Randolph v. East Baton Rouge Parish School System et al

Filing 41

RULING denying 7 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 6/28/2016. (LLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KATHRYN RANDOLPH

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

15-654-SDD-EWD

EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH
SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.

RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction1 filed by
Plaintiff, Kathryn Randolph (“Plaintiff”). Defendants, East Baton Rouge Parish School
System, David Tatman, Warren Drake, Domoine Rutledge, Millie Williams, and
Sharmayne Rutledge, (“the Defendants”) have filed an Opposition2 to this motion, to
which Plaintiff filed a Reply.3 For the reasons which follow, the motion shall be denied.
I.

BACKGROUND4
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board and

other Defendants asserting civil rights employment claims arising under both state and
federal law. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the Defendants have deprived her of the right to
her job as an administrator in violation of federal and state law and have committed state

1

Rec. Doc. No. 7.
Rec. Doc. No. 36.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 37.
4
The facts were taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint (Rec. Doc. No. 1), Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Rec. Doc. No. 7), and Defendant’s Opposition (Rec. Doc. No. 36).
2

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torts against her. Plaintiff contends that she returned to the East Baton Rouge Parish
School System in 2007 as a high school teacher and guidance counselor. Plaintiff claims
that, in 2008, she was promoted to assistant principal at Belaire High School. In 2009,
Plaintiff alleges she was transferred to Twin Oaks Elementary to serve as assistant
principal and, in 2013, she was promoted to principal of Twin Oaks Elementary. Plaintiff
alleges that she became tenured in her position as high school teacher and guidance
counselor in 2011.
In August of 2014, Plaintiff was placed on two days of administrative leave by the
School System pending completion of an investigation of complaints that had been filed
against her by a parent. Plaintiff claims she advised the School System that it was not
complying with the Policy Manual with regard to handling employee investigations. After
thirty days passed from the completion of the investigation, Plaintiff sought to be restored
to her position but claims that she was met with threats and intimidation. Plaintiff then
filed a Grievance against the parties that placed her on administrative leave. Plaintiff
contends this Grievance resulted in the immediate termination of her contract and that
she received an “angry” letter from then-Superintendent Bernard Taylor admonishing
Plaintiff for failing to comply with the System’s policy regarding employees on
administrative leave. Plaintiff was notified by correspondence on October 9, 2014 that
disciplinary proceedings were initiated seeking to terminate her employment with the
School System. Plaintiff claims that this letter notified her of the right to respond to the
charges but failed to give notice that she had the right to request a hearing. Ultimately,
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Plaintiff claims she was told by Defendants that she was not entitled to a hearing and also
claims that Defendant Rutledge “verbally assault[ed]”5 her when she attempted to pick up
a paycheck.

Plaintiff alleges she has never been provided with any results of the

investigations or the outcome of the disciplinary hearing.

Plaintiff further contends

Defendants have attempted to place her as an elementary classroom teacher, which she
has continuously refused. Plaintiff argues that she should have been returned to her last
tenured position as a high school teacher and guidance counselor. Plaintiff claims that
she is in “employment limbo” because she is still technically employed by the School
System but has not been paid since June of 2015.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit and moved for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff seeks an
order enjoining the Defendants from: “the continuously bullying, humiliating, harassing,
and intimidating her to, include the withholding Plaintiff’s pay, pending the completion of
any disciplinary proceeding;”6 “continuing the disciplinary proceeding which it began
against her more than a year ago;”7 and “the hiring of administrators who are entitled to
promotional contracts pursuant to LSA R.S. 17:444 as interim and depriving them of their
rights to due process.”8
Defendants contend Plaintiff was appointed as the interim principal of a school,
and an interim status employee is not entitled to the protections she claims. Defendants

5

Rec. Doc. No. 7-1, p. 5.
Id. at pp. 18-19.
7
Id. at p. 19.
8
Id.
6

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deny all of the claims brought against them. Defendants concede that, on October 9,
2014, Dr. Taylor brought charges to terminate Plaintiff after she allegedly abandoned her
job. However, Defendants aver that Plaintiff was granted sick leave and did not to return
to work for an extended period of time. Following Plaintiff’s medical release to return to
work, the Defendants contend that the disciplinary charges were no longer pursued, and
she was contacted to return to work in a teaching position. Defendants claim that Plaintiff
repeatedly ignored these requests.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction for a variety
of reasons.

First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s disciplinary procedure was

discontinued months before she filed this lawsuit, and, because disciplinary proceedings
are no longer being pursued, relief relating to the disciplinary hearing is moot. Defendants
claim that Plaintiff’s motion is also mooted by the fact that she resigned due to retirement.
Second, Defendants challenge the injunction because Plaintiff seeks an order that
the Defendants “obey the law,” which is improper under Fifth Circuit jurisprudence.9
Additionally, Defendants contend that an order enjoining “harassing, intimidating and
humiliating” behavior is too vague to satisfy Rule 65’s requirement that the injunction be
in specific terms and “describe in reasonable detail … the act or acts sought to be
restrained.”
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to meet the heavy burden that she is

9

Defendants cite Meyer v. Brown & Root Const. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981). Rec. Doc. No. 36,
p. 4.

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substantially likely to succeed on the merits of this case considering that the School
System cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligent or tortious acts of third
parties, and because she fails to even allege that any decision regarding her employment
occurred as a result of an official policy or custom which is required in a Section 1983
action. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot show irreparable injury because
money damages are available should she prevail on her claims.
II.

PRELMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff has moved for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under well settled Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, a plaintiff's

entitlement to a preliminary injunction depends upon a clear showing that: (1) there is a
substantial likelihood she will prevail on the merits of her claim; (2) there is a substantial
danger she will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue; (3) the threatened
injury to plaintiff outweighs any harm the injunction may cause the defendants; and (4)
that granting the injunction will not harm the public interest.10 Thus, the “extraordinary
and drastic remedy” of a preliminary injunction will not be granted if the plaintiff fails to
carry this heavy burden of proof on any of these four prerequisites.11
Because the facts of this case are so sharply disputed, the Court is not prepared
to make a finding of mootness.

While Defendants claim Plaintiff resigned due to

10

Howard v. Town of Jonesville, 935 F.Supp.855, 858-59 (W.D. La. 1996), citing Hull v. Quitman County
Bd. of Educ., 1 F.3d 1450, 1453 (5th Cir.1993); Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir.1990).
11
Id., citing Enterprise International, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472
(5th Cir.1985) (quoting Canal Authority of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir.1974)).

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retirement, Plaintiff maintains that she was forced to resign and is owed pay that she has
not received. The Court is not inclined to make such a finding on the current record.
However, the Court agrees that much of what Plaintiff requests be enjoined is improper
as a matter of law.

The request to enjoin Defendants from bullying, harassing,

intimidating, or depriving administrators of due process is essentially an “obey the law”
injunction. Such broad injunctive relief is improper and will not be ordered. These words
are too general and vague, and the Fifth Circuit has held that such “obey the law”
injunctions cannot be sustained.12
Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff's inability to demonstrate the threat of
irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction does not issue prevents her from satisfying
the factors required for a preliminary injunction. Irreparable injury, it is well established,
exists only when no adequate legal (that is non-equitable) remedy is available.13 As such,
a preliminary injunction will usually be denied if it appears that the applicant has an
adequate legal remedy in the form of money damages or other relief.14 Indeed, “there
can be no irreparable injury where money damages would adequately compensate a

12
See Abner v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., No. 03-0765, 2007 WL 1169373 at *1, n. 2, (W.D. La. Apr.
17, 2007)(citing Payne v.. Travenol Lab., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir.1978)); Versata Software, Inc.
v. Internet Brands, Inc., No. 08-cv-313, 2012 WL 3075712, at * 3 (E.D. La. July 8, 2012)(citing Meyer v.
Brown & Root Const. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir.1981)).
13
Id. at 859, citing 11A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2944 at 88 (1995).
14
Id., citing 11A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §
§ 2948.1 at 149–51 (1995); see also Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 91–92 (1974) (mere loss of income
or damaged reputation insufficient to establish irreparable injury in case involving loss of government
employment); Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir.1975) (same).

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plaintiff.”15
In the instant case, should Plaintiff prove that she has been the victim of unlawful
employment practices and/or torts, and establish a constitutional violation by which she
suffered injuries caused by that deprivation, several remedies will be available to her
under the law, including monetary damages.16 Finally, Plaintiff's generally conclusory
allegations of irreparable harm are simply not of a magnitude to justify a preliminary
injunction.17 Accordingly, because Plaintiff's alleged injuries, if proven, will be adequately
remedied by this Court, Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief at this stage of
the proceedings must be denied.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction18

is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on June 28, 2016.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

15
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Guidry, 724 F.Supp.2d 612, 619 (W.D. La. 2010)(citing DFW Metro Line
Services v. Southwestern Bell, 901 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
16
Cozzo v. Parish of Tangipahoa, No. , 1998 WL 865289 at *6 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 1998)(citing Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253–57 (1978); Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1270 (5th Cir.1986)(overruled on
other grounds) (law entitles § 1983 plaintiff to same compensation as any tort plaintiff, i.e., damages forJune
28, 2016 pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, medical expenses and lost wages)).
17
Howard, 935 F.Supp. at 859, citing Sampson, 415 U.S. at 91–92; Morgan, 518 F.2d at 240.
18
Rec. Doc. No. 7.

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