Aucoin v. Cupil et al

Filing 81

RULING AND ORDER granting 78 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Andrew Cupil, Reginald Robinson. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A separate Final Judgment shall issue in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Signed by Judge Brian A. Jackson on 12/4/2018. (SWE)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAYNE AUCOIN

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
ANDREW CUPIL, ET AL.

NO.: 16-00373-BAJ-RLB
RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 78) Plaintiff’s claims
as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). For the reasons that follow, in
addition to those stated in Court on the record on November 27, 2018, the Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 78) is construed as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings and is GRANTED.

I.

BACKGROUND
This is an excessive-force case. (Docs. 13). Plaintiff Layne Aucoin is an inmate who

was incarcerated at Dixon Correctional Institute in Jackson, Louisiana. (Id.). He sued
Lieutenant Andrew Cupil and Master Sergeant Reginald Robinson, guards at Dixon
Correctional Institute, alleging they sprayed him with mace and then kicked and
punched him when he was restrained. (Id.). On the morning of trial, Defendants invoked
Heck and moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.1

The Court is troubled by Defendants’ failure to raise the Heck defense until the morning of trial of
this two-and-a-half year old case. The failure is inexcusable: the disciplinary records forming the basis
of Defendants’ Heck defense were available to Defendants at the motion to dismiss and summary
judgment stages. The Court will issue a separate order directing counsel for Defendants to show cause
why the Louisiana Department of Justice - Litigation Division should not be assessed the cost of
assembling the venire.
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The incident happened on August 24, 2015. (Doc. 13 at ¶ 5). That morning,
Plaintiff was an inmate on suicide watch at Dixon Correctional Institute. (Id. at ¶ 7).
Around 11:00 A.M., Plaintiff placed a paper cup over a video camera in his prison cell to
see if anyone was watching him. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Master Sergeant Robinson
and Lieutenant Cupil then “snuck up” on him in his cell, sprayed him with mace, and
beat him after he had been restrained. (Id. at ¶ 8). Plaintiff sued Defendants for
negligence and for using excessive force against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Docs. 1, 13).
The day after the incident, Dixon Correctional Institute issued two disciplinary
reports against Plaintiff.2 (Docs. 33-13, 33-14). The reports charged Plaintiff with
“defiance,” “aggravated disobedience,” and “destruction of property” for his conduct on
the morning of August 24, 2015. (Doc. 33-13). According to the reports, Plaintiff disobeyed
Master Sergeant Robinson’s direct orders to uncover the camera in Plaintiff’s cell, spat
on Master Sergeant Robinson, and yelled expletives at both Defendants. (Docs. 33-13, 3314). The reports reflect that the Dixon Correction Institute held disciplinary hearings on
the charges on September 2, 2015 and September 4, 2015, and that Plaintiff was found
guilty of two counts of “defiance,” two counts of “aggravated disobedience,” and one count
of “property destruction.” (Id.). The reports also reflect that Plaintiff’s disciplinary
convictions resulted in his loss of 30 days of good-time credit. (Id.).
Now, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Heck. (Doc. 78).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck because success on the

The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s disciplinary convictions because the convictions are facts
that are not subject to reasonable dispute and that can be accurately and readily determined from
documents whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. FED. R. EVID. 201(b); see also Gray v.
Erfe, No. 3:13-CV-39-JBA, 2015 WL 3581230, at *2 (D. Conn. June 5, 2015) (taking judicial notice of
prison records); Martinez v. New York State Dep’t of Corr., No. 12-CV-1499-RWS, 2013 WL 5194054,
at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013) (same).
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claims would imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s disciplinary convictions. (Doc. 78-1 at p.
4). Plaintiff disagrees.3 (Doc. 79). He argues that Heck does not apply because his suit
does not challenge his disciplinary convictions or his loss of good-time credit.4 (Id.).

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed

but early enough not to delay trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Entry of judgment on the
pleadings is proper if the material facts are not in dispute and the Court can render
judgment on the merits by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially
noticed facts. Linicomn v. Hill, 902 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2018).

III.

DISCUSSION
The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s suit if judgment in his favor would necessarily

imply the invalidity of the prison disciplinary convictions that resulted in his loss of 30
days of good-time credit.5 Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th
Cir. 1998) (en banc) (a “conviction” under Heck includes “a ruling in a prison disciplinary
proceeding that results in a change to the prisoner’s sentence, including the loss of goodtime credits”).

As purported support for his argument that Heck does not apply, Plaintiff cites two report and
recommendations in which United States Magistrate Judges recommended that district courts dismiss
prisoner-plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims under Heck. See Swafford v. Cain, No. 13-CV-788-JWD-RLB, 2014
WL 4418537, at *5 (M.D. La. Sept. 8, 2014); Spann v. Strain, No. 16-CV-4126, 2016 WL 7626574, at
*13 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 2016).

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Plaintiff does not argue that Defendants’ Motion is untimely. (Doc. 79). Nor can he. A defendant does
not waive a Heck defense by failing to raise it in a responsive pleading; to the contrary, a defendant
may raise the defense by motion at trial. Walker v. Munsell, 281 F. App’x 388, 389 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam).
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The pleadings and judicially-noticeable facts confirm that Plaintiff’s disciplinary convictions have not
been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . .
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
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A.

Excessive Force

To succeed on his excessive-force claim, Plaintiff would have to show that
Defendants used force against him “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
Plaintiff’s prison disciplinary proceedings found that Lieutenant Cupil sprayed
Plaintiff with a one-second burst of a chemical agent only after Plaintiff (1) disobeyed
direct orders to come to the bars of his cell to be restrained; (2) spat on Master Sergeant
Robinson’s face; (3) attempted to flood his prison cell by placing his gown in the toilet; (4)
yelled expletives in response to Lieutenant Cupil’s direct orders; and (5) yelled expletives
in response to Master Sergeant Robinson’s direct orders. (Docs. 33-13, 33-14).
A finding that Defendants used force against Plaintiff “maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm,” rather than in a “good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline,” would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s disciplinary convictions.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendants used excessive force against
him — specifically, that Defendants use of force was not in “a good-faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline” — without invalidating the factual findings incorporated into
Plaintiff’s prison disciplinary convictions.6 (Docs. 33-13, 33-14). Thus, the pleadings and
the judicially-noticeable facts contained in Plaintiff’s disciplinary reports confirm that
Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim is barred by Heck. See Jackson v. Mizzel, 361 F. App’x
622, 625 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of prisoner plaintiff’s § 1983
claim under Heck because success on plaintiff’s claim would imply the invalidity of prison

6 Plaintiff focuses on the labels he assigned to the relief he requests. (Doc. 79). He asserts that because
his complaints seek only damages, and not the return of good-time credits, Heck cannot apply. (Id.).
Plaintiff’s focus is misplaced. Heck’s application does not turn on a plaintiff’s characterization of his
requested relief; it turns on the effect of a judgment in his favor incorporating that relief—specifically,
whether that judgment would imply the invalidity of the underlying disciplinary conviction. See
Jackson, 361 F. App’x at 625.

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disciplinary convictions that resulted in his loss of good-time credits). Because the
pleadings and judicially-noticeable facts show that Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim is
barred by Heck, Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s
excessive-force claim.7 See Linicomn, 902 F.3d at 533.

B.

Negligence

To succeed on his negligence claim, Plaintiff would have to show that Defendants
acted unreasonably under the totality of the circumstances. See Duncan v. Kansas City
Southern Rwy. Co., 2000-0066, p. 4 (La. 10/30/00); 773 So. 2d 670, 675 (stating the
elements of a negligence claim under Louisiana’s duty/risk formulation). The factual
findings incorporated into Plaintiff’s disciplinary convictions and detailed above show
that Defendants responded reasonably to Plaintiff’s violation of prison rules. (Docs. 3313, 33-14). A finding that Defendants acted unreasonably would necessarily imply the
invalidity of Plaintiff’s disciplinary convictions. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Thus, the
pleadings and judicially-noticeable facts contained in Plaintiff’s disciplinary reports
confirm that Plaintiff’s negligence claim is barred by Heck.8 Because the pleadings and
judicially-noticeable facts show that Plaintiff’s negligence claim is barred by Heck,
Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the claim. See Linicomn, 902
F.3d at 533.

7 Plaintiff’s position finds no support in Causey v. Poret, No. 07-CV-238-FJP-SCR, 2007 WL 2701969,
at *1 (M.D. La. Aug. 23, 2007). There—unlike here—the prisoner plaintiff did not lose any good-time
credit as a result of the disciplinary violations. Id. at *4.

Plaintiff has not argued that Heck’s application is limited to § 1983 claims. And even if he had, the
argument lacks merit: the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has applied Heck to
state-law claims, Thomas v. La. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 406 F. App’x 890, 897-898 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam), and affirmed a district court’s dismissal of state-law claims under Heck. DeLeon v. City of
Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 652 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007). District courts have followed suit. See, e.g.,
Tickner v. City of Shreveport, No. 14-CV-2679, 2017 WL 629226, at *4 (W.D. La. Feb. 15, 2017);
Lavergne v. Martinez, 2014 WL 897837, at *5 n.2 (W.D. La. Mar. 6, 2014).
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IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 78), construed as

a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. A separate Final Judgment shall issue in accordance with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 4th day of December, 2018.
_____________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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