Hall v. Louisiana Workforce Commission et al

Filing 29

RULING and ORDER: Defendants' 8 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's FMLA claim, Title VII disparate impact claim, and request for punitive damages against the Louisiana Workforce Commission; Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for violation of the FMLA against Wes Hataway, Bryce Tomlin, and Nakesla Blount; and Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for intentional employment discrim ination against Wes Hataway and Nakesla Blount. It is DENIED as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for intentional employment discrimination against Bryce Tomlin. Plaintiff's claims against Louisiana Workforce Commission, pursuant to the ADA, FMLA, Title VII disparate impact, La. R.S. § 23:301 et seq., La. R.S. § 23:967, and La. R. S. § 23:314, as well as punitive damages, are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's claims against Bryce Tomlin, in his individual and official capacity, pursuant to the ADA, and in his individual capacity, pursuant to § 1983 for violation of the FMLA, are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's claims against Wes Hataway, in his individual capacity, pursuant to § 1983 for violation of the FMLA and intentional employment discrimination, are DISMISSED. Defendant, Nakesla Blount, is DISMISSED from this action. Signed by Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson on 4/29/2016. (BLR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKEISHA HALL

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
LOUISIANA WORKFORCE
COMMISSION, ET AL.

NO.: 15-00533-BAJ-RLB

RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 8), filed by Defendants Louisiana Workforce
Commission, Wes Hataway, Bryce Tomlin, and Nakesla Blount (collectively,
"Defendants"). Defendants seek an order from this Court pursuant to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure ("Rules") 12(b)(1) a nd 12(b)(6), dismissing some of Pla intiff
Lakeisha Ha ll's ("Plaintiff') claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. An opposition was filed by Plaintiff, (Doc. 21), and a reply was filed by
Defendants, (Doc. 24). Jurisdiction is proper pursuan t to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Ora l
argument is not necessary.

I.

BACKGROUND
This action arises out of Plaintiffs termination from t he Louisiana Workforce

Commission ("LWC") on July 14, 20 14. Plaintiff alleges t h at she was terminated as a
result of her pregnancy and her pregnancy related absences. (Doc. 4 at

~

14). She

began her full-time, probationary employment with the LWC in 2012, where she
worked in the Office of Workers' Compensation Administration. (Id . at~~ 12- 14). At
all relevant t imes, Plaintiff alleges that Bryce Tomlin ("Tomlin") was her direct

supervisor , Wes Hataway ("Hataway") was th e Director of the

Workers'

Compensation Administration, and Nakesla Blount ("Blount") was the Human
Resources Manager. (Id. at , [ 15).
Plaintiff claims that her pregnancy began around June 1, 2014. (Id. at ,[ 4).
She alleges that she informed Tomlin of her pregnancy around June 23, 2014. (Id. at
~

26). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that she started suffering from "morning

sickness," which r esulted in multiple absences and late arrivals to work. (Id. at
30A).

~

P la intiff a lleges that Tomlin informed her that her absences would be

considered unexcused, and fa iled to advise her that she may be eligible for leave
under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). (ld.).
On July 10, 2014, Plaintiff alleges t hat Tomlin implemented a Supervisory
Pla n to help improve her attendance due to her leave balance being low as a res ult of
h er pre gnancy. (Id.

at ~ ~

31, 33). According to Plaintiff, she was instructed that sh e

would not receive approval on annual and compensatory leave requests until she
significantly improved her attendance, but she was permitte d to use a nnual leave for
medical appointme nts if it was qualified leave under the FMLA. (Id. at

~ ,1

31, 32).

The next day, Friday July 11, 2014, Plaintiff a lleges that she used previously
approved leave to attend her first prenatal appointment. (Id. at

~

35). When she

returned to work on Monday July 14, 2014, Plaintiff alleges that Tomlin gave her a
Notice of Separation. (Id . at

~

36). P laintiff a lleges that she subsequen tly met with

Hataway and Blount about her termination. (Id. at ,[ 39). During the meeting,
Plaintiff alleges that Hataway seemed surprised to learn about t he termination, but
conveyed t hat Tomlin informed him that she "would not be a good fit" based on the
2

Supervisory Pla n meeting. (Id. at ,[ 38). Plaintiff a lleges that Blount falsely
represented that management was considering the Supervisory Plan before Plaintiff
disclosed her pregnancy. (ld.

at~

39).

Plaintiff filed the instant action on August 12, 2015, pursuant to the following
federal s tatutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S. C. § 2000e et
seq. ; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"); Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101, et seq.; and the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §2601 et seq. Pla intiff a lso alleges t he
following state law claims : Louisia na Employme nt Discrimination Law ("LEDL"), La.
R.S. § 23:30 1 et seq.; La. R.S. § 23:967; and La. R.S. § 23:314. Pur su ant to Rules
12(b)(6) a nd 12(b)(1), Defendants now seek to dismiss some of Pla intiffs claims on
the grounds of Eleventh Amendment I mmunity and failure to state a claim for relief.
(Doc. 8).

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the s ufficie ncy of a complaint against

the legal sta nda rd set forth in Rule 8, which requires "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing t hat the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepte d as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is pla usible on its face."' Ashcroft u.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. u. T wombly, 550 U .S. 544, 570
(2007)). "[F]acial plausibility" exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual con ten t t hat
a llows the court to draw the reasonable infere nce t hat the defendant is liable for the
misconduct a lleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. a t 556).

3

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is '"properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate'
the claim." In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F .3d 281, 286
(5th Cir. 20 12) (quoting Home Builders Ass 'n, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006,
10 10 (5th Cir. 1998)). A court should consider a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack
before addressing any attack on the merits. !d. (citing Ramming v. United States, 28 1
F.3d 158, 16 1 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 960 (2002)). Considering a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss first "prevents a court without jurisdiction from
prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice." Id. at 286- 87 (citing Ramming, 281
F.3d at 161). Additionally, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is analyzed under
the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Benton v. U.S., 960
F .2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992).

Ill.

DISCUSSION
A.

RULE 12(B)(l): SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
1.

Eleventh Amendment I mmunity: The LWC

Defendants contend that t his Court lacks subj ect matter jurisdiction over the
LWC because, as a n executive departme nt of th e State of Louisiana, it is e ntit led to
Eleve nth Amendment immunity against P laintiffs claims under the ADA, FMLA,
and state law. (Doc. 8-1 at p. 5).
The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ba rs s uits against the
States in federal court. U.S. Cont. amend. XI; see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U .S . 265,
276 (1986). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless ofthe nature ofthe relief sou ght.

Lewis v. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir.
4

2011) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)).
As a state agency, the L\NC is also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an
a lter ego or arm of the State of Louisiana. Sandres v. Louisiana Workforce Comm 'n,
No. CIV.A.09-652-C, 2010 WL 565378, at *3 (M.D. La. Feb. 17, 2010) (finding that
the LWC was entitled to Elevent h Amendment Immunity); see also Perez v. Region

20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2002).
A State's immunity from suit is not absolute. The Supreme Court has
recognized certain circumstances in which an individual may sue a State in federal
court. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 662 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir.
2011). One such circumstance includes a State waiving its Eleve nth Amendment
immunity by voluntarily invoking federal court jurisdiction, or by making a "clear
declaration" that it intends to submit itself to federal court jurisdiction. Coll. Sav.

Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. , 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).
Another circumstance is Congress' abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by
making "its inte ntion to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute
and act[ing] pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U .S. 721, 726 (2003).
The parties do not dispute that Louisiana has not waived its immunity to suit
in federal court. La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 13:5106(A). Additionally, Plaintiff concedes that
Louisiana has not waived immunity to the ADA and state law claims, and she
voluntarily dismisses those claims against Defendants. 1 (Doc. 21-3 at pp. 3, 7).

I Plaintiffs opposition unartfully states, "absent a waiver by Defendants, this Court does not have
jUTisdiction over her ADA claim .... Plaintiff is willing to voluntarily dismiss these claims against the

5

Therefore, the only re maining claim to be considered, for the purpose of this Court's
jurisdiction, is Plaintiffs FMLA claim.
The

Supreme

Court

established

t hat

Congress

abrogated

Elevent h

Amendment immunity for t he family-care provision of the FMLA, but not for the selfcare provision. See Coleman u. Court of Appeals of Maryland, _ U.S. _ , 132 S . Ct .
1327 (2012) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a brogated unde r t he
self-care provision); Hibbs, 538 U .S. 721 (holding t hat the Eleventh Amendment is
abrogated under the family-care provision). The par ties disagree as t o wheth er
pregnancy-related illness is classified under the family-care provision or th e self-care
prOVISIOn.
In Coleman, the Supreme Court addressed, inter alia, the issue of pregnancyrelated illness. The Court noted, while recognizing t he legislative purpose, that the
self-ca re provision offered women the benefit of allowing them to take leave for
pregnancy-related illnesses. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1335. Conversely, in Hibbs , th e
Court discussed the fact t hat the family-care provision was enacted predominately
for t he purpose of offering gender-neutra l leave for child-birth and child-care, m
addition to other family caregiving needs. Hibbs, 538 U .S. at 731-35.
Since Plaintiffs claim is due to pregn a ncy-related illness, her claim fa lls under
the self-care provision as ident ified by the Supreme Court in Coleman. As Con gress

State." Doc. 21-3 at p. 7. The Court construes this as a dismissal of her ADA claims against Defenda n ts,
including Tomlin in his individual and official capacities. Furthermore, irrespective of Plaintiffs
voluntary dismissal, the ADA claim against Tomlin in his individ ual capacity would not have been a
cognizable claim. See Robertson u. Neu romedical Ctr. , 983 F. Supp. 669, 670 n. 1 (M.D. La. 1997)
(reasoning that "there is no individual liability under Title Vll or the ADEA, so likewise there should
be no individual liability under the ADA").
6

did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under the self-care prov1s10n,
Plaintiffs claim against th e LWC under th e FMLA are barred, and this Court is
without jurisdiction.
2.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Tomlin and Hataway

Plaintiff asserts FMLA claims against Tomlin and Hataway in their individual
capacities. Individual capacity claims against state officials are not subject to
Eleventh Amendment immunity2 unless the State is the real and s ubstantial party
in interest. Modica u. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2006). Determining whether th e
State is the real and substantial party in interest is a fact intensive inquiry. Id. at
183. Indemnification, alone, is not enough. Henley u. Simpson, 527 F. App'x 303, 305
(5th Cir. 2013). Courts must consider whether a State's treasury would be ultimately
liable for t h e mone tary da mages or whether the suit is brought for the purpose of
compelling the State to act. Id. at 306-07.
Under the facts of this case, and at this stage in the proceedings, this Court
concludes that t he State is not the real party in interest. See Modica, 465 F.3d at
183-84 (comparing an FMLA claim against a state official to cases under t he Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") a nd concluding that the State was not the real party
in interest). Plaintiff does not allege the existence of an improper or illegal LWC
policy, but alleges impermissible conduct by LWC employees. Cf. Henley, 527 F. App'x

2 In Plaintiffs opposition, s he argues that the claims against Defendants in their individual capacities
are s ubject to Elevent h Amendment immunity because they fall under Ex Parte Young, 209 U .S. 123
(1908). Doc. 21-3 at p. 9. Plaintiffs unders tanding of Ex Parte Young is mistake n. The Ex Parte Young
doctrine applies to claims against state officials in their official capacity, not individual capacity. See
Nelson u. Uniu. of Texas at Dallas, 535 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Pu rsuant to the Ex Parte Young
exception, the Eleventh Am endmen t is not a bar to s uits for prospective relief against a state employee
acting in his official capacity.").

7

at 306 (finding t he Eleventh Amendment applicable in FLSA case against officia ls in
their individual capacity where officers challenged a State's compensation policy and
n ot t he wrongful enforcment of that policy); see also Luder u. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020,
1024-25 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that t he State was th e real party in interest
because t he state officials would not have the financial ability to personally pay the
wages owed by t he State to 145 plaintiffs). And the fact t hat the State may indemnify
Tomlin and Hataway for potential damages does not render it the real party in
interest. Henley, 527 F. App'x at 305. Thus, at this early stage of the proceedings, the
Court finds that t he Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiffs claims against
Tomlin and Hataway in their individual capacities.

B.

RULE 12(B)(6): FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
1.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

a.

FMLA

Plaintiff alleges a§ 1983 claim against Hataway, Tomlin and Blount, in their
individual capacities, for violating the Fourteenth Amendment by denying her
protected leave under the FMLA. (Doc. 4 at p . 24). Section 1983 imposes liability on
every person acting under color of state law that deprives another of rights or
privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For a § 1983
remedy to exist, there must be a violation of a federal right and Congress must not
h ave specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983 by providing a compreh ensive
enforcement mechanism for the protection of that right. Lafleur u. Texas Dep't of

Health , 126 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997).

8

Under the FMLA, "[t] he comprehensive detailed enforcement provisions ...
show an intention of Congress that the specific remedies set forth in § 2617 be the
exclusive remedies available for a violation of the FMLA." Sturza v. Loadmaster

Eng'g, Inc. , No. CIV. A. H-07-2500, 2008 WL 1967102, at *2 (S. D. Tex. May 1, 2008)
(quoting O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ. , 16 F.Supp.2d 868, 894 (S.D. Ohio 1998));

see also Haydul7- v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429, 487 (W.D. Pa. 2008); Lucht
v. Encompass Corp., 49 1 F. Supp. 2d 856, 866-67 (S.D . Iowa 2007); Cisneros v.
Colorado, No. CIV.A.03CV02122'WDMCB, 2005 WL 1719755, at *8 (D. Colo. July 22,
2005). As a result, Plaintiff cannot a llege a FMLA violation pursuant to § 1983, and
Plaintiffs FLMA claim pursuant to § 1983 is dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.

b.

Employment Discrimination

Plaintiff also alleges a § 1983 claim against Hataway, Tomlin and Blount, in
t heir individual capacit ies, for violating the Fourteenth Amendment by engaging in
intentional employment discrimination. Intentional employme nt discrimination
claims under § 1983 mirror th at of a parallel action under Title VII. Lauderdale v.

TX. Dept. of Crim. Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2007). Here, Plaintiff a lleges
intentional employment discrimination based on pregnancy, which is akin to sex
discrimination under Title VII. Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 859
(5th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging t hat the Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title
VII by explicitly including pregnancy discrimination within the definition of sex
discrimination).

9

Since Plaintiff is sumg Hataway, Tomlin a nd Blount, in t heir individua l
cap acit ies, she "must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation."

Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002). This heighten pleading standa rd
requires Plaintiff to a llege that Defenda nts were either personally involve d or that
their wrongful actions were causally connected to t he constitutional violation. See

James v. Texas Collin Cty. , 535 F .3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008).
Here, Plaintiff failed to a llege sufficie nt facts to implicate the personal
involvement of Hataway and Blount in the alleged pregnancy discrimination. At
most, Plaintiff alleges t hat Blount and Hataway, t he Huma n Resources m a nager and
the Director of the Workers' Compensation Administration, ratified Tomlin's conduct
by n ot overriding the termination decision and failing to conduct an investigation.
(Doc. 4

at ~

39B). As supervisory officials, Blount and Hataway "may be held liable if

there exists either (1) [their] personal involve men t in the constitutiona l deprivation,
or (2) a sufficient causal connection between [their] wrongful conduct a nd the
constitutional violation." Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F .2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing

Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 47 1 U.S. 1126 (1985).
Section 1983 requires "more than a simple ratification of a n impermissible act when
the ratification is based on independent legitimate r easons." Bowen v. Watkins, 669
F.2d 979, 988 (5th Cir. 1982). Because Plaintiff merely alleges ratification, a nd
nothing more, Plaintiff has failed to state a sup ervisory liability claim against Blount
a nd H ataway.
Plaintiff does, however, a llege sufficient facts against Tomlin. Plaint iff a lleges
that after she disclosed her pregnancy to Tomlin, he began devising a scheme to
10

terminate her employment based on her pregnancy. (Doc. 4 at

~

36A). The alleged

sch eme included Tomlin t elling Plaintiff that her pregnancy-related absences were
unexcused, placing her on the Supervisory Pla n , a nd terminating her after sh e u sed
previously approved leave. (Id . at~~ 30-35). Based on the foregoing, t he Court finds
that Plaint iff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against Tomlin for
intent ion al employment discrimination.

c.

Qualified Immunity

Defendants r aise the defense of qua lified immunity. (Doc. 8-1 at p. 13). "The
doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from lia bility for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutiona l rights of which a reasonable person would h ave known."' Terry v.

Hubert , 609 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223
(2009)). A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff a lleges
that (1) t he defendant violated the plaint iff's constitutional rights; a nd (2) t he
defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly establis hed law
at the time of the violation. Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011) (cit ing

Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2007)).
As previously noted, pregnancy discrimination in the workplace is akin to sex
discrimination. Stout, 282 F. 3d at 859. It has long bee n clearly established that "[s]ex
discrimination ... in public employment violate[s] the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice , 114 F.3d 539,
550 (5th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, intentional sex discrimination is never objectively
reasonable, a nd at the motion to dismiss stage, a qualified immunity defense should
11

generally be foreclosed as long as the plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to state a claim.

Ezell v. Wells , No. 2:15-CV-00083-J, 2015 WL 4191751, at *12 (N.D. Tex. July 10,
2015); Starh v. Univ. of S. Miss. , 8 F . Supp. 3d 825, 838 (S.D. Miss. 2014). Because
the Court has found that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim, Tomlin is not entitled
to qualified immunity.3 See, e.g., Been v. New Mexico Dep't of Info. Tech. , 815 F. Supp.
2d 1222, 1243 (D.N.M. 2011) (denying qualified immunity for pregnancy
discrimination claim); Williams v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, No. 07 C 6997, 2009 v\TL
140124, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2009) (same).
2.

Title VII

Defendants challenge Plaintiffs Title VII disparate impact claim on the
grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies . (Doc. 8-1 at p.
17). It is well established that the "scope" of a complaint is limited to the "scope" of
the EEOC investigation which can "reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge
of discrimination." Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc. , 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970)).
In Pacheco, the Fifth Circuit examined what facts in an EEOC charge might
be reasonably expected to trigger an EEOC disparate impact investigation. 448 F.3d
at 790. The Fifth Circuit noted that a review of the prima facie case for disparate
impact was relevant in making the determination. Id. at 791. To establish a prima
facie case for disparate impact a plaintiff must show "(1) a facially neutral policy; (2)

Plaintiffs only remaining§ 1983 is against Tomlin for intentional employment discrimination, so the
Cow·t only considered the qualified immunity defense as to him.

3

12

that, in fact, has a disproportionately adverse effect on a protected class." Id. (cit ing

Hebert u. Monsanto , 682 F.2d 1111, 1116 (5th Cir. 1982)).
A review of Plaintiffs EEOC charge fa iled to reveal t hat a disparate impact
claim was asserted. Plaintiffs EEOC charge alleged that she notified Tomlin of h er
pregn a ncy, a nd seventeen-days later, he placed her on t he Supervisory Plan to
improve her attendance. (Doc. 4-1 at p. 3). These allega tions do not implicate a
dispa rate impact claim. Additionally, Plaintiff only h ad 180 days from the last a lleged
act of discrimination to file an EEOC charge for dispa rate impact. Deleon u. Gen.

Insulation, Inc., 575 F. App'x 292, 293 (5th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff was terminated on
July 14, 2014, but she does not allege that a sepa rate EEOC charge was filed within
the a pplicable time limit. Th erefore, the Court concludes t hat Plaintiff failed to
exhaust administrative remedies for her disparate impact cla im.
3.

Punitive Damages

Plaintiff requests "[p]unitive [d]amages where applicable." (Doc. 4

at~

90(F)).

Defendants contend, and Plaintiff agrees, that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1),
punitive damages are not permitted against the LWC'1 for intentional employment
discrimination. (Doc. 8- 1 at p. 13). As § 1981a(b)(1) explicitly instructs that p unitive
damages m ay not be recovered against a government agency, any potential claim for
punit ive damages against the LvVC is dismissed.

t Defendants also argue that punitive damages are not permitted agains t the state officials in their
official capacities. Si nce Plaintiff only sought an official capacity cla im under the ADA against Tomlin,
and that claim has subsequently been dismissed, the matte r of punitive damages need not be
cons idered.

13

IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 8) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs FMLA claim, Title VII
disparate impact claim, and request for punitive damages against the Louisiana
Workforce Commission; Plaintiffs § 1983 claim for violation of the FMLA against
Wes Hataway, Bryce Tomlin, and Nakesla Blount; a nd Plaintiffs § 1983 claim for
intentional employment discrimination against V.les Hataway a nd Nakesla Blount.
It is DENIED as to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim for intention al employment

discrimination against Bryce Tomlin.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED th at Plaintiffs claims against Louisiana
Workforce Commission, pursuant to the ADA, FMLA, Title VII disparate impact, La.
R.S. § 23:301 et seq. , La. R.S. § 23:967, and La . R.S. § 23:314, as well as punitive
damages, are DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED th at Plaintiffs claims against Bryce Tomlin, in
his individual a nd official capacity, pursuant to the ADA, and in his individual
capacity, pursuant to § 1983 for violation of the FMLA, are DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims against Wes Hataway,
m his individual capacity, pursuant to § 1983 for violation of the FMLA and
intentional employment discrimination, are DISMISSED.

14

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, Nakesla Blount, is
DISMISSED from t his action.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this

2'l~ay of April, 2016.

BRIAN A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

15