Carroll v. SGS North America, Inc.

Filing 104

RULING denying 93 MOTION for Temporary Stay Pending Resolution of FCC Proceedings. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 5/9/2019. (SGO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TAYLOR CARROLL, individually
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

16-537-SDD-RLB

SGS AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Temporary Stay Pending
Resolution of FCC Proceedings1 filed by Defendant, SGS Automotive Services, Inc.
(“SGS”). Plaintiff Taylor Carroll (“Carroll”) has filed an Opposition,2 to which SGS filed a
Reply.3 For the following reasons, the Defendant’s Motion shall be denied.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
In 2016, Carroll filed suit individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals,

alleging that SGS violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) when it sent
pre-recorded calls to his cell phone without his consent. With discovery now complete
and a proposed class not yet certified, SGS contends that a stay is necessary because
Carroll’s Third Amended Complaint “raises several issues that are currently awaiting
interpretation and/or potential rulemaking by the Federal Communications Commission
which would directly affect this Court’s consideration of certification of any class and be
dispositive of Carroll’s claims on the merits.”5 Carroll disagrees, arguing that 1) the FCC’s

1

Rec. Doc. No. 93.
Rec. Doc. No. 100.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 103.
4
For a full factual discussion of the case, see the Court’s Ruling at Rec. Doc. 40.
5
Rec. Doc. 93-1, p. 1.
2

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pending rulemaking would not address an issue that is necessary to decide the case; 2)
this Court has already ruled on the issue that SGS contends is disputed; and 3) the stay
is unreasonable because it would be of unlimited duration.
II.

LAW
A district court has the inherent power to stay its proceedings. This power to stay

is “incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes
on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”6 This
is best accomplished by the “exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests
and maintain an even balance.”7 When determining whether to exercise its discretion to
stay proceedings, relevant factors for the Court to consider include: (1) the potential
prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the hardship and inequity to the moving party if the
action is not stayed; and (3) judicial economy.
When a stay is sought pending the outcome of a regulatory matter, the court “must
weigh the benefits of obtaining the agency's aid against the need to resolve the litigation
expeditiously.”8 The ultimate question is “whether a case raises issues of fact not within
the conventional experience of judges, but within the purview of an agency's
responsibilities.”9 “The advisability of invoking primary jurisdiction is greatest when the
issue is already before the agency.”10 The expected duration of the stay is also relevant.
“Before granting a stay pending the resolution of another case, the court must carefully
consider the time reasonably expected for resolution . . . ‘stay orders will be reversed

6

Landis v. No. American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
Id. at 254–55.
8
Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1988).
9
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 673 (2003).
10
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 532 F.2d 412, 420 (5th Cir.1976).
7

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when they are found to be immoderate or of an indefinite duration.’”11
III.

ANALYSIS
After reviewing the parties’ Memoranda on the instant Motion, the Court finds that

the question of a stay in this matter has two facets: first, is a stay necessary? And second,
is a stay reasonable under the circumstances? Arguing for the necessity of a stay, SGS
contends that this Court should aim to “avoid judicial uncertainty”12 by invoking the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, under which courts can elect to abstain from ruling on a
matter that is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a governmental agency or a
matter that would benefit from the agency’s superior expertise. “Without a stay,” SGS
argues, “this Court runs the risk of issuing a decision that can be immediately overridden
by the FCC and perhaps, depending on the circumstances, result in prejudice to class
members.”13 Specifically, SGS fears that this Court would certify a class based on one
definition of consent to receive calls, only to be faced with an FCC ruling that would “result
in a need to reconsider any certification of a class and/or reconstitute and re-notice a
class.”14 In SGS’s view, that process would be costly, confusing, and possibly prejudicial
to potential class members.
By contrast, Carroll argues that “there is little benefit to awaiting the FCC’s
determination, as the issues before it are neither present in this case nor outside the
Court’s competence.”15 Because the putative class definition is limited to “[a]ll persons or

11

Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir.1983).
Rec. Doc. No. 93-1, p. 11.
13
Rec. Doc. No. 93-1, p. 11.
14
Rec. Doc. No. 93-1, p. 11.
15
Rec. Doc. No. 100, p. 8.
12

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entities in the United States who received an artificial or prerecorded message”16 during
a specified timeframe, the FCC’s adjudication of various issues, including an
interpretation of what constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system or what
constitutes an advertising or dual purpose call, “is neither an issue in this case nor does
SGS explain how it would be outside the Court’s own common sense or conventional
knowledge.”17 In fact, Carroll notes, this Court has already made a finding, in its denial of
SGS’s Motion for Summary Judgment, that the robocalls received by Carroll had a dual
purpose of customer service and solicitation.18
The Court finds that SGS’s argument that a stay is necessary is speculative. It
presumes that: a) the FCC will rule on the issues raised in its Petition at all; b) the FCC’s
ruling will have problematic implications for the class certification process in this Court;
and c) any FCC action will come in a timely manner, such that a stay would not unduly
prejudice the progress of this litigation. The delays inherent in agency action and the rulemaking process bear upon the reasonableness of a stay. Although SGS claims that “the
FCC appears prepared to soon provide clear guidance,”19 Carroll points out that “the
process can take, and previously has taken, years,”20 citing a number of cases where
district courts declined to issue a stay because of the indefinite, and often slow, nature of
the FCC rulemaking process. In any event, because of the realities of this Court’s docket,
nearly five months have already elapsed since SGS filed the instant Motion. If the FCC
does indeed provide a relevant ruling “soon,” there is no reason why the class certification

16

Rec. Doc. No. 100, p. 3.
Rec. Doc. No. 100, p, 7.
18
See Rec. Doc. No. 40, p. 7.
19
Rec. Doc. No. 93-1, p. 13.
20
Rec. Doc. No. 100, p. 8.
17

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process cannot respond to that new guidance.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, SGS’s Motion for Temporary Stay Pending Resolution of

FCC Proceedings21 shall be DENIED. This matter is hereby referred back to the
Magistrate Judge to set necessary deadlines.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on May 9, 2019.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

21

Rec. Doc. No. 93.

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