Jamison Door Company et al v. Southeast Material Handling

Filing 13

RULING: For the reasons set forth above, 12 Plaintiffs' Motion for a Judgment of Default Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 55 and Local Rule 55 on March 2, 2017 is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 10/3/2017. (EDC) Modified on 10/3/2017 to edit text. (EDC).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JAMISON DOOR COMPANY AND HCR, INC.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

16-778-SDD-EWD

SOUTHEAST MATERIAL HANDLING, LLC

RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for a Judgment of Default Pursuant
to F.R.C.P. 55 and Local Rule 55 on March 2, 20171 by Plaintiffs, Jamison Door Company
(“Jamison”) and HCR, Inc. (“HCR”)(or collectively “Plaintiffs”). Defendant, Southeast
Material Handling, LLC, (“Defendant”) has never appeared in this matter nor filed an
Opposition to this motion. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ motion
should be granted.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed an open account petition against the Defendant on November 22,

2016.2 Jamison is a Maryland corporation and the sole shareholder of HCR, a subsidiary
located in the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs allege that, in May of 2010, they entered into
a business relationship with Defendant whereby Plaintiffs agreed to provide certain
equipment and materials to Defendant on open account.3 Pursuant to this agreement,
upon receipt of a purchase order from Defendant, Plaintiffs would deliver the order and

1

Rec. Doc. No. 12.
Rec. Doc. No. 1.
3
Id. at ¶ 6.
2

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invoice the amount owed.4 Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant is liable to them for the
amount of $86,123.10 for certain equipment and materials provided to Defendant for the
“Associated Grocers project.”5 Plaintiffs allege Defendant is further liable for contractual
and legal interest on that amount from the date the money was due until paid, plus
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.6
On November 29, 2016, the Clerk of Court issued a Summons to Defendant,
through its registered agent, Christopher Scott Callihan (“Callihan”), 14411 Milldale Road,
Zachary, Louisiana 70791.7 On December 21, 2016, Defendant was served by personal
service of the summons on Callihan at the listed address, and proof of service was filed
into the record.8

Defendant never filed an Answer or responsive pleading to the

Complaint. Thus, on January 19, 2017, the Clerk of Court entered a preliminary default
into the record.9 Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Judgment of Default Pursuant to F.R.C.P.
55 and Local Rule 55 on March 2, 2017.10 As of the date of this Ruling, Defendant has
never appeared in this case.
II.

LAW AND ANLYSIS
A. Default Judgment
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has outlined a three step

process to obtain a default judgment: (1) a defendant's default; (2) a clerk's entry of
default; and (3) a plaintiff’s application for a default judgment.11 The service of summons
4

Id.
Id. at ¶ 8.
6
Id.
7
Rec. Doc. No. 4.
8
Rec. Doc. No. 7.
9
Rec. Doc. No. 10.
10
Rec. Doc. No. 12.
11
See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir.1996).
5

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or lawful process triggers the duty to respond to a complaint.12 A defendant's failure to
timely plead or otherwise respond to the complaint triggers a default.13 Accordingly, Rule
55 provides that the clerk must enter a party's default “[w]hen a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that
failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise....”14
After the Clerk of Court has found a defendant to be in default, the Court may,
upon motion by a plaintiff, enter a default judgment against the defaulting defendant.15
Default judgments are “generally disfavored in the law” in favor of a trial upon the merits.16
Indeed, default judgments are considered “a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal
Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.... [T]hey are ‘available only
when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive
party.’”17 Even so, this policy is “counterbalanced by considerations of social goals,
justice and expediency, a weighing process [that] lies largely within the domain of the trial
judge's discretion.”18 In accordance with these guidelines, “[a] party is not entitled to a
default judgment as a matter of right, even where the defendant is technically in default.”19
While “the defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact,”

12

Fagan v. Lawrence Nathan Assocs., 957 F.Supp.2d 784, 795 (E.D.La. 2013) (citing Rogers v. Hartford
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 937 (5th Cir.1999)).
13
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 141.
14
Fed.R.Civ.P. 55.
15
Id.
16
Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mason & Hanger–Silas Mason Co. v.
Metal Trades Council, 726 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir.1984)).
17
Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting H.F.
Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C.Cir.1970)).
18
Rogers, 167 F.3d at 936 (internal citations omitted).
19
Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir.1996); see also Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat'l Bank,
515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.1975) (“[A] defendant's default does not in itself warrant the court in entering
a default judgment. There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.”).

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the Court retains the obligation to determine whether those facts state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.20
Courts have developed a two-part analysis to determine whether a default
judgment should be entered against a defendant.21 First, a court must consider whether
the entry of default judgment is appropriate under the circumstances.22 The factors
relevant to this inquiry include: (1) whether material issues of fact are at issue; (2) whether
there has been substantial prejudice; (3) whether the grounds for default are clearly
established; (4) whether the default was caused by good faith mistake or excusable
neglect; (5) the harshness of a default judgment; and (6) whether the court would think
itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant's motion.23 Second, a court must
assess the merits of the plaintiff's claims and find sufficient basis in the pleadings for the
judgment.24
B. Entitlement to Default Judgment
First, the Court must determine whether the entry of default judgment is
appropriate under the circumstances by considering the Lindsey factors. As reflected by
the record, the Defendant has failed to file an Answer or a motion under Rule 12 in
response to the Complaint. As such, there are no material facts in dispute. Second, it is
undisputed that Defendant has not responded to any of Plaintiffs’ or the Court's overtures.

20

Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206; see Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming
the district court's denial of a default judgment because, even if the plaintiffs factual allegations were found
to be true, the defendants would not have been liable under the law).
21
Taylor v. City of Baton Rouge, 39 F.Supp.3d 807, 813 (M.D.La. 2014); United States v. Chauncey, No.
14–CV–32, 2015 WL 403130, at *1 (M.D.La. Jan. 28, 2015); see also Fidelity & Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v.
Unknown Tr. of Revocable Trust–8407, No. 13–CV–412–PRM, 2014 WL 2091257, at *2 (W.D.Tex. May
16, 2014) (citing cases).
22
See Lindsey v. Price Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir.1998).
23
Id.
24
See Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206.

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Defendant’s “failure to respond threatens to bring the adversary process to a halt,
effectively prejudicing [Plaintiffs’] interests.”25 Third, the grounds for granting a default
judgment against Defendant are clearly established, as evidenced by this action's
procedural history and the Clerk's entry of default, outlined above.

Fourth, as this

Defendant has failed to respond at all to Plaintiffs or to the Court, the Court has no basis
to find that the failure to respond was the result of either good faith mistake or excusable
neglect. Fifth, Defendant’s failure to file any responsive pleading or motion mitigates the
harshness of a default judgment.26 Finally, the Court is not aware of any facts that would
lead it to set aside the default judgment if challenged by the Defendant. Thus, the Court
finds that the six Lindsey factors weigh in favor of default.
The Court must also decide if Plaintiffs’ pleadings provide a sufficient basis for a
default judgment against Defendant. Plaintiffs bring this action under Louisiana’s “open
accounts” statute, set forth in La. R.S. 9:2781, which reads in pertinent part, as follows:
When any person fails to pay an open account within thirty days after the
claimant sends written demand therefor correctly setting forth the amount
owed, that person shall be liable to the claimant for reasonable attorney
fees for the prosecution and collection of such claim when judgment on the
claim is rendered in favor of the claimant. Citation and service of a petition
shall be deemed written demand for the purpose of this Section. If the
claimant and his attorney have expressly agreed that the debtor shall be
liable for the claimant's attorney fees in a fixed or determinable amount, the
claimant is entitled to that amount when judgment on the claim is rendered
in favor of the claimant. Receipt of written demand by the person is not
required.
The Court has reviewed the affidavits and exhibits attached to Plaintiffs’
memorandum, including the purchase orders, email communications, and a demand

25

See Ins. Co. of the W. v. H & G Contractors, Inc., No. C–10–390, 2011 WL 4738197, at *3 (S.D.Tex. Oct.
5, 2011).
26
See Taylor, 39 F.Supp.3d at 814.

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letter sent to Defendant relating to the orders. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have
established that they are owed the amount claimed by virtue of the uncontested evidence
presented. Further, Plaintiffs contend that under La. R.S. 9:2784, Plaintiffs are entitled to
the full penalty of 15% of the outstanding balance due – that is, 15% of $106,703.31,
which is $16,005.49, plus attorneys’ fees. La. R.S. 9:2784 provides as follows:
A. When a contractor receives any payment from the owner for
improvements to an immovable after the issuance of a certificate of
payment by the architect or engineer, or when a contractor receives any
payment from the owner for improvements to an immovable when no
architect or engineer is on the job, the contractor shall promptly pay such
monies received to each subcontractor and supplier in proportion to the
percentage of work completed prior to the issuance of the certificate of
payment by such subcontractor and supplier, or by the owner if no architect
or engineer is on the job. Further, whenever a subcontractor receives
payment from the contractor, the subcontractor shall promptly pay such
monies received to each sub-subcontractor and supplier in proportion to the
work completed.
B. If for any reason the contractor receives less than the full payment from
the owner, then the contractor shall be obligated to disperse only the funds
received on a prorated basis with the contractor, subcontractors, and
suppliers each receiving a prorated portion based on the amount due on the
payment.
C. If the contractor or subcontractor without reasonable cause fails to make
any payment to his subcontractors and suppliers within fourteen
consecutive days of the receipt of payment from the owner for
improvements to an immovable, the contractor or subcontractor shall pay
to the subcontractors and suppliers, in addition to the payment, a penalty in
the amount of one-half of one percent of the amount due, per day, from the
expiration of the period allowed herein for payment after the receipt of
payment from the owner. The total penalty shall not exceed fifteen percent
of the outstanding balance due. In addition, the contractor or subcontractor
shall be liable for reasonable attorney fees for the collection of the payments
due the subcontractors and suppliers. However, any claim which the court
finds to be without merit shall subject the claimant to all reasonable costs
and attorney fees for the defense against such claim.
D. The provisions of this Section shall not be applicable to improvements
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to an immovable that is used for residential purposes.27
Based on the applicable law and the evidence submitted in this matter, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment should be granted, and Plaintiffs are entitled to
the relief sought.
E. Damages
A defaulting defendant “concedes the truth of the allegations of the Complaint
concerning the defendant's liability, but not damages.”28 A court's award of damages in
a default judgment must be determined after a hearing, unless the amount claimed can
be demonstrated “by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts.”29 If a court can
mathematically calculate the amount of damages based on the pleadings and supporting,
a hearing is unnecessary.30
Considering the claim at issue in this lawsuit is an open account, the Court finds
that the damages to which Plaintiffs are entitled can be mathematically calculated and
have been demonstrated by the supporting documentation provided. Thus, a hearing to
determine damages is unnecessary in this case.
F. Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiffs seek reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $6,753.88. Plaintiffs
have attached counsel’s billing records for this matter and a Declaration by Jeanette A.
Donnelly (“Donnelly”), wherein Donnelly declares that she is an attorney with Fishman
Haygood, LLP, that she is counsel of record for Plaintiffs in this matter, and the amounts

27

Emphasis added.
Ins. Co. of the W. v. H & G Contractors, Inc., 2011 WL 4738197, *4 (S.D. Tex., Oct. 5, 2011).
29
United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir.1979).
30
Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Alima, No. 3:13–CV–0889–B, 2014 WL 1632158, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Apr. 22,
2014) (citing James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir.1993)).
28

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charged to Plaintiffs for the specific actions taken in pursuit of this claim. Missing from
this Declaration is any reference to the partner who, according to the billing records,
worked on this matter and billed 3.5 hours at the rate of $425.00 per hour. There is no
information regarding years of practice by either billing attorney, their areas of expertise,
any complexities of this case, or any reference to the standard hourly billing rate in the
community.
In the Fifth Circuit, the “lodestar” method is used to calculate reasonable attorneys'
fees.31 The “lodestar” analysis involves a two-step procedure.32 Initially, the district court
must determine the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation and the
reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers. Then, the court must multiply the
reasonable hours by the reasonable hourly rates.33 The product is the “lodestar,” which
the court either accepts or adjusts upward or downward, depending on the circumstances
of the case, assessing the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.34
A court's discretion in fashioning a reasonable attorney's fee is broad and
reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, i.e., it will not be reversed unless there is strong
evidence that it is excessive or inadequate, or the amount chosen is clearly erroneous.35
To determine a reasonable fee, a court must provide a concise but clear explanation of
its reasons for the fee award, making subsidiary factual determinations regarding whether
the requested hourly rate is reasonable, and whether the tasks reported by counsel were

31

In re Fender, 12 F.3d 480, 487 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1143, 114 S.Ct. 2165, 128 L.Ed.2d
888 (1994).
32
Louisiana Power & Light Company v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 323-324 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
33
Id. at 324.
34
488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir.1974).
35
Hopwood v. State of Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 277, n.79 (5th Cir. 2000); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37.

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duplicative, unnecessary, or unrelated to the purposes of the lawsuit.36 The Fifth Circuit
has noted that its “concern is not that a complete litany be given, but that the findings be
complete enough to assume a review which can determine whether the court has used
proper factual criteria in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation.”37
In assessing the reasonableness of attorneys' fees, the court must first determine
the “lodestar” by multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended and the
reasonable hourly rate for each participating attorney.38 The party seeking the fee bears
the burden of proof on this issue.39
The Court begins by determining whether the number of hours claimed by
Plaintiffs’ attorneys is reasonable.40 Local Rule 54 provides specific guidance regarding
how this burden is met, stating: “the party desiring to be awarded such fees shall submit
to the court a contemporaneous time report reflecting the date, time involved, and nature
of the services performed. The report shall be in both narrative and statistical form and
provide hours spent and justification thereof.”41 “Where the documentation of hours is
inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.”42
The Court must also determine if the hourly rates of $425/hour for billing partner
John D. Werner and $290/hour for billing associate Donnelly are reasonable given

36

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437–39; Associated Builders & Contractors v. Orleans Parish School Board, 919
F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1990).
37
Brantley v. Surles, 804 F.2d 321, 325–26 (5th Cir.1986).
38
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Green v. Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 661 (5th
Cir. 2002); Associated Builders & Contractors, 919 F.2d at 379; Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041,
1047 (5th Cir.1998); Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324.
39
See Riley v. City of Jackson, 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir.1996); Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324.
40
Migis, 135 F.3d at 1047.
41
M.D. La. LR54(b).
42
Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted); see also Kellstrom, 50
F.3d at 324 (“[A] district court may reduce the number of hours awarded if the documentation is vague or
incomplete.”).

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counsels’ ability, competence, experience, and skill. An attorney's reasonable hourly rate
should be “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers
of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”43

The Fifth Circuit has

emphasized that “the relevant market for purposes of determining the prevailing rate to
be paid in a fee award is the community in which the district court sits.”44
Counsel for Plaintiffs has failed to provide the Court with any information regarding
either billing attorney’s years of experience or level of expertise in any particular field.
Further, counsel has failed to provide the Court with examples of the prevailing rate to be
paid in this community. Thus, the Court finds guidance in the decision by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in Blackwater Diving, LLC v. Monforte
Exploration, LLC.45 In Blackwater Diving, the plaintiff brought an open account suit
pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2781 and further claimed reasonable attorneys’ fees thereunder.
The court ultimately ruled in the plaintiff’s favor and found that it was entitled to attorneys’
fees under the statute. The court stated:
Louisiana's open account statute, La. R.S. § 9:2781, provides for an award
of reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution and collection of a claim
when judgment on the claim is rendered in favor of the claimant. La. R.S. §
9:2781(A). An award of attorney's fees under this statute is exceptional and
penal in nature so its application must be strictly construed. Frank L. Beier
43

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); see also Leroy v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 1068,
1078–79 (5th Cir.1990) (“In evaluating an attorneys' fees award, we are guided by the overriding principles
that a reasonable attorney's fee is one that is adequate to attract competent counsel, but that does not
produce windfalls to attorneys ....” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
44
Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
45
No. 15-70, 2015 WL 4397142 (E.D. La. July 16, 2015). The prevailing market fee is generally determined
by affidavits filed by attorneys practicing in the area. Ball v. LeBlanc, 2015 WL 4454779 at *3 (M.D. La. July
20, 2015), quoting Tollett, 285 F.3d at 368. However, markets of comparable sizes can be informative in
determining the prevailing market rate of another district. See e.g., Strogner v. Sturdivant, No. 10–125–
JJB–CN, 2011 WL 6140670, at *2 n.4 (M.D.La. Dec. 9,2011) (finding that the rate in New Orleans could
help determine the rate in Baton Rouge because after Hurricane Katrina, the size of New Orleans
and Baton Rouge became more comparable); Advocacy Center v. Cain, 2014 WL 1246840, at *7 n. 6
(M.D. La. Mar. 24, 2014)(same).

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Radio, Inc. v. Black Gold Marine, Inc., 449 So.2d 1014, 1016 (La.1984). The
quantum of fees awarded under § 2781 is left to the sound discretion of the
district court. Metro. Reporters, Inc. v. Avery, 665 So.2d 547, 550 (La.App.
5th Cir.1995). Some of the factors that guide the court's discretion are the
ultimate result obtained, the amount involved, the extent and character of
labor performed, the legal knowledge, skill, and diligence of counsel, the
number of appearances made, the intricacies of the facts and law involved,
and the court's own knowledge. Id. (citing S. Jackson & Son, Inc. v. Aljoma
Lumber, Inc., 637 So.2d 1311 (La.App. 4th Cir.1994); Julius Cohen Jeweler,
Inc. v. Succession of Jumonville, 506 So.2d 535 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987)).46
The court then evaluated the itemized billing statements submitted by the
attorneys.

The court noted that the lead attorney had over 35 years of litigation

experience, an impressive résumé, and oversaw the entire litigation – which was not
resolved by default judgment.47 Thus, the court found reasonable a rate of $280/hour in
light of the lead attorney’s background and experience.48 The associate working on the
case graduated from law school four years prior to the litigation (2011) and had been
admitted to practice in the Eastern District for two years at the time of the case (2013);
thus, the court found that a rate of $150/hour was reasonable in the region for the
associate’s experience.49
The lead attorney billed 28.1 hours and 58.05 hours on the case, which was
resolved in the plaintiff’s favor on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement.50 The
Court rejected the necessity of these hours and stated:
The Court is persuaded that this case did not require nearly this much
attorney time. While counsel obtained a favorable judgment for their client,
this case presented a simple collection matter on an unpaid invoice that the
defendant essentially admitted that he owed. Neither attorney was required
to make appearances in court. The time sheets suggest some duplication
46

Blackwater Diving, 2015 WL 4397142 at *1.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at *2.
47

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of effort and redundancy of attorney time, and while this might be a result
of having an experienced attorney oversee the work of an associate, it
remains that there was nothing complicated or intricate about the facts or
law in this case.51
The court reduced the lead attorney’s recoverable hours to 15 and the associate’s hours
to 35 and calculated the fee based on the rate found reasonable by the court.52
For several of the same reasons set forth by the Blackwater Diving court, this Court
finds that both the hours expended and the hourly rates requested should be reduced.
First, this case presented only a simple collection matter and was even less involved than
Blackwater Driving considering no court appearances were ever made or required, and
Plaintiffs have been awarded a default judgment after presenting a case that has never
been contested. Further, there is nothing complicated or intricate about the law or facts
of this case; indeed, the facts are straightforward. Thus, the Court will reduce the hours
of the billing partner to 2, and reduce the billing hours of the associate to 10.53
As the Court has already stated, the Court has no information regarding the
experience of the attorneys who represented Plaintiffs in this case. Thus, the Court is left
with the Blackwater Diving decision as guidance. Accordingly, the Court will reduce the
billing partner’s reasonable hourly rate to $280 and the billing associate’s reasonable
hourly rate to $150. Therefore, having determined the “lodestar” reasonable hourly rates
and hours for the billing attorneys, and after consideration of the Johnson factors,54 the

51

Id.
Id.
53
The Court notes that the billing entries associated with drafting, revising, finalizing and filing the motion
for default judgment, which total nearly 7 hours, appear duplicative and excessive in light of the simplicity
of the motions and the facts of this case.
54
The twelve factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3)
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the
attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent,
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results
52

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Court finds that an attorneys’ fee in the amount of $2,060.00 is reasonable.55
In accordance with Local Rule 54(a), the Court will refer the matter of costs and
expenses to the Clerk of Court’s Office.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Judgment of Default

Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 55 and Local Rule 55 on March 2, 201756 is GRANTED.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on October 3, 2017.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case,
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.
Johnson, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974). Counsel presented no argument of the Johnson factors to
the Court.
55
The Court reached this amount by calculating 2 hours x $280 for the billing partner, totaling $560; and
10 hours x $150 for the billing associate, totaling $1,500.00; resulting in $2,060.00.
56
Rec. Doc. No. 12.

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