Hughes v. Vannoy

Filing 17

RULING and ORDER Adopting 12 Report and Recommendation of the U.S. Magistrate Judge. Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief be GRANTED. The Petitioner be granted a new trial at the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. Signed by Judge Brian A. Jackson on 10/31/2019. (EDC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GEORGE HUGHES CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
DARREL VANNOY, ET AL. NO.:16-00770-BAJ-RLB

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is the United States Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 12) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l). The Report and
Recommendation addresses Petitioner's application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
(Doc. 1). Petitioner, an inmate confined at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in
Angola, Louisiana, filed this proceeding against Defendants to challenge his
confinement. The Magistrate Judge recommended that Petitioner's application for

habeas corpus relief be granted and the state court be directed to retry Petitioner.
The Report and Recommendation notified the parties that, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §636(b)(l), they had fourteen days from the date they received the Report and
Recommendation to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendations therein. Defendants filed a timely objection

(Doc. 13), and Plaintiff filed a response to the objection. (Doc. 16).

A. Whether Petitioner s Petition was Untimely Filed.
The State asserts that petitioner's application is time-barred under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), The State argues that the
thirty-day extension granted by the Court was not warranted by equitable tolling.
The statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas corpus claims is one year,
unless a court finds that the circumstances are rare and exceptional to warrant

equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). Petitioner filed
his original petition within the one-year limitation, but it was filed before Petitioner
exhausted state court remedies. Petitioner filed the petition because he had three
days remaining before the end of the one-year limitation and he did not want to forfeit
his rights to a file a habeas petition (Doc. 16 at p. 3). Petitioner filed a motion to stay
his petition until he exhausted his state court remedies, but the Court denied his
motion and dismissed his petition. (Doc. 15, 3:15-cv-00795-JJB-EWD). However, the

Court granted Petitioner an additional thirty days, commencing after the Louisiana
Supreme Court issued its ruling on his petition. (Id.). The Magistrate Judge found
that the Court s decision to grant an extension of time to file the petition is a rare and
exceptional circumstance that warrants equitable tolling of the one-year limitation,
therefore the merits of Petitioner's petition must be considered.

The Magistrate Judge cites Prieto v. Quarterman, 456 F. 3d 511 (5th Cii\ 2006)
as support for the finding that Petitioner s petition was not untimely filed. In Prieto,

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the Prieto (1)
relied on the district court s order extending his filing deadline in good faith and (2)

relied to his detriment on the prior court ruling when he filed his petition. 456 F.3d
at 515. The Fifth Circuit also found that since Prieto submitted his petition within
the time expressly allowed by the district court, he is entitled to equitable tolling. Id.
The Fifth Circuit previously recognized in Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.
1998) that a district court's grant of extensions of time beyond the AEDPAs
limitations period is likely a rare and exceptional circumstance that justifies
equitable tolling.
The Court agrees that Petitioner s petition is not time-barred. The extension
of time granted by the Court is the rare and exceptional circumstance that warrants

equitable tolling; therefore, the Court did not have to list other exceptional
circumstances, as the State argued. The Magistrate Judge correctly found that this
rare and exceptional circumstance justified equitable tolling.
As previously noted, Petitioner filed his original petition within the AEDPAs
one-year limitation period, but the petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state
court remedies. Just as in Prieto, Petitioner relied on the Court s Order granting an

extension of time to re-file his petition in good faith. The Petitioner re-filed his
petition within the time permitted by the Court. Thus, the Magistrate Judge's finding
that the petition was not time barred, and that the merits of the petition must be
considered was correct.
The State argues that the Court's sua sponte extension of time to re-file

Petitioner's petition was issued without notice to the State, which it alleges is in
violation of fair notice principles. (Doc. 13 at p. 2). Regardless of whether the

notification of the entry of the Order was received, the State was allowed the
opportunity to object to the timeliness of the filing of the petition (Doc. 7) and the
objection was considered by the Magistrate Judge and now this Court.
B. Whether Petitioner's Case Should be Retried Due to Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner asserted that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner more specifically asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
conduct an investigation regarding the statements of Sandra Alien, an alleged

eyewitness, failing to call Jamie Mobley and Denise Feldman to testify at trial, and
failing to assert a justification defense. (Doc. 12 at p. 8, 12, and 14). A habeas
petitioner who asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must demonstrate
that (1) his counsels performance was deficient, i.e. that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense, i.e., that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984).
The Magistrate Judge applied the Strickland test and found that counsel's
decisions to forego calling Mobley and Feldman to testify at trial and not asserting a
justification defense did not render the assistance of counsel ineffective because
Petitioner failed to establish that but for these errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. (Doc. 12 at p. 14,15). However, the Magistrate Judge did
find that the record established that but for trial counsels decision to forego
investigating and interviewing Alien, there was a reasonable probability that the

result of the proceeding would have been different. (Id at. p. 10). Alien was a crucial
eyewitness. Had counsel interviewed her, counsel may have discovered circumstances

that greatly diminished Alien's credibility. The Magistrate Judge noted that the
evidence of specific intent was not so extensive as to render harmless the errors of

trial counsel. (Id. at 11).
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge s findings on the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner failed to establish that had Mobiey and
Feldman been called to testify, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
The trial court disallowed any testimony regarding domestic violence. Feldman's

testimony had no other purpose but to inform the jury of the allegations of domestic
violence; thus, her testimony would have been excluded by the trial court. Mobleys
testimony would have also consisted of domestic violence claims, and the part of her

testimony that did not contain domestic violence would have been cumulative along
with other witness testimony. The Court also agrees with the Magistrate Judge s
finding that counsels decision to forego the assertion of a justification defense did not
prejudice the defendant. Petitioner again failed to establish that but for counsel's
decision, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Additionally,
Petitioner's trial testimony was not sufficient to establish a justification defense and
there was no evidence that Petitioner felt that he or others were being threatened by
the victim at the time he removed the weapon from his pocket. (Doc. 12 at p. 15).

Finally, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge s finding that counsels
decision to forego the investigation and interview of Alien was not reasonable under

the circumstances. The Magistrate Judge cited Koon v. Cain, 277 Fed.Appx. 381 (5th
Circ. 2008) for support of its findings. In Koon, defense counsel made errors in his

performance, including the failure to interview the lone eyewitness, which prejudiced
the defendant. After finding that counsels performance was deficient, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have
convicted the defendant of a lesser offense if counseFs performance had not been

deficient.
Alien was the sole witness that could have been considered disinterested to the
outcome of the case. (Id. at p. 10). Because of trial counsels decision to not interview
her prior to the trial, he was ill- prepared to conduct cross-examination on Alien, who

changed her testimony days before trial.1 Alien's inconsistent testimony had the effect
of giving credence to the inconsistent testimony of another witness who testified
against Petitioner. Had trial counsel interviewed Alien, he would have been prepared

to confront Alien about her changed testimony and could have mitigated the damage
of her testimony. The Magistrate Judge found that it is possible that Alien might not
have provided testimony inconsistent with her prior statements had trial counsel
interviewed her because trial counsel would have known of her television interview

1 Alien gave a written statement shortly after the shooting. She wrote that she was sitting in her
front room when she heard someone calling for help. She then wrote that she heard a gunshot and
exited her home where she saw two people arguing. She wrote that she saw a red truck back out and
travel down Central Woods Ave. towards Sullivan Rd. (Doc. 12 at p. 8). Alien also participated, in a
television interview in which she gave statements consistent with her written statement. A week
prior to trial, Petitioner s counsel was notified that Alien would testify at the trial that she witnessed
the shooting and that the victim had his hands in the air indicating that he was surrendering as he
was shot. Alien testified at trial, inconsistent with her written statement that she saw two men
arguing and pushing each other, then the victim backed away with his hands up. (Id. at p. 8-9).

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statements. Petitioner's counsel also would have known that Alien had a roommate.2

The television interview and the testimony of Aliens roommate would have
diminished Alien's credibility at trial. The Court agrees that this deficiency in trial
counsel's performance prejudiced Petitioner's defense and that there is a reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Although
Petitioner raised this issue in his post-conviction petition, the state trial court denied
Petitioner s post-conviction relief claims in a brief order that did not address the
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court agrees that the trial court s ultimate legal
conclusion was objectively unreasonable. For these reasons, Petitioner's application
for habeas corpus relief will be granted, and Petitioner must be granted a new trial.

Having carefully considered the underlying Complaint, the instant motions,
and related filings, the Court approves the Magistrate Judges Report and
Recommendation, and hereby adopts its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation.

2 On the night of the shooting, Alien's roommate was Lee Alien. Petitioner s counsel was not aware of
the existence of Lee Alien; therefore, Lee Alien was never interviewed by Petitioner s counsel. Lee
Alien testified at trial that she was sitting at the computer and Alien was sitting near her when they
heard the gun shot. Lee Alien further testified that after they heard the gunshot, Alien then exited
their home and called the police. (Doc. 12 at p. 9).

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 12) is ADOPTED as the Court s opinion herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's application for habeas corpus

relief be GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitioner be granted a new trial at
the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.

s.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ^' day of October, 2019.

JUDGE BRIA^A. JACKSON

UNITED STATES-01STRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA