Wilson v. Grimes et al

Filing 133

RULING: Dr. Rani Whitfield's 30 , 39 Motion to Dismiss are hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Dr. Charles Bridges 77 Motion to Dismiss Original and First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6 ) is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Dr. Charles Stuarts 86 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B) is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's 130 Motion to Strike is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion is denied as to striking Defendant Dr. Stuart Motion to Dismiss. The Motion is granted as to sealing Dr. Stuarts Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is hereby instructed to file Dr. Stuarts 86 Motion to Dismiss with attachments under seal. Plaintiff's second request for leave to amend his Complaint is DENIED. Signed by Judge James J. Brady on 5/31/2017. (LLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CORNELIUS LORENZO WILSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
NO. 15-00680-JJB-RLB
DENNIS GRIMES, ET AL.

RULING
Before the Court are two Rule 12(B)(6) Motions seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s
Complaint and Amended Complaint filed by Defendant Dr. Rani Whitfield (“Dr. Whitfield”
or “Whitfield”).1 Plaintiff Cornelius Lorenzo Wilson (“Wilson” or “Plaintiff”) has filed an
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.2 Whitfield subsequently
filed a Reply3 to which Plaintiff filed a Surreply.4 Additionally, Defendant Charlie H.
Bridges, M.D. (“Dr. Bridges” or “Bridges”), has filed a Motion to Dismiss Original
Complaint and First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 12(b)(6).5 Wilson has filed an Opposition6 to which Dr. Bridges has filed a Reply.7
Also pending before the Court is Defendant Dr. Michael Stuart’s (“Dr. Stuart” or “Stuart”)
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(B)(6).8 Plaintiff has filed an Opposition9 and a separate Motion to Strike10 Stuart’s

1

Doc. 30 (Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(B)(6) by Defendant, Dr.
Rani Whitfield); and Doc. 39 (Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 12(B)(6) by Defendant, Dr. Rani Whitfield).
2
Doc. 44.
3
Doc. 65.
4
Doc. 71.
5
Doc. 77.
6
Doc. 94.
7
Doc. 109.
8
Doc. 86.
9
Doc. 120.
10
Doc. 130. (Memorandum in Support Under Seal [Doc. 128]).

1 

Motion. Stuart has filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike.11 The Court’s
jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331. There is no need for oral argument. For
the following reasons, each of the Defendants’ Motions and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike are
granted in part and denied in part.
I.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND12
During his incarceration as both a pretrial detainee at East Baton Rouge Parish

Prison (“EBRPP”) and as a convicted inmate with the Louisiana Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) at numerous public and private facilities, Wilson claims that he
received inadequate medical care for untreated and undiagnosed throat cancer that has
resulted in the loss of his vocal chords and ongoing pain and suffering. Wilson has
asserted various federal and state law claims against fourteen defendants, including
private medical physicians Dr. Whitfield13, Dr. Bridges14, and Dr. Stuart15 (collectively
“Defendant Physicians”), arising out his medical treatment in his original Pro Se
Complaint16 and First Amended Complaint,17 filed by counsel. Plaintiff’s claims against
these physicians concern the medical treatment he received while at EBRPP from
February of 2015 through October of 2015.

11

Doc. 113. (Under Seal).
The relevant factual background is taken from the allegations in Wilson’s Complaint and First Amended
Complaint.
13
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Whitfield is a “private medical physician that was contracted to provide medical
services to inmates at EBRPP.” Doc. 36, p. 8, ¶22.
14
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Bridges is a “private medical physician that was contracted to provide medical
services to inmates at EBRPP.” Doc. 36, p. 7, ¶21.
15
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Stuart is a “private medical physician that was either employed by or contracted
to provide medical services to inmates at EBRPP.” Doc. 36, p. 8, ¶23.
16
Doc. 1.
17
Doc. 36.
12

2 

A. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations against Dr. Rani Whitfield
In February of 2015, while he was being held at EBRPP as a pretrial detainee,18
Wilson claims he began experiencing problems with his throat. In response to his medical
requests, Wilson had three interactions with Dr. Whitfield over a two month time span.
On February 24, 2015, Dr. Whitfield initially saw and treated Wilson for complaints of a
sore and hoarse throat, sinus congestion, difficulty swallowing, and persistent cough.19
Dr. Whitfield prescribed Wilson with a seven day treatment of Mucinex and the antibiotic
Amoxicillin.20

Wilson completed his medication, but claims it did not improve his

condition. On March 18, 2015, Dr. Whitfield treated Wilson again for his throat.21 During
this visit, Wilson allegedly told Dr. Whitfield that the medications were not working and
that he needed to see a doctor due to his continuing problems with his throat and voice.
Dr. Whitfield diagnosed Wilson with a “hoarse pharyngitis cough” and ordered the
following medications for Wilson: Cephalexin (antibiotic), the expectorant Mucinex, and
the steroid Medrol.22 Dr. Whitfield did not refer Wilson to an Ear, Nose, and Throat
(“ENT”) specialist or to a facility that could examine his vocal chords with a scope. Wilson
claims that he took his medication until March 28, 2015, but his conditions did not improve.
On April 29, 2015, Dr. Whitfield prescribed another round of Keflix to treat Wilson’s sore
throat, hoarse voice, persistent and productive cough, and difficulty swallowing.23 Once
again, Dr. Whitfield did not refer Wilson to an ENT or to a facility with a medical scope
that could examine his vocal chords.

18

Doc. 36, p. 1, ¶1.
Doc. 36, p. 15, ¶48.
20
Doc. 36, p. 15, ¶48.
21
Doc. 36, p. 15, ¶51.
22
Doc. 36, p. 16, ¶51.
23
Doc. 36, p. 18, ¶63. 
19

3 

B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations against Dr. Charles Bridges
While at EBRPP, Plaintiff claims that he was examined on two occasions by Dr.
Bridges.24 On April 24, 2015, Plaintiff complained about his sore throat, productive cough,
hoarse throat, and difficulty swallowing. Dr. Bridges prescribed Plaintiff Mucinex, but did
not refer him to an ENT or to a facility with a scope.25 Dr. Bridges examined Plaintiff a
second time on May 12, 2015.26 During this exam, Plaintiff complained about his sore
throat, his productive cough with blood, hoarse voice, and difficulty swallowing. Once
again, Dr. Bridges did not refer Plaintiff to an ENT or outside facility with a scope.
C. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations against Dr. Michael Stuart27
In his Amended Complaint, Wilson alleges that he was examined by Dr. Stuart on
four (4) different occasions while at EBRPP.28 During an examination for another medical
issue on March 21, 2015, Plaintiff claims that he told Dr. Stuart that his conditions
regarding his throat, cough, and voice were not improving.29 Nonetheless, Dr. Stuart did
not refer Plaintiff to an ENT specialist or to a facility that could examine his vocal chords
with a scope. Plaintiff does not allege being examined by Dr. Stuart again until August of
2015.

On August 14, 2015, Plaintiff claims that although he had no voice, at the

conclusion of the examination, Dr. Stuart did not refer him to an ENT specialist or to an
outside facility with a scope.30 When Dr. Stuart examined Plaintiff again two days later,31
Plaintiff complained of his hoarse voice, productive cough, and sore throat.32 At the end

24

Doc. 36, p. 17, ¶60; p. 18, ¶67.
Doc. 36, p. 17, ¶60.
26
Doc. 36, p. 18, ¶67.
27
Plaintiff named Dr. Stuart as a Defendant in his Amended Complaint.
28
Doc. 36, p. 16, ¶53; p. 20, ¶79; p. 20, ¶80; and p. 20, ¶86.
29
Doc. 36, p. 16, ¶53.
30
Doc. 36, p. 20, ¶79.
31
Plaintiff erroneously had August 16, 2016 in his Amended Complaint.
32
Doc. 36, p. 20, ¶80. 
25

4 

of the examination, Dr. Stuart prescribed Plaintiff with the steroid Medrol.33 However, he
still did not refer Plaintiff to a specialist or an outside facility with a scope. Subsequently,
on August 31, 2015,34 Dr. Stuart conducted another examination of Plaintiff and
recommended that he be referred to an ENT specialist.
D. Plaintiff’s Claims
Based upon the foregoing allegations, Wilson brings 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
claims against Dr. Whitfield, Dr. Bridges, and Dr. Stuart, in their official and individual
capacities, for acting with deliberate indifference to his right to reasonable and adequate
medical care in violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Wilson also asserts corresponding constitutional violations arising under the Louisiana
Constitution, Article 1, §§ 2, 3, 7, 9, 20, against Dr. Whitfield, Dr. Bridges, and Dr. Stuart,
and state law claims of medical malpractice, negligence, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress (“NIED”) or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Defendants now seek dismissal with prejudice of Wilson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims, and dismissal of Wilson’s medical malpractice claims without prejudice on the
grounds of prematurity. Dr. Stuart also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims as premature
for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(B)(6) Standard
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept the well-plead factual

allegations in the complaint as true.35 The Court views the complaint in the light most

33

Doc. 36, p. 20, ¶80.
Doc. 36, p. 21, ¶82. Plaintiff erroneously alleges this examination occurred on August 31, 2016 in his
Amended Complaint.
35
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007).
34

5 

favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all doubts in his favor.36 However, “the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions.”37

The Court will not “strain to find inferences favorable to the

plaintiff.”38 If the facts as plead allow the Court to conclude that plaintiff’s claims for relief
are “plausible,” the motion must be denied.39 To satisfy the plausibility standard, the
plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”40
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”41
B. Prematurity Arguments
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy Procedures
Dr. Stuart argues that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies pursuant to La. R.S. 15:1171.42 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e, Wilson was required to exhaust administrative remedies available to him at the
prison prior to commencing a civil action in this Court with respect to prison conditions.43
This provision is mandatory and applies broadly to “all inmate suits about prison life.”44
Additionally, a prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies by complying with the

36

Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
38
Taha v. William Marsh Rice Univ., Civ. Action No. H-11-2060, 2012 WL 1576099, *2 (S.D.Tex. May 3,
2012)(quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2004)).
39
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
40
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
41
Id.
42
Dr. Stuart is the only Defendant Physician to make this specific argument.
43
42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
44
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
37

6 

applicable prison grievance procedures before filing a lawsuit relative to prison
conditions.45
Wilson has alleged that he submitted complaints that comprise the claims of the
instant litigation through the ARP process while detained at EBRPP, and that he has
exhausted all administrative remedies available to him through the ARP process.46
Wilson attached a copy of Prison Medical Services Medical Grievance Reply, No. 150127, dated April 6, 2015 to his Complaint.47 Although the actual grievance is not
available for review, it appears from the Grievance Reply that Wilson was complaining of
the medical treatment he had received prior to April 6, 2015 by medical staff at EBRPP
and that he thought he needed to be hospitalized for his voice. Wilson has also alleged
that he discussed his throat and voice problems with Dr. Stuart on March 21, 2015, prior
to the date the Grievance Reply was completed.

Accepting the allegations of the

Complaints as true, the Court finds Wilson has sufficiently plead that he exhausted his
claims through EBRPP’s ARP process so as to survive a Rule 12(b) challenge.
Accordingly, Dr. Stuart’s Motion shall be denied on this ground.
2. Medical Malpractice Claims
Each of the Defendant Physicians argues that Plaintiff’s state law medical
malpractice claims are premature because they have not been presented to a Medical
Review Panel as required by Louisiana law. The Plaintiff does not deny this point.48 With
regard to any of the medical malpractice claims asserted against Dr. Whitfield, Dr.

45

Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 517 (5th Cir. 2004).
Doc. 1, p. 3, Section II(C); Doc. 36, p.31, ¶140.
47
Doc. 1-1, p. 3. 
48
The Plaintiff does argue that the Court should stay the matter pending the outcome of the Medical Review
Panel instead of the dismissing the claims. Because the Court ultimately finds that the Plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claims must be dismissed, there is no need to stay the case pending the outcome of the
Louisiana Medical Review Panel.
46

7 

Bridges, and Dr. Stuart, the Court finds such claims are premature, as each of these
Defendants is a qualified healthcare provider49 pursuant to Louisiana law and the claims
have not been presented to a Medical Review Panel as required by La. R.S. 40:1231.8.
Accordingly, each of the Defendants’ Motions shall be granted on this ground, and the
state law medical malpractice claims against Dr. Whitfield, Dr. Bridges, and Dr. Stuart
shall be dismissed, without prejudice.
C. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Dr. Stuart’s Rule 12(B)(6) Motion
Plaintiff has requested that the Court strike Dr. Stuart’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(f) for improperly disclosing confidential health information that is irrelevant to
Plaintiff’s Complaint.50 In the alternative, Plaintiff requests that Dr. Stuart’s Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion be filed under seal. Dr. Stuart disagrees arguing that the information is relevant
to establish the basis of his treatment of Wilson, and to discern that treatment from the
alleged ineffective treatment of Wilson’s throat condition. Stuart further argues that
because Plaintiff has asserted claims of malpractice against him, Wilson has waived any
health care provider-patient privilege. Dr. Stuart also points to an allegation in Plaintiff’s
Complaint that specifically references the other type of medical treatment Stuart provided
to him.
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district court “may
strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent,
or scandalous matter.”51 Although it is within the sound discretion of the court to grant a
motion to strike, that authority should be exercised with caution.52

49

 Doc. 30-2 and Doc. 39-2; Doc. 77-1; and Doc. 86-2. 
Doc. 130.
51
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
52
United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th Cir. 2012).
50

8 

A motion to strike

based on immateriality should only be granted when the challenged allegations “can have
no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation.”53 “Both because striking a
portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy, and because it often is sought by a movant
simply as a dilatory tactic, motions under Rule 12(f) are viewed with disfavor and are
infrequently granted.”54 “Matter will not be stricken from a pleading unless it is clear that
it can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation. If there is any
doubt as to whether under any contingency the matter may raise an issue, the motion
should be denied.”55
Initially, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that the challenged
information will have no bearing upon this case. For purposes of the medical malpractice
claim, Dr. Stuart is only being sued for his treatment of Wilson’s throat. Therefore, the
Court agrees with Dr. Stuart that the challenged information is relevant so that it may be
discerned from the alleged ineffective treatment upon which Wilson’s claims are based.
Further, at least one federal court within this circuit has found that when a plaintiff “is the
party who placed his medical conditions at issue in his suit, he cannot maintain privilege
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.”56 Nonetheless,
as a practical matter, when considering a motion to dismiss, the court “must limit [its]
inquiry to the facts stated in the complaint and the documents either attached to or
incorporated in the complaint.”57 Therefore, while the additional information included by

53

Sadler v. Benson Motors Corp., Civ. A. No. 97-1083, 1997 WL 266735, *1 (E.D.La. May 15,
1997)(citations omitted).
54
F.D.I.C. v. Niblo, 821 F.Supp. 441, 449 (N.D. Tex. 1993)(citing Augustus v. Bd. of Public Instruction of
Escambia County, Fl, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962)). 
55
Mercado v. Dallas County, Texas, Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-3481-D, 2017 WL 169102, *16 (N.D.Tex.
Jan. 17, 2017)(quoting Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 311 F.2d 424, 428 n. 13 (5th Cir. 1962)(citation
omitted)).
56
Roberts v. River City Care Center, 13-CA-670, 2014 WL 12540478, *2 (W.D.Tex. Feb. 14, 2014).
57
Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1996).  

9 

Dr. Stuart in his Motion may be relevant to the case at hand, it cannot be considered by
the Court in ruling on the Motion as it was not a fact alleged in either of the Complaints or
any of the documents attached to them. Therefore, the Court will not strike Dr. Stuart’s
pleading, but rather order that Dr. Stuart’s Motion be filed under seal. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike shall be granted in part, and denied in part.
D. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Deliberate Indifference Claims
In response to Wilson’s claims of deliberate indifference to his medical needs, each
of the Defendant Physicians makes two arguments. First, the Defendant Physicians
argue that they are neither state actors nor acting under color of state law, and therefore,
Wilson has failed to state a viable claim upon which relief may be granted.58 In the
alternative, the Defendant Physicians each argue that even if they were state actors, they
would each be entitled to qualified immunity because Wilson has not alleged facts
showing they were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Because Plaintiff
has alleged that each of the Defendant Physicians were state actors at the time of the
alleged constitutional violations,59 the Court denies the Defendant Physicians’ Motions to
Dismiss on this ground. However, the Court shall proceed with the Defendant Physicians’
alternative argument and assess whether as state actors they are entitled to qualified
immunity.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

58

In his first Motion to Dismiss, Dr. Whitfield also argued that he is not a state actor because he is not
governed by La. R.S. 40:1237.1, Louisiana’s statute governing medical malpractice actions against state
employees. Doc. 30-1, pp. 8-9.
59
The Court also believes that a much more fact-intensive and evidentiary-based analysis would be
required in order to determine whether the Defendant Physicians are state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which would be inappropriate at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.

10 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”60 In assessing
whether an individual is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court applies a two-part test to
determine “(1) whether the defendant’s alleged action is a violation of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights;” and (2) if so, “whether the defendant’s actions were objectively
unreasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the conduct in
question.”61 The Defendant Physicians contend that construing the allegations in the
Complaints in the light most favorable to Wilson, each of their alleged actions did not
amount to a constitutional violation. For the following reasons, the Court agrees.
Wilson claims that Dr. Whitfield, Dr. Bridges, and Dr. Stuart were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs by denying him reasonable and adequate medical
care while Wilson was both a pretrial detainee and convicted prisoner at EBRPP. “Pretrial
detainees and convicted prisoners … look to different constitutional provisions for their
respective rights to basic needs such as medical care and safety.”62

While “[t]he

constitutional rights of a convicted state prisoner spring from the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and with a relatively limited reach, from
substantive due process,” the “rights of a pretrial detainee, on the other hand, flow from
both the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth

60

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
Deal v. Dept. of Corrections, Civ. Action No. 16-61, 2016 WL 3580671, *3 (M.D.La. June 28,
2015)(quoting Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
62
Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996). See also, Hanson v. Richardson, No.
2:06-CV-0178, 2008 WL 818893, *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2008)(“With respect to the differing sources of
protection for pretrial detainees and convicted inmates, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that the distinction
as to medical care due to a pretrial detainee, as opposed to a convicted inmate, may be a distinction without
difference, because if an act or omission violates the Eighth Amendment protection against deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, it will certainly violate a detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment
protections.”).
61

11 

Amendment.”63 Ultimately, “[t]here is no significant distinction, however, between pretrial
detainees and convicted inmates when the denial of medical care is at issue.”64
Because Wilson has complained of one or more particular acts or omissions by
prison health care providers, his claims are characterized as episodic acts or omissions.65
Thus, whether Wilson was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, the Court analyzes
his claim under the deliberate indifference standard.66 Deliberate indifference is an
“extremely high standard to meet”,67 one that has been equated to “‘[s]ubjective
recklessness,’ as used in the criminal law.”68 Under this standard, a state actor may not
be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless “the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.”69 “Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or
medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner’s
disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.”70

A

prisoner who alleges that he should have received additional treatment “is a classic
example of a matter for medical judgment.”71 To establish deliberate indifference a
plaintiff must show that an official “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,

63

Id. (internal citations omitted).
McCarty v. Zapata County, 243 Fed. Appx. 792, 2007 WL 1191019, *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2007)(citing
Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 2001)).
65
Hare, 74 F.3d at 645.
66
McCarty, 2007 WL 1191019, *1; Id. at 647-48. 
67
Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001).
68
Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997)(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838-40
(1994)).
69
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.
70
Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 409-10 (5th Cr. 2013)(quoting Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 359, 346
(5th Cir. 2006)(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847)).
71
Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)).
64

12 

intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly
evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.”72 Additionally, a mere delay
in providing medical treatment does not amount to a constitutional violation without both
deliberate indifference and a resulting harm.73
Accepting Wilson’s allegations as true, the Court finds that he has failed to state a
claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against the DefendantPhysicians. Based on the allegations in his Complaints, Wilson did not allege that any of
the Defendant Physicians were aware of a substantial risk of harm to him, or that they
purposely denied him treatment, ignored his medical complaints, intentionally treated him
incorrectly, or engaged in any other similar conduct that would evince a wanton disregard
for any serious medical need. According to the allegations, Dr. Whitfield examined Wilson
on three occasions for his complaints related to a sore and hoarse throat accompanied
with congestion, cough, and difficulty swallowing. During each visit, Dr. Whitfield
prescribed Wilson various antibiotics and decongestants. Based on these allegations, it
appears that Dr. Whitfield was quite attentive to Wilson’s medical needs. Similarly, on
one of the two occasions that Dr. Bridges examined Wilson, he was prescribed Mucinex
for his medical condition. Likewise, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that Dr. Stuart also took
Wilson’s medical needs seriously. In August of 2015, Dr. Stuart examined Plaintiff three
times. During his second visit, Dr. Stuart prescribed Wilson a steroid to address his
medical complaints. When Dr. Stuart re-examined Wilson approximately 15 days later,
Dr. Stuart recommended that Plaintiff be referred to an ENT.

72
73

Id. (quoting Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). 

13 

It appears to the Court that Wilson’s main complaint with Dr. Whitfield, Dr. Bridges,
and Dr. Stuart is that he disagreed with the medical treatment he received and believed
that he should have been referred to a medical specialist, specifically an ENT, or a clinic
with a scope to evaluate his throat, earlier than such a referral was made. Plaintiff
attempts to buttress his position with the conclusory allegation that Whitfield allegedly told
him on one occasion that he needed to get his throat scoped but the EBRPP did not have
the necessary equipment.

As previously discussed, however, Wilson’s disagreement

with a course of a medical treatment alone does not amount to deliberate indifference.74
As this Court has previously explained, “[a] decision to refer an inmate for additional
treatment, tests or evaluation is a matter of professional judgment that the courts will not
normally second-guess in the context of a claim of deliberate medical indifference.”75
While misdiagnosis or incorrect treatment might in some instances amount to negligence
or medical malpractice, the Fifth Circuit has explained that “negligent medical care does
not constitute a valid section 1983 claim.”76

Rather, such claims of negligence or

malpractice present issues of state law to be addressed by state courts.77 In this case,
Wilson’s allegations clearly sound in medical malpractice and do not amount to an Eighth
Amendment constitutional violation. Additionally, without a viable claim of deliberate

74

Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. See also, Norton, 122 F.3d at 292 (prisoner’s disagreement with prison officials
regarding medical treatment insufficient to establish an unconstitutional denial of medical care).
75
Auguillard v. Toce, Civ. Action No. 14-394, 2015 WL 5093842, *5 (M.D.La. Aug. 27, 2015)(citing Cuellar
v. Livingston, 321 Fed. Appx. 373, 374 (5th Cir. 2009)). See also, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (The “question
of whether … additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment is indicated is a classic example of a
matter for medical judgment” and is not actionable under Section 1983.)
76
Mendoza, 989 F.2d at 195.
77
Coleman v. Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex, Civ. Action No. 13-4325, 2013 WL 6004051,
*4 (E.D.La. Nov. 13, 2013).

14 

indifference, any Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claims premised on a delay in medical
care must also fail.78
The Court further finds the jurisprudence relied on by Plaintiff to be factually
distinguishable from his case.79 For instance, in Rodrigue v. Morehouse Detention Ctr,80
a Licensed Practical Nurse (“LPN”) failed to perform any physical examination of the
plaintiff-inmate or refer him to a physician after he made persistent complaints of “extreme
abdominal pain and bilious vomiting over a week.”81 The Rodrigue court found that the
LPN knew that inmate’s complaints showed he was at risk of serious harm—acute
appendicitis—and yet still failed to refer the plaintiff to a physician, who could make a
medical diagnosis. The Court stated that “[w]hen a gatekeeper to emergency care, like
[the LPN], knowingly disregards a prisoner’s complaints, she acts with deliberate
indifference to that prison[er]’s medical needs.”82 In its reasoning, the Rodrigue court
further distinguished itself from those cases “where an inmate [sees] a physician and that
physician [makes] an unfortunately incorrect medical decision.”83

In contrast to the

plaintiff in Rodrigue, Wilson was not in a similar emergency care situation. Further, Wilson
has alleged that he was examined and treated by several physicians on several
occasions. Ultimately, Wilson’s case would be more akin to the very case the Rodrigue
court distinguished itself from—one where a physician makes an incorrect medical

78

Easter, 467 F.3d at n. 2 (citing Mendoza, 989 F.2d at 195). See also, Garza v. Harris Cty., Tex., 2011
WL 3925020, *7 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 7, 2011).
79
Plaintiff’s reliance on Bektic-Marrero v. Goldberg, 850 F.Supp.2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2012) is also
misplaced. The only issue the Bektic-Marrero court considered on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds was whether the
defendants were state actors.
80
Rodrigue v. Morehouse Detention Ctr., Civ. Action No. 09-985, 2012 WL 4483438, *6 (W.D.La. Sept. 28,
2012).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.

15 

decision.

For those reasons previously discussed herein, even if Dr. Whitfield, Dr.

Bridges, or Dr. Stuart made incorrect medical decisions—which the Court does not find
today—negligent medical care is not a constitutional violation.84
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Wilson has failed to allege facts
showing that Defendants Whitfield, Bridges, and Stuart acted with deliberate indifference
toward his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.
Because Wilson has not satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, each
of the Defendant Physicians are entitled to have the deliberate indifference claims against
them dismissed based on qualified immunity, and each of their Motions shall be granted
on this ground.
E. Leave to Amend
In each of his Oppositions, Wilson seeks leave to remedy the pleading deficiencies
as to the Defendant Physicians. A district court has discretion to grant a motion to amend,
and leave to amend shall be granted when justice so requires.85 However, a district court
does not abuse its discretion when it denies leave to amend because the amendment
would be futile.86 Wilson has already been permitted file an Amended Complaint, which
was prepared by counsel.87

The 42 page Amended Complaint details with great

specificity the instances in which Dr. Whitfield, Dr. Bridges, and Dr. Stuart each examined
and treated Wilson for his medical complaints while housed at EBRPP. The Court also
finds that the case cited by Plaintiff to support his motion to amend is factually and procedurally
distinguishable from the instant matter. In Public Health Equipment & Supply Co., Inc., v.

84

Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
86
Stripling v. Jordan Production Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2000).
87
Doc. 36.
85

16 

Clarke Mosquito Control Products, Inc.,88 the district court denied plaintiff’s first motion to
amend and, unlike Wilson, the plaintiff “laid out the grounds on which the amendment
should be permitted.”89

Therefore, the Court finds that permitting Wilson another

opportunity to amend his Complaint to remedy the pleading deficiencies at this stage
would be futile.90 Accordingly, Wilson’s request to amend his Complaint is hereby denied.
F. Supplemental Jurisdiction over Remaining State Law Claims
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
state law claims if they raise novel or complex issues of state law, if the claims
substantially predominate over the claim over which the district court has original
jurisdiction, if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction, or for other compelling reasons.91

In the instant case, the Court has

dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction as to Dr. Whitfield, Dr. Bridges,
and Dr. Stuart. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims of negligence and intentional and/or negligent
infliction of emotional distress asserted against Dr. Whitfield, Dr. Bridges, and Dr. Stuart.
These claims shall be dismissed without prejudice.

88

Public Health Equipment & Supply Co., Inc., v. Clarke Mosquito Control Products, Inc., No. 10-50193,
410 Fed.Appx. 738 (5th Cir. 2010).
89
Id. at 740-41.
90
Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014)(“Denying
a motion to amend is not an abuse of discretion if allowing an amendment would be futile.”)(quoting Briggs
v. Miss., 331 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003)).
91
28 U.S.C. § 1367.

17 

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Rani Whitfield’s Motions to Dismiss are hereby

GRANTED IN PART, and DENIED IN PART,92 Dr. Charles Bridges’ Motion to Dismiss
Original and First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
12(b)(6) is hereby GRANTED IN PART, and DENIED IN PART;93 and Dr. Charles Stuart’s
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B)
is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.94
It is hereby ordered that Plaintiff Cornelius Lorenzo Wilson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
deliberate indifference claims brought pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments against Defendants, Dr. Whitfield, Dr. Bridges, and Dr. Michael Stuart are
hereby dismissed with prejudice because each of the Defendants is entitled to qualified
immunity.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff Cornelius Lorenzo Wilson’s state law medical
malpractice claims, negligence claims, and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims against Defendants, Dr. Whitfield, Dr. Bridges, and Dr. Michael Stuart are
hereby dismissed without prejudice.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff Cornelius Lorenzo Wilson’s Motion to Strike is
GRANTED IN PART, and DENIED IN PART.95 The Motion is denied as to striking
Defendant Dr. Stuart’ Motion to Dismiss. The Motion is granted as to sealing Dr. Stuart’s
Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is hereby instructed to file Dr. Stuart’s

92

Doc. 30 and Doc. 39.
Doc. 77.
94
Doc. 86. 
95
Doc. 130.
93

18 

First Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 12(b)(6) and Memorandum in Support of said Motion with attachments under seal.96
It is further ordered that Plaintiff Cornelius Lorenzo Wilson’s second request for
leave to amend his Complaint, is hereby DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on May 31, 2017.

S

JUDGE JAMES J. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

96

Doc. 86. 

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