Randolph v. OSC-MANAGEMENT, INC

Filing 18

RULING : The 17 MOTION to Reset Hearing for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, treated as a renewed 4 Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, is DENIED, and the 4 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is also DENIED. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 2/17/2017. (LLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ANGEL RANDOLPH

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

16-825-SDD-RLB

OSC-MANAGEMENT, INC.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Reset Hearing for Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction1 filed by Plaintiff, Angel Randolph (“Plaintiff”),
against Defendant, OSC-Management, Inc. (“OSC”).

The Court will treat this as a

renewed motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”).2 For the following reasons,
this motion is DENIED.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
Plaintiff is a thirty-three year old resident of the Jefferson South apartment

complex, a building owned and operated by OSC. Plaintiff has lived at Jefferson South
since 2013. Plaintiff has a developmental disorder and other mental health issues and
receives assistance from multiple federal and state programs including the Social Security
Disability benefits program (“SSD”), the Rural Development Rental Assistance Program
(“RDRAP”), and the New Opportunity Waiver program (“NOW”). Plaintiff’s sole source of
income is her SSD payment, and she is assisted by healthcare attendants on a daily
basis.

1

Rec. Doc. 17.
Rec. Doc. 4.
3
The Court bases the factual background on Rec. Docs. 1, 4-1, 17-1.
2

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Plaintiff receives rental assistance benefits through the RDRAP program. Plaintiff
is required to complete and provide documentation in order to maintain her assistance
under the RDRAP program. Plaintiff claims that, on February 26, 2016, she submitted
her documentation for recertification under the RDRAP program. Plaintiff was contacted
on February 29, 2016 by an employee of OSC requesting that Plaintiff provide pay stubs
and checking information.

Plaintiff claims she provided the information with the

documents on February 26, 2016 and, on February 29, 2016, she resubmitted these
documents to an employee of OSC.
On March 1, 2016, an employee of OSC left a note for Plaintiff stating that OSC
had “completed a recertification of [plaintiff’s income] effective 3-1-16 and your rate has
changed. Please come in to sign all paperwork.”4 Plaintiff claims that, beginning on
March 1, 2016, she, her parents, and her healthcare workers made “daily trips to the office
and left phone messages in an attempt to obtain the paperwork for Ms. Randolph to sign”5
- to no avail. Plaintiff’s father received a call from an employee of OSC on March 16,
2016 informing him that Plaintiff’s lease had been terminated because Plaintiff had not
signed the required paperwork. The following day, Plaintiff’s father “retrieved from the
Post Office a certified letter to [plaintiff] which contained a notice of ‘Non-renewal of Lease
for Good Cause,’ which was also dated on March 1st.”6
The Notice for Non-renewal of Lease contained the following as reasons for good
cause termination: “non-compliance with the recertification process, failure to comply with
monthly inspections, late payment of rent, failure to comply with signing of paperwork

4

Rec. Doc. 1.
Id.
6
Id.
5

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when needed; parking issues, and failure to report income changes.”7 Plaintiff also states
that, “in the aforementioned certified letter, or in a separate certified letter also dated
March 1st, was a Termination Notice which stated the grounds for termination as failure
to comply with recertification process.”8 Plaintiff’s father, on her behalf, tried to arrange a
meeting in accordance with the notice in the letter from March 1st, by sending a letter
within 10 days of receipt with both OSC and the United States Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”) - the administrative agency in charge of the RDRAP program.
Plaintiff alleges she was not granted an informal meeting with OSC and, on April
1, 2016, OSC began eviction proceedings, Jefferson South Apartments v. Angel
Randolph, Case No. 48,721, in the Justice of the Peace Court. Plaintiff claims that this
proceeding was in violation of 7 C.F.R. 2560.160 which provided her an administrative
hearing prior to eviction. At the hearing, before the Justice of the Peace, an OSC
employee testified that Plaintiff had not completed the necessary paperwork to receive
benefits under the USDA program. In the hearing, the Justice of the Peace suggested
that Plaintiff sign the paperwork during the proceedings; however, the OSC employee
refused. The Justice of the Peace ruled in favor of Plaintiff and dismissed OSC’s eviction
suit.
Thereafter, an attorney for OSC contacted Plaintiff’s attorney offering to provide a
“reasonable hearing” relating to the non-renewal of Plaintiff’s lease.9 On May 5, 2016,
Plaintiff’s attorney informed OSC’s attorney as “[he] [saw] no need for the hearing you
propose since all of the issues presented by Ms. McCulloch on behalf of your client were

7

Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
9
Id.
8

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rejected by the Justice of the Peace in the eviction proceeding filed by your client.”10 In
April of 2016, OSC stopped accepting Plaintiff’s rental payments and proceeded with the
eviction. On April 30, 2016, Plaintiff’s father left a note with OSC indicating that Plaintiff’s
air conditioner unit needed replacing. On August 1, 2016, the air conditioner repairman
left a note for Plaintiff indicating that the air conditioner unit needed to be replaced.
On August 1, a “Lease Violation” was placed on Plaintiff’s door. The notice stated
that, on June 20, 2016, Plaintiff had caused damage to the unit by stopping up the shower
causing OSC damage in the amount of $210. Plaintiff claims that, several months prior
to June 20, 2016, Plaintiff and her next door neighbor were required to vacate their
apartment in order for a plumbing company to break through the floors “to access the
building’s sewer and to make substantial repairs to the system.”11 On August 5, 2016,
Plaintiff’s father sent a letter to OSC requesting an informal meeting about the delay in
making repairs to Plaintiff’s air conditioner unit. The letter was returned refused by OSC.
Plaintiff claims that OSC’s continued refusal to accept her rent and “holding the
possibility of eviction over her head indefinitely…exacerbated [Plaintiff’s] mental
condition…requir[ing] her to be hospitalized in a mental health hospital for ten days...”.12
On August 24, 2016, Plaintiff was served with a “Notice to Vacate” with the same
allegations as the prior eviction proceeding before the Justice of the Peace on April 8,
2016 and the additional allegation of the damage to the shower. Plaintiff’s father again
attempted to schedule an informal meeting but was refused.

10

Rec. Doc. 17-2.
Rec. Doc. 1.
12
Id.
11

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In the second hearing before the Justice of the Peace, the justice found in favor of
OSC and ordered Plaintiff’s eviction. Plaintiff filed a suspensive appeal of the Justice of
the Peace’s judgment on September 9, 2016, and Defendant moved to dismiss the
suspensive appeal and immediately evict Plaintiff. On December 5, 2016, the 19th
Judicial District Court for East Baton Rouge Parish ruled in favor of OSC upholding the
Justice of the Peace’s ruling granting OSC’s petition to evict Plaintiff.
On December 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief13 against
OSC. Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order Pursuant to Federal Rule
65(a)14 against OSC on December 15, 2016.

On December 20, 2016, the Court

conducted a telephone status conference with both parties wherein both parties agreed
that Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order was moot “per agreement of the
parties.”15

On January 19, 2017, the Court conducted another telephone status

conference in which “the parties were advise[d] that based on the record in this matter,
there is no emergency situation and/or any disputed injury that could not later be solved
with monetary damages.”16 Accordingly, the Court cancelled the Preliminary Injunction
hearing and referred the matter to the United States Magistrate Judge for further
proceedings.17 On February 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed a new motion to reset the TRO in
light of the order to vacate her apartment by February 17, 2017, which she was informed
of on February 1, 2017.
Plaintiff seeks the following in her TRO:

13

Rec. Doc. 1.
Rec. Doc. 4.
15
Rec. Doc. 8.
16
Rec. Doc. 13 (emphasis added).
17
Id.
14

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Declaratory judgment that the defendant’s failure to recertify
her benefits and its refusal to renew her lease violate the Rural
Development Act, the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; [sic] plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and
a preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendant from
terminating her rental assistance benefits and her tenancy at
their apartment complex and directing defendants to renew
the lease for her apartments.18
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. State Court Eviction Judgment
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction…they possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statue, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.”19
Therefore, “a federal court must raise the issue [of jurisdiction] because it is forbidden –
as a court of limited jurisdiction – from acting beyond [its] authority, and no action of the
parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.”20 Accordingly, the
Court must examine whether it has jurisdiction in the present case.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction based
upon a final judgment from the 19th Judicial District Court of which Plaintiff is seeking to
bar enforcement.21

The United States Supreme Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust

Company held that only the Supreme Court could “entertain a proceeding to reverse or
modify the judgment” of a state court proceeding.22 The Supreme Court in District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman stated:
[District Courts] do not have jurisdiction, however, over
challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising
18

Rec. Doc. 17-1.
Hinojosa v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 759 F. Supp.2d 53, 54 (D. D.C. 2011) quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994).
20
Id. quoting NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (internal quotations omitted).
21
Rec. Doc. 17.
22
263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923).
19

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out of judicial proceedings even those challenges allege that
the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Review of those
decisions may be had only in this Court.23
Most recently, the Supreme Court in ExxonMobil Corporation v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corporation held: “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine…is confined to cases of the kind from
which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”24 Here,
Plaintiff’s eviction challenge is the type of claim the Supreme Court has consistently and
explicitly held may not be heard in federal district court because federal district courts lack
jurisdiction to review a state court judgment.25
Plaintiff attempts to argue that the relief sought is not a “specific injunction
enjoining the state court action,”26 but “[sic] we only ask the court to enjoin the defendant,
the state actor on behalf of the federal government from exercising his right to enforce
the state court judgment.”27 Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive as the relief sought
requires the Court to prohibit OSC from exercising the final judgment of the 19th JDC the Court would have to reject the judgment of the 19th JDC in direct contravention of
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.28

23

460 U.S. 462, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).
544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).
25
See also DiVetro v. Housing Authority of Myrtle Beach, No. 13-cv-01878, 2014 WL 3385163 at *3-4 (D.
S.C. July 10, 2014). DiVetro involves similar facts and allegations as present in this case, and the DiVetro
court also denied plaintiff’s claim to overturn the state court eviction proceeding.
26
Rec. Doc. 17.
27
Id.
28
ExxonMobil Corporation v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161
L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).
24

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Accordingly, because Plaintiff asks the Court to prevent the enforcement of the
judgment of the Justice of the Peace and the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of
East Baton Rouge in direct contravention of the long established Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, Plaintiff’s petition for the Court to halt the enforcement of the judgment of the
state court is DENIED as this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant such relief.
B. Plaintiff’s TRO Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) states:
(1) Issuing Without Notice.
The Court may issue a
temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to
the adverse party or its attorney only if:
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or verified complaint clearly
show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party
can be heard in opposition; and
(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts
made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be
required.29
Given the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the present case, the only issue
properly before the Court is whether OSC violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process prior to the alleged termination of her benefits under the RDRAP program.
Indeed, Plaintiff concedes: “the sole issue presented in this matter is whether plaintiff has
been recertified to receive benefits; and, whether defendant has violated her right to
procedural due process by the relevant provisions of 7 CFR 3560.159 and 7 CFR
3560.208(d).”30

29
30

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
Rec. Doc. 17.

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A party requesting a TRO “must ‘clearly’ show four elements: (1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that failure to grant the
injunction will result in irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage
that the injunction will cause the adverse party; and (4) the injunction will not adversely
affect the public interest.”31

Plaintiff must satisfy all of the above enumerated

requirements for the Court to grant a TRO.
Plaintiff must first demonstrate that there is a substantial likelihood that she will
succeed on the merits of her case against OSC. Again, the only issue before the Court is
whether OSC failed to properly follow the procedures contained in 7 C.F.R. §§ 3560.159
and 7 CFR 3560.208(d),32 which allegedly resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to continued benefits under the RDRAP program. Based upon a review
of the allegations in the motion and the record, the Court is not persuaded at this time
that Plaintiff is substantially likely to prevail. For example, Plaintiff does not assert that
her Fourteenth Amendment right to continual receipt of benefits under the RDRAP plan
was actually terminated, but that her eviction will have this ultimate effect. As Plaintiff has
admitted in a previous motion, participation in the RDRAP program does not automatically
result in Plaintiff remaining in the Jefferson South complex.33 Vice versa, Plaintiff’s
eviction is not the equivalent of barring her participation in the RDRAP program.
Similarly, it is not apparent that OSC’s attempt to arrange an informal hearing
following the Justice of the Peace ruling in April of 2016 was in violation of the relevant

31

Daniel v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 12-2933, 2012 WL 6738765, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 31, 2012), quoting RW
Development, LLC v. Cunningham Grp. Architecture, Inc., No. 12-00224, 2012 WL 3258782, at *2 (S.D.
Miss. Aug. 8, 2012).
32
Rec. Doc. 17.
33
Id.

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statutory provisions, as the USDA letter dated May 23, 2016 addressed to OSC’s attorney
states: “it appears all procedural requirements have been met concerning Ms. Randolph’s
tenure at Jefferson South Apartments and pursuant to Louisiana State Law governing this
matter.”34 Plaintiff’s attorney argues that the USDA letter “was obviously solicited by
defendant’s attorney in an attempt to obtain some legal authority to suggest that the
purported due process hearing he conducted on May 6, 2016 conform[s] to the
administrative hearing requirements under 7 CFR 3560.159,160.”35 That OSC may have
solicited this letter is immaterial and does not undermine the substance of the letter – the
conclusion that OSC complied with the relevant federal regulations.
Accordingly, because there are unresolved issues that raise substantial questions
as to the success of Plaintiff’s claims on the merits, the extraordinary remedy of a TRO is
not warranted. Although the loss of one’s benefits under a federal program may constitute
irreparable harm in the form of a violation of one’s property interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment,36 in the absence of showing of a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits, Plaintiff is unable to meet all of the four requirements to obtain a TRO.37
As the Supreme Court stated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., “a
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”38 As a
specialized subset of preliminary injunctions, with an explicit four part test, a TRO is an
extraordinary remedy with additional requirements that must be met in order for the Court

34

Rec. Doc. 12-1, p. 31.
Rec. Doc. 17-1.
36
Ridgley v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 512 F. 727, 735 (5th Cir. 2008).
37
See Daniel v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 12-2933, 2012 WL 6738765, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 31, 2012), quoting
RW Development, LLC v. Cunningham Grp. Architecture, Inc., No. 12-00224, 2012 WL 3258782, at *2
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 8, 2012).
38
129 S.Ct. 365 at 367.
35

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to grant Plaintiff’s TRO motion. After reviewing the motion and the record, the Court
concludes that, on the current record, Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, as serious questions regarding the merits
of Plaintiff’s claim exist. Additionally, the Court is unpersuaded of the emergency nature
of Plaintiff’s motion considering that Plaintiff alleges a violation of RDRAP policies in April
of 2016, because the Plaintiff had notice of eviction ten days ago,39 and because the
Plaintiff’s father is prepared to house her while this matter is litigated.40
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion41 for a TRO is DENIED.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reset Hearing on Plaintiff’s

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order42 is DENIED, and the Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order43 is also DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on February 17, 2017.

S
JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

39

Rec. Doc. 17.
Rec. Doc. 12-1, p. 19.
41
Rec. Doc. 17.
42
Id.
43
Rec. Doc. 4.
40

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