K&F Restaurant Holdings, Ltd. et al v. Rouse et al

Filing 31

ORDER: Motion to Dismiss 5 for Failure to State a Claim granting in part and denying in part. Motion for Oral Argument 6 is Denied as moot. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 02/02/2017. (ELW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

K&F RESTAURANT HOLDINGS, LTD.
d/b/a IZZO’S ILLEGAL BURRITO; K&F
RESTAURANT OPERATIONS, LLC;
G&O PIZZA HOLDINGS, LTD d/b/a
LIT PIZZA; G &O RESTAURANT
OPPERATIONS, LLC; OSVALDO
FERNANDEZ; and A. GARY KOVACS

CIVIL ACTION
16-293-SDD-EWD

VERSUS
DONALD J. ROUSE, JR.; DONALD J.
ROUSE, SR.; THOMAS B. ROUSE;
ALLISON ROUSE ROYSTER; and
ROUSE’S ENTERPRISES, L.L.C.
RULING

This matter is before the Court on the Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6)1 filed by Defendants, Donald J. Rouse, Jr., Donald J. Rouse, Sr., Thomas B.
Rouse, Allison Rouse Royster, and Rouse’s Enterprises, L.L.C. (“Defendants”). Plaintiffs,
K&F Restaurant Holdings, Ltd., d/b/a Izzo’s Illegal Burrito, K&F Restaurant Operations,
L.L.C., G&O Pizza Holdings, Ltd., d/b/a Lit Pizza, G&O Restaurant Operations, L.L.C.,
Osvaldo Fernandez, and A. Gary Kovacs (“Plaintiffs”), filed an Opposition2 to which
Defendants filed a Reply.3 For the reasons that follow, the Motion4 shall be granted in
part and denied in part.

1

Rec. Doc. 5.
Rec. Doc. 10.
3
Rec. Doc. 23.
4
Rec. Doc. 5.
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2

Page 1 of 14

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND5
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants engaged in unfair trade practices, tortious

interference with a contract, defamation, conversion, trademark infringement, and
conspiracy under Louisiana law.6

Defendants allegedly included in their lease

agreements with various developers a provision which prevented Izzo’s, or any business
owned by Izzo’s holding companies or owners, Osvaldo Fernandez (“Fernandez”) and A.
Gary Kovacs (“Kovacs”), from being located in the same development as Rouse’s.7 The
three lease agreements at issue were executed on June 5, 2013, June 18, 2013, and
February 9, 2015 in the Parishes of East Baton Rouge, Livingston, and Tangipahoa,
respectively.8
Plaintiffs’ colorful assertions against the Defendants include the following
allegations. Plaintiffs “suspect that Defendants lied to the developers, probably making
defamatory statements in order to induce them into executing the [prohibition on leasing
property to Izzo’s or any company owned by Plaintiffs].”9 “The Rouse family, each and
every one, hates Izzo’s for catching Rouse’s with its hand in the cookie jar.”10 The heated
relationship between the parties began when Izzo’s became aware that an employee of
Defendants had in his possession an Izzo's recipe book at a Rouse’s location.11
Defendants’ alleged hatred for Plaintiffs allegedly inspired them to “destroy Izzo’s” which,
Plaintiffs posit, lead to “a conscious meeting wherein the Rouse family members spoke

5

The Court bases the factual background on Rec. Docs. 1-1, 5, 10, 23.
Rec. Doc. 5.
7
Rec. Doc. 10.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
The Court notes that Plaintiffs took no legal action relating to the burrito recipe book incident. See Rec.
Doc. 5.
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6

openly about how to retaliate against Izzo’s and doing the most damage.”12 Defendants
were allegedly so enflamed by their hatred for Plaintiffs that “Plaintiffs suspect that
Defendants lied to the developers, probably making defamatory statements, in order to
induce them into executing the sweeping discriminatory provisions.”13
Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have infringed on Izzo’s “Roll Your Own”
trademark and began to use a similar slogan, “Build your own.” According to Plaintiffs,
this was done “to cause confusion in the market and to take away the good will that Izzo’s
had created with its good name.”14
This matter was originally filed in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the State
of Louisiana, Parish of East Baton Rouge on April 15, 2016 and was removed to this
Court on April 29, 2016.15 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants now seek to dismiss
the following claims: Violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law (“LUTPA”) – Count I; Violation of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 –
Count II; Tortious Interference with a Contract – Count II A; Product Defamation – Count
II B; Civil Conversion – Count II C, Trademark Infringement under Louisiana Law – Count
III; and Conspiracy – Count IV.

12

Rec. Doc. 10.
Id.
14
Id.
15
This case was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446, and 1331. “Defendants also reserve their
right to assert 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) as a basis of removal if discovery reveals it to be appropriate.” Rec.
Doc. 1.
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13

II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-

pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”16 The
Court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into
the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”17 “To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”18 In Twombly, the United States Supreme
Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”19 A complaint is also insufficient if it
merely “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”20 However,
“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”21 In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than

16

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Martin K. Eby Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
17
Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dorsey v. Portfolio
Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)).
18
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas
Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d at 467).
19
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and brackets omitted)
(hereinafter Twombly).
20
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted)
(hereinafter “Iqbal”).
21
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.”22 “Furthermore, while the
court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable
to the plaintiff.’”23 On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”24
B. LUTPA Claim
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated LUTPA because Defendants’ “acts
and practices…in concert with various developers and potentially other parties were all
conducted with the sole intent to cause economic damage” to Plaintiffs.25 In their Motion
to Dismiss, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ LUTPA claims are time barred as the
peremption period to file a LUTPA claim has lapsed.26 As this case presents a Louisiana
state law claim, the Court relies on Louisiana jurisprudence to analyze the claim
presented.27
Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that LUTPA is subject to a one year peremptive
period calculated from the date on which the alleged unfair trade practice occurred.28 The
alleged acts that violated LUTPA were the restrictive covenants contained in the lease
agreements dated June 18, 2013, June 5, 2013, and February 9, 2015.29 The case was
filed on April 15, 2016, well beyond the one year peremptive period act. Plaintiffs argue

22

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire
Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).
24
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d
209 (1986)).
25
Rec. Doc. 1-1.
26
Rec. Doc. 5.
27
See Shakeri v. ADT Sec. Services, Inc., 816 F.3d 283, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2016); “In resolving issues of
state law we are bound to apply the law as interpreted by the state’s highest court.”(internal citations
omitted).
28
See Rec Docs. 5 and 10.
29
Rec. Doc. 5.
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23

the strict peremption should not apply because “it is well settled that the continuing
violation doctrine applies to the LUTPA peremptive period, and one year has not passed
since the last alleged act.”30
While the Fifth Circuit has held that the continuing violation can be applied to a
LUTPA claim,31 the party arguing for the continuing violation doctrine must prove why it
merits application.32 Plaintiffs’ assertion that the “Court need only look at the various
general allegations set forth in paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs Petition to see that the alleged
violations of LUTPA are continuing…” does not automatically give rise to the application
of the continuing violation doctrine and is a “legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation” that the United States Supreme Court held cannot survive a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss.33
Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs had plead their LUTPA continuing violation doctrine
in a legally sufficient manner, the continuing violation doctrine is still inapplicable to the
present case. In applying the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Tubos de Acero de Mexico, S.A. v.
American International Investment Corp., Inc., Louisiana Federal District Courts have
held that “a continuing violation is occasioned by unlawful acts, not the continuation of the
ill effects of the original wrongful act.”34 The “continued existence of these discriminatory
provisions,”35 which Plaintiffs argue merits the application of the continuing violation

30

Rec. Doc. 10.
Tubos de Acero de Mexcio, S.A. v. American Intern. Inv. Corp., Inc., 292 F.3d 471, 482-83 (5th Cir. 2002).
32
See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. V. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 886 (5th Cir. 2002).
33
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d
209 (1986)).
34
Naquin v. Berryland Campers, LLC., No. 14-2133, 2014 WL 6981944, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 2014);
quoting Crump v. Sabine River Auth., 98-2326 (La. 9/17/99); 737 So.2d 720, 728; Tubos de Acero de
Mexcio, S.A. 292 F.3d at 483.
35
Rec. Doc. 10.
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31

doctrine, is precisely the type of pseudo-LUTPA continuing violation that Louisiana
Federal District Courts have held does not merit application of the continuing violation
doctrine.36 The alleged wrongful acts occurred on June 18, 2013, June 5, 2013, and
February 9, 2015.37 The fact that Plaintiffs continue to be impacted by the “ill effects”38
of the juridical acts does not merit application of the continued violation doctrine.
In support of their continuing violation theory, Plaintiffs point to the “continued
existence of these discriminatory provisions.”39 However, for the reasons stated above,
this proposition has not been recognized as an act meriting the application of the
continuing violation doctrine to a LUTPA claim under applicable jurisprudence.40
Plaintiffs’ inartful attempt to recast which act violates LUTPA is contrary to the
jurisprudence of Louisiana federal district courts that have examined when the continuing
violation doctrine saves a LUTPA claim on a 12(b)(6) motion.41 Accordingly, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ LUTPA claim – Count I is GRANTED.42
C. Tortious Interference With a Contract Claim
Plaintiffs’ mislabeled tortious interference with a contract claim, per Plaintiffs’ own
admission, is actually a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ actions “have tortuously [sic] interfered and continue to

36

See supra note 34.
Rec. Doc. 1-1.
38
Naquin, 2014 WL 6981944, at *3.
39
Rec. Doc. 10.
40
Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that the “act” to calculate the LUTPA peremptive period is the denial of lease
that occurred on March 15, 2016. However, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the denial of the lease on March
15, 2016 was “by virtue of the June 18, 2013 lease agreement.” Rec. Doc. 10. By Plaintiffs’ own admission,
the March 15, 2016 incident is an ill effect originating “by virtue” of the June 18, 2013 lease agreement.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ bid to redefine the act does not escape the peremptive period,
as the March 15, 2016 is but an ill effect of the June 18, 2013 lease agreement.
41
See supra note 38.
42
As Plaintiffs’ LUPTA claim has prescribed, the Court need not reach the merits of Plaintiffs LUTPA
complaint.
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37

tortuously interfere with lawful business relationships between Izzo’s and its partners and
other developers.”43 While “Louisiana courts have recognized a cause of action for
tortious interference with business,”44 Louisiana jurisprudence has viewed [tortious
interference with a business relationship] with disfavor.”45 Notably, Plaintiffs must plead
that Defendants had actual malice, “a showing of spite or ill will,”46 which resulted in the
Defendants “improperly influenc[ing] others not to do business” with the Plaintiffs.47
Once again, Plaintiffs support their pleading with the conclusory statement that
Defendants “have harbored significant and substantial malice towards Izzo’s as a result
of the incident from February of 2012.”48 The statement that Defendants had malice is a
“legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”49 which this Court finds cannot survive
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.50 Puzzlingly, Plaintiffs have failed to specifically identify
which of Defendants’ acts and practices interfered with Plaintiffs’ business relationships.
Plaintiffs’ speculation as to the Defendants’ state of mind is not factual pleading.
Consequently, the Court is left “strain[ing] to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.”51

43

Rec. Doc. 1-1.
Junior Money Bags, Ltd. V. Segal, 970 F.2d 1, 10 (5th Cir. 1992); citing Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp.,
660 F.2d 594, 601 (5th Cir. 1981).
45
JCD Mktg. Co v. Bass Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 2001-1096, (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/6/2002); 812 So.2d 834, 841.
46
Id.
47
Junior Money Bags, 970 F.2d at 10.
48
Rec. Doc. 1-1.
49
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d
209 (1986)).
50
Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead this claim in comportment with
jurisprudence from the United States Supreme Court, the Court need not examine Defendants’ arguments
regarding prescription.
51
Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire
Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).
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44

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss52 Plaintiffs’ Tortious Interference with
a Contract Claim – Count II A is GRANTED.
D. Plaintiffs’ Product Defamation Claim
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that the “various aforementioned acts and practices
by [Defendants] constituted and continue to constitute defamation of Izzo’s and its
partners’ product and name.”53 Again, Plaintiffs have failed to label their claim properly;
their Opposition54 states that they allege both “defamation and disparagement,” but their
Complaint only contains a claim for “product defamation.”55 Nevertheless, the Court will
examine whether Plaintiffs have plead a valid claim for product defamation and product
disparagement.
To successfully prove a defamation claim in Louisiana, a plaintiff must prove all of
the following: “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an
unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the
publisher and (4) resulting injury.”56 To the first requirement, a false and defamatory
statement concerning another, Plaintiffs concede that they have no specific examples of
a false and defamatory statement concerning another, but “common sense permits the
conclusion that the facts are there.”57 Plaintiffs merely “suspect that Defendants lied to
the developers, probably making defamatory statements, in order to induce them into

52
The Court has considered the arguments made by Defendants regarding the standard for an interference
with a contract claim under Louisiana law and the prescriptive period for a breach of contract claim. Given
that Plaintiffs acknowledge in their Opposition that their interference with a contract claim is actually an
interference with a business relationship claim, which Defendants failed to acknowledge in their Reply, the
Court finds Defendants’ arguments in their memorandum in support of their Motion moot.
53
Rec Doc. 1-1.
54
Rec Doc. 10.
55
Rec. Doc. 1-1.
56
Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 98-2313 (La. 6/29/99); 737 So.2d 706, 715.
57
Rec. Doc. 10.
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executing the sweeping discriminatory provisions.”58

Furthermore, “Plaintiffs simply

cannot imagine that the developers would be willing cohorts of Defendants.”59 Plaintiffs’
supposition and suspicion that Defendants made a false and defamatory statement
absent any concrete specific factual allegation based on actual knowledge that any
statement was made by Defendants is a “naked assertion devoid of further factual
enhancement.”60 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met the most basic
pleading requirements to state a claim of product defamation, and Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ product defamation claim is GRANTED.
To succeed on a product disparagement claim, a plaintiff must plead: “publication,
with malice, of false allegations concerning the property or product, and the causing of
pecuniary harm.”61

For the same reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs offer only

conjecture and speculation that Defendants made, or published, any statement regarding
Plaintiffs. Accordingly, without any “factual enhancement” for their “naked assertion” that
Defendants disparaged their product,62 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ product
disparagement claim is GRANTED.
E. Conversion Claim
Plaintiffs’ Complaint also contains a claim for civil conversion.63 Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for conversion.64 Plaintiffs offer no response in
opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the conversion claim. Under local rule 7(f)

58

Id.
Id.
60
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
61
Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990).
62
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
63
Rec. Doc. 1-1.
64
Rec. Doc. 5.
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of the Middle District of Louisiana, all memorandum in opposition to a motion shall contain
a concise statement of reasons in opposition to the motion. Therefore, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss the conversion claim is deemed to be unopposed and, further, after
reviewing the record, the Court finds that the Motion has merit.65
Accordingly, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ conversion claim - Count
II C is GRANTED.
F. Louisiana Trademark Infringement Claim
Plaintiffs’ Complaint states that Defendants violated the Louisiana Trademark
statute, “because [Defendants’] use of Izzo’s proprietary information is intended to and is
likely to cause confusion or mistake and is intended to and has deceived consumers as
to the source of origin of such goods or services.”66 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs
“make only conclusory allegations regarding Defendants’ use of trademark” and that
“Plaintiffs have not plea[d] facts sufficient to show that they have a substantive right in the
mark permitting them to assert a claim against Defendants for their use of the same.”67
Plaintiffs counter that “it is undisputed that Izzo’s Illegal Burrito has long enjoyed the
Tradename ‘Roll Your Own’ as a part of the Burrito restaurant concept.”68
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Gulf Coast Bank v. Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co.
held: “the primary issues in a trade name infringement case are: (1) whether the party
seeking the injunction has a protectable proprietary right in the name it seeks to exclude

65

See, e.g., Servicios Azucareros de Venezuela, C.A. v. John Deere Thibodeaux, Inc., 702 F.3d 794, 806
(5th Cir. 2012) [“The] failure to oppose a 12(b)(6) motion is not in itself grounds for granting the motion.
Rather, a court assesses the legal sufficiency of the complaint.“); Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918
(5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); John v. La. (Bd. of Trustees), 757 F.2d 698, 709 (5th Cir. 1985).
66
Rec. Doc. 1-1.
67
Rec. Doc. 5.
68
Rec. Doc. 10.
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others from using, and (2) if so, whether there has been an infringement of that right.”69
The Court must first examine whether Plaintiffs had a “protectable right” in the trade name
“Roll Your Own” “such that it may exclude others from using it.”70 Plaintiffs allege that it
has “long enjoyed the tradename ‘Roll Your Own’” thus establishing a “protectable
property right in its name such that it may exclude others from using it.”71 “Use alone,
however, does not create a protectable proprietary interest; the trademark or name must
be distinctive, either by being inherently distinctive or by having acquired distinctiveness
through secondary meaning.”72 The Court declines to make a determination on the
inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the trade name “Roll Your Own” as it is
inappropriate for the Court to make factual determinations on a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint specifically states that the use of the term “Build Your Own”
was used to “cause confusion or mistake and is intended to and has deceived consumers
as to the course of origin of such goods or services.”73 This specifically meets the second
requirement outlined in Gulf Coast Bank – “an infringement on [Izzo’s protectable
proprietary right].”74
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Louisiana Trademark claim
– Count III is DENIED.
G. Civil Conspiracy Claim
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges “Defendants are liable in solido to Plaintiffs for any and
all damages resulting from their acts of conspiracy which have caused damage to

69

94-2203 (La. 1994); 652 So.2d 1306, 1309.
Id. at 1313.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Rec. Doc. 1-1.
74
652 So.2d at 1309.
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Plaintiffs and for any amounts by which Defendants have been unjustly enriched in
connection therewith.”75 Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs’ claim for civil conspiracy fails
for lack of an underlying tort.”76 Plaintiffs counter:
Clearly, after Rouses’s was caught with the Izzo’s recipe
book, Rouse became extremely upset and determined to
destroy Izzo’s. Consequently, there was a conscious meeting
wherein the Rouse family members spoke openly about how
to retaliate against Izzo’s and doing [sic] the most damage.
Rouse’s concluded that the perfect vindication would be to
have third parties to do business with Izzo’s, or its affiliates, in
perpetuity.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Ross v. Conoco, Inc., held, “the actionable element in a
claim [under the civil conspiracy statute] is not the conspiracy itself, but rather the tort
which the conspirators agreed to perpetrate and which they actually commit in whole or
in part.”77 Plaintiffs’ Complaint is vague and conclusory and whether Defendants’ actions
were “acts of conspiracy” is a legal conclusion which the United States Supreme Court
held in Twombly78 cannot survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for civil conspiracy – Count IV is GRANTED.

75

Rec. Doc. 1-1.
Rec. Doc. 5.
77
02-0299 (La. 2002); 828 So.2d 546, 553.
78
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
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III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant

to FRCP 12(b)(6)79 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants’ motion
to dismiss the LUTPA claim is granted, and this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
as prescribed. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims of tortious interference
with a business relationship, product defamation and/or disparagement, civil conversion,
and conspiracy is granted, and these claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Louisiana trademark claim is DENIED.
Furthermore, Defendants’ Motion for Oral Argument80 is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on February 2, 2017. 

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

79

Rec. Doc. 53.
Rec. Doc. 6.
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