Sidney Arnold v. Steven Williams

Filing 26

RULING granting in part and denying in part 16 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 11/15/17. (DCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SIDNEY ARNOLD

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

17-344-SDD-RLB

DEPUTY STEVEN WILLIAMS

RULING
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss1 urged by the Defendant, Steven Williams.
The Motion is opposed.2
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Sidney Arnold (“Arnold”) brings civil rights claims, pursuant to 42 USC

1983, and a state law negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
against East Baton Rouge Sherriff Deputy Steven Williams (“Williams”) in his individual
capacity. Plaintiff alleges that at all relevant times Deputy Williams was in the course and
scope of employment and acting in his capacity as a deputy or officer with the East Baton
Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office.3
Arnold alleges that he was residing in a garage apartment on the premises of a
homeowner for whom he was doing home repair work. Upon hearing “someone at his
door, [Arnold] got out of bed and went to the door, opened it and saw a police officer”.4
Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he officer had come under the carport of the home where [Plaintiff]

1

Rec. Doc. 16.
Rec. Doc. 25.
3
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 4.
4
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 9.
2

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was then residing” and upon hearing someone, Arnold “stepped out of his apartment to
go look at where the police officer was pointing.5 The officer asked Plaintiff for his name
and driver’s license. Arnold advised officer of his name but told officer he had no driver’s
license.6 The officer asked Arnold to come “out to the police car”. He refused and instead
commenced to awaken the homeowner by knocking on her window. Plaintiff alleges that
the homeowner came outside, identified him and told the officer “that he and his brother
were working, living in the garage apartment and that they had a right to be there.”7
Plaintiff alleges that the officer then “reached to grab” him and he ran.8 The officer gave
chase, Arnold climbed over a fence in the backyard and fell and dislocated his shoulder.
Arnold was taken to Lane Memorial Hospital, and according to his Complaint “woke up in
jail.”
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-

pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”9 The Court
may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”10 “To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”11 In Twombly, the United States Supreme

5

Rec. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 8, 10.
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 11.
7
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 13.
8
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 14.
9
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Martin v. Eby Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
10
Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).
11
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area
Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d at 467).
6

2

Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”12 Notably, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels
and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’”13 A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.’”14 However, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”15 In order to satisfy the plausibility
standard, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has
acted unlawfully.”16 “Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true,
it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’”17 On a motion to dismiss,
courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.”18
On the other hand, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

12

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal citations and brackets
omitted)(hereinafter “Twombly”).
13
Id.
14
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(internal citations
omitted)(hereinafter “Iqbal”).
15
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
16
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
17
Taha v. William Marsh Rice Univ, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins.
Solutions, 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)).
18
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d
209 (1986)).

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entitlement of relief.”19 “A claim for relief is implausible on its face when ‘the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’”20
B. 42 USC 1983
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for persons who have been “depriv[ed] of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States by the actions of a person or entity operating under color of state law.21 “Section
1983 does not create any substantive rights, but is merely a vehicle whereby a plaintiff
can challenge actions by governmental officials.”22 In order to establish a Section 1983
violation, the plaintiff must demonstrate the following two elements: “first, that [he was]
deprived of a right or interest secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
and second, that the deprivation occurred under color of state law.”23 Therefore, the initial
inquiry in a lawsuit brought under § 1983 is “whether plaintiff has alleged that his
constitutional rights have been violated. If no constitutional violation has been alleged,
there is no cognizable claim under § 1983.”24
C. Fourth Amendment Claims
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Williams, acting under the color of state
law, violated the Plaintiff’s Constitutional right, secured under Fourth Amendment, to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure. Defendant submits that the Plaintiff concedes
dismissal of his Fourth Amendment claims by failing to oppose the Defendant’s Motion to

19

Id. at 664.
Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
21
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West) (2013).
22
DeVille v. Regional Transit Authority, No. 07-1345, 2008 WL 200020 at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 22, 2008).
23
Dow v. Rains County Independent School Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, at 1407 (5th Cir. 1995).
24
Sheppard v. Hawkins, No. 2:12-cv-0307, 2012 WL 6020037 at *2 (W.D.La. Nov. 9, 2012).
20

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Dismiss on this claim. In his Opposition, Plaintiff cites Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
but fails to address the Defendants argument that his Complaint fails to articulate facts in
support of his claim. In the Fifth Circuit, arguments not raised in opposition to a motion
are waived.25 Nonetheless, since the Plaintiff addresses the Fourth Amendment in his
opposition brief, albeit by mere recitation of law, the Court will treat the Motion as opposed
on this point.
The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment,26 protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. It provides
that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.” There are no allegations of a warrant search or arrest, hence the Court analyzes
the actions taken as warrantless.
i.

Fourth Amendment Search

The Complaint contains no allegations regarding a search, other than general
conclusory references to search.27 The Complaint is insufficient if it merely “tenders
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”28 Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s
claims of an unconstitutional search shall be dismissed with prejudice.

25

See Texas Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413 F.3d 503, 510 (5th Cir. 2005)(citing Norton v.
Bank One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2004).
26
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
27
“Actions taken related to the stop, seizure and search were objectively unreasonable”. Rec. Doc. 1 ¶28
28
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(internal citations omitted).

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ii. Fourth Amendment Seizure
As to allegations of an unconstitutional seizure, again the Complaint sets forth only
conclusory allegations that the Plaintiff was “arrested and jailed” without supplying any
factual underpinnings for his claim of an unconstitutional seizure.
“To bring a § 1983 excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff
must first show that he was seized. Next [Plaintiff] must show that [he] suffered (1) an
injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the
need and that (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.”29
An officer seizes a person when he, “by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”30 In addition, the
“governmental termination of freedom of movement” must be made “through means
intentionally applied.”31
The only factual allegations concerning an alleged seizure are:
The police officer . . . reached to grab Sidney Arnold and Sidney Arnold
ran.32
Sidney Arnold then ran and Deputy Steven Williams chased him into the
back yard. Sidney Arnold was chased into a fence in the back yard, that
he climbed over fell dislocated his shoulder.33

29

Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004)(internal citations omitted).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
31
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (emphasis
original).
32
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 14.
33
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 15.
30

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The Complaint follows with conclusory allegations that “Williams knew he lacked
cause to stop, search or arrest,”34 and that “[a]ctions taken related to the stop, seizure
and search were objectively unreasonable.”35
The Court finds that the allegation that the officer “reached to grab” Plaintiff falls
short of pleading a “governmental termination of freedom of movement” made “through
means intentionally applied.”36

Furthermore, even if the alleged “reach to grab” is

sufficient to constitute “physical force or show of authority,”37 there is no allegation that
this restrained Plaintiff’s liberty. There is no allegation that the officer made contact with
the Plaintiff in any way. Merely reaching to grab the Plaintiff is not an excessive use of
force. The Plaintiff ran, scaled a fence and fell injuring himself. By these facts, the
Plaintiff’s injury did not result “directly and only from the use of force that was excessive.”38
The Plaintiff fails to state a facially plausible claim of an unconstitutional seizure.
As pled, the Complaint does not enable the Court to “infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct.”39 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim shall be
dismissed. Mindful of the Fifth Circuit’s guidance “to allow a plaintiff initially failing to state
a claim the opportunity to amend or supplement the pleadings freely, so that he may state
his best case. Where the plaintiff has filed only one pleading . . . immediate dismissal
ordinarily is not justified.40 Plaintiff will be permitted leave to amend.

34

Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 26.
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 28.
36
Note 35, supra.
37
Note 34, supra.
38
Note 33, supra.
39
Note 18, supra.
40
Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Services, 41 F.3d 991, 997 (5th Cir. 1995).
35

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D. False Arrest/False Imprisonment Claim
“To ultimately prevail on his section 1983 false arrest/false imprisonment claim,
[Plaintiff] must show that Williams did not have probable cause to arrest him.”41 “Probable
cause exists ‘when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer's
knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that
the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.’”42
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss asserts that the allegations of the Complaint are
insufficient to meet the “heightened” pleading requirement necessary to overcome a
defense of qualified immunity available Williams.43 “To survive a motion to dismiss in
cases where the qualified immunity defense is raised, a plaintiff must state facts, which if
proven, would defeat the defense.”44 Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that
Williams “knew there was no basis for any arrest or conviction for any underlying crime.”45
Defendant counters that “[f]light from an officer is suspicious and could have provided
reasonable suspicion to Defendant that Plaintiff was engaged in criminal behavior.”46
“Williams is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer in his position could have
believed that, in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances of which Williams was
aware, there was a fair probability that [Plaintiff] had committed or was committing an

41

Haggerty v. Texas Southern University, 391 F.3d 653, 655–56 (5th Cir. 2004), citing Brown v. Lyford, 243
F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir.2001).
42
Id. citing Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir.2001).
43
Rec. Doc. 16-1.
44
Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1994) citing Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789 (5th
Cir.1986); Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir.1985).
45
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 29.
46
Rec. Doc. 16-1.

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offense.”47 “Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that
probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.”48
Considering the qualified immunity defense, the sparse and conclusory factual
allegations are insufficient to state a claim for false arrest/imprisonment. However, the
Court will allow Plaintiff leave to amend his claim of false arrest/imprisonment. As noted
by the Fifth Circuit:
We are aware that by requiring heightened pleading before discovery
some plaintiffs will be unable to state a claim. But, as noted in the
concurring opinion in Elliott, the “denial of some meritorious claims is the
direct product of the immunity doctrine which weighed these losses when
it struck the policy balance.” The seeming unfairness of this conclusion is
tempered by this circuit's directives to allow a plaintiff initially failing to
state a claim the opportunity to amend or supplement the pleadings freely,
so that he may state his best case. Where the plaintiff has filed only one
pleading . . . immediate dismissal ordinarily is not justified.49

E. Malicious Prosecution
Arnold also alleges a claim for malicious prosecution under 42 USC 1983.
Defendants urge dismissal on the grounds that “[t]here is no freestanding constitutional
right to be free from malicious prosecution.”50 Plaintiff counters that “Section 1983
provides a federal cause of action. . .for constitutional violations [but] the substantive law
of the state determines the elements of the offense.”51 Plaintiff erroneously cites Spriggs
v Wiley52 which does not support the argument made. In the context of a false arrest
claim, not a claim of malicious prosecution, Spriggs v Wiley held that “Section 1983

47

Haggerty v. Texas Southern University, 391 F.3d at 655–56 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. citing Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir.2000); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039–40, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).
49
Wicks 41 F.3d at 997.
50
Rec. Doc. 16-1 citing Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 942, 945 (5th Cir. 2003).
51
Rec. Doc. 21.
52
No. 11-316-JJB, 2012 WL 1143842 (M.D. La. April 4, 2012).
48

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provides a federal cause of action, but it looks to state law to determine the limitations
period applicable for personal injury torts.”53
The Defendants are correct. “‘[M]alicious prosecution’ standing alone is no
violation of the United States Constitution[;] ... to proceed under [Section 1983] such a
claim must rest upon a denial of rights secured under federal and not state law.”54 “A
claim for malicious prosecution brought under Section 1983 must be judged against the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”55
[I]t must be shown that the officials violated specific constitutional rights in
connection with a “malicious prosecution.” For example, “the initiation of
criminal charges without probable cause may set in force events that run
afoul of the ... Fourth Amendment if the accused is seized and arrested ...
or other constitutionally secured rights if a case is further pursued.”
However, these “are not claims for malicious prosecution.” Accordingly,
plaintiffs' claim under § 1983 for “malicious prosecution” in respect to the
May 2006 arrest is not independently cognizable.56

For the reasons articulated and well settled in this Circuit, Plaintiff has failed to
state a constitutional claim for malicious prosecution. Inasmuch as the Plaintiff shall be
granted leave to amend to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment, if he can, the
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution under § 1983 is dismissed without prejudice, and he will
be granted leave to amend his complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
F. Substantive Due Process Claims
Plaintiff claims that Deputy Williams’s alleged failure to act on the basis of probable
cause is a violation of procedural and substantive due process under the Fifth and

53

Id. at *3, citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (emphasis added).
Laird v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, No. 16-707-JWD-RLB, 2017 WL 2239578, at *8
(M.D.La., May 22, 2017), citing Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 942, 945 (5th Cir. 2003).
55
Id.
56
Id.
54

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Fourteenth Amendments.57 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim must
be dismissed because “the Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal
government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case”.58
This is a correct statement of the law. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment due
process claims are dismissed with prejudice.
To the extent the Plaintiff attempts to assert a substantive due process claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment, that claim is also dismissed with prejudice. “Where a
particular amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’
against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these
claims.’”

59

In this case the Fourth Amendment provides the “explicit textual source of

constitutional protection”; accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process claim shall be dismissed with prejudice.
G. State Law Claims
i.

Negligence

Plaintiff claims that Deputy Williams was negligent as a matter of state law because
he “knew or should have known that chasing a man in the dark could result serious
personal injury.”60 Defendant moves dismissal arguing that he did not breach a duty to
Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s injury was not caused by the Defendant’s acts. Breach and
causation are fact bound determinations inappropriate for resolution at the pleading

57

Rec. Doc. 1, ¶35
Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 120 (5th Cir.1996)
59
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
60
Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 38
58

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stage. The Defendants’ Motion to dismiss the state law negligence claims shall be
Denied.
ii. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress shall be dismissed
with prejudice. The Plaintiff fails to allege any factual support for the allegation. Plaintiff’s
complaint sets forth no allegations of conduct “so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.”61
III.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant, Steven Williams, Rule 12(b)6) Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 16)

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows.
The Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 16) is GRANTED in the following respects:
The Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim of unconstitutional search is DISMISSED
with prejudice;
The Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims of unconstitutional seizure and false
arrest/false imprisonment are DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a Motion for
leave to amend;
The Plaintiff’s claim of malicious prosecution is DISMISSED without prejudice to
the filing of a Motion for leave to amend;
The Plaintiffs Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process are DISMISSED with
prejudice;

61

White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991).

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The Plaintiff’s state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 16) is DENIED as to the state law negligence
claim.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on November 15, 2017.

S
JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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