Ayo et al v. East Baton Rouge Parish

Filing 61

RULING granting 17 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 6/4/2018. (SGO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
HENRY AYO, and KAIASHA WHITE
on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated

CIVIL ACTION
17-526-SDD-EWD

VERSES
CLEVE DUNN Sr., REHABILITATION HOME
INCARCERATION, SID J.
RULING
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) (“FRCP 12(b)(6)”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted filed by Defendant, Sid J. Gautreaux, III, in his official capacity as Sheriff of East
Baton Rouge Parish (“Defendant” or “Sheriff”). Plaintiffs, Henry Ayo and Kaiasha White,
(“Plaintiffs”) filed an Opposition,2 and Movant has filed a Reply.3 For the reasons stated
herein, the Motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
Plaintiffs, Henry Ayo (“Ayo”) and Kaiasha White (“White”), bring claims on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”),
against Sid J. Gautreaux, in his official capacity as Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish.
Plaintiffs also assert claims against Cleve Dunn, Sr. (“Dunn”) and Rehabilitation Home
Incarceration (“RHI”), under Federal and State Racketeering Influenced Corrupt
1

Rec. Doc. 17.
Rec Doc. 23 (duplicate filed at Rec. Doc. 29).
3
Rec. Doc. 37.
2

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Organization Acts (“RICO”), the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”), and
state tort claims for conversion and unjust enrichment.4
According to the Amended Complaint,5 Plaintiffs were arrested in East Baton
Rouge Parish and taken to the East Baton Rouge prison (“prison”).6 The Plaintiffs
appeared before 19th Judicial District Court (“JDC”) Judge Trudy White (“Judge White”)
“for a hearing to determine probable cause for detention and to set bond”7 on the day
following their respective arrests. Ayo, who was arrested on a charge of Simple Burglary
of an Inhabited Dwelling and related offenses, alleges that “Judge White set his bond at
$8,000, informed him of the charges, and assigned him to RHI supervision. White
informed him that someone from RHI would visit him at the Prison to explain the
process.”8 The Amended Complaint incorporates Ayo’s Bond Order entered by Judge
White.9 The Bond Order directs the Sherriff to release Ayo “upon a good and solvent
bond conditioned as the law directs in the total sum of $8,000.”10 The Order further
provides: “You shall be under the supervision of RHI-Cleve Dunn @ 364-7753 for a
period of 90 days to ensure compliance with this order upon release on bond.”11 Finally,
the Order directs that “You shall not be released on bond without first meeting with your
bond supervisor.”12 Plaintiff White alleges that, following an “arrest on charges of simple

4

Rec. Doc. 2.
Id.
6
The Plaintiffs’ arrests and subsequent State Court proceedings are unrelated.
7
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶27, 50, 64.
8
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶51.
9
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶31.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
5

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and aggravated battery…Judge White set her bond at $4,000 and informed her that she
would also have to report to RHI.”13
Plaintiffs claim that the Sheriff violated their constitutional rights secured under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs allege
that the Sherriff is the final policy maker responsible for the detention and release of
prisoners in East Baton Rouge Parish and that, “[t]hrough an agreement with RHI,” the
Sherriff “created and enforce[d] a policy that the Prison will not release arrestees from the
Prison until it receives permission from RHI—permission that comes only after RHI is
satisfied with the initial payment made.”14 Plaintiffs allege that continued detention until
an arrestee can “pay the initial RHI fee and be release from the Prison” violates their
fundamental liberty interests secured by the Fourteenth Amendment15 and constitutes an
unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.16
Urging dismissal for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6), the Sherriff
argues that, “[e]ven if the Sheriff created and enforced a policy that the Prison will not
release arrestees ‘until it receives permission from RHI-permission that comes only after
RHI is satisfied with the initial payment made,’ Plaintiffs have not alleged that the policy
is the moving force behind the violation of their constitutional right and have failed to show
a direct causal link between the alleged policy and the violation.”17

13

Rec. Doc. ¶ 64, 65.
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶8.
15
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶ 124.
16
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶ 128.
17
Rec. Doc. 17-1.
14

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II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-

pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”18 The
Court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into
the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”19 “To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”20 In Twombly, the United States Supreme
Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”21 A complaint is also insufficient if it
merely “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”22 However,
“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”23 In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than

18

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Martin v. Eby Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
19
Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).
20
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area
Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d at 467).
21
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal citations and brackets
omitted)(hereinafter Twombly).
22
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(internal citations
omitted)(hereinafter “Iqbal”).
23
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

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a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.”24 “Furthermore, while the
court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable
to the plaintiff.’”25 On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”26
B. Section 1983 Claims against the Sheriff
A suit against a government official in his official capacity is the equivalent of filing
suit against the government agency of which the official is an agent.27 Accordingly, the
claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity are, in effect, claims against the municipal
entity he represents, which is East Baton Rouge Parish.28
To determine whether a public official is liable in his official capacity, the Court
looks to the jurisprudence addressing municipality or local government liability under
Section 1983.29 Municipal liability under Section 1983 requires proof of three elements:
1) an official policy or custom, of which, 2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or
constructive knowledge, and 3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is
the policy or custom.30
In order for a municipality to be held liable under Section 1983, the plaintiff must

24

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire
Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).
26
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d
209 (1986)).
27
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv, of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55 (1978); Burge
v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F. 3d 452,466 (5th Cir. 1999)
28
Graham, 473 U.S. at 165; see also Bellard v. Gautreaux, No. CIV.A. 08-627, 2010 WL 3523051, at *4
(M.D. La. Sept. 3, 2010) amended in part, No. CIV.A. 08-627, 2010 WL 4977480 (M.D. La. Dec. 2, 2010),
affirmed, 675 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2012) and affirmed, 675 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2012).
29
Id. at 470.
30
Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010).
25

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identify an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom that caused his/her injury.31
It is not enough for a Section 1983 plaintiff to identify conduct properly attributable
to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through deliberate conduct,
the municipality was a ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must
show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must
demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of
federal rights.32
Movant urges dismissal arguing that Plaintiffs fail to plead plausible allegations that
the Sheriff’s detention and release policies and/or practices were the “moving force”
behind the constitutional violation. The following are the entirety of the allegations against
the Sheriff:
2.
This scheme is arranged by Cleve Dunn, Sr. (“Dunn”), RHI’s Chief
Executive Officer, and East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Office officials
operating the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (the “Prison”), who, at RHI’s
direction, refuse to release individuals ordered to RHI supervision until they
pay the initial fee.
15.
Defendant Sid J. Gautreaux, III is the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish.
He is sued in his official capacity.
26.
Individuals arrested for criminal offenses in East Baton Rouge Parish are
initially taken to the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (the “Prison”), which
is staffed and operated by the East Baton Rouge Sheriff, Defendant
Gautreaux.
31

Monell v. Dep 't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Parm v.
Shumate,513 F. 3d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 2007), cert denied, 129 S.Ct. 42, 172 L.Ed.2d 21 (2008).
32
Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388,
L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).

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35.
Sheriff Sid J. Gautreaux III has authority over, and responsibility for,
operating the Prison. LSA-R.S. § 13:5539(C) (“Each sheriff shall be the
keeper of the public jail of his parish . . .”). Gautreaux and Prison Warden
Dennis Grimes (“Grimes”) have final policymaking authority on jailing and
releasing arrestees for the East Baton Rouge Sheriff.
36.
Through an agreement with RHI, Gautreaux and Grimes, as final
policymakers for the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff with respect to jailing
and releasing arrestees at the Prison, created and enforce a policy that the
Prison will not release arrestees from the Prison until it receives permission
from RHI—permission that comes only after RHI is satisfied with the initial
payment made.
124 & 128.
Defendant Gautreaux’s practice and policy—enforced through Gautreaux
and Grimes as final policymakers for the Sheriff on jailing and releasing
practices at the Prison—to jail Plaintiffs and members of the Proposed
Class until they could pay RHI the initial fee, without an affirmative inquiry
into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and
findings concerning alternative conditions of release, violated Plaintiffs and
the proposed Class’s fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
by detaining arrestees until they could pay the initial RHI fee and be
released from the Prison.33
Plaintiffs plead the existence of a “scheme” between the Sherriff and the RHI
principal Cleve Dunn.34 Plaintiffs also plead that there is an “agreement” whereby “the
Prison will not release arrestees from the Prison until it receives permission from RHI—
permission that comes only after RHI is satisfied with the initial payment made.”35
However, these conclusory allegations of a “scheme” and an “agreement” are
unsupported by the detailed factual allegations of the Amended Complaint, set forth in
their entirety above. Plaintiffs fail to plead facts which would allow the Court to draw an

33

Rec. Doc. 2.
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶ 2.
35
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶ 36.
34

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inference that the Sherriff was the moving force behind the constitutional violations.
Plaintiff Ayo’s Bond Order incorporated at paragraph 31 of the Amended
Complaint provides as follows: 36




Authorizes release “upon a good and solvent bond conditioned as the law directs
in the total sum of $8,000.”
“You shall be under the supervision of RHI-Cleve Dunn @ 364-7753 for a period
of 90 days to ensure compliance with this order upon release on bond.”
“You shall not be released on bond without first meeting with your bond
supervisor.” 37
Nothing in the Bond Order requires the payment of initial fees to RHI as a condition

for release. Plaintiffs allege that “arrestees typically only learn that they must pay this
initial fee to be released when they or their family members attempt to post bail or when
they first meet with RHI at the Prison.”38 Again, this conclusory allegation is unsupported
by the facts pled. Neither Ayo nor White allege that they attempted to post bail but were
refused release by the Sheriff until RHI was paid a fee.
Ayo alleges that he had to stay in prison two (2) months because “he and his wife
could not afford the bond amount and to pay RHI”.39 There is no allegation that Ayo
attempted to post the bond amount but was refused release. Likewise, there is no
allegation that a Sheriff’s office employee or Deputy told Ayo that payment of initial fees
to RHI was a condition of release. Rather, the Amended Complaint makes plain that
Ayo’s belief that paying RHI was a condition of release came from an RHI representative
- a “Mr. Hall (“Hall”) - [who] informed [Ayo’s wife] that she still had to pay approximately

36

Rec. Doc. 2, ¶ 31.
Id.
38
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶38.
39
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶54.
37

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$500 to RHI for Mr. Ayo to be released from the Prison.”40
Plaintiff White alleges that “the bondswoman told Ms. White that the bondswoman
and RHI would split the payment, and that a portion would go towards RHI’s initial fee.”41
White further alleges that, “[t]he next day, RHI employee Hall went to the prison and met
with Ms. White [and] informed her that she would have to pay the remainder of the initial
fee and the monthly supervision fee after she was released.”42

At that time, Hall

presented RHI’s contract to White for her signature. Plaintiffs incorporate what is alleged
to be “a copy of [RHI’s] redacted, standard contract” as a part of the Amended
Complaint.43 Notably, the RHI contract, which White signed, provides that “payment is
due upon release of the client from incarceration.”44
On these facts, the Court finds no plausible basis to support the conclusory
allegations that the Sheriff was “in agreement” or part of a “scheme” with RHI. At best,
the factual allegations suggest that Plaintiffs believed that RHI’s initial fees had to be paid
as a condition of release because of what they were allegedly told by RHI or bondsmen.
Under the circumstances as pled, it is understandable that the Plaintiffs believed what
RHI told them, but there are simply no allegations that allow the Court to draw the
reasonable inference that the Sheriff was a moving force behind the alleged constitutional
violations. At most, the allegations suggest that the Bond Order created an indicia of
authority in RHI which RHI then exploited to extract fees in contravention of the plain
language of its own contract with Plaintiffs. The law presumes that Plaintiffs read and

40

Rec. Doc. 2, ¶56.
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶68.
42
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶69.
43
Rec. Doc. 2, ¶41
44
Id. (emphasis added).
41

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understood RHI’s fees when they signed the contract with RHI.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the Sheriff’s Motion to Dismiss45 is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on June 4, 2018.

S
JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

45

Rec. Doc. 17.

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