Carter et al v. Cain et al

Filing 62

RULING granting in part and denying in part 48 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by James Cruze, Burl N. Cain, Barrett Boeker, Jonathon London, Darrel Vannoy, Leslie Dupont, James M LeBlanc. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 2/21/2019. (SWE)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IRMA JEAN CARTER, et al.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

17-201-SDD-RLB

N. BURL CAIN, et al.
RULING
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss1 filed by Defendants James LeBlanc, N.
Burl Cain, Darryl Vannoy, Leslie Dupont, James Cruze, Barrett Boeker, and Jonathan
London (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs, Irma Jean Carter, Christa Carter, and Does
1-5 (“Plaintiffs”) filed an Opposition,2 to which Defendants filed a Reply.3 For the reasons
which follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 2, 2016, Terrance Carter was found dead in his cell at Camp J in the

Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”), where he was an inmate.4 Carter’s mother, sister,
and other siblings subsequently brought the present lawsuit, alleging that Carter had
“years of documented mental health problems”5 and that various officials at LSP “drafted,
authorized, condoned, and/or knowingly acquiesced to the unconstitutional policy of
housing mentally ill inmates . . .in Camp J, referred to as disciplinary or administrative
segregation.”6

1

Rec. Doc. No. 48.
Rec. Doc. No. 52.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 53. 
4
Rec. Doc. No. 4, p. 2.
5
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 1.  
6
Rec. Doc. No. 4, pp. 3-4.
2

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On May 30, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss,7 arguing that “Plaintiffs
are not the proper parties to bring the claims brought, lack standing and failed to state a
claim.”8 Among other arguments, Defendants contended that Carter’s siblings were not
proper parties under Louisiana’s wrongful death and survival statutes, which allow the
decedent’s parents to recover in such a lawsuit, to the exclusion of other, lower-ranked
beneficiaries.
In its Ruling9 on the Motion to Dismiss, this Court found Plaintiffs’ Complaint
deficient because it “fail[ed] to affirmatively negate the existence of any primary
beneficiaries (i.e., spouse or children) who can bring a survival or wrongful death
action.”10

Plaintiffs were ordered to file an amended Complaint addressing that

deficiency. They did so, adding one line: “Decedent Terrance Carter was not survived by
a spouse or children.”11 Defendants then re-urged their Motion to Dismiss.12
In their re-urged Motion to Dismiss, Defendants raise numerous issues. First, they
reassert their argument that Carter’s siblings are not proper parties to a wrongful death
or survival action because Irma Jean Carter, Carter’s mother, is alive and party to this
suit. Second, they argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, and that, in any event, Plaintiffs lack standing
to bring a claim under those statutes. Additionally, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’
claims for money damages brought against LSP officials in their official capacities

7

Rec. Doc. No. 24.
Rec. Doc. No. 24, p. 1.
9
Rec. Doc. No. 46.
10
Rec. Doc. No. 46, p. 3.
11
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 3.
12
Rec. Doc. No. 48.  
8

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because, they argue, those claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Likewise, they argue, the official capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief should
be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack standing. The Court will address Defendants’
arguments in turn.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motions to Dismiss Under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
1. Rule 12(b)(1)
“When a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction ‘is filed in conjunction with other

Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
addressing any attack on the merits.’”13 If a complaint could be dismissed for both lack
of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, “‘the court should dismiss only on the
jurisdictional ground under [Rule] 12(b)(1), without reaching the question of failure to state
a claim under [Rule] 12(b)(6).’”14 The reason for this rule is to preclude courts from issuing
advisory opinions and barring courts without jurisdiction “‘from prematurely dismissing a
case with prejudice.’”15
“Article III standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite.”16 If a plaintiff lacks standing to
bring a claim, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, and dismissal

13
Crenshaw–Logal v. City of Abilene, Texas, 436 Fed.Appx. 306, 308 (5th Cir. 2011)(quoting Ramming v.
United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Randall D. Wolcott, MD, PA v. Sebelius, 635
F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir.2011); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3)).
14
Crenshaw–Logal, 436 Fed.Appx. at 308 (quoting Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th
Cir.1977)).
15
Id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210
(1998), and Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161).
16
Crenshaw–Logal, 436 Fed.Appx. at 308 (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003, and Xerox
Corp. v. Genmoora Corp., 888 F.2d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 1989)). 

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under Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate.17 The party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of showing that standing existed at the time the lawsuit was filed.18 In
reviewing a motion under 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may
consider (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the
court's resolution of disputed facts.19
2. Rule 12(b)(6)
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all wellpleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”20 The
Court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into
the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”21 “To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”22 In Twombly, the United States Supreme
Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

17

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154–55, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990); Chair King, Inc.
v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir.1997).
18
M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001); Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243
F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001); Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
19
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981).
20
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Martin v. Eby Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
21
Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).
22
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area
Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d at 467).

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of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”23 A complaint is also insufficient if it
merely “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”24 However,
“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”25 In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than
a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.”26 “Furthermore, while the
court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable
to the plaintiff.’”27 On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”28
B. Wrongful Death Claims
1. Standing
Plaintiffs’ Sixth Cause of Action is entitled “State Law Wrongful Death.”29
Defendants argue that under Louisiana law, Terrance Carter’s mother, Irma Jean Carter,
“is the only proper plaintiff”30 to bring this claim. The Court agrees. “As a threshold matter,
any party bringing suit must have standing to do so, and the [United States Court of
Appeals for the] Fifth Circuit has instructed district courts to evaluate state law concepts

23

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal citations and brackets
omitted)(hereinafter Twombly).
24
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(internal citations
omitted)(hereinafter “Iqbal”).
25
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
26
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
27
Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire
Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).
28
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d
209 (1986)).
29
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 24.
30
Rec. Doc. No. 48-1, p. 5.  

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. . . to establish standing in wrongful death and survivorship actions.”31 Under Louisiana
Civil Code Articles 2315.1 and 2315.2, the right of a survival or wrongful death action is
afforded to four exclusive categories of survivors. However, the statutes do not allow for
multiple classes of survivors, e.g., both the mother and siblings of the decedent, to
recover. Rather, the existence of a person within a higher class precludes a person in a
lower class from filing suit.32 The primary category under both 2315.1 and 2315.2 includes
the surviving spouse and/or children of the decedent. The second category includes “the
surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them if he left no spouse or child
surviving.”33 Siblings are only permitted to recover under the third category, and then only
if [the decedent] left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.”34
Plaintiffs aver in their Complaint that “Plaintiff Irma Jean Carter is Terrance Carter’s
mother.”35 The law is clear that Irma Jean Carter, who, as the decedent’s mother, ranks
in the second category, excludes any of Terrance Carter’s siblings from recovering in a
wrongful death action. Therefore, all Plaintiffs except Irma Jean Carter lack standing to
bring their wrongful death and survival claims, and those claims shall be dismissed with
prejudice. The wrongful death claim may continue with Irma Jean Carter as Plaintiff.36

31

Howell v. Hillcorp Energy Co., No. 12–0293, 2013 WL 1455758, *3 (E.D. La. 2013).
See Kumasi v. Cochran, No. 2015 WL 4429192 at *3 (M.D. La. July 17, 2015).
33
La. C. C. art. 2315.1 and 2315.2.
34
Id.
35
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 3.
36
Plaintiffs further argue that Christa Carter, Terrance Carter’s sister, is a proper plaintiff for the wrongful
death claim because she “is Ms. Irma Jean Carter’s mandatary and has all legal rights to sue on her
behalf.” (Rec. Doc. No. 52, p. 4.). The Court fails to see why mandate is at issue when Irma Jean Carter
is a party to this lawsuit in her own right. Plaintiffs’ “mandatary” argument cannot prevent Christa Carter’s
wrongful death claim from being dismissed.
32

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2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
a. Standing Under 42 U.S.C. §1983
Plaintiffs bring their First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action37 under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, which provides a civil cause of action for the deprivation of certain rights. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that “[s]tanding under the
Civil Rights Statutes is guided by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that state common
law is used to fill the gaps in administration of civil rights suits.”38 Therefore, a party must
have standing under the relevant state wrongful death or survival statutes to bring a claim
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988.39 As discussed above, Plaintiff’s mother, Irma
Jean Carter, is the only Plaintiff with standing under Louisiana’s wrongful death and
survival statutes. Therefore, she is the only proper party for a claim brought under 42
U.S.C. §1983.
Despite the clear law and jurisprudence on the issue, Plaintiffs insist that the
siblings of Terrance Carter have standing for their wrongful death claim because “courts
have recognized a Fourteenth Amendment right and injury of a family member that exists
separate and apart from the primary violation of the decedent’s rights.”40 Specifically,
Plaintiffs cite the 1992 Fifth Circuit case Rhyne v. Henderson County.41 In Rhyne, the
mother of a man who committed suicide in a Texas jail sued under § 1983, seeking,
among other things, “to recover for her own injuries arising out of the wrongful death of

37

Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 17 and p. 23.
Pluet v. Frasier, 355 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 2004). 
39
See Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 390–91 (5th Cir.1992).
40
Rec. Doc. No. 52, p. 14.
41
Rhyne, 973 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1992).
38

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her son.”42 The Fifth Circuit noted that the right to such recovery under § 1983 was an
unsettled issue, but went on to find that the decedent’s mother had standing to recover
for her own injuries because “[t]here [was] no dispute that [the plaintiff] is within the class
of people entitled to recover under Texas law for the wrongful death of a child.”43
Plaintiffs in the instant case are mistaken in their belief that Rhyne creates a
blanket right for family members to recover under §1983. In fact, Rhyne demonstrates
that the right to recover for one’s own injuries is derivative of the right to pursue a wrongful
death action under state law. Since, as discussed above, only Terrance Carter’s mother
has standing under Louisiana’s wrongful death statutes, the right to recover under § 1983
is likewise restricted to his mother. Indeed, Plaintiffs at times appear to concede as much.
They state in their Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that “[Terrance Carter’s]
mother, Irma Jean Carter, may bring Mr. Carter’s surviving claims for Defendants’
violations of his constitutional rights and section 1983,”44 pleading no facts that would
support the existence of standing on the part of the siblings.
Plaintiffs further argue that Terrance Carter’s § 1983 claim “survives his death and
is transferred to his estate.”45 Although it is true that a succession administrator has
procedural capacity to bring certain types of suits on behalf of a decedent, Plaintiffs have
not alleged that any of the parties herein is the succession administrator. Moreover, as
the Fifth Circuit recently noted in Walker v. New Orleans City,46 “[a] succession

42

Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
44
Rec. Doc. No. 52, p. 6.
45
Rec. Doc. No. 52, p. 5.
46
709 Fed.Appx. 303 (5th Cir. 2018).
43

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administrator has no standing to bring a wrongful death claim under Louisiana law,”47 and,
as such, would not have standing to bring a § 1983 claim predicated on a wrongful death
claim. Thus, the notion that anyone except Irma Jean Carter has standing under § 1983
because they somehow represent “the estate” is not persuasive.
Accordingly, the Court shall grant the Motion to Dismiss as to the following claims
of Christa Carter and the five unnamed siblings of Terrance Carter: the “First Cause of
Action,” entitled “Section 1983 – Violation of Eighth Amendment,”48 the “Second Cause
of Action,” entitled “Section 1983 – Violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment,”49 and
the “Fourth Cause of Action,” entitled “Section 1983 – Violation of Fourteenth
Amendment.”50 The Motion to Dismiss as to Irma Jean Carter is DENIED and those
causes of action may proceed with Irma Jean Carter as Plaintiff.
b. Official Capacity Claims Under § 1983
A suit against a state official or employee in his or her official capacity is actually a
suit against the state itself.51 The Eleventh Amendment bars a state's citizens from filing
suit against the state in federal court unless the state has waived its immunity.52 Louisiana
has refused any such waiver of its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity regarding
suits in federal court.53 Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official
capacities as employees of the state Department of Corrections are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.

47

Id. at 304. 
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 17.
49
Id.
50
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 23.
51
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
52
See Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council–President Government, 279 F.3d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 2002).
53
See La. R. S. § 13:5106(A).
48

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The doctrine of sovereign immunity does permit an exception when it comes to
prospective injunctive relief: “Under Ex Parte Young, a federal court, consistent with the
Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the
requirements of federal law.”54 Therefore, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for prospective
relief are not barred by sovereign immunity; nonetheless, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring
a claim for prospective injunctive relief.55 Claims for prospective injunctive relief are
subject to the standing requirements articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.56 Therein, the Court held that a plaintiff seeking to enjoin
the Los Angeles Police Department from the use of chokeholds lacked standing because
he failed to show that he was “likely to suffer future injury from the use of the chokeholds
by police officers.”57 The Court further stated that “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct”
cannot suffice to create standing “if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse
effects.”58
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot allege any continuing, present adverse
effects because her claim is brought on behalf of Terrance Carter, who is deceased, and
the Plaintiff herself is not incarcerated at LSP or likely to suffer future injury from any
actions taken by Defendants at LSP. As Defendants note, the Fifth Circuit in Plumley v.
Landmark Chevrolet59 granted a motion to dismiss on similar facts, namely, where the

54

McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 
Plaintiffs pray for injunctive relief, specifically, “permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendants. . .from
violating” the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in the form of a court order “requiring Defendants to present
a plan to the Court within 60 days that provides for” certain specified reforms at LSP. (Rec. Doc. No. 47).
56
461 U.S. 95 (1983).
57
Id. at 105.
58
Id.
59
122 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1997).  
55

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original plaintiff died, and a family member was substituted as plaintiff to pursue the
lawsuit on his behalf. The Fifth Circuit held that the family member lacked standing to
bring a claim for injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act because the
plaintiff was dead and thus, “[i]t [was] unlikely that [the defendant] will wrong [the plaintiff]
again.”60 Similarly, the Eastern District of Texas in Smith v. Stephens61 held that the
plaintiff, a former inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, lacked standing to
bring a claim for prospective injunctive relief against that agency after he was transferred
to the custody of another agency, the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Texas court
reasoned that injunctive relief, even if granted, would not redress the plaintiff’s injury
because he was no longer in the custody of the agency he was seeking to enjoin.62
Likewise, with respect to the instant case, Terrance Carter is no longer an inmate
at LSP. His mother, who brings this action on his behalf, is not an inmate at LSP, and she
pleads no facts suggesting that she faces a “real and immediate” threat of future injury.
As such, Plaintiff lacks standing to seek prospective injunctive relief regarding the
conditions at LSP, and her claims for prospective injunctive relief against Defendants in
their official capacities are hereby dismissed.
That does not end the inquiry, however. In addition to injunctive relief, Plaintiff also
prays for “a declaration that Defendants’ policies and procedures, or lack thereof . . .
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”63 The
Fifth Circuit has held that the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity can allow

60

Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1997).
No. 9:14CV64, 2016 WL 11212419 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No.
9:14CV64, 2017 WL 3404797 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2017).
62
Id. at *3.
63
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 27.
61

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for official capacity claims seeking declaratory relief.64 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has
also imposed the “future injury” requirement that applies to injunctive relief on plaintiffs
seeking declaratory relief. In Bauer v. Texas,65 the court held that “[i]n order to
demonstrate that a case or controversy exists to meet the Article III standing requirement
when a plaintiff is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts from
which it appears there is a substantial likelihood that [s]he will suffer injury in the future.”66
As discussed above, Plaintiff herein has failed to allege facts that demonstrate any
likelihood that she will suffer injury in the future that the declaratory relief she seeks would
redress. Accordingly, her official capacity claims for declaratory relief cannot survive this
motion to dismiss and will be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff Irma Jean Carter also seeks “monetary relief.”67 Defendants argue that
any claim for money damages against them in their official capacities is subject to
dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendants are correct that § 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a
litigant who seeks monetary damages against either a state or its officials acting in their
official capacities, specifically because these officials are not seen as “persons” within the
meaning of § 1983.68 In addition, in Hafer v. Melo,69 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the distinction between official capacity and individual capacity lawsuits and

64

A final prerequisite of Ex parte Young is that “the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature
and prospective in effect.” NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2015), quoting Saltz
v. Tenn. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 976 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir.1992).
65
341 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2003).
66
Id. at 358.
67
Rec. Doc. No. 52, p. 13 (“In addition to monetary relief, Plaintiffs have requested declaratory and
injunctive relief.”).
68
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
69
502 U.S. 21 (1991).

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made clear that a suit against a state official in an official capacity for monetary damages
is treated as a suit against the state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.70
Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims for monetary damages
against Defendants in their official capacities, those claims are dismissed with prejudice.
The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
above. Accordingly, since none of the prayed-for relief is available to Plaintiff as a matter
of law, the Motion to Dismiss is granted and Plaintiff’s official capacity claims under §
1983 are hereby dismissed with prejudice in their entirety.
c. Individual Capacity Claims under § 1983
To successfully allege constitutional violations in a § 1983 claim, the Fifth Circuit
has held that a plaintiff “must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional
violation. This standard requires more than conclusional assertions: The plaintiff must
allege specific facts giving rise to the constitutional claims.”71 In order to establish the
personal liability of a certain defendant to a plaintiff who is claiming damages for
deprivation of his civil rights, that plaintiff must show that particular defendant's action or
inaction was a violation of the plaintiff's civil rights.72 Overall, “[p]ersonal involvement is
an essential element of a civil rights cause of action.”73 “Under section 1983, supervisory
officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”74
A supervisory official may be held liable under section 1983 only if “(1) he affirmatively
70

Id. at 25.
Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
72
Archie v. LeBlanc, No. CV08-CV-1381, 2010 WL 3522296, at *4 (W.D. La. July 28, 2010), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 08-CV-1381, 2010 WL 3522293 (W.D. La. Sept. 2, 2010), aff'd, 447 F. App'x
591 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1322 n. 4 (5th Cir.1981). Also, Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1098 n. 7, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)).
73
Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir.1 983).
74
Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987).
71

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participates in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements
unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.”75
The Court will now address the specific allegations against each Defendant in turn.
1. Secretary James LeBlanc
Plaintiff states that LeBlanc “is the present Secretary of the Department of
Corrections, a position he has held since 2012.”76 As the head of the Louisiana
Department of Corrections, Secretary LeBlanc is a “supervisory official” under the
doctrine. As discussed above, a supervisory official can be liable in his individual capacity
under § 1983 if “(1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the constitutional
deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the
constitutional injury.”77 Plaintiff does not allege that LeBlanc affirmatively participated in
the acts described in the Complaint. Instead, she alleges facts consistent with the second
prong, with respect to policy. The Fifth Circuit has held that “[s]upervisory liability may
also exist without overt personal participation in the offensive act if the supervisory official
‘implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional
rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.’”78
Plaintiff alleges that Secretary LeBlanc “is responsible for drafting and
promulgating the administrative procedures under which all prisons in Louisiana,
including the Louisiana State Penitentiary, are required to operate.”79 The policy that

75

Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008). 
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 3.
77
Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir.2008). 
78
Walker v. Nunn, 456 F. App'x 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2011), citing Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
79
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 13.
76

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allegedly played a role in Terrance Carter’s death is described by Plaintiff as “the
institutional policy of housing mentally ill inmates and inmates in acute mental distress in
Camp J.”80 Plaintiff describes the disciplinary process for placing an inmate in Camp J81
and alleges that the process fails to offer “any safeguard or provision addressing the
needs of inmates with mental health issues, diagnosed disorders, or in acute mental
distress.”82 Per Plaintiff, the disciplinary process, as codified by Secretary LeBlanc in Title
22, fails to consider the mental health status of inmates or their rights under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.83
Plaintiff further offers the general allegation that Secretary LeBlanc “drafted,
authorized, condoned, and/or knowingly acquiesced to” certain policies in force at LSP
that allegedly had the effect of, in short, contributing to Terrance Carter’s suicide. This
Court has previously held that allegations of “’tacit approval of, acquiescence in, or
purposeful disregard of, rights-violating conduct’ will defeat a motion to dismiss predicated
on Rule 12(b)(6).”84 However, such allegations must include “factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”85 Throughout her Complaint, Plaintiff repeats the same allegation – that an
individual “drafted, authorized, condoned, and/or knowingly acquiesced to the
unconstitutional policy of housing mentally ill inmates and inmates in severe mental
distress in Camp J”86 -- with respect to various Defendants. Such a general, conclusory,

80

Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 3.
See Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 13-14.
82
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 15.
83
Rec. Doc. No. 47, pp. 13-14 at ¶ 51.
84
Cleveland v. Gautreaux, 198 F.Supp.3d 717, 739 (M.D. La. 2016).
85
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
86
See, e.g., Rec. Doc. No. 47 ¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.
81

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and repetitive allegation is insufficient unless supported by additional specific factual
allegations.
Throughout, Plaintiff asserts that all Defendants, including Secretary LeBlanc,
“knew or should have known” of certain information or risks pertaining to Terrance Carter,
without specifying how each Defendant was in a position to know that information or
otherwise offering facts that would take the allegations beyond the realm of “sheer
possibility.”87 Twombly instructs that a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action is not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.88 Therefore, the Court concludes that
these “knew or should have known” allegations against all Defendants are insufficient to
show that Secretary LeBlanc engaged in tacit approval, acquiescence, or purposeful
disregard of the allegedly rights-violating policy at issue here.
More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Department of Corrections policy calls for
disciplinary sentences to be imposed by a Disciplinary Board composed of “two people .
. . each representing a different discipline (security, administration, or treatment).”89 In
reality, however, Plaintiff contends, “the common practice at the prison is to comprise the
Board almost exclusively of members from security and administration.”90 The Complaint
lacks any factual basis for the allegation that Secretary LeBlanc implemented, or was
even aware of, the “common practice[s]” of the LSP Disciplinary Board. If anything, by
showing that the prison policy for which Leblanc “is responsible” on its face includes
treatment personnel in disciplinary decisions, Plaintiff fails to state a claim that the

87

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007).
Twombly at 555 (internal citations and brackets omitted).
89
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 14.  
90
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 14.
88

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challenged policy is “so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional
rights.”91
In Archie v. LeBlanc,92 the Western District of Louisiana granted Secretary
LeBlanc’s motion to dismiss in a case where a prisoner “allege[d] in his complaint that his
constitutional rights were violated when he was incarcerated . . . because he was
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement.”93 The Western District found that
these generalized allegations were not enough to state a claim against LeBlanc in his
individual capacity, because the plaintiff did not “allege[] or offer[] any specific facts or
proof of any act or omission by LeBlanc which constituted a violation of [the plaintiff’s]
civil rights.”94 The same is true here.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has noted an important caveat to supervisory liability
claims brought based on an allegedly deficient policy: the “[e]xistence of a constitutionally
deficient policy cannot be inferred from a single wrongful act.”95 To demonstrate that the
violations at Camp J were not limited to a single act, Plaintiff avers that “another inmate
at Camp J also took his life”96 on the day of Carter’s suicide, and that, “on information and
belief . . . at least four other inmates at Camp J have taken their own lives”97 since then.
However, Plaintiff’s allegations surround “the unconstitutional policy of housing mentally

91

Walker v. Nunn, 456 F. App'x 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2011), citing Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
92
No. CV08-CV-1381, 2010 WL 3522296, at *1 (W.D. La. July 28, 2010), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 08-CV-1381, 2010 WL 3522293 (W.D. La. Sept. 2, 2010), aff'd, 447 F. App'x 591 (5th Cir.
2011).
93
Id. at *4.
94
Id. at *1.
95
Brown v. Bolin, 500 Fed.Appx. 309, 314 (5th Cir.2012). 
96
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 12.
97
Id.  

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ill inmates and inmates in acute mental distress in Camp J,”98 and she does not allege
that these five other inmates who allegedly committed suicide at Camp J were mentally
ill. Though undoubtedly tragic, the five other suicides do not provide factual support for
Plaintiff’s allegation that Secretary LeBlanc‘s policy with respect to mentally ill inmates
was constitutionally deficient. As such, the allegations in the Complaint only state a claim
as to Carter. Even accepting as true that his suicide was caused by the allegedly deficient
policy, Plaintiff has successfully pled only a “single wrongful act.”
Other allegations also suggest that the alleged violation was unique to Carter.
Plaintiff avers that although Carter was sentenced to 6 months at Camp J, “other inmates
with similar infractions are given only a few days to a few weeks at Camp J.”99 In
Thompkins v. Belt, the Fifth Circuit concluded that there was no basis for finding
supervisory liability where the record “indicate[d] no more than that the system may have
failed in the one particular instance.”100 Carter’s allegedly disproportionate sentence
stands as “one particular instance” in contrast with the sentences allegedly given to other
similarly situated inmates. Because the Fifth Circuit has clearly held that a single instance
of wrongful conduct cannot support a claim for supervisory liability on the basis of deficient
policy, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss shall be granted as to the claims
against Secretary LeBlanc in his individual capacity.
2. Warden Burl Cain
Plaintiff asserts various claims against former LSP Warden N. Burl Cain in his
individual capacity. But the pleaded allegations pertaining to Warden Cain are limited to

98

Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 4.
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 10.
100
Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1987). 
99

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the unelaborated assertion that “[o]n information and belief,” Warden Cain and several
others “assisted Defendant LeBlanc and the Department of Corrections in drafting and
promulgating the administrative procedures at issue during all times relevant to this
complaint.”101 Even accepting that allegation as true, the Court concluded above that
Plaintiff did not successfully plead that the policy was so constitutionally deficient as to
give rise to supervisory liability. As such, Cain’s alleged involvement in the creation of the
policy does not suffice to state a claim for his individual liability.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s own account of Warden Cain’s tenure at LSP highlights that
he resigned “in December 2015”102 and was thus not employed there when Terrance
Carter was sent to the disciplinary housing unit at Camp J in February 2016, nor during
the subsequent events leading up to his death in April 2016. For these reasons, the Court
finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss shall be granted as to the claims against Warden
Burl Cain in his individual capacity.
3. Warden Darryl Vannoy
Plaintiff alleges that Warden Vannoy was employed at LSP during the relevant
timeframe in the first half of 2016.103 Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Warden Vannoy
“overs[aw] the operations, staffing, and administration of the prison, including the
operations, staffing, and administration of Camp J,”104 where Terrance Carter was housed
before his death. Although they successfully establish that Warden Vannoy was present
at LSP during the relevant timeframe and had some degree of power and control over the

101

Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 13.
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 4.  
103
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 4 (“was the interim Warden from January 2016 until his appointment as Warden [in
July 2016])”.
104
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 4.
102

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operations there, Plaintiff does not bring forth any factual allegations that demonstrate
personal involvement by Warden Vannoy, nor does she cite any specific action or inaction
taken by Warden Vannoy as having been a contributing cause to the violation of Terrance
Carter’s rights. To be liable under § 1983, a person must either be personally involved in
the acts causing the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, or there must be a causal
connection between the act of that person and the constitutional violation sought to be
redressed.105 Because Plaintiff fails to allege any specific actions taken by Warden
Vannoy, the Complaint fails to state a claim that Vannoy deprived Terrance Carter of
constitutional rights. Plaintiff generally describes the disciplinary procedure in place at
LSP, including the involvement of the “Disciplinary Board,”106 but does not allege that
Warden Vannoy or any other named Defendant was a member of that Board. Plaintiff
fails to plead any facts that Warden Vannoy implemented allegedly unconstitutional
policies. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss shall be
granted with respect to the claims against Warden Vannoy in his individual capacity.
4. Deputy Warden Leslie Dupont and Assistant Warden James “Jimmy”
Cruze
Plaintiff asserts that “during times relevant to this Complaint, [Dupont] was the
Deputy Warden in charge of Security”107 at LSP, while Cruze was “in charge of Death
Row, Security, and Camp J.”108 Both men, Plaintiff claims, “[were] aware, or should have
been aware, of Terrance Carter’s mental health issues and acute mental distress.”109

105

Barnes v. Bond, No. CIV.A.07-789JVP-SCR, 2008 WL 3887657, at *4 (M.D. La. Aug. 21, 2008) (citing
Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756 (5th Cir.1983)).
106
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 14.  
107
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 4.
108
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 5.
109
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 5.

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Absent factual detail, this claim cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Even accepting as
true that Dupont and Cruze had duties related to “security” and/or Camp J, that alone is
not sufficient to state a claim that they participated in constitutional violations. As to
Deputy Warden Dupont, Plaintiff avers that “[o]n information and belief . . . [he] assisted
Defendant LeBlanc and the Department of Corrections in drafting and promulgating the
administrative procedures at issue.”110 For the same reasons set forth as to Warden Burl
Cain, that allegation is insufficient to state a claim. Moreover, the plausibility of that
assertion is undermined by Plaintiff’s claim elsewhere in the Complaint that Secretary
LeBlanc “is responsible”111 for the drafting and promulgation of administrative procedures.
Although detailed factual allegations are not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss,
such general and formulaic allegations as the ones made against Dupont and Cruze
cannot suffice. Therefore, the Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss shall be granted with
respect to the claims against Deputy Warden Leslie Dupont and Assistant Warden James
“Jimmy” Cruze in their individual capacities.
5. Assistant Wardens Barrett Boeker and Jonathon London
Assistant Wardens Boeker and London are each alleged to have been “the
Assistant Warden in charge of Camp J.”112 Likewise, each man is alleged to have been
“aware, or should have been aware, of Terrance Carter’s mental health issues and acute
mental distress.”113 This conclusory assertion is unaccompanied by any factual
allegations that demonstrate personal involvement or any specific action or inaction taken

110

Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 13.
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 13.
112
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 5.
113
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 5. 
111

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by Defendants Boeker and London. The Court finds that merely having been employed
in Camp J during the relevant timeframe is not sufficient to give rise to the inference that
Boeker or London was involved in a constitutional violation. As such, the Motion to
Dismiss shall be granted as to Assistant Wardens Barrett Boeker and Jonathan London
in their individual capacities. Having examined Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims under
§ 1983 for their compliance with the Rule 12 standard, the Court concludes that none of
the individual capacity claims can survive a motion to dismiss as pleaded. Accordingly,
the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s individual capacity § 1983 claims as to all Defendants is
granted and the claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
d. Deliberate Medical Indifference Under § 1983
Plaintiff also appears to assert a claim for deliberately indifferent medical treatment
under Section 1983, alleging that Defendants’ “failure to treat Mr. Carter or address his
mental health issues was cruel, unusual, and deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs.”114 Terrance Carter’s time at LSP was, per Plaintiff, marked by “the denial of
appropriate treatment, medication, and mental health services.”115 Moreover, Carter’s
sentence to Camp J came with an “obvious risk of harm”116 because it had the effect of
“restricting his access to medical care.”117 Carter allegedly told his attorney that “the
prison would not put him on suicide watch”118 despite his repeated requests.
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for the deprivation of medical care, a
plaintiff must allege and show that appropriate care has been denied and that the denial

114

Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 15.
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 16.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 2.
115

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has constituted “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”119 Whether the plaintiff
has received the treatment or accommodation that he believes he should have is not the
issue, because a prisoner's mere disagreement with his medical treatment, absent
exceptional circumstances, does not support a claim of deliberate medical indifference.120
Nor do negligence, neglect, medical malpractice or unsuccessful medical treatment give
rise to a § 1983 cause of action.121 Rather, “subjective recklessness as used in the
criminal law” is the appropriate definition of “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth
Amendment.122 A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if the official (1)
“knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm,” and (2) “disregards
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”123
The deliberate indifference standard sets a very high bar. Plaintiff Irma Jean Carter
must allege that prison officials “refused to treat [her son], ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly
evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.”124 Based on the allegations in
her Complaint, Plaintiff has not cleared that high bar.
The allegations in the Complaint, accepted as true, show that Terrance Carter did
receive some level of medical care during his time at LSP. For example, Plaintiff alleges
that Carter “was frequently in contact with the medical and mental health professionals at
the prison,”125 and that when Carter’s appellate lawyer “made the prison aware of Carter’s
119

Thomas v. Carter, 593 Fed. Appx. 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2014), citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006).
121
See Zaunbrecher v. Gaudin, 641 F. App'x 340, 342 (5th Cir. 2016).
122
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-30 (1994).
123
Gobert at 346, quoting Farmer v. Brennan at 847.
124
Domino v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001), quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
supra. 
125
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 9.
120

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complaints,” the prison medical staff examined him and ‘were unable to find anything
physically wrong.”126 Later, a doctor at the prison told Carter’s attorney that he “thought
Mr. Carter was having olfactory hallucinations, and that he referred Mr. Carter to mental
health services.”127
Plaintiff also alleges that Terrance Carter “requested to be put on suicide watch”128
and that prison officials refused that request. Plaintiff fails to name or specify any official
who received, or refused, Carter’s request. Moreover, elsewhere in her Complaint,
Plaintiff describes a letter written from Terrance Carter to his appellate lawyer where
Carter stated: “The Sergeant claimed the reason I’m being watched is because I’m on
suicide watch. I was unaware of that. . .”129 So, the allegations in the Complaint potentially
show that Carter was, in fact, on suicide watch. The generality of the allegation, and the
presence of conflicting allegations, cannot suffice to state a claim that Defendants,
generally, were deliberately indifferent.
The Fifth Circuit has noted that, “‘while ... the law is clearly established that jailers
must take measures to prevent inmate suicides once they know of the suicide risk, we
cannot say that the law is established with any clarity as to what those measures must
be.’ ”130 What is clear is that, even if an officer responds without the due care a reasonable
person would use—such that the officer is only negligent—there will be no liability.131
Here, Plaintiff fails to identify specific officers or doctors who were involved in the allegedly
126

Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 9.
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 9.
128
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 2.
129
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 2.  
130
Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't, 228 F.3d 388, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2000), citing Hare III, 135 F.3d at
328–29 (quoting Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau County, 924 F.2d 794, 797 (8th Cir.1991)).
131
Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 178 (5th Cir. 2016), citing Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347, 106
S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986). 
127

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indifferent medical treatment, much less set forth a factual basis for their deliberate
indifference. Accordingly, in the absence of any factual content upon which the Court can
infer liability, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted as to the § 1983 claim for
deliberate medical indifference.
3. Plaintiffs’ Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act
(“RA”) Claims
a. Standing under the ADA and RA
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring an ADA claim since they
“have not and cannot allege that they suffered an injury in fact” and their “allegations
concern only [Terrance] Carter.”132 Plaintiffs object, citing two Texas district court cases
for the proposition that “the ADA and RA have much broader standing provisions”133 that
permit them to advance their ADA claim. Although the issue of who has standing to bring
an ADA claim on behalf of a deceased person has been the subject of some disagreement
at the district court level,134 the Fifth Circuit has held that the “survivability” of ADA claims
is to be evaluated with reference to the relevant body of state law.135 Thus, as it did above
in its analysis of Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim, the Court applies Louisiana law and
concludes that Irma Jean Carter is the only proper plaintiff for the ADA claim brought on
behalf of Terrance Carter. The Motion to Dismiss the ADA claims of Christa Carter and

132

Rec. Doc. No. 48-1, p. 6.
Rec. Doc. No. 52, p. 11.
134
See, e.g., Cardella v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. CIV.A. 308-CV-1656-M, 2010 WL 1141393, at *1, n. 7
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2010). 
135
 See Rideau v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 819 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Hutchinson on Behalf of
Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1997)) (“We may consider that common law rule in determining
who may assert a claim for a minor's compensatory damages under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, just as
other courts have looked to the common law to determine when federal civil rights claims survive the death
of the person aggrieved.”).
133

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the other, unnamed siblings is granted and the claims are dismissed with prejudice for
lack of standing.
b. Stating a Claim Under the ADA and RA136
In order to establish a violation of the ADA, Plaintiff Irma Jean Carter must be able
to demonstrate: (1) that Terrance Carter was a qualified individual within the meaning of
the Act, (2) that he was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of services,
programs, or activities for which the defendants were responsible, or was otherwise
discriminated against by the defendants, and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits,
or discrimination was by reason of his disability.137 Here, based on the allegations in
Plaintiff’s Complaint, every element of this cause of action can be found.
As to the first prong, Plaintiff alleges that Terrance Carter suffered from “mental
illness, psychosis, paranoia, acute anxiety, [and] hallucinations,” and that he “was at high
risk of suicide.”138 A qualified disability under the ADA is one that substantially limits an
individual’s ability to engage in “major life activities.” The Fifth Circuit has described “major
life activities” as “’those activities that are of central importance to daily life’”139 including
things like “’caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’” Plaintiff’s allegations describe how Terrance
Carter’s mental illness caused him debilitating anxiety and even interfered with his ability

136

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act protects qualified individuals from discrimination on the basis of
disability by entities receiving financial assistance from any federal department or agency. 29 U.S.C. § 794
et seq. Passed in 1973, the ADA expanded upon its protections. The same prima facie case can be made
by a disabled plaintiff under both acts (Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th
Cir.1999)). Courts “examine cases construing claims under the ADA, as well as [S]ection 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, because there is no significant difference in the analysis of rights and obligations created
by the two Acts,” Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1152 n. 7 (9th Cir.2002).  
137
Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, Texas, 118 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir.1997).
138
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 22.
139
Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 500 (5th Cir. 2011).

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to perceive reality. Finding these allegations satisfactorily proved, a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that Carter had a “qualified disability” under the ADA.
With respect to the second prong, which requires that Plaintiff demonstrate that
Carter was discriminated against by the Defendants in some way, Plaintiff alleges the
following:
Instead of accommodating Mr. Carter’s needs, these Defendants and the
prison denied [him] services and programs available to others, including but
not limited to, access to appropriate medication, access to attorney-client
and spiritual/religious visits, family contact, access to a telephone, and
access to appropriate care and treatment that could have protected him
from suicide and could have reduced the risk of harm and suicide.140
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Terrance Carter was sent to the disciplinary unit
at Camp J after he threw urine on another inmate in February 2016.141 Per Plaintiff, being
assigned to Camp J meant that Carter was on “restricted medical status,”142 which limited
his access to the medical care that he needed. While in Camp J, Terrance Carter
“repeatedly complained to the prison staff, correctional officers, Assistant Wardens and
Warden” and “repeatedly requested to be put on suicide watch.”143 Plaintiff alleges that
this request was ignored.144
The Court notes that these allegations are in some ways more consistent with a
claim regarding the adequacy of the medical treatment and services provided at LSP than
a claim arising under the ADA. Courts within the Fifth Circuit have held that, where the
“plaintiff's core complaint [is] incompetent treatment for his underlying medical condition,

140

Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 23.
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 10.
142
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 10.
143
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 10.
144
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 16 at ¶ 62.
141

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[s]uch a complaint does not state a claim for relief under the ADA because ‘[t]he ADA
does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.’ ”145 However, as this Court noted in
Cleveland v. Gautreaux, “a contrary principle controls in accommodations cases: in case
after case, the Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant's failure to make the reasonable
modifications necessary to adjust for the unique needs of disabled persons can constitute
intentional discrimination under the ADA.”146
Plaintiff’s attempt to plead discrimination finds stronger footing with the allegation
that Carter was sentenced to six months at Camp J while “other inmates with similar
infractions are given only a few days to a few weeks at Camp J.”147 As to the third prong,
requiring a showing that the discrimination occurred “by reason of” the alleged disability,
Plaintiff alleges that Carter “believed his lengthy time at Camp J was retaliation because
of his complaints about his odor problem”148 related to his olfactory hallucinations. The
Court notes that assessing the adequacy of this allegation is a uniquely challenging task,
since the premise of Terrance Carter’s disability as articulated by Plaintiff is that he
suffered from extreme anxiety and hallucinations caused by his mistaken belief that he
“smelled bad.” Carter often believed that “other people were mocking him for his smell,”149
which, per the prison medical staff, did not exist.150 Indeed, Plaintiff avers that the “doctors
who were treating [Carter]” during his time in Camp J “told him that he was
hallucinating.”151 In short, it is difficult to determine the plausibility of the allegation that
145

Brown v. Wilson, 2012 WL 6719464, *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2012), quoting Moore v. Prison Health
Services, Inc., 24 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1168 (D.Kan.1998), affirmed, 201 F.3d 448 (10th Cir. 1999).
146
Cleveland v. Gautreaux, 198 F. Supp. 3d 717, 746 (M.D. La. 2016) (internal citations omitted).  
147
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 10.
148
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 10.
149
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 9.
150
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 9 (“unable to find anything physically wrong”).
151
Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 10.  

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Carter was targeted by virtue of his disability, since suspecting that he was being targeted
for his disability was, apparently, a symptom of that disability. Nevertheless, Rule 12
requires that the Court view this allegation in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, if found true, would set forth a
cognizable claim for discrimination under the ADA.
4. Prescription
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims are prescribed because the applicable
prescriptive period is one year, and Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 31, 2017, more
than a year after most of the conduct alleged in their Complaint occurred.152 Plaintiff does
not dispute that one year is the applicable prescriptive period. However, she maintains
that she have pleaded facts “sufficient to plead tolling of the prescriptive period and/or the
application of the continuing violation doctrine.”153 Moreover, Plaintiff argues that “the
constitutional violations Mr. Carter suffered continued until and through the day of his
death on April 2, 2016,” which date is less than one year before they filed suit and thus
not outside the prescriptive period. The Court agrees on both counts. First, Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint contains factual allegations that could support the application of a
“tolling” doctrine. For example, Plaintiff alleges that Terrance Carter experienced
hallucinations that plausibly could have prevented him from becoming aware that he had
a legal cause of action.154

152

Rec. Doc. No. 48-1, pp. 8-9.
Rec. Doc. No. 52, p. 8.
154
See, e.g., Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 11 (wherein during a visit from a representative of Plaintiffs’ counsel,
Terrance Carter “expressed that everyone was watching him, that his smell was still bad, and that people
on the tier, including the guards, were bullying him and messing with him”).
153

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Additionally, the Court agrees that the civil rights violations alleged by Plaintiff
plausibly continued until Terrance Carter’s death on April 2, 2016. Defendants
conclusorily assert that any claim that arose before March 31, 2016 is prescribed, without
explaining why April 1 and April 2, 2016 should not be considered for purposes of the
prescription analysis. Those dates are within the one-year prescriptive period, and the
violations alleged by Plaintiff are specifically described as occurring “at all times
herein,”155 up to Carter’s suicide on April 2, 2016.
Defendants urge this Court to follow the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Brockman v. Texas
Dept. of Criminal Justice,156 where it concluded that a mother’s claims related to her
bipolar son’s suicide in jail were time-barred because her son “should have known the
quality of the treatment he was receiving for his bipolar disorder”157 and was thus aware
of his claim more than two years (the applicable statute of limitations in Texas) before the
suit was filed. The Court finds Brockman inapposite here. The plaintiff in Brockman waited
until her appeal to raise the argument that her son’s bipolar disorder might have precluded
him from becoming aware of his cause of action. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the so-called “unsound minds” tolling argument was waived. Because Plaintiffs herein
have successfully raised a tolling argument here, at the district level, there is no such
issue of waiver. Moreover, the appellate record in Brockman contains no mention that
plaintiff argued for the application of the continuing violation doctrine, as Plaintiffs herein
have done. Overall, the Court declines to find that this action is prescribed on the face of
the complaint.

155

See Rec. Doc. No. 47, pp. 15-16, ¶ 55 – 61. 
397 F. App'x 18, 22 (5th Cir. 2010).
157
Id. at *3.
156

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III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss158 is granted in

part and denied in part.
a. The Motion to Dismiss the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983159 is
GRANTED, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice.
b. The Motion to Dismiss the wrongful death and ADA/RA claims of Christa
Carter and Plaintiffs named “Does 1-5” is hereby GRANTED, and those
claims are dismissed with prejudice for lack of standing. The Motion to
Dismiss Irma Jean Carter’s wrongful death claim and ADA/RA claims is
hereby DENIED.160
c. Plaintiffs’ State Law Negligence claim161 was not addressed in the instant
Motion to Dismiss and remains a part of this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on February 21, 2019.

S

CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

158

Rec. Doc. No. 48.  
 First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action (Rec. Doc. No. 47, pp. 17-24). 
160
Sixth and Third Causes of Action, respectively (Rec. Doc. No. 47 p. 22-24).
161
Fifth Cause of Action, Rec. Doc. No. 47, p. 24.  
159

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