Carroll v. SGS North America, Inc.

Filing 257

RULING denying 238 Motion to Alter, Amend or Reconsider Ruling on Daubert Motion to Exclude Class Expert. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 6/22/2021. (EDC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TAYLOR CARROLL
CIVIL ACTION
16-537-SDD-RLB

VERSUS
SGS AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.
RULING

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Alter, Amend or Reconsider Ruling
on Daubert Motion to Exclude Class Expert1 filed by Plaintiff Taylor Carroll (“Carroll”).
Defendant SGS North America, Inc. (“SGS”) filed an Opposition,2 to which Carroll filed a
Reply.3 For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Carroll’s Motion4 shall be DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND
On November 30, 2020, the Court granted SGS’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Class

Expert,5 finding that the report of Carroll’s proffered expert witness, Anya Verkhovskaya
(“Verkhovskaya”), should be excluded because her “methodology [was] insufficiently
reliable and of limited utility.”6 Carroll now urges the Court to reconsider that ruling
because the Court excluded Verkhovskaya’s report in its entirety when, in Carroll’s view,
“certain aspects of [the] report were not challenged,”7 including her “conclusions related
to sorting and filtering data.”8 SGS opposes the motion, arguing that it “fails to address
the procedural standard required to justify reconsideration, much less show that the

1

Rec. Doc. No. 238.
Rec. Doc. No. 244.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 251.
4
Rec. Doc. No. 238.
5
Rec. Doc. No. 232.
6
Id. at p. 11.
7
Rec. Doc. No. 238, p. 1.
8
Id.
2

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applicable legal standard has been met.”9 After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the
applicable law, the Court agrees with SGS.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
a. Motions for Reconsideration
Although it has been noted that the Federal Rules “do not recognize a ‘motion for

reconsideration’ in haec verba,”10 the Fifth Circuit has “consistently recognized that such
a motion may challenge a judgment or order under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
54(b) [or] 59(e) . . .”11 Because the Court’s granting of SGS’s Daubert Motion was not a
final judgment, Rule 54(b) is the proper standard to apply.12
Rule 54(b) provides that:
[A]ny order or other decision . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties does not end the
action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties'
rights and liabilities.
Accordingly, under Rule 54(b), “a court retains jurisdiction over all the claims in a suit and
may alter any earlier decision at its discretion until final judgment has been issued on a
claim or on the case as a whole.”13
Compared to the “stricter”14 analysis required by Rule 59(e), “[d]istrict courts have
considerable discretion in deciding whether to reconsider an interlocutory order”15 under

9

Rec. Doc. No. 244, p. 1.
Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167,173 (5th Cir. 1990).
11
Lightfoot v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 2012 WL 711842, *2 (E.D. La. 2012).
12
See Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017)(“Because the district court was not
asked to reconsider a judgment, the district court’s denial of Austin’s motion to reconsider its order denying
leave to file a surreply should have been considered under Rule 54(b)”).
13
Livingston Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475 (M.D. La.
2002).
14
Adams v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of the United
States & Canada, AFL-CIO, Loc. 198, 495 F. Supp. 3d 392, 395 (M.D. La. 2020).
15
Keys v. Dean Morris, LLP, 2013 WL 2387768, *1 (M.D. La. 2013).
10

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54(b). “However, this broad discretion must be exercised sparingly in order to forestall the
perpetual reexamination of orders and the resulting burdens and delays.”16 Therefore,
“rulings should only be reconsidered where the moving party has presented substantial
reasons for reconsideration.”17 “There are three major grounds justifying reconsideration:
(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3)
the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”18
b. Analysis
Because no evidentiary developments or changes in the law are discussed
whatsoever, the Court assumes that Carroll’s argument for reconsideration relies upon
the third basis provided by Rule 54(b): clear error. That being said, Carroll does not argue
that this Court committed clear error; the word “error” does not appear in his Motion or
Memorandum in Support (though “clear error” is alleged in the Reply19). He instead opines
that it was “unfair to completely exclude [Verkhovskaya’s] testimony”20 and suggests that
“an appropriate resolution”21 would be an amended Ruling.
The Court rejects the premise that it erred by allegedly exceeding the bounds of
the relief sought by SGS in its Daubert Motion. Carroll makes much of the Court’s
statement in its Ruling that the “process of sorting numbers from the call logs into wireless
or home numbers is not, for the most part, called into question by SGS.”22 This statement
was not, however, intended to delineate the scope of the relief requested; it only served

16

Southern Snow Mfg. Co., Inc. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 548, 564–65 (E.D. La. 2013).
State of La. v. Sprint Communications Co., 899 F. Supp. 282, 284 (M.D. La. Sept. 8, 1995).
18
J.M.C. v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ, 584 F. Supp. 2d 894, 896 (M.D. La. 2008)
(quoting Shields v. Shetler, 120 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Colo. 1988)).
19
Rec. Doc. No. 251.
20
Rec. Doc. No. 238-1, p. 3.
21
Id.
22
Rec. Doc. No. 232, p. 9.
17

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to note that the parties’ briefing was mostly focused on other topics, namely,
Verkhovskaya’s proffered methodology for matching telephone numbers to names.23
Similarly, the Court stated in its Ruling on the Motion to Certify Class that “[t]he bulk of
the briefing on the instant Motion revolves around the ascertainability of potential class
members.”24 This did not mean that the other factors for class certification were irrelevant
or not before the Court, just as the Court’s statement that SGS’s Daubert Motion focused
primarily on Verkhovskaya’s name-matching methodology did not mean that only that
portion of her report was the subject of the motion.
It is abundantly clear that SGS sought the exclusion of Verkhovskaya’s report and
testimony in their entirety. SGS’s Memorandum in Support states that “[h]er report and
testimony should be stricken under Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.”25 And several of SGS’s arguments addressed Verkhovskaya’s credibility and
qualifications overall, not any particular aspects of her report.26 Moreover, the Court’s
analysis and conclusions clearly considered Verkhovskaya’s process in globo. The
finding that “her proposed methodology is neither ‘expert’ nor clearly reliable,”27 for
example, applies with equal force to her name-matching and to her “sorting and filtering.”
Even if SGS only moved for the exclusion of parts of Verkhovskaya’s report and
testimony, this Court would have been within its power to exclude it all. It is a well-worn
principle that courts have has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit expert opinion

23

The Court notes that the presence of the phrase “for the most part” clearly indicates that the sorting
process was challenged to some extent by SGS, though it was not the primary focus of the motion.
24
Rec. Doc. No. 234, p. 2.
25
Rec. Doc. No. 126-1, p. 2.
26
See, e.g., SGS’s argument that she lacked expert qualifications (Rec. Doc. No. 126-1, p. 8) and its
argument that she made misrepresentations to the Court about her prior admissions as an expert (Id. at p.
17 et seq).
27
Rec. Doc. No. 232, p. 16.

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testimony.28 This Court clearly cited that principle in its Ruling, stating that “[u]ltimately,
this Court exercises its discretion as the gatekeeper of expert testimony to exclude
Verkhovskaya’s report.”29 Thus, insofar as Carroll argues that the Court was clearly in
error because of the scope of its ruling, the Court disagrees. With Carroll having failed
to present substantial grounds for reconsideration, his motion shall be denied.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Carroll’s Motion to Alter, Amend or Reconsider Ruling on

Daubert Motion to Exclude Class Expert30 is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on June 22, 2021.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

28

See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997) (holding that appellate courts review a trial
court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert under the abuse of discretion standard);
see also Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding “[d]istrict courts enjoy wide
latitude in determining the admissibility of expert testimony”); Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d
1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Trial courts have ‘wide discretion’ in deciding whether or not a particular witness
qualifies as an expert under the Federal Rules of Evidence”).
29
Rec. Doc. No. 232, p. 17.
30
Rec. Doc. No. 238.

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