Sidney Arnold v. Steven Williams

Filing 62

RULING granting 44 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 48 Motion to Strike and 49 Motion to Supplement. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 6/13/2019. (EDC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SIDNEY ARNOLD

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

17-344-SDD-RLB

DEPUTY STEVEN WILLIAMS
RULING
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment1 filed by Defendant, Deputy
Steven Williams (“Deputy Williams”). Plaintiff Sidney Arnold (“Arnold”) filed an
Opposition,2 to which Williams filed a Reply.3 Also before the Court are two procedural
motions filed by Arnold: his Motion to Strike RD 44-64 and his Motion to Supplement
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment.5 Both motions are opposed.6 For the
reasons that follow, the Court finds that both procedural motions should be denied, and
Williams’ Motion for Summary Judgment7 should be granted.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This suit arises out a March 8, 2017 encounter between Deputy Steven Williams

and Sidney Arnold at a residence on Ruston Drive in Baker, Louisiana, where Arnold was
living temporarily while he performed repair work after the flood of August 2016. In its

1

Rec. Doc. No. 44.
Rec. Doc. No. 46.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 60.
4
Rec. Doc. No. 48.
5
Rec. Doc. No. 49.
6
Rec. Doc. No. 54; Rec. Doc. No. 50.
7
Rec. Doc. No. 44.
2

52016 
Page 1 of 8 

previous Ruling on Deputy Williams’ Motion to Dismiss, this Court dismissed Arnold’s
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his substantive due process claims, and his claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 Arnold was granted leave to amend his
Complaint with respect to the § 1983 claims; he did not do so. Therefore, the only claim
remaining for summary judgment is the state law negligence claim, which this Court
declined to dismiss in its previous Ruling in light of the fact-intensive nature of the
negligence analysis and the Court’s obligation to accept the Plaintiff’s allegations as true
at the 12(b)(6) stage.
A. Motion to Strike RD 44-6
Record Document 44-6 is a certified copy of Sidney Arnold’s booking records,
produced by the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office.9 The booking records were
attached as Exhibit 4 to Deputy Williams’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Arnold moves
to strike the records, arguing that “no affidavit has been offered with it certifying it.”10
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that “[t]he court may strike from a
pleading ... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The decision
to grant or deny a motion to strike lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.11
However, motions to strike are disfavored and should be used “sparingly” because they
are a “drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.”12

8

Rec. Doc. No. 26, p. 12.
Rec. Doc. No. 44-6.
10
Rec. Doc. No. 48-2, p. 1.
11
Frank v. Shell Oil Co., 828 F. Supp. 2d 835, 852 (E.D. La. 2011), reconsideration granted in part on other
grounds, 2012 WL 1230736 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 2012).
12
Id.
9

52016 
Page 2 of 8 

A motion to strike should be granted only when the challenged allegations are “prejudicial
to the defendant or immaterial to the lawsuit.”13
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) provides that when a party offers evidence
at the summary judgment stage that is not in admissible form, the opposing party can
object by stating that the document “cannot be presented in a form that would be
admissible in evidence.” Arnold has not made that argument, and, given that the booking
records are in certified form, this Court finds it unlikely that such an argument would
succeed. This Court and other courts in the Fifth Circuit have routinely denied motions to
strike where the proponent of the challenged documents demonstrates that the
documents could be put into a form that would be admissible at trial.14 For his part, Deputy
Williams avers that, if necessary, he “could call a records custodian to testify as to the
authenticity of these booking records.”15 For these reasons, the Motion to Strike shall be
denied.16
B. Motion to Supplement Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment17
Plaintiff moves to supplement his Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
with a declaration, handwritten and signed by his brother, Jason Arnold. Deputy Williams
opposes the motion, arguing that a) the declaration “directly contradicts and impeaches
Plaintiff’s sworn testimony”18 from his deposition; b) based on that deposition testimony,

13

Id.
See Cook v. Perkins, 2013 WL 5592805 (M.D. La. Oct. 10, 2013); Aubin v. Columbia Cas. Co., 272 F.
Supp. 3d 828 (M.D. La. 2017); El-Bawab v. Jackson State Univ., 2013 WL 3884128 (S.D. Miss. July 26,
2013).
15
Rec. Doc. No. 54, p. 3.
16
Although the Motion is denied, the Court notes that the presence or absence of the booking records in
evidence ultimately has no effect on the summary judgment ruling.
17
Rec. Doc. No. 49.
18
Rec. Doc. No. 50, p. 1.
14

52016 
Page 3 of 8 

Deputy Williams did not see a need to depose Jason Arnold and so did not do so before
the discovery deadline, such that allowing the declaration into evidence now would be
prejudicial to him; and c) the deadline for Arnold’s opposition to the summary judgment
was February 4, 2019, and this motion to supplement was not filed until February 6,
2019.19 Arnold does aver by way of explanation that Jason Arnold “was out of town and
recently located,”20 so that the declaration was not produced to Plaintiff’s counsel until
February 6, 2019. Nevertheless, the Court finds all of Deputy Williams’ arguments in
opposition to be well-founded, and further finds that the contents of the declaration are
not material to its ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, Arnold’s Motion
to Supplement shall be denied.
C. Motion for Summary Judgment21
1. Applicable Law
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”22 “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all
of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”23 A party moving for summary judgment “must ‘demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant’s
case.”24 If the moving party satisfies its burden, “the non-moving party must show that
19

Rec. Doc. No. 50, pp. 1-4.
Rec. Doc. No. 49, p. 1.
21
Rec. Doc. No. 44.
22
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
23
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).
24
Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, 246 F.Supp.2d 488, 494 (M.D. La. 2003)(quoting Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2552)).
20

52016 
Page 4 of 8 

summary judgment is inappropriate by setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence
of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.’”25 However, the
non-moving party’s burden “is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a
scintilla of evidence.”26
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”27 All reasonable factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.28 However, “[t]he Court has no
duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the summary
judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate precisely
how this evidence supports his claim.”29 “Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific
facts … will not prevent the award of summary judgment; ‘the plaintiff [can]not rest on his
allegations … to get to a jury without any “significant probative evidence tending to
support the complaint.”’”30

25

Rivera v. Houston Independent School Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Morris v. Covan
World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
26
Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995)(quoting Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
27
Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
28
Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
29
RSR Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
30
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir.
1994)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

52016 
Page 5 of 8 

2. Analysis
In its previous Ruling on Deputy Williams’ Motion to Dismiss, this Court declined
to dismiss the state law negligence claim, finding that “[b]reach and causation are fact
bound determinations inappropriate for resolution at the pleading stage.”31 The Court
notes that even under the deferential motion to dismiss standard, Arnold’s Complaint
made out a barely passable negligence claim. Arnold alleged that Deputy Williams was
negligent because he “knew or should have known that chasing a man in the dark could
result serious personal injury [sic]”32 and stated that he “seeks relief under La. C. C. arts.
2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which injuries were occasioned by the intentional and/or
negligent acts and/or omissions of the Defendant(s) herein.”33 The elements of
negligence analysis under Louisiana law34 were not mentioned at all, much less were any
facts or law offered to establish them.
Defendants concede that there are disputed factual issues in this case.35 However,
Arnold’s pleadings are so inadequate that the Court is not in a position to discern if the
factual disputes are material ones. The word “negligence” does not appear in Arnold’s
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, nor do any of the elements of
negligence. Arnold does offer, without citation to evidence or legal authority, the
conclusory statement that a “reasonable person would run from an individual posing as

31

Rec. Doc. No. 26, pg. 11.
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 8.
33
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 8.
34
Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 2005-1095 (La. 3/10/06), 923 So. 2d 627, 633 (“(1) the defendant
had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) the defendant's conduct
failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the defendant's substandard conduct
was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant's substandard
conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element);
and (5) the actual damages (the damages element)”).
35
Rec. Doc. No. 60, p. 1 (“Defendant concedes that there are issues of fact. . .”).
32

52016 
Page 6 of 8 

an officer.”36 It is not clear to the Court why Arnold repeatedly focuses on the
reasonableness of Arnold’s flight from the officer; the claim is against Deputy Williams
and therefore, the relevant issue is the reasonableness of Deputy Williams’ conduct.
Indeed, elsewhere in the Opposition, Arnold argues that “Deputy Williams’ conduct was
unreasonable.”37
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Deputy Williams notes the well-settled rule
that Arnold, as the plaintiff, bears the burden of proving the elements of negligence by a
preponderance of the evidence.38 Furthermore, as the party opposing the summary
judgment, Arnold “is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate
precisely how this evidence supports his claim.”39 Although there are significant disputed
factual issues in this case, Arnold has not made an attempt to articulate how those facts
interact with the elements of Louisiana negligence law. The Court declines to labor to
infer an argument on Arnold’s behalf. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “[a]
negative answer to any of the elements of the Duty/Risk analysis prompts a no-liability
determination.”40 Because Arnold has failed to even address the elements of negligence,
the Court finds that summary judgment should be granted in favor of Deputy Williams.

36

Rec. Doc. No. 46, p. 9. See also, Rec. Doc. No. 46, p. 9 (“Deputy Williams knew of should have known
[sic] that a reasonable person would run if he woke them in the middle of the night and tried to force the
individual away from his home”).
37
Rec. Doc. No. 46, p. 4.
38
Rec. Doc. No. 44-1, p. 5, citing Miller v. Leonard, 588 So.2d 79 (La. 1991).
39
RSR Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
40
Joseph v. Dickerson, 1999-1046 (La. 1/19/00), 754 So. 2d 912, 916.

52016 
Page 7 of 8 

II.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment41

is hereby GRANTED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on June 13, 2019.

S

CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

41

Rec. Doc. No. 44.

52016 
Page 8 of 8