Mendoza et al v. Doyle International Louisiana, LLC et al

Filing 184

RULING AND ORDER: Whitney's 179 Supplemental Re-Urged Motion ToEnter Final Judgment And Fix Amount Of Attorneys' Fees And LegalExpenses be and is hereby DENIED. Signed by Judge Brian A. Jackson on 5/11/2023. (LLH)

Case 3:17-cv-00437-BAJ-SDJ

Document 184

05/11/23 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DOUGLAS MENDOZA, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
DOYLE INTERNATIONAL
LOUISIANA, LLC, ET AL.

NO. 17-00437-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER
On August 18, 2021, this Court entered its Order (Doc. 174) amending its
original judgment to state a damages award in favor of Plaintiff-in-Intervention
Hancock Whitney Bank (“Whitney”), and to require Defendant-in-Intervention
Douglas K. Mendoza (“Mendoza”) to pay Whitney’s attorney’s fees and costs,
including the fee of Charles Parrott, Whitney’s banking industry expert. Relevant
here, the Court’s August 18 Order also denied Whitney’s request for $60,562.50 to
reimburse the fee of its rebuttal damages expert, Jacqueline C. Tuthill, explaining
that “Ms. Tuthill’s ‘block billing’ makes it impossible to determine the reasonableness
of her fee, absent additional evidence of the specific work performed.” (Doc. 174 at p.
11). Nonetheless, the Court permitted Whitney to resubmit its application for Ms.
Tuthill’s fee, “supported by more specific timesheets or other records.” (Id.).
Now, Whitney has resubmitted its application for Ms. Tuthill’s fee. (Doc. 179).
Whitney offers no new argument or authorities to justify its request, (id. at ¶ 1), and
instead submits a September 27, 2021 affidavit from Ms. Tuthill, which generally
describes her work in this case. (Doc. 179-1). Ms. Tuthill’s affidavit, in turn, attaches
two exhibits: (1) the June 14, 2019 expert report prepared by Mendoza’s damages

Case 3:17-cv-00437-BAJ-SDJ

Document 184

05/11/23 Page 2 of 4

expert, Mark Shirley (Doc. 179-2); and (2) and the corresponding July 30, 2019
rebuttal report prepared by Ms. Tuthill’s firm, Legier & Company. (Doc. 179-3).
As previously explained, Louisiana law allows the Court to award expert fees
to the prevailing party. See Dakmak v. Baton Rouge City Police Dep’t, 2012-1850 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 9/4/14), 153 So. 3d 511, 514. And again, in this case, Whitney prevailed in
its action to enforce a contract that plainly provided for an award of all “costs and
expenses” incurred in the action, including costs of “hir[ing] or pay[ing] someone else
to help enforce this Agreement.” (Doc. 86-5 at pp. 137, 143). Still, any award of expert
fees must be tethered to an objective measure of the expert’s work.
Factors to be considered by the trial court in setting an expert witness
fee include the time spent testifying, time spent in preparatory work for
trial, time spent away from regular duties while waiting to testify, the
extent and nature of the work performed, and the knowledge,
attainments and skill of the expert. Additional considerations include
the helpfulness of the expert's report and testimony to the trial court,
the amount in controversy, the complexity of the problem addressed by
the expert, and awards to experts in similar cases.
Dakmak, 153 So. 3d at 514 (citations omitted). Further, the Court cannot award fees
related to “time spent in consultation which only assists the attorney in preparation
for the litigation.” Id. “Most importantly, expert witnesses are entitled only to
reasonable compensation.” Id.
Having reviewed Whitney’s additional proof submitted in support of its
renewed request for Ms. Tuthill’s fee, the Court finds itself in the same place as
before: completely unable to determine the reasonableness of Whitney’s $60,562.50
demand. Indeed, Whitney’s renewed demand raises even more questions than
answers. In its application, Whitney seeks recovery of Ms. Tuthill’s fee only,
2

Case 3:17-cv-00437-BAJ-SDJ

Document 184

05/11/23 Page 3 of 4

explaining that “Ms. Tuthill, a certified public accountant, drafted an expert report
which … rebutted many of the observations and conclusions set forth in Mr. Shirley’s
report.” (Doc. 168-1 at p. 11). In her September 27, 2021 affidavit, Ms. Tuthill affirms
that she “prepar[ed]” the “14 page expert report issued July 30, 2019.” (Doc. 179-1 at
p. 3). But these statements are not linked to any of the billed hours appearing in Ms.
Tuthill’s contemporaneous timesheets. (Compare Doc. 168-2 at pp. 91-95, with 1791). And clearly the July 30 report is not exclusively Ms. Tuthill’s work product. First,
the July 30 report does not identify an author, and instead is signed collectively by
Ms. Tuthill’s firm—“Legier & Company.” (Doc. 179-3 at p. 15). Second, Ms. Tuthill’s
contemporaneous timesheets show that in the weeks leading up to the Report’s
publication, multiple Legier & Company employees worked on Whitney’s account. In
fact, six different “Item” keys appear on Ms. Tuthill’s timesheets—“JCT501”,
“LBS501”, “WRL501”, “ALR501”, “MJL501”, and “EAG501”—corresponding to six
different billing rates. (Doc. 168-2 at pp. 91-95). Even assuming that all Ms. Tuthill’s
time on this case was devoted to the July 30 report, it only amounts to 66.25 hours
billed at $299 per hour, yielding a total fee of $19,808.75, or less than one-third of
what Whitney claims on Ms. Tuthill’s behalf. None of the additional hours billed on
Ms. Tuthill’s timesheets are explained in Ms. Tuthill’s affidavit, which is dated 13
months after Legier & Company completed its work on this case.
Of course, Whitney now asserts that Ms. Tuthill did more than just work on
the July 30 report. In her affidavit, Ms. Tuthill states she also reviewed pleadings,
bank records, and other documents, analyzed and prepared summaries of bank

3

Case 3:17-cv-00437-BAJ-SDJ

Document 184

05/11/23 Page 4 of 4

account transactions, prepared questions for Mr. Shirley's deposition, attended JVTr.
Shirley's deposition, and also attended "[vjarious conferences with counsel, in person
and via telephone." (Doc. 179-1 at pp. 2-3). But at least some of these activities appear
to be consultation which only assists the attorney in preparation for the litigation,"
which, again, is not compensable. Dakmak, 153 So. 3d at 514. Absent any attempt to
correlate her activities in this case to her contemporaneous timesheets, and/or to
disaggregate and explain the work performed by other members of her firm, the Court
cannot meaningfully assess whether Ms. Tuthill's fee is actually related to
compensable activities, and is reasonable.

In sum, Whitney as completely failed to justify Ms. Tuthill's claimed
$60,562.50 fee.
Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Whitney's Supplemental Re-Urged IMotion To
Enter Final Judgment And Fix Amount Of Attorneys' Fees And Legal
Expenses (Doc. 179) be and is hereby DENIED.

^

Baton Rouge, ]^uisiana, this fj -n5ay of May, 2023

A;

^a:

JUDGE BRIAN A. ^A^KSON
UNITED STATES STRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA