Lee et al v. Continental Casualty Company et al
Filing
102
RULING granting 73 Motion for Summary Judgment. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 4/17/2019. (LLH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRENT MIRONELLE LEE, INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILDREN
BRE’UNISTY LEE AND JAMAL LEE
CIVIL ACTION NO.
VERSUS
17-23-SDD-EWD
SHERIFF JASON ARD, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF LIVINGSTON
PARISH, SERGEANT CARLCHILDERS, AND
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment1 by
Defendants, Sheriff Jason Ard, Sheriff of Livingston Parish (“Sheriff Ard”) and Sergeant
Carl Childers (“Sgt. Childers”)(or collectively “Defendants”).
Plaintiff, Brent Lee
(“Plaintiff”), has filed an Opposition2 to this motion, to which Defendants filed a Reply,3
Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply,4 and Defendants filed a Sur-Sur-Reply.5 For the following
reasons, the Court finds that Defendants’ motion should be granted.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that, on or about January 11, 2016, he was traveling on Florida
Boulevard in Denham Springs, Louisiana, when he allegedly changed lanes without using
1
Rec. Doc. No. 73.
Rec. Doc. No. 82.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 88.
4
Rec. Doc. No. 93.
5
Rec. Doc. No. 96.
2
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a turn signal. For this alleged traffic violation, Sgt. Childers and other responding officers
attempted to initiate a traffic stop. Plaintiff contends that he did not immediately pull over
because of his prior experiences with Livingston Parish Police officers which “led him to
be extremely fearful” of what the officers might to do him if he stayed in the area.6 Thus,
Plaintiff contends he continued driving for approximately seven minutes until he reached
a neighborhood in which he felt safer.7
Upon entering the neighborhood, Plaintiff stopped and exited his vehicle. Plaintiff
claims that Sgt. Childers deployed a K9 Apache dog (“the dog”) to assist in making the
arrest. Plaintiff contends witness accounts establish that the dog viciously attacked him
for between five and seven minutes after he had surrendered to police. Plaintiff further
claims that, during this alleged attack, he was pleading with officers for relief as the dog
was “chewing at his flesh.”8 Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Childers allowed the dog to attack
Plaintiff for an unnecessary and excessive amount of time. Further, Plaintiff alleges that
the dog continued to attack him even after Sgt. Childers ordered the dog to cease. As a
result of this attack, Plaintiff alleges he has suffered severe physical injuries and the loss
of quality and enjoyment of life.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit asserting various federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983
and state law. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, and the Court dismissed all official
capacity federal claims brought against Sheriff Ard and Sgt. Childers with prejudice,
dismissed the Section 1983 individual capacity claim against Sgt. Childers for the initial
6
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 12.
Id., ¶ 13.
8
Rec. Doc. No. 18, p. 2.
7
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release of the canine, and held that all other claims remained before the Court.9 Shortly
after this Ruling, Plaintiff submitted a Status Report wherein he advised that he had pled
guilty to all three criminal charges brought against him – aggravated flight from an officer,
resisting an officer with force or violence, and relative to possession with intent to
distribute marijuana - on August 28, 2017.10
Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that, as a result
of Plaintiff’s guilty pleas, his civil claims are foreclosed by Heck v. Humphrey.11 Plaintiff
opposes this motion and maintains that his underlying guilty plea for resisting an officer
is not undermined by his claim that his constitutional rights were violated when Sgt.
Childers allegedly allowed the canine to continue to attack him after he was subdued.
II.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”12 “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all
of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”13 A party moving for summary judgment “must ‘demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant’s
case.”14 If the moving party satisfies its burden, “the non-moving party must show that
9
Rec. Doc. No. 44.
Rec. Doc. No. 46.
11
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
13
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).
14
Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, 246 F.Supp.2d 488, 494 (M.D. La. 2003)(quoting Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2552)).
10
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summary judgment is inappropriate by setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence
of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.’”15 However, the
non-moving party’s burden “is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a
scintilla of evidence.”16
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”17 All reasonable factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.18 However, “[t]he Court has no
duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the summary
judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate precisely
how this evidence supports his claim.”19 “Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific
facts … will not prevent the award of summary judgment; ‘the plaintiff [can]not rest on his
allegations … to get to a jury without any “significant probative evidence tending to
support the complaint.”’”20
B. Heck v. Humphrey
It is well-settled that a Section 1983 claim for damages cannot directly attack the
constitutionality of a conviction, imprisonment, or other harm caused by unlawful actions
unless that conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
15
Rivera v. Houston Independent School Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Morris v. Covan
World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
16
Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995)(quoting Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
17
Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
18
Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
19
RSR Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
20
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir.
1994)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
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executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a
determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.”21 This burden placed on Section 1983 plaintiffs is for the purpose of avoiding
collateral attacks by plaintiffs on convictions that are “still outstanding.”22 In the absence
of this circumstance, “the maturity of a § 1983 claim depends on ‘whether a judgment in
favor of the [p]laintiff ... would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's]
conviction.’”23 However, the alleged constitutional violation should not be barred “if the
factual basis for the conviction is temporally and conceptually distinct from the excessive
force claim.”24 Thus, “if the district court determines that [the plaintiff's] action, even if
successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment
against [the plaintiff], the action should be allowed to proceed ... .”25
The Fifth Circuit has explained that “a plaintiff’s claim is Heck-barred despite its
theoretical compatibility with his underlying conviction if specific factual allegations in the
complaint are necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the conviction.”26
This is
because “factual assertions in pleadings are ... judicial admissions conclusively binding
on the party that made them.”27 Accordingly, “when a plaintiff contends that he did not
resist arrest, that is, that he committed no offense and was instead unjustly victimized,
21
See Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir.1996) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487) (internal
quotations omitted).
22
See id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487) (internal quotations omitted).
23
See id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).
24
See Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2008); see also, e.g., Ballard v. Barton, 444 F.3d 391,
401 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the excessive force claim against an officer other than the one the plaintiff
was convicted of assaulting was “conceptually distinct,” and therefore, the two could “easily coexist”).
25
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
26
Bush, 513 F.3d at 498 n. 14.
27
Daigre v. City of Waveland, Miss., 549 Fed.Appx. 283, 286 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Davis v. A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc., 823 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1987) (alterations and citation omitted)).
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the Fifth Circuit has uniformly concluded that his excessive force claim is Heck barred
because the excessive force claim necessarily attacks the validity of the conviction for
resisting arrest.”28 “Moreover, when there is no temporal and conceptual distinction
between the factual basis for the conviction and the excessive force claim, that is, when
the complained of use of force is applied during or simultaneously with the arrest, Heck
applies.”29 In these cases, the “[p]laintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice to their
being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.”30
C. Application
Plaintiff likens his claims to those in Bush v. Strain.31 In Bush v. Strain, it was
undisputed that the defendant detective was interviewing a witness when the plaintiff
walked up and greeted him. When the plaintiff overheard the witness comment about
plaintiff’s sister, the plaintiff became enraged and threw a cup of ice water at the witness.
The defendant detective attempted to arrest the plaintiff for simple battery, and when the
plaintiff was partially handcuffed she pulled her right arm away in an apparent attempt to
hit or intimidate the witness.32 Stories diverged as to what happened next. The defendant
detective testified that the plaintiff continued to resist arrest while he attempted to cuff her
28
Price v. City of Rayne, No. 13-0790, 2016 WL 866945 at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 3, 2016)(citing DeLeon v. City
of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656–57 (5th Cir. 2007); Daigre, 549 Fed.Appx. at 287; Walker v. Munsell,
281 Fed.Appx. 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2008); Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 100 Fed.Appx. 321, 324 (5th Cir.
2004)).
29
Id. (citing Walter v. Horseshoe Entertainment, 483 Fed.Appx. 884, 887 (5th Cir. 2012); Bush, 513 F.3d
at 495, 498 (use of force after arrest and handcuffing when resistance by the arrestee had ceased was
temporally and conceptually distinct from the criminal conviction); DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 656-657 (finding
that the complaint did not allege that the claims of excessive force were separable from the plaintiff’s
aggravated assault on the officer); Pratt v. Giroir, 2008 WL 975052, at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2008) (“Fifth
Circuit precedent is clear that whether the plaintiff alleges excessive force during or simultaneous with an
arrest versus after an arrest results in distinct consequences under Heck.”).
30
DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 657 (quoting Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996)).
31
513 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2008).
32
Id. at 496.
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right hand. As they struggled, they both fell on the rear window of a car. In contradiction
to the testimony of defendant detective, the plaintiff admitted that she pulled away when
defendant detective attempted to arrest her, but she stated that she stopped resisting
after he grabbed her right hand. She contended that after she ceased all resistance and
both hands were cuffed, defendant detective placed his hand behind her neck and head
and forced her face into the rear window of car injuring her jaw and breaking two of her
teeth.33
The Fifth Circuit determined that the plaintiff stated a claim for excessive force after
she was restrained.34 The court concluded that, because the plaintiff produced evidence
that the alleged excessive force occurred after she stopped resisting arrest, the fact
findings essential to her criminal conviction were not inherently at odds with this claim,
and a favorable verdict on her excessive force claim would not undermine her criminal
conviction for resisting arrest.35
In contrast, in Daigre v. City of Waveland, Miss., officers responded to a domestic
disturbance call and arrested Daigre after she refused the officers’ commands to get out
of bed.36 As officers approached Daigre in the bed with tasers drawn, Daigre screamed
obscenities and refused. When the officers attempted to physically pull Daigre from the
bed, she pulled back against them, “using her body as leverage, initiating a kind of tugof-war.”37 When officers pulled back again, Daigre was slammed into the wall and also
33
Id.
Id. at 499.
35
Id. at 500.
36
549 Fed. Appx. 283, 284 (5th Cir. 2013).
37
Id. at 285.
34
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deployed the taser.38 Daigre was arrested and charged with resisting arrest and simple
assault on a police officer, and she ultimately pled guilty to resisting arrest.39 Daigre sued
the officers under Section 1985 alleging excessive force. The Fifth Circuit held that
“Daigre's excessive-force claim is barred because she ‘still thinks [she is] innocent.’40
Unlike the allegations in Bush, Daigre's broad claims of innocence relate to the entire
arrest encounter, and not merely a discrete part of it.41 The result is dismissal under
Heck.”42
Defendants maintains that it is a bright-line rule in the Fifth Circuit that, when a
plaintiff pleads guilty to a charge of resisting an officer but alleges and/or testified in a
later civil suit that he did not resist arrest, his claims necessarily imply an invalidity of the
plea/conviction and are barred by Heck. Indeed, Plaintiff testified in his deposition that,
at no time during the encounter did he use any kind of physical force against any of the
police officers.43
Further, in the Status Report submitted by Plaintiff regarding the
resolution of the criminal charges brought against him, counsel states that Plaintiff
“immediately submitted to the officers” upon his exit from his vehicle.44 In Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Childers and other officers “attempted to
38
Id.
Id.
40
Id. at 287 (quoting DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 657).
41
See Bush, 513 F.3d at 499.
42
See DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 657; see also Whatley v. Coffin, 496 Fed.Appx. 414, 417 (5th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (“We need not determine whether [plaintiff's] excessive force claims undermine an
element of his assault of a public servant convictions because the facts alleged in his complaint were
inherently inconsistent with those convictions.”); Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 100 Fed.Appx. 321, 324 (5th
Cir.2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) (claims barred where plaintiff “claim[ed] that he did nothing wrong, but
was viciously attacked for no reason”).
43
Rec. Doc. No. 73-4 at 2 (Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 39).
44
Rec. Doc. No. 46 at 1.
39
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initiate a traffic stop,”45 and “[w]hen this attempt was unsuccessful,”46 the K9 was
deployed “to assist with the arrest.”47 While Plaintiff claims that the K9 was allowed to
attack for “an unnecessary and excessive amount of time … even after being ordered to
cease by the attending officers,” Plaintiff’s allegations do not address his own resistance
and ostensibly imply that he was not resistant.
Plaintiff’s allegations cannot be
transformed by arguments of counsel in a brief.
Further, although Plaintiff appears to admit to some resistance on his part during
the encounter in his late-filed Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,48 Plaintiff cites to
no record or summary judgment evidence in support of these alleged factual statements.
Plaintiff states:
5.
6.
Despite the fact that Plaintiff pled guilty to Resisting an Officer
pursuant to of La. R.S. §14:108.2, a genuine issue of material fact
still exists as to the duration of Plaintiff’s resistance;49
Despite the fact that Plaintiff pled guilty to Resisting an Officer
pursuant to of La. R.S. §14:108.2, a genuine issue of material fact
still exists as to whether or not Sergeant Childers allowed the police
canine under his control attack Plaintiff after Plaintiff had ceased
resistance and surrendered to Sergeant Childers’ authority;50
These statements constitute argument and are not supported by record evidence.
Indeed, Plaintiff’s complaint is void of allegations regarding his purported resistance, and
as set forth above, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony contradicts these statements. At the
summary judgment stage, when the party moving for summary judgment meets its burden
45
Rec. Doc. No. 61, ¶ 11.
Id. at ¶ 12.
47
Id.
48
Rec. Doc. No. 82-1. The Court refers to this document as untimely because Plaintiff failed to include a
statement of facts with the opposition originally submitted. Plaintiff’s original opposition was stricken for a
Local Rule 7(g) deficiency (Rec. Doc. No. 79), and only upon leave to substitute his opposition did Plaintiff
attach a statement of facts.
49
Id. at ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
50
Id. at ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
46
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by showing the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party’s case, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “identify specific evidence in the
record, and articulate” precisely how that evidence supports his claims.51 To satisfy this
burden,
the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in his
pleadings, but rather must set forth “specific facts showing the existence of
a ‘genuine’ issue concerning every essential component of its case.” A
party seeking to establish that a fact is genuinely disputed must support
such an assertion by reference to “materials in the record, including
depositions, documents ... affidavits or declarations ... admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” The nonmovant’s burden of
demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact is not satisfied merely by
creating “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” “by conclusory
allegations,” by “unsubstantiated assertions,” or “by only a scintilla of
evidence.” There is no genuine issue for trial “unless there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party.”52
Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts cites to no record evidence whatsoever
in support of his assertions. Further, Plaintiff has failed to controvert the facts contained
in Defendants’ Statement of Uncontested Facts with supporting evidence as required by
Local Rule 56(b).
Plaintiff contends he has been unable to gather evidence due to the stay of
discovery, to which he agreed, during the pendency of this motion. However, Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate, as required by Rule 54(d), how the deposition testimony of Sgt.
Childers or other witnesses will create a material issue of fact regarding the subject of the
present motion – whether Plaintiff maintains his innocence for charges to which he pled
51
Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994); see also Morris
v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
52
DeCossas v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, No. 16-3786, 2017 WL 3971248 at *10 (E.D. La. Sep.
8, 2017)(internal citations omitted).
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guilty. Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony and pleadings filed into the record of this
matter undermine the statements set forth above. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how
the testimony of any other witnesses will serve to correct this inconsistency for purpose
of the application of Heck v. Humphrey to his claims; the same is true for the Affidavit of
Lennon Rushing submitted by Plaintiff.53
The Court finds the reasoning and analysis in Claunch v. Williams54 applicable to
the present case. In Claunch, the plaintiff alleged that he was transported from a bar to
his home in Slidell, Louisiana and charged $17.10 instead of the allegedly correct cab
fare of $8.00. The plaintiff also claimed that, when he failed to tender the fare charged,
he was locked in the cab by the driver, who called the St. Tammany Sheriff's Office, and
the defendant officers responded. According to the complaint, the plaintiff claimed that,
when the officers ordered him to retrieve the additional fare from his house, we was struck
from behind by one of the officers, handcuffed, tased, put into the sheriff's vehicle,
transported a gas station where he was again beaten and tased before being taken to
and detained at the St. Tammany Parish jail for 2–3 days without being allowed to use
the phone to contact an attorney or family.55 The plaintiff brought a variety of federal and
state claims against the defendants, including excessive force, assault and battery, and
unlawful detention.56
The uncontroverted police record indicated that the plaintiff was intoxicated and
arrested for disturbing the peace and resisting arrest at his home, and the plaintiff
53
Rec. Doc. No. 89-3.
No. 10-1716, 2012 WL 366544 (M.D. La. Jan. 30, 2012).
55
Id. at *1.
56
Id.
54
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continued to act violently in the sheriff's vehicle during transport.
The plaintiff was
charged with two misdemeanor counts for disturbing the peace and resisting an officer
and two felony counts for resisting an officer with force or violence and public intimidation.
He was also charged in a bill of information with resisting an officer “by the intentional
interference, obstruction or resistance to a law enforcement officer acting in his official
capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest knowing or having reason to know
that the officer was acting in his official capacity” in violation of La.Rev.Stat. § 14:108 and
for disturbing the peace in a manner “as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public by
being intoxicated” in violation of La.Rev.Stat. 103. Approximately one month prior to filing
this suit, the plaintiff entered a plea of “no contest” to the charges contained in the bill of
information and was sentenced.57
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims arguing the
Section 1983 claims were barred by Heck. The defendants presented the plaintiff’s
deposition testimony in support of their motion:
Claunch testified that he was “visibly intoxicated” at the bar on the night of
the arrest, that he did nothing wrong at his home, that he was handcuffed
at his home “for no reason” given the insignificant amount of cab fare owing,
that he was not belligerent or hostile or resistant to the officers prior to being
hit in the head at his home, that the officers did not tell him he was under
arrest at his home and that his resistance did not start until after he was hit,
handcuffed and tased, and that he was transported with leg restraints on.
Rec. Doc. 60–11. Claunch did not remember kicking the doors or windows
of the police car after leaving his home. Id. He testified that he exhibited no
resistance to the officers' lawful commands at any time prior to being tased
in handcuffs and that any resistance was in the nature of self-defense. Id.
Claunch concluded his deposition by testifying that he did not at any time
during his interaction with the officers do anything wrong insofar as resisting
abusing or intimidating the officers, other than asking to be released
because of his father's position. Id. Claunch did not pay the cab fare that
57
Id.
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night. Id.58
The court noted that the plaintiff offered no deposition testimony to contradict the
defendants’ arguments.59
The plaintiff argued that his claims were not barred by Heck by relying on the
distinctions in Bush. The court summarized the plaintiff’s reasoning:
Claunch claims that he “plead no contest only to resisting arrest when the
Deputies attempted to place him in restraints” and “does not contest that he
may have struggled and resisted at the point in time when the deputies
actually placed him in handcuffs at his property.” Rec. Doc. 69 at 6. He
supports his argument that the excessive force occurred before and after
he was placed under arrest with an January 2012 affidavit in which he
swears that he was not resisting arrest when he was hit over the head at
his home, that his resisting arrest conviction only concerns the time when
he was placed in restraints at his home because he “was shocked and
rattled by the chain of events,” and that he was not resisting arrest at the
gas station. Rec. Doc. 69–2.2 Again, no deposition excerpts are offered by
the plaintiff.60
The defendants argued the plaintiff could not impeach his prior sworn testimony with a
subsequent conflicting affidavit that failed to explain the inconsistencies. The plaintiff
argued in response that his plea of no contest only related to resisting arrest when he
was placed in restraints.61 The court rejected this contention, holding:
The Court finds this explanation unpersuasive and ill-timed. Claunch's
deposition testimony is not so restricted, he testified that he acted in selfdefense, and the current time-sensitive explanation of the scope of the
crimes for which the plaintiff is convicted are contrary to that deposition
testimony and otherwise unsupported by police and court records. It should
be noted that the affidavit was signed by Claunch months after the plaintiff's
deposition testimony and almost eighteen months after the incident.62
58
Id. at *2.
Id.
60
Id. at *3.
61
Id.
62
Id.
59
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Thus, the court found that the “same facts attend Claunch's convictions as his § 1983
claims for excessive force and unlawful arrest and those claims necessarily imply the
invalidity of his convictions for disturbing the peace and resisting arrest. As such, any §
1983 claim for damages relative to excessive force or wrongful arrest are barred by
Heck.”63
Like the plaintiff in Claunch, Plaintiff herein failed to offer any contradicting excerpts
from his own deposition testimony to establish a distinct excessive force claim for
purposes of Heck. Further, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony demonstrates that Plaintiff
appears to still deny that he, in fact, resisted arrest by force or violence, a charge for
which he was convicted:
Q All right. Now, at any time that whole night during this whole incident did
you ever use any physical force against any of the police officers or
deputies out there?
A No, sir.
Q All right. At any time that whole night during the whole incident did you
punch any of the officers or deputies out there?
A No, sir.
Q At any time that whole night during the whole incident did you ever, you
know, use an elbow or a knee on any of the officers or deputies?
A No, sir.64
While Plaintiff has not attempted to contradict this testimony with an inconsistent,
subsequent affidavit, Plaintiff has simply ignored his testimony altogether and avoided
addressing Defendants’ arguments regarding same. Thus, because Plaintiff has failed
63
64
Id.
Rec. Doc. No. 73-4 (Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 39:18 through p. 40:5).
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to present summary judgment evidence demonstrating a material issue of fact regarding
his admission of resistance, the Court finds that his Section 1983 claims and state law
claims65 are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Summary Judgment66 by
Defendants is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on April 17, 2019.
S
CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
65
See Collier v. Roberts, No. 13-425-SDD-EWD, 2016 WL 3448607 at *6-*7 (M.D. La. June 17, 2016);
Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, No. 01-902-D, 2003 WL 25739166, *4 (M.D.La., Sep. 5, 2003)(citing Mayeux
v. Lee, No. CIV. A. 99-1625, 2000 WL 17836, 3 (E.D.La., Jan. 10, 2000); Williams v. DiVittoria, 777 F.Supp.
1332, 1337 (E.D.La. 1991)).
66
Rec. Doc. No. 73.
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