Mitchell v. Shaw Power Services, LLC
Filing
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RULING AND ORDER granting 2 Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternate Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Shaw Power Services, LLC. The above-captioned matter brought by Plaintiff Kendall Mitchell is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 6/11/2015. (LLH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KENDALL MITCHELL
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
SHAW POWER SERVICES, LLC
NO.: 15-00184-BAJ-RLB
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 2) filed by Defendant Shaw Power Services, LLC
(“Shaw”), seeking to dismiss all claims of Plaintiff Kendall Mitchell1 as time-barred
or, in the alternative, as failing to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Mitchell has filed no opposition to Shaw’s motion. The Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. For reasons explained fully herein, Shaw’s
motion is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
On September 16, 2014, Mitchell filed a petition in the Nineteenth Judicial
District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in which he alleged a claim
of employment discrimination in violation of the
Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law (“LEDL”), La. R.S. 23:301, et seq. (Doc. 1-1). After being
Shaw notes that its records indicate that Plaintiff’s first name is “Kindell,” although the state court
petition spells it as “Kendall.” This Court’s docket reflects the spelling used in the petition.
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granted leave by the state court, Mitchell filed an amended petition,2 adding a claim
of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”). (Doc. 1-2 at p. 3). Shaw timely removed the matter to this Court. (See Doc. 1
at p. 2).
According to the petition, Mitchell was “passed over” for job promotions while
employed at Shaw. Specifically, Mitchell claims that he applied and was
interviewed for the position of Transaction Process Manager I between January
2012 and October 2012. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 8). He was then denied entry into the
position, and he contends that “a white male with lesser experience was
immediately hired after being interviewed.” (Id.). Mitchell asserts that, during the
entirety of his employment with Shaw, “his ability to perform his daily assigned job
duties was not diminished. He was constantly commended by immediate and other
supervisors on his job performance. His experience and knowledge . . . held him in
good steady [sic] to be a candidate for the position offered.” (Id. at ¶ 9).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6)
tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8,
which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Because the amended petition expressly incorporates the original petition, Mitchell’s original
petition retains legal effect. See Canal Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 625 F.3d 244, 246 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010)
(King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994)) (amended complaint supersedes original complaint
and renders it of no legal effect “unless amended complaint specifically refers to and adopts or
incorporates by reference the earlier pleading” (emphasis added)).
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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]
. . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Facial plausibility exists “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678
(Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Hence, the complaint need not set out “detailed factual
allegations,” but something “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. When conducting its inquiry, the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true
and views those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bustos v. Martini
Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court generally “must limit itself to the
contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto.” See Collins v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Where matters outside the
pleadings are presented and not excluded by the Court, the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on
file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(c). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine
issues of material fact in dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The Court views “the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant,
drawing all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor.” Riverwood Int'l Corp.
v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
LEDL Claim
Shaw seeks to dismiss with prejudice Mitchell’s LEDL claim as time-barred
under Louisiana law. Shaw argues that the one-year prescriptive period on his
LEDL claim would have extended to, at the latest, April or May of 2014. Mitchell
did not file suit until September 2014.
Mitchell’s LEDL claim is subject to a prescriptive period of one year, which
may be suspended up to six months during the pendency of administrative review
or investigation of the claim conducted by the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights.
See La. R.S. 23:303(D). The prescriptive period commences at the time the failure to
promote occurs. Sinegal v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., No. CIV.A. 04CV-1188, 2006 WL 15403, at *7 (W.D. La. Jan. 4, 2006). Here, the face of the
petition does not contain a specific date or time frame in which Shaw failed to
promote Mitchell, i.e., when the Transaction Process Manager position was filled by
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somebody else. The Court is thus inclined to convert Shaw’s instant motion into a
motion for summary judgment, for which it may consider extra-pleading material.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has advised that “[w]hen the
extra-pleading material is comprehensive and will enable a rational determination
of a summary judgment motion, the court is likely to accept it, [but] when it is
scanty, incomplete, or inconclusive, the court will probably reject it.” Isquith ex rel.
Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., 847 F.3d 186, 194 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) (5 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 (1969)). Here, Shaw has attached a
declaration by Shaw’s Senior Accounting Manager, Suzan LaFleur, who interviewed
candidates, including Mitchell, for the Transaction Processing Manager position at
issue. (See Doc. 2-2). LaFleur declares, under penalty of perjury, that the successful
candidate for the Transaction Processing Manager position was offered the position
“on about November 5 and started work in this position on about November 19,
2012.” (Id. at ¶ 7). Particularly in light of the fact that Mitchell has filed no
opposition to Shaw’s instant motion, the Court finds that LaFleur’s declaration is
comprehensive and enables a rational determination of a summary judgment
motion. Accordingly, failure to promote Mitchell and the commencement of the
prescriptive period occurred, at the latest, on November 19, 2012.
“A defendant seeking to invoke the defense of prescription bears the initial
burden of proving that prescription has occurred; if the defendant shows that the
time delay has passed between the tortious act and the filing of a lawsuit, then the
burden shifts to plaintiff to prove that an exception to prescription applies.” Sinegal,
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2006 WL 15403, at *7. Mitchell has not asserted any exception to the standard oneyear duration of the prescriptive period. Even if the Court were to afford Mitchell
the maximum six-month period of suspension available under Louisiana law during
the pendency of administrative review or investigation by the EEOC, the
prescriptive period would end eighteen months after November 19, 2012, on May
19, 2014.
Mitchell filed suit in the instant matter in state court on September 16, 2014.
(See Doc. 1-1 at p. 3). Here, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
regarding the date of the failure to promote and the date of the lawsuit’s filing. The
petition was filed nearly four months after the maximum prescriptive period
available for Mitchell’s LEDL claim. Hence, Shaw is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the LEDL claim, and the claim shall be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
B.
Title VII Claim
Similarly, Shaw argues that Mitchell’s Title VII claim should also be
dismissed with prejudice as time-barred. Title VII claims must be filed within
ninety days of a plaintiff's receipt of the notice of right to sue. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1). The ninety-day period begins to run “on the date the EEOC right-to-sue is
delivered to the offices of formally designated counsel or the claimant.” Ringgold v.
Nat'l Maint. Corp., 796 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir.1986). When the exact date of receipt
of a right-to-sue letter is disputed or unknown, courts presume that the claimant
received it between three and seven days after it was mailed. Taylor v. Books A
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Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1200 (2003).
The Fifth Circuit has held that the ninety-day statutory period is strictly construed.
See id.
Here, Shaw has attached a copy of the right-to-sue letter sent by the EEOC to
Mitchell. (See Doc. 2-4). Because this is extra-pleading material that is
comprehensive and will enable a rational determination of a summary judgment
motion, the Court also considers Shaw’s instant motion to be a summary judgment
motion for the purposes of evaluating Mitchell’s Title VII claim.
The right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, titled a “Dismissal and Notice of
Rights” and addressed to Mitchell, explicitly states that it is the only notice of
dismissal, and that any lawsuit filed in federal or state court must be brought
within ninety days upon receipt of notice. (Doc. 2-4). The letter was mailed on July
1, 2014. (Id.). With no evidence presented offering a precise date of receipt, the
Court presumes, then, that Mitchell received the letter no later than seven days
after, on July 8, 2014. Mitchell would have then had ninety days, or until October
26, 2014 to file his federal claim.
Mitchell filed his original petition in state court in September 2014 asserting
an LEDL claim. It was not until February 2015, however, that Mitchell amended
his petition to assert the Title VII claim on the same underlying facts. (See Doc. 12). Thus, Mitchell’s Title VII claim will be found timely filed only if the amended
petition relates back to the date of the original petition.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B) provides that an amended
pleading may relate back to the date of the original pleading where “the amendment
asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” The Federal Rules,
however, only apply to a civil action after removal from state court. Fed. R. Civ. P.
81(c)(1). Here, where Mitchell’s pleading amendment occurred prior to removal, the
state’s relation-back statute applies to determine whether the amended petition
filed in state court relates back to the date of his original petition. See Taylor v.
Bailey Tool Mfg. Co., 744 F.3d 944, 947 (5th Cir. 2014). Louisiana law on the
relation back of pleadings arising out of the same conduct mirrors that of the
Federal Rules. See La. C.C.P. art. 1153 (“When the action or defense asserted in the
amended petition or answer arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of filing the original pleading.”).
Here, both Mitchell’s LEDL and Title VII claims arise from the same set of
facts. Louisiana courts, however, have held that a claim cannot relate back to a
claim that has prescribed. “In order for a second amended petition to relate back,
the original petition must have been timely filed.” Raymond v. Orleans Parish Sch.
Bd., 856 So. 2d 27, 31 (La. Ct. App. 2003). See also Ford v. Murphy Oil, U.S.A., Inc.,
710 So. 2d 235, 235 (La. 1997) (“Because these amended pleadings will relate back
to the originally filed petition, prescription of the individual claims will not be an
issue provided that the original petition was timely filed.” (emphasis added)); Estate
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of Ehrhardt v. Jefferson Parish Fire Dep't, 108 So. 3d 1223, 1232 (La. Ct. App. 2013)
(“[B]ecause the 2009 claim is prescribed, the 2011 claim cannot relate back to that
prescribed claim under LSA–C.C.P. art. 1153.”).
Here, there is no genuine dispute that Mitchell failed to assert his Title VII
claim within the ninety-day statutory period after he received notice of his right to
sue. With the Court having found supra that Mitchell’s LEDL claim is prescribed,
Mitchell cannot salvage his Title VII claim by relating it back to his LEDL claim.
Shaw is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Title VII claim, and the
claim shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 2) filed by Defendant Shaw Power
Services, LLC is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned matter brought by
Plaintiff Kendall Mitchell is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 11th day of June, 2015.
_____________________________________
BRIAN A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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