Courteaux v. Union Pacific Railroad Company et al

Filing 32

RULING: The Defendants Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. As Plaintiffs only claims are for mental anguish/suffering, Plaintiffs claims are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 03/16/2016. (ELW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NICHOLAS COURTEAUX

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

15-530-SDD-EWD

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CORPORATION,
KINDER MORGAN G.P., INC., KINDER
MORGAN ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P.,
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORPORATION,
CHESAPEAKE OPERATING, L.L.C., AND
EARTHSTONE OPERATING, LLC
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants,
Union Pacific Railroad Company and Union Pacific Railroad Corporation (“Union
Pacific”),1 Kinder Morgan G.P., Inc. and Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. (“Kinder
Morgan”),2 Chesapeake Energy Corporation and Chesapeake Operating, L.L.C.
(“Chesapeake”),3 and Earthstone Operating, LLC (“Earthstone”)4 or collectively “the
Defendants.” Plaintiff, Nicholas Courteaux (“Plaintiff”), has filed an Opposition5 to each
motion, to which all Defendants have filed Replies.6 For the reasons which follow, the
Court finds that the Defendants’ motions should be granted.

1

Rec. Doc. No. 11.
Rec. Doc. No. 16.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 5.
4
Rec. Doc. No. 10.
5
Rec. Doc. Nos. 15, 20, 26, & 28.
6
Rec. Doc. Nos. 23, 27, 29, & 30.
2

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I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a train accident which occurred in De Soto Parish,

Louisiana, on February 16, 2015. A Union Pacific freight train collided with a Dodge Ram
pickup truck that had stopped on the railroad tracks. The three occupants of the pickup
truck were killed. At the time of the collision, Plaintiff had crossed the tracks in his vehicle
and viewed the collision from his own truck. Plaintiff has alleged that, on the date of the
accident, four trucks were returning from lunch and traveling in procession on a private
drive on their way to a pipeline job site.7 The private drive is accessed from LA Hwy 5.
Approximately 70 feet from the highway turnoff is a private railroad crossing, and 85 feet
beyond the railroad crossing is a cattle guard, fence, and locked gate.8 The Complaint
alleges that the gate was interlocked with locks from Kinder Morgan, Chesapeake, and
Earthstone.9 Plaintiff was alleged to be in the third truck of this processional. Plaintiff
contends that his truck and the first two trucks had crossed the train tracks and were
waiting for the gate to be opened, while the fourth truck was stopped on the train tracks.10
Shortly thereafter, a Union Pacific freight train collided with the stopped truck and all three
occupants were killed.11
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking damages for the mental anguish he has suffered
from witnessing this accident. Plaintiff alleges that he “witnessed and felt the impact of

7

Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 21.
Id. at ¶ 22.
9
Id. at ¶ 23.
10
Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.
11
Id. at ¶¶ 24-27.
8

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the collision,”12 and that the “violent collision behind him” caused him to “fear for his own
personal safety.”13 Plaintiff further contends that he has suffered “severe and disabling
and debilitating and foreseeable emotional distress and mental anguish” as a result of
“witnessing the Collision and participating in the accident and aftermath.”14 Plaintiff
contends he “was involved to a reasonable degree, in proximity and time, in the
collision,”15 and that the collision and its aftermath “presented an especial likelihood of
genuine and serious mental distress and arose from the special circumstances which
serve as a guarantee that plaintiff’s claims are not spurious.”16
Plaintiff contends Kinder Morgan, Chesapeake, and Earthstone were negligent in
locking the gate, failing to provide adequate warning-signal devices, and/or creating a
hazard with the locked gate unaccompanied by warnings. Plaintiff claims these three
Defendants created an unsafe entry way onto the property and an unsafe railroad
crossing.17 Plaintiff asserts numerous allegations of negligence against Union Pacific,
including, inter alia, inadequate audible or visual warning, train operations, failure to repair
and inspect an unsafe crossing, and failure to report unsafe conditions.18
All of the Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6),
arguing that this Plaintiff does not have a legally cognizable claim under the law as he
does not meet the bystander exception set forth in Article 2315.6 of the Louisiana Civil

12

Id. at ¶ 28.
Id.
14
Id. at ¶ 29.
15
Id. at ¶ 30.
16
Id. at ¶ 31.
17
Id.at ¶¶ 77-81.
18
Id. at ¶¶ 33-55.
13

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Code, he was not a participant in the accident as set forth by applicable jurisprudence,
and they owed no duty to this Plaintiff under applicable law.
II.

LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-

pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”19 The
Court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into
the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”20 “To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”21 In Twombly, the United States Supreme
Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”22 A complaint is also insufficient if it
merely “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”23 However,
“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the

19
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Martin v. Eby Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
20
Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).
21
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area
Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d at 467).
22
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal citations and brackets
omitted)(hereinafter Twombly).
23
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(internal citations
omitted)(hereinafter “Iqbal”).

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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”24 In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than
a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.”25 “Furthermore, while the
court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable
to the plaintiff.’”26 On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”27
B. Participant
Plaintiff concedes that he cannot bring a bystander claim as he is not an
enumerated person set forth in Article 2315.6,28 which allows recovery for mental anguish
or emotional distress to a specific class of persons who witness or come upon the scene
of an event causing injury to another. Plaintiff’s claims are based wholly on his contention
that he was a participant in this accident/collision under the law.

24

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
26
Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, No. H-11-2060, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (quoting Southland Sec.
Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).
27
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d
209 (1986)).
28
A. The following persons who view an event causing injury to another person, or who come upon the
scene of the event soon thereafter, may recover damages for mental anguish or emotional distress that
they suffer as a result of the other person's injury:
(1) The spouse, child or children, and grandchild or grandchildren of the injured person, or either the
spouse, the child or children, or the grandchild or grandchildren of the injured person.
(2) The father and mother of the injured person, or either of them.
(3) The brothers and sisters of the injured person or any of them.
(4) The grandfather and grandmother of the injured person, or either of them.
B. To recover for mental anguish or emotional distress under this Article, the injured person must suffer
such harm that one can reasonably expect a person in the claimant's position to suffer serious mental
anguish or emotional distress from the experience, and the claimant's mental anguish or emotional distress
must be severe, debilitating, and foreseeable. Damages suffered as a result of mental anguish or emotional
distress for injury to another shall be recovered only in accordance with this Article.
25

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Generally, a defendant will not be held liable under Louisiana law where its conduct
is merely negligent and causes only emotional injury unaccompanied by physical injury
as outlined in Moresi v. State, Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.29 In Moresi, the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff could recover for mental
disturbances caused by a defendant's ordinary negligence when the mental disturbance
was unaccompanied by physical injury, illness, or other physical consequences.30 The
court refused to allow recovery for mental anguish absent a physical injury except in
“special circumstances.”31 Only where there is an “especial likelihood of genuine and
serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a
guarantee that the claim is not spurious,” will recovery be permitted.32
Louisiana courts have identified only four instances in which recovery is allowed
for mental anguish without physical injury.33 These instances all involve “the especial
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances,
which serve as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious.”34 These four circumstances
are discussed below.
First, a plaintiff may recover damages for a defendant's infliction of emotional
distress based on a separate tort involving physical consequences to the person or

29
Molden v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 465 F.Supp.2d 606, 614 (M.D. La. 2006), citing Moresi v. State,
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1081, 1096 (La.1990). See also Bonnette v. Conoco, Inc.,
837 So.2d 1219, 1235 (2003).
30
Id., citing Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1095.
31
Id., quoting Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1096.
32
Id., quoting Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1096.
33
Id.
34
Id.,quoting Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1096.

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property of the plaintiff, such as an assault or a battery, false imprisonment, trespass to
land, nuisance or the invasion of the person's right to privacy.35 Second, a defendant's
intentional infliction of emotional distress will also support an award for mental anguish
damages.36 Third, when the plaintiff is a direct participant in the accident causing the
emotional injury, and the defendant owes a direct, specific statutory duty to the plaintiff
to refrain from the specific conduct that causes the accident, damages for the infliction of
emotional distress may be awarded, even absent physical injury.37 Finally, a bystander
may recover an award for infliction of emotional distress where the bystander either views
the accident or injury causing event or comes upon the accident before a substantial
change.38
When a plaintiff does not fall into one of the above four categories, the plaintiff
must prove the “claim is not spurious by showing a particular likelihood of genuine and
serious mental distress arising from special circumstances.”39 If the plaintiff is unable to
meet this standard, recovery for mental distress is not allowed absent physical injury.
Plaintiff claims that he was a participant in the accident and cites Dumas v. Angus
Chemical Company40 in support of his position. In a case involving toxic exposure after
an explosion at a fertilizer plant, the Dumas court held that: “Regardless of whether
recovery is premised on ‘participation’ or an ‘ordeal in progress,’ the inquiry remains

35

Id., citing Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1095.
Id., quoting White v. Monsanto, 585 So.2d at 1209.
37
Id. at 614-615, citing Clomon v. Monroe City School Board, 572 So.2d 571, 586 (La.1990); Guillory v.
Arceneaux, 580 So.2d 990 (La.App. 3 Cir.1991), writ denied, 587 So.2d 694 (La.1991)(emphasis added).
38
Id. at 615, citing Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So.2d 559, 570 (La.1990).
39
Id., quoting Bonnette v. Conoco, Inc., 837 So.2d at 1235.
40
31,400 (2d Cir. 1/11/99), 728 So.2d 441.
36

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whether the claimant was ‘involved’ to a reasonable degree [proximity in time and
distance] in the event causing harm.”41

Plaintiff contends that the Defendants’

interpretations of “participant” are narrower than it is defined by jurisprudence. Plaintiff
further claims that he was “involved in the accident to a reasonable degree [proximity in
time and distance]”42 such that he was a participant under the law.
The Court finds that Plaintiff is not a “participant” as defined by Louisiana
jurisprudence. First, the Court notes that the allegations in Plaintiff’s case are conclusory
in that the allegations recite the necessary language for participation without any
underlying factual support. Second, nowhere does Plaintiff allege that he had to move to
get out of the way of the oncoming train. He was clearly not in the vehicle that was struck.
Witnessing a fatal accident, even in close proximity, does not render one a direct
participant in the accident. Under Plaintiff’s overly broad interpretation, the passengers
of any vehicles within one or two cars of any collision, or close enough to a traffic accident
to feel any impact, could bring a claim for mental anguish or negligent infliction of
emotional distress. This would lead to an absurd result.
Moreover, while Plaintiff has alleged in his Complaint that the collision “presented
an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress and arose from the special
circumstances which serve as a guarantee that plaintiff’s claims are not spurious,”43

41

Id. at 448.
Rec. Doc. No. 15, p. 4.
43
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 31.
42

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Plaintiff has alleged no factual support for such a claim nor has he identified the alleged
special circumstances in this case.
The cases Plaintiff cites in support of his position are also easily distinguishable
from the facts of this case. The plaintiff in Pourciau v. Allstate Insurance Company had
to swerve and fall to the ground to avoid the vehicle that struck and killed her friend with
whom plaintiff had been roller skating.44 The plaintiff in Guillory v. Arceneaux45 actually
ran over a victim who was lying in the road after having been struck by a different vehicle.
The plaintiff in Carroll v. State Farm Insurance Co.46 was allowed to recover for mental
anguish suffered during an ordeal in progress when a boat became airborne and passed
directly over her head. In Carroll, the court noted that the plaintiff, who was nearly
decapitated, “had to lean over to prevent the motor’s propeller from slashing into her
head.”47
The facts alleged by the Plaintiff are not analogous to any of the factual
circumstances in the above-cited cases. In the present case, the Plaintiff did not strike
anything with his vehicle nor was his vehicle struck, he did not fall to the ground, he made
no bodily contact with the train or any other vehicle, and he did not have to take any action
to avoid the train or get out of the path of the oncoming train. No amount of artful pleading
of legal “buzzwords” changes the fact that Plaintiff’s allegations only confirm that he was

44

98-473 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/17/98), 712 So.2d 250, reversed in part and remanded, 98-1129 (La. 4/29/1998),
805 So.2d 184. Defendant Earthstone erroneously argues that the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the
lower court’s holding that the plaintiff had a right of action; in fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff’s daughter was not one of the classes of persons who could recover under Article 2315.6.
45
580 So.2d 990 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1991).
46
427 So.2d 24 (La.App.3 Cir.1983).
47
Id. at 26.

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a bystander and not a participant in this tragic accident. Further, having found that the
Plaintiff was not a participant in this case, the Court need not address whether the
Defendants owed a particular duty to this Plaintiff since both participation and duty are
required for recovery.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss48 are

GRANTED. As Plaintiff’s only claims are for mental anguish/suffering, Plaintiff’s claims
are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on March 16, 2016.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

48

Rec. Doc. Nos. 5, 10, 11, & 16.

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