Thomas v. Gullotta et al

Filing 85

RULING: The 81 Motion for Reconsideration filed on behalf of Defendants, Plaquemine Police Chief Orian Gulotta, the City of Plaquemine, and Plaquemine Police Officer John Little, in his individual capacity is hereby granted. Plaintiff Thomas Gulotta's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 individual capacity claim against Officer Little for false arrest/false imprisonment under the Fourth/Fourteenth Amendments and state law claim of false imprisonment arising out of Thomas' March 9, 2015 a rrest for resisting an officer are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's state law claims of respondeat superior and vicarious liability against the City of Plaquemine and Plaquemine Police Chief Orian Gulotta based upon Thomas' March 9, 2015 arrest for resisting an officer, are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 7/9/2018. (KAH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MAURICE THOMAS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
NO. 15-00435-JWD-RLB
ORIAN GULOTTA, ET AL.

RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration filed on behalf of Defendants,
Plaquemine Police Chief Orian Gulotta, the City of Plaquemine, and Plaquemine Police Officer
John Little, in his individual capacity. (collectively “Defendants”).1 Plaintiff Maurice Thomas
(“Plaintiff” or “Thomas”) has filed an Opposition.2 For the following reasons, the Defendants’
Motion shall be granted.
I.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE3
On June 14, 2018, the Court issued a Ruling granting in part and denying in part

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.4 The Court granted the Defendants’ Motion on all of
Thomas’ remaining claims against the Defendants arising out of his July 5, 2014 arrest, after
finding that these claims had been released pursuant to a March 24, 2015 Settlement Agreement
and were barred by res judicata. The Court also found that Heck v. Humphrey barred some of the
Plaintiff’s claims arising out of his March 9, 2015 arrest for cruelty to animals (simple and
aggravated) and possession of a Schedule I CDS. The Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s
42 U.S.C. § 1983 individual capacity claim against Officer Little for false arrest and false

1

Doc. 81.
Doc. 84.
3
On January 26, 2017, the Court issued a Ruling dismissing certain claims against the Defendants on Rule 12(b)(6)
grounds. Doc. 64. This Ruling is not the subject of the Defendants’ pending Motion.
4
Doc. 79.   
2

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imprisonment under the Fourth/Fourteenth Amendments, state law claim of false imprisonment,
and state law claims of respondeat superior and vicarious liability against the City and the Chief
of Police that were premised his cruelty to animals and possession of Schedule I CDS charges.
However, the Court denied the Defendants’ Motion on Thomas’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 individual
capacity claim against Officer Little for false arrest/false imprisonment under the
Fourth/Fourteenth Amendments, state law claim of false imprisonment, and state law claims of
respondeat superior and vicarious liability against the City and Chief of Police based on his
resisting an officer charges arising out of his March 9, 2015 arrest. Unlike his other claims, the
Court found that Thomas’ claims based on his resisting an officer charges were not barred by Heck
v. Humphrey.
On June 20, 2018, the Defendants filed the instant motion urging the Court to reconsider
its June 14, 2018 Ruling to the extent it denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment based
upon Thomas’ March 9, 2015 arrest charges of resisting an officer. In his Opposition, Plaintiff
has failed to address the Defendants’ arguments; instead, he focuses on his charges arising out of
his July 5, 2014 arrest, which is not the subject of the instant Motion.5
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
“Rule 54(b) allows parties to seek reconsideration of interlocutory orders and authorizes

the district court to ‘revise[ ] at any time’ ‘any order or other decision . . . [that] does not end the
action.’”6 Recently in Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., the Fifth Circuit made clear that Rule 54(b) and

5
Plaintiff’s argument also consists of a reassertion of his prior summary judgment arguments strictly related to his
July 5, 2014 arrest. Doc. 84. (“The following argument was previously submitted in our prior submission and are
being resubmitted for the Court to reconsider.” Doc. 84, p. 1). Although Plaintiff asserts that his arrest occurred on
July 3, 2014 in his Opposition, the record evidence shows that the actual date of his arrest was July 5, 2014. Doc. 736, p. 3.  
6
Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017)(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b))(per curiam).

2

Rule 59(e) require distinct analyses.7 “Under Rule 54(b), ‘the trial court is free to reconsider and
reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an
intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law.’”8 The stricter Rule 59(e), however,
only applies to the reconsideration of final judgments. The Austin court, adopting language from
the D.C. Circuit, contrasted Rule 54(b) with Rule 59(e) as follows:
Rule 59(e), understandably, sets a high threshold for parties to raise a new argument
for the first time after judgment has already been entered . . . In contrast, Rule
54(b)’s approach to the interlocutory presentation of new arguments as the case
evolves can be more flexible, reflecting the ‘inherent power of the rendering district
court to afford such relief from interlocutory judgments as justice requires.’9
Because the Defendants move the Court to reconsider the denial of their summary
judgement motion on charges of resisting an officer—an interlocutory order that “adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties [and] does not end
the action as to any of the claims or parties”—the proper analysis is under Rule 54(b).10 As this
Court has previously explained, “district courts have considerable discretion in deciding whether
to reconsider an interlocutory order.”11
Defendants assert that the Court’s June 14, 2018 Ruling should be altered or amended
because it contains a manifest error of law. In particular, Defendants argue that because probable
cause existed for two of Thomas’ charges arising out of his March 9, 2015 arrest, then pursuant to
Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, the entire arrest was supported by probable cause; therefore, Thomas’
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for false arrest based on his charges of resisting an officer must be

7

Id. at 336. (finding that district court abused its discretion by applying stricter Rule 59(e) analysis instead of the more
flexible Rule 54(b) analysis).
8
Id. (quoting Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
9
Id. at 336-37 (quoting Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
10
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
11
Swoboda v. Manders, Civil Action No. 14-19, 2016 WL 1611477, *4 (M.D.La. Apr. 21, 2016)(citing Stewart v.
Gautreaux, Civil Action No. 12-00594, 2014 WL 46638, at *2 (M.D.La. Mar. 13, 2014)).

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dismissed.12 In the “interest of finality and [the] conservation of judicial resources,” the Court
shall exercise its broad discretion and grant the Defendants’ Motion for the following reasons.13
It is undisputed that on March 9, 2015, Thomas was charged with cruelty to animals (simple
and aggravated), Possession of a Schedule I CDS, and 4 counts of resisting an officer. Thomas
entered guilty pleas to simple cruelty to animals and Possession of Schedule II CDS—as of this
date, these convictions still stand. According to the Fifth Circuit decision, Wells v. Bonner, the
fact that Thomas was also charged with 4 counts of resisting an officer but never convicted of these
charges is "insignificant” in determining whether Thomas has a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for
unconstitutional arrest.14 The Wells court explained that “[t]he claim for false arrest does not cast
its primary focus on the validity of each individual charge; instead, [the court’s] focus [is] on the
validity of the arrest. If there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest
was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.”15
Applying Wells to the case at hand, in order for Thomas to establish that his false arrest
claim based upon his charges of resisting an officer, he must show that there was no probable cause
to arrest him for any of the charges on March 9, 2015. Ultimately this would require Thomas to
offer evidence showing that his convictions for simple cruelty to animals and possession of
Schedule II CDS have been invalidated.16 Consequently, Heck v. Humphrey dictates that Thomas'
claim for false arrest is not cognizable in the absence of the invalidation of Thomas' convictions
for simple cruelty to animals and possession of Schedule II CDS, which the undisputed evidence

12

The Court notes that Defendants never raised this argument in their Memorandum in Support of their Motion for
Summary Judgment or in their Reply.
13
Williams v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., Civil Action No. 14-382, 2016 WL 9384349, at *2 (M.D.La. Mar.
31, 2016)(quoting Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
14
Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995). 
15
Id. (emphasis original).
16
Id. (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)).

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shows has not occurred.17 Because there was probable cause for Thomas’ March 9, 2015 arrest,
the Court finds that Thomas’ remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Officer Little for false
arrest/false imprisonment under the Fourth/Fourteenth Amendments for the charges of resisting an
officer is barred by Heck and shall be dismissed.
Thomas has also failed to raise any argument regarding the applicability of Heck’s
favorable termination rule to his parallel state law claim for false imprisonment pertaining to his
March 9, 2015 arrest charges for resisting an officer.18 Therefore the Court finds that Thomas has
“waived any argument that his state-law claims should be addressed apart from Heck.”19
Considering that a successful ruling on Thomas’ state law claims for false imprisonment would
undermine his convictions for simple cruelty to animals and possession of Schedule II CDS, his
state law claim of false imprisonment based upon his resisting an officer charges are also barred
by Heck.

Accordingly, Thomas’ remaining respondeat superior and vicarious liability claims

against the City and the Chief of Police arising out of his March 9, 2015 arrest must also be
dismissed.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Reconsideration filed on behalf of Defendants,

Plaquemine Police Chief Orian Gulotta, the City of Plaquemine, and Plaquemine Police Officer
John Little, in his individual capacity is hereby granted.20
It is hereby ordered that Plaintiff Thomas Gulotta’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 individual capacity
claim against Officer Little for false arrest/false imprisonment under the Fourth/Fourteenth

17

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
Again, as previously noted, Thomas has failed to raise any argument in his Opposition that relates to his March 9,
2015 arrest.
19
Elphage v. Gautreaux, 969 F.Supp.2d 493, 515 (M.D.La. Sept. 3, 2013)(quoting Thomas v. La. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
406 Fed.Appx. 890, 898 (5th Cir. 2010)(citation omitted)(unpublished). 
20
Doc. 81.
18

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Amendments and state law claim of false imprisonment arising out of Thomas’ March 9, 2015
arrest for resisting an officer are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s state law claims of respondeat superior and vicarious
liability against the City of Plaquemine and Plaquemine Police Chief Orian Gulotta based upon
Thomas’ March 9, 2015 arrest for resisting an officer, are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 9, 2018.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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