B and D Plumbing Company, Inc. et al v. Finley et al

Filing 36

RULING granting 18 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plumbing Contractors have not met their Rule 12(b)(1) burden of demonstrating that theyhave standing to bring this lawsuit. Therefore, this matter is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 01/22/20219. (NLT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
B AND D PLUMBING COMPANY, INC.;
QUALITY PLUMBING, INC.; THE PAYNE
COMPANY, INC.; LAFLEUR’S PLUMBING, L.L.C.;
BONNECAZE PLUMBING, L.L.C.; M&M PLUMBING
COMPANY, INC.; AND KENT’S PLUMBING, INC.

CIVIL NUMBER

18-38-SDD-RLB
VERSUS
JAMES C. FINLEY, KELLY CRAFT, RICKEY
FABRA, TERRY SMITH, RANDALL MCGEE, CARL
BOURGEOIS, LARRY REILING, SR., AND GERALD
LACOUR, ALL IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
MEMBERS OF THE STATE PLUMBING BOARD OF
LOUISIANA

RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss1 filed by Defendants, the
named members of the State Plumbing Board of Louisiana (“Board”), pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs, the named plumbing contractors
(“Plumbing Contractors”), have filed an Opposition2 to this motion, to which the Board
filed a Reply.3 For the reasons which follow, the Court finds that the Board’s motion
should be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction because Plumbing
Contractors lack standing to bring this suit.
Because the Court finds that Plumbing Contractors have failed to sufficiently plead

1

Rec. Doc. No. 18.
Rec. Doc. No. 28.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 32.
2

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facts which give rise to Article III standing, the Court does not reach the Board’s motion
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) in this ruling.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are plumbing contractors, working in the State of Louisiana, who are

licensed by the State Plumbing Board of Louisiana and the Louisiana State Licensing
Board for Contractors.4 Plumbing Contractors employ individuals who are training to
become journeyman plumbers.5

Plumbing Contractors claim that they are “directly

impacted” by mandatory indentured apprenticeship requirements “enforced by” the
Board.6 The Board requires that all apprentice plumbers be under the “direct, constant,
on-the-job supervision of a licensed journeyman plumber7 and be indentured in a
Workforce Commission approved apprenticeship program.8 Plumbing Contractors claim
that the requirements of the apprenticeship program have “significant implications”9 on
Plaintiffs and are “detrimental to the growth of the industry”10 because the requirements
“essentially close the industry to those who do not have access to approved
apprenticeship programs.”11
The apprenticeship program requirements at issue are set forth at LSA R.S.
37:1377. Plumbing Contractors claim that these Louisiana statutory requirements are
preempted by federal law, specifically the preemption clause found at 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(a) within the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§
4

Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 2.
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at ¶ 9.
8
Id. at ¶ 10.
9
Id. at ¶ 11.
10
Id. at ¶ 16.
11
Id. at ¶ 15.
5

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1001, et seq.
The Board moves to dismiss Plumbing Contractors’ Complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Plumbing Contractors lack standing to
bring these claims and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted as to preemption by ERISA. The Board contends Plumbing Contractors lack
standing because they have not sufficiently plead that they “have suffered or will
imminently suffer a concrete, particularized injury as a result of the challenged law.”12
Because the Court finds that Plumbing Contractors have failed to demonstrate standing,
the Court lacks jurisdiction and does not reach the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
“When a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction ‘is filed in conjunction with other

Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
addressing any attack on the merits.’”13 If a complaint could be dismissed for both lack
of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, “‘the court should dismiss only on the
jurisdictional ground under [Rule] 12(b)(1), without reaching the question of failure to state
a claim under [Rule] 12(b)(6).’”14 The reason for this rule is to preclude courts from issuing
advisory opinions and barring courts without jurisdiction “‘from prematurely dismissing a
case with prejudice.’”15
12

Rec. Doc. No. 18 at 2.
Crenshaw–Logal v. City of Abilene, Texas, 436 Fed.Appx. 306, 308 (5th Cir.2011)(quoting Ramming v.
United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001); see also Randall D. Wolcott, MD, PA v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d
757, 762 (5th Cir.2011); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3)).
14
Crenshaw–Logal, 436 Fed.Appx. at 308 (quoting Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th
Cir.1977)).
15
Id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210
(1998), and Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161).
13

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“Article III standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite.”16 If a plaintiff lacks standing to
bring a claim, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, and dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate.17 The party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of showing that standing existed at the time the lawsuit was filed.18 In
reviewing a motion under 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may
consider (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the
court's resolution of disputed facts.19
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is
characterized as either a “facial” attack, i.e., the allegations in the complaint are
insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction, or as a “factual” attack, i.e., the facts in the
complaint supporting subject matter jurisdiction are questioned.20 A facial attack happens
when a defendant files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion without accompanying evidence.21 In a
facial attack, allegations in the complaint are taken as true.22
Because the arguments made by the Board relating to standing rely on the
allegations asserted in the Complaint, it has presented a facial attack on Plumbing
Contractors’ standing.
16

Crenshaw–Logal, 436 Fed.Appx. at 308 (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003, and Xerox
Corp. v. Genmoora Corp., 888 F.2d 345, 350 (5th Cir.1989)).
17
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154–55, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990); Chair King, Inc.
v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir.1997).
18
M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001); Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243
F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001); Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
19
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981).
20
In re Blue Water Endeavors, LLC, Bankr. No. 08–10466, Adv. No. 10–1015, 2011 WL 52525, *3 (E.D.Tex.
Jan. 6, 2011)(citing Rodriguez v. Texas Comm'n of Arts, 992 F.Supp. 876, 878–79 (N.D.Tex.1998), aff'd,
199 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000)).
21
Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981).
22
Blue Water, 2011 WL 52525 at *3 (citing Saraw Partnership v. United States, 67 F.3d 567, 569 (5th
Cir.1995)).

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B. Article III Standing
Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to certain “cases” and
“controversies.” “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to
actual cases or controversies.”23 “One element of the case-or-controversy requirement”
is that plaintiffs “must establish that they have standing to sue.”24
To establish Article III standing, an injury must be “concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a
favorable ruling.”25 “Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it
cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not
too speculative for Article III purposes – that the injury is certainly impending.”26 The
United States Supreme Court has reiterated that “threatened injury must be certainly
impending to constitute injury in fact,” and that “[a]llegations of possible future injury” are
not sufficient.27
Here, Plumbing Contractors’ allegations of injury on the face of the Complaint are
not “concrete, particularized, actual or imminent.”

Additionally, the allegations of

23

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 492-493, 129
S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009).
24
Raines, supra, at 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312; see also Summers, supra, at 492-493, 129 S.Ct. 1142;
DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, at 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560,
112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
25
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 2752, 177 L.Ed.2d 461
(2010); see also Summers, supra, at 493, 129 S.Ct. 1142; Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
26
Id., at 565, n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
Whitmore, 495 U.S., at 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Lujan, supra, at 565, n. 2, 567, n. 3, 112 S.Ct. 2130; see DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, at 345, 126
S.Ct. 1854; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190,
120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60
L.Ed.2d 895 (1979).

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“anticipated detriment” to the plumbing industry as a whole are speculative.
The Board argues that Plumbing Contractors “simply made the broad and purely
speculative statement that the [plumbing apprenticeship] regulations are detrimental to
industry growth” and that Plumbing Contractors failed to include any factual allegations
to support this contention.28 In support of standing sufficient to invoke jurisdiction the
Plumbing Contractors cite solely to paragraph 2 of the Complaint,29 which states:
Plaintiffs are all plumbing contractors actively performing work in the State
of Louisiana and who are duly licensed by the STATE PLUMBING BOARD
OF LOUISIANA (hereinafter “PLUMBING BOARD”) and the Louisiana State
Licensing Board for Contractors. Plaintiffs all employ individuals who are
training to become journeyman plumbers and who are directly impacted by
the mandatory indentured apprenticeship requirements enforced by
Defendants through their service as board members of the PLUMBING
BOARD. The foregoing demonstrates that Plaintiffs have a personal stake
in the outcome of this controversy so as to ensure that concrete
adverseness is present. As such, Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims
in these proceedings.30
Although the Plumbing Contractors base their standing argument solely on the
allegations of paragraph 2, the Court reviewed the entirety of the Complaint for allegations
of “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged
action”.31 Paragraph 10 of Plumbing Contractors’ Complaint explains that the
apprenticeship program was always a part of the Louisiana statutory requirements;
however, the Board did not strictly enforce the requirements until January 1, 2017.32
Therefore, apprentice plumbers who were working prior to the strict enforcement period
found themselves out of work, presumably unless or until these apprentice plumbers met

28

Rec. Doc. No. 18 at 7.
Rec. Doc. No. 28 at 4.
30
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 2.
31
Note 25, supra
32
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 10.
29

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the requirements of the apprenticeship program. However, these allegedly out-of-work
apprentice plumbers are not parties to this action.33 Paragraph 11 of the Complaint
alleges “significant implications” to Plumbing Contractors:
The indentured apprenticeship requirement has significant implications for
plumbing contractors and their employees. Pursuant to Title 40 § 301 of
the Louisiana Administrative Code, the apprentice is required to be placed
under a written apprenticeship agreement which is required to incorporate
the standards of the program. The minimum standards include a term of
apprenticeship, a minimum of 144 hours of classroom instruction in
technical subjects per year, a progressively increasing schedule of wages
which are set by the program sponsor and approved by the State
Apprenticeship Council, periodic review of the apprentice’s progress, a
probationary period and a required supervision ratio. With respect to the
required ratio of apprentices to journeymen, LSA R.S. 37:1367(A) provides:
‘Direct, constant on-the-job supervision means that a licensed journeyman
plumber will supervise apprentices as governed by the Louisiana Workforce
Commission.’34
Paragraph 12 of the Complaint explains that the ratio is 1-1.35 Plumbing Contractors
conclude by asserting:
The approved apprenticeship programs throughout the state consist of
programs sponsored by organized labor unions and two non-union
programs, one in Lafayette and one in Baton Rouge. The programs require
attendance at classes, regular testing and the payment of semester fees.
There is no opportunity for young men and women to enter the plumbing
industry unless they live close to the training centers and have the funds to
pay for the fees. This mandatory statutory scheme essentially closes the
industry to those who do not have access to approved apprenticeship
programs.36
Louisiana’s plumbing industry does not have a sustainable workforce and
new entrants into the industry are necessary to perform the plumbing work
required. The statutory scheme as enforced by the Plumbing Board is
33

The Court notes with interest that it is a group of plumbing contractors/employers instituting the subject
action, not apprentice plumbers themselves. Noticeably absent are apprentice plumbers complaining of
burdensome and unfair enforcement of requirements that have rendered individuals unemployed.
34
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 11.
35
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 12.
36
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 15.

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detrimental to the growth of the industry.37
As set forth, the Complaint alleges an anticipated impact and implications of the
enforcement of the apprenticeship program requirements. The Plumbing Contractors
allege that they find the requirements burdensome and that, as employers of apprentice
plumbers, Plaintiffs fear the impact this may have in the future on the plumbing industry.
However, the Court does not find that Plumbing Contractors’ allegations sufficiently plead
a concrete and particular injury triggering Article III standing. What is the specific injury
to the named Plaintiffs? Is the burden of the requirements and the fear of a presumed
stunted workforce in the future sufficient? Neither the Board, nor Plumbing Contractors,
provided the Court with legal authority answering this inquiry. Arguing that the Complaint
is too vague and speculative the Board cites Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,38
without any further examination.39

Plumbing Contractors argue that only a general

allegation of injury and its imminence is necessary, relying upon Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.40
In Clapper, supra, plaintiffs challenged the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA), which allowed the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence to obtain foreign intelligence information by authorizing the

37

Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 16.
568 U.S. 398, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013).
39
Rec. Doc. No. 18 at 6-7.
40
504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The Court acknowledges that Plumbing
Contractors highlights Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490
(1983), for the position that a party seeking injunctive relief from state regulation on the ground that such
regulation is preempted by federal law presents a federal question over which federal courts have
jurisdiction. Rec. Doc. No. 28 at 4. However, the initial inquiry before the Court on the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion
to Dismiss is whether sufficient injury has been alleged such that the Complainants have constitutional
standing to proceed. The Court does not reach the issue of preemption if Complainants do not sufficiently
plead their injury.
38

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surveillance of certain persons believed to be located outside of the United States. A
challenge was brought by “attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media
organizations” who claimed to communicate with individuals who would be targeted by
this surveillance.41 Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that there was an “objectively
reasonable likelihood” that their communications with their foreign contacts would be
intercepted under the Act.42 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and a declaratory
judgment that the Act was unconstitutional. The district court found that standing was
lacking, and the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court found that there was no
standing because there was no showing of a “concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent” injury “fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling.” Simply put, the Supreme Court found the plead injuries to be speculative, failing
to establish an impending injury.
Clapper originally came before the district court on summary judgment. Unlike
here, evidence was offered to show the harm and expense incurred due to the enactment
of the Act at issue. Even then, the district court and Supreme Court did not find standing.
At the heart of the matter was the speculative nature of the plaintiffs’ alleged injury.
Similarly, Plumbing Contractors complain that the enforcement of the
apprenticeship program requirements will cause inconvenience, additional expense, a
decrease in available plumbers, and an eventual demise to the plumbing industry.43
These allegations speak to what may occur in the future and are not supported by any
factual allegations of real or imminent injury. In Clapper, the Second Circuit, reversing

41

133 S.Ct. at 1140.
133 S.Ct. at 1141.
43
Rec. Doc. No. 1.
42

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the district court’s ruling, allowed the plaintiffs to establish standing based on fears and
anticipated burdens. The Supreme Court reprimanded this finding as it “improperly
waters down the fundamental requirements of Article III.”44 “Respondents’ contention that
they have standing because they incurred certain costs as a reasonable reaction to a risk
of harm is unavailing – because the harm respondents seek to avoid is not certainly
impending. In other words, respondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting
harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly
impending.”45
Plumbing Contractors argue that general allegations of injury are sufficient at the
12(b) stage, relying upon Lujan, supra.

In Lujan, the federal act at issue was the

Endangered Species Act of 1973. The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Commerce initially promulgated a regulation extending coverage of the act to actions
taken in foreign nations, but a subsequent rule limited the geographic scope to the United
States and the high seas.46

“[W]ildlife conservation and other environmental

organizations” sought declaratory relief and an injunction, seeking to restore the initial
interpretation and scope.47 The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Eighth
Circuit reversed. Cross motions for summary judgment were brought, with judgment
entered in favor of the environmental groups by the district court and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not come forward with sufficient

44

Clapper, supra, 568 U.S. at 416.
Clapper, supra, 568 U.S. at 416, citing Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664, 96 S.Ct. 2333,
49 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976) (per curiam); National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Assn., Inc., 468 F.3d
826, 831 (C.A.D.C.2006).
46
Lujan, supra, 112 S.Ct. at 2133.
47
Lujan, supra, 112 S.Ct. at 2133.
45

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evidence of imminent injury to have standing.
Although the standing inquiry in Lujan was before the Court on a Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Supreme Court in Lujan observed that “[a]t the pleading stage,
general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice,
for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific
facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”48
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed Article III
standing in the procedural context of a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Lee v. Verizon
Communications, Inc.49 In Lee, the plaintiffs, representatives of different classes, brought
claims against the defendants for alleged violations of ERISA. The claims were dismissed
and affirmed by the appellate court. Specifically, one of the representatives of one of the
classes of pension plan participants was found to lack standing to sue for fiduciary
misconduct pursuant to ERISA. The Fifth Circuit determined that any direct harm to this
representative was too speculative. The matter found itself before the Fifth Circuit a
second time when, after the plaintiff sought a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, the matter was remanded to the Fifth Circuit to revisit the issue of
standing in light of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.50 The Fifth Circuit ultimately reached the same
conclusion – the representative lacked standing due to not meeting the injury-in-fact
prong.
The representative in Lee claimed that he was injured through “losses to [pension]

48

Lujan, supra, 112 S.Ct. at 2137, citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, supra, 497 U.S. 871 at 889,
110 S.Ct., at 3189.
49
837 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2016).
50
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). See Lee, supra, 837 F.3d
at 528-529.

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Plan assets held on [his] behalf as a direct result of the fiduciary mismanagement of Plan
assets in violation of ERISA, and that this invasion of his statutory right to proper
management of Plan assets is sufficiently concrete to provide standing.”51

The

defendants argued that Article III required allegations to support injury against an
individual’s payments, not the plan as a whole.52 Despite detailed pleading of an alleged
injury, it was found to be insufficient to meet the requirements of Article III standing.53
The Court distinguished statutory standing versus Article III standing, relying on
Lujan. The Fifth Circuit explained that “Article III standing is distinct from statutory
standing, and we decline to undermine this distinction by recognizing the latter as
conferring the former. Though the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
allowed that the invasion of statutory rights might create standing, Lujan addressed
constitutional standing arising from de facto injury, which is not alleged by a breach of
fiduciary duty.”54 The Court concluded that the representative’s facial allegations were
insufficient to support his constitutional standing.
In line with the findings of the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit, this Court finds that
Plumbing Contractors did not sufficiently plead an injury to meet the standards of

51

Lee, supra, 837 F.3d at 544-545.
Lee, supra, 837 F.3d at 545.
53
“The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Spokeo that violation of a procedural right granted by statute may in
some circumstances be a sufficiently concrete, albeit intangible, harm to constitute injury-in-fact without an
allegation of ‘any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’ However, the Supreme Court
also took care to note that ‘Congress’[s] role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean
that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a
statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.’ Rather, ‘Article III standing
requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. Put differently, the deprivation of a
right created by statute must be accompanied by ‘some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation.’
Thus, Spokeo recognizes that at minimum [sic], a ‘concrete’ intangible injury based on a statutory violation
must constitute a ‘risk of real harm’ to the plaintiff.” Lee, supra, 837 F.3d at 529, internal citations omitted.
(emphasis added).
54
Lee, supra, 837 F.3d at 546.
52

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constitutional standing under Article III.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the written reasons assigned, the Board’s Motion to Dismiss55 is GRANTED.

Plumbing Contractors have not met their Rule 12(b)(1) burden of demonstrating that they
have standing to bring this lawsuit. Therefore, this matter is dismissed without prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on January 22, 2019.

S

CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

55

Rec. Doc. No. 18.

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