’s negligence. Like the plaintiff in In Re
Cooper, Thomas has provided no summary judgment evidence other than her own
subjective opinion that the threshold constitutes an unsafe condition and, thus,
Defendants were negligent. Thomas has presented no genuine issue of material fact that
precludes summary judgment on this claim. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
of Thomas’ negligence claim is GRANTED.

51

Rec. Doc. 17-1, p. 10.
Id.
53
Supra, Note 38.
54
In Re Cooper, 939 F.2d at 1078.
52

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C. Maintenance and Cure
The remaining motion before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Maintenance and Cure.55

Defendants pray that “Plaintiff’s claim for

maintenance and cure be dismissed and that the Court determine that Hercules is entitled
to a credit in the amount of $44,237.07 for all maintenance and cure paid to Plaintiff, in
the [event] that a judgment is issued against Hercules.”56 Thomas counters that there are
genuine issues of fact as to whether she intentionally concealed prior injuries and whether
the McCorpen defense applies to the present case.
“Maintenance and cure is a contractual form of compensation afforded by general
maritime law to seamen who fall ill or are injured while in the service of a vessel.”57 The
Fifth Circuit in Brown v. Parker Drilling Offshore Corporation held that, “[a] Jones Act
employer is entitled to investigate a seaman’s claim for maintenance and cure benefits.
An employer is allowed to rely on certain legal defenses to deny these claims.”58 A
defendant may assert the “defense [] that the injured seamen willfully concealed from his
employer a preexisting medical condition”59 – the McCorpen defense. For Defendants to
successfully assert the McCorpen defense, they must show: “(1) the claimant intentionally
misrepresented or concealed medical facts; (2) the non-disclosed facts were material to

55

Rec. Doc. 18.
Rec. Doc. 18-1, p. 18.
57
Jauch v. Nautical Servs., 470 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 2006).
58
410 F.3d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 2005).
59
Id.
56

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the employer’s decision to hire the claimant; and (3) a connection exists between the
withheld information and the injury complained of in the lawsuit.”60
Defendants maintain, and Thomas “does not dispute,”61 that she suffered injuries
in two prior car accidents, and she failed to disclose these prior injuries in her preemployment physical and medical questionnaire. It is Thomas’ position, however, that
there is a material issue of fact as to whether or not she “‘intentionally’ concealed these
minor injuries, which occurred over three years before the time of her application.”62 In
Brown, the Fifth Circuit held that the “intentional concealment element [of the McCorpen
defense] does not require a finding of subjective intent.”63 The Fifth Circuit has held that
the intentional concealment element:
[r]efers to the rule that a seamen may be denied maintenance
and cure for failure to disclose a medical condition only if he
has been asked to reveal it. Failure to disclose medical
information in an interview or questionnaire that is obviously
designed to elicit such information therefore satisfies the
“intentional concealment” requirement.64
When prompted in her Medical Questionnaire about whether she had sustained an injury
or sought medical attention for any physical injuries, Thomas failed to indicate that she
had sought medical attention for the injuries she sustained in 2008 and 2009.65 Thomas’
medical records clearly indicate that she sought medical treatment on both occasions.66
Accordingly, Thomas failed to disclose medical information on the questionnaire that was

60

Id.
Rec. Doc. 21, p. 1.
62
Id. at p.2.
63
Brown, 410 F.3d at 174.
64
Brown, 410 F.3d at 174, citing, Vitcovich v. Ocean Rover O.N 94-cv-35047, 106 F.3d 411, 1997 WL
21205, *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1997).
65
Rec. Doc. 18-23, p. 11.
66
Rec. Docs. 18-16, pp. 1-2, 18-17, 18-20, pp. 1-3, 18-21.
61

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obviously designed to illicit such information. The intentional concealment element of the
McCorpen defense is therefore easily met.
Defendants maintain that Thomas’ previous injuries were material to their hiring
process. Thomas “strongly disputes whether the failure to disclose these minor injuries
was material to [Defendant’s] hiring process, and believes that there are genuine issues
of material fact which preclude summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.”67 In Lett,
the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Brown regarding the second element of the
McCorpen defense:
In Brown, we stated that the fact that an employer asks a
specific medical question on an application, and that the
inquiry is rationally related to the applicant’s physical ability to
perform his job duties renders the information material for the
purpose of this analysis.68
Defendants specifically asked Thomas if she had any injures and sought medical
treatment for said injuries in the questionnaires. Eric Ferguson (“Ferguson”), the Human
Resources director for Hercules, attested:
Hercules requires applicants to disclose prior injuries and/or
diseases to certain body parts in order to form an overall
assessment of whether the prospective employee is capable
of performing the work required of him or her. Had Hercules
been aware of [Thomas’] prior history of injuries, it would have
inquired further concerning her medical history prior to hiring
her.69
The questions regarding Thomas’ prior medical history were posed in order for Hercules
to determine whether she was capable to perform her job; whether Thomas was ultimately
able to perform her job notwithstanding prior undisclosed injuries is not a bar to the

67

Rec. Doc. 21, p. 2.
Lett, 487 Fed.Appx. at 849 (internal citations omitted).
69
Rec. Doc. 18-28, pp. 4-5.
68

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McCorpen defense.70 Considering Ferguson’s uncontroverted affidavit, and the standard
articulated in Brown, the second element of the McCorpen defense is satisfied.
The final element of the McCorpen defense requires a connection between the
withheld information and the injury complained of in the lawsuit. There is documentation
from physicians, as well as Thomas’ own testimony, that she sustained injuries to the
right side of her face, neck, arm, hip, leg, and lower back in the 2008 car accident,71 and
additionally injuries to her left shoulder and cervical area, trapezius, back strain, and neck
pain due to the 2009 accident.72 Thomas now alleges that, as a result of her fall on the
Hercules, she injured her lumbar spine, cervical spine, and right hip.73
The court in Brown found a sufficient causal connection between a pre-existing
lumbar strain and a herniated-disc which was the result of an employment related injury
because it was in the “same region.”74 Hercules is not required to demonstrate that
Thomas’ prior injuries are the sole cause of her present injures.75 Thomas’ argument that
her “vague, low back pain complaints”76 are not causally connected to the alleged present
injuries does not create a material issue. Thomas sought medical treatment due to the
back pain resulting from her prior injuries.77 Unlike the plaintiff in Parker v. Jackup Boat
Service, LLC., a case relied on by Thomas, in this case Defendants presented

70

Brown, 410 F.3d at 175.
Rec. Doc. 18-18, p. 1.
72
Rec. Doc. 18-22, pp. 1-2.
73
Rec. Docs. 18-2, p. 1, 18-5, p. 2.
74
Brown, 410 F.3d at 175.
75
“There is no requirement that a present injury be identical to a previous injury. All that is required is a
causal link between the pre-existing disability that was concealed and the disability incurred during the
voyage.” Brown, 410 F.3d at 176(quoting Quiming v. Int’l Pac. Enters, Ltd., 773 F.Supp. 230, 236 (D. Haw.
1990)).
76
Rec. Doc. 21.
77
Rec. Docs. 18-2, p. 1, 18-5, p. 2.
71

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uncontroverted medical evidence that Thomas sustained prior injuries to the same region
of her body which she claims was injured when she fell on board the Hercules.78

The

summary judgment evidence establishes a causal connection sufficient to satisfy the third
prong of the McCorpen defense. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Maintenance and Cure is GRANTED.79
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons assigned, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

Liability80 is GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

Maintenance and Cure81 is GRANTED.
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Maintenance and Cure is
DENIED as moot, 82 and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike83 and Motion for Expedited Hearing84
are each DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on July 26, 2017.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

78

542 F.Supp. 2d 481, 493 (E.D. La. 2008); See also, Rec. Docs. 18-2, p. 1, 18-5, p. 2.
Rec. Doc. 18.
80
Rec. Doc. 17.
81
Rec. Doc. 18.
82
Rec. Doc. 34.
83
Rec. Doc. 35.
84
Rec. Doc. 36.
79

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