Marlowe v. LeBlanc et al
Filing
151
RULING AND ORDER: Granting in part and denying in part 84 Motion to Dismiss as stated herein. Raman Singh, Pam Heard, John Morrison, Timothy Hooper, Stephanie Michel, Morgan LeBlanc, Darryl Campbell, Preety Singh, Gail Levy, Polly Smith, Elizabeth Gauthreaux, Jonathan Travis, and Chameka Johnson are dismissed. This action be and is hereby referred to the Magistrate Judge for selection of a new trial date and, as necessary, entry of a revised scheduling order. Signed by Judge Brian A. Jackson on 4/13/2023. (EDC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL.
NO. 18-00063-BAJ-EWD
RULING AND ORDER
On July 5, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit returned this
action to this Court for a second look at whether Plaintiff’s personal-capacity Eighth
Amendment claims survive certain Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity. In
doing so, the Circuit also instructed the Court to “carefully disaggregate all personalcapacity claims from official-capacity claims.” (Doc. 148 at p. 8).
Heeding the Fifth Circuit’s call, and with the benefit of the Circuit’s guidance,
the Court now dismisses all Defendants named in Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims
(Counts 1 and 2) except Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
(DPSC) Secretary James LeBlanc. Additionally, the Court now dismisses certain
Defendants named in Plaintiff’s personal-capacity deliberate indifference claims
(Count 3), and all Defendants named in Plaintiff’s personal-capacity failure to train
and supervise claims (Count 4). As a result if this Order, and the Court’s prior Order
of October 26, 2020 (Doc. 136), Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims (Counts 1 and 2) will
proceed against DPSC Secretary LeBlanc, only; Plaintiff’s personal-capacity
deliberate indifference claims (Count 3) will proceed against Elayn Hunt Correctional
Center (EHCC) EMT Fallon Stewart, EHCC Master Sergeant Angel Horn, EHCC
1
Master Sergeant Rolanda Palmer, and EHCC Sergeant Chermaine Brown, only; and
Plaintiff’s statutory claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Americans
with Disabilities Amendment Act, and Rehabilitation Act (collectively, “ADA”) (Count
5) will proceed against DPSC only. All other Counts and Defendants will be
dismissed.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The Court has already set forth the relevant allegations and procedural
background, at Sections I and II of its October 26 Order granting in part Defendants’
collective Motion To Dismiss. (Doc. 136 at pp. 2-5). The Court incorporates those
sections by reference, as if fully set forth herein.
To quickly recap, Plaintiff is an inmate in DPSC custody. Until January 2019,
Plaintiff was incarcerated at EHCC. Now he resides at Rayburn Correctional Center.
Plaintiff suffers from diabetes, and contends that the medical treatment and food
options provided to him fall below even the most basic standards required for his
medical condition, violating constitutional, statutory, and state law duties of care.
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC) names 18 Defendants, ranging from
DPSC at the top, to the Correctional Officers that administered Plaintiff’s daily
insulin and other medications at EHCC “pill call.”
Most recently, this Court granted in part Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (Doc.
84), dismissing Plaintiff’s state law claims; permitting Plaintiff’s ADA claim to
proceed; and taking a middling path as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims,
dismissing some Defendants but allowing Plaintiff’s claims to proceed against others.
(Doc. 136). The Court’s muddled analysis of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims tracked
2
closely the parties’ presentation in their respective Rule 12 papers, but nonetheless
drew the Fifth Circuit’s reproach after the Defendants not dismissed sought
immediate review of this Court’s denial of qualified immunity.
Consistent with the Circuit’s instructions on remand, the Court now expands
its analysis of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims and Defendants’ qualified immunity
defenses. First, as directed, the Court “disaggregate[s] all personal-capacity claims
from official-capacity claims.” (Doc. 148 at p. 8). Second, for all personal-capacity
claims not previously dismissed,1 the Courts conducts the following qualified
immunity analysis as to each Defendant:
The first question is (a) whether [the Defendant] violated a clearly
established right. In considering that question, the court must (b) frame
the constitutional question with specificity and granularity. With the
question thus framed, the court should (c) inquire whether existing
precedent places the statutory or constitutional question—here,
whether [the Defendant] violated Marlowe’s rights—beyond debate. And
finally, the court should (d) be sure to apply the modified motion-todismiss standard that governs in the context of qualified immunity.
(Id. at pp. 7-8 (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard
At the Rule 12 stage, “[t]he critical issue is whether the complaint contains
‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Doe v. Bd. of Supervisors of Univ. of Louisiana Sys., --- F.Supp.3d ----,
The Court’s prior Order dismissed Plaintiff’s personal-capacity deliberate indifference
claims (Count 3) against EHCC Medical Director Dr. Preety Singh, EHCC Nurse Practitioner
Polly Smith, EHCC EMT Elizabeth Gauthreaux, and EHCC Pharmacist Jonathan Travis.
(Doc. 136 at pp. 15-16, 17-19, 25). The Fifth Circuit does not take issue with these dismissals,
and the Court does not revisit them here.
1
3
2023 WL 143171, at *8 (M.D. La. Jan. 10, 2023) (Jackson, J.) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679. Facial
plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. Hence, the complaint need not set out “detailed factual
allegations,” but something “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is required. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When conducting its inquiry, the Court accepts all wellpleaded facts as true and views those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010).
B. Discussion
The Eighth Amendment forbids cruel and unusual punishments. This
prohibition includes “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The Defendants here do not contest that
diabetes is a serious condition that requires medical attention.
As such, the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims is driven
entirely by whether Defendants’ alleged response(s) to Plaintiff’s diabetes amounted
to “deliberate indifference.” The Fifth Circuit cautions that “deliberate indifference”
is “a demanding standard.” Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2019).
Negligence or inadvertence is not enough. A complaint that a physician
has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does
not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth
4
Amendment. An inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care
cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind.
Rather, the inmate must show that officials acted with malicious
intent—that is, with knowledge that they were withholding medically
necessary care. The plaintiff must show that officials refused to treat
him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or
engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton
disregard for any serious medical needs.
Id. at 219–20.
Still, despite being a high bar, deliberate indifference is not an impossible bar.
To the point, an inmate need not die or even suffer “serious illness” to establish
deliberate indifference. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004) (“It is also
important to note that the inmate need not show that death or serious illness has
occurred.” (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)).
i. Official-Capacity Claims For Injunctive And Declaratory
Relief (Counts 1 And 2)
As noted, on remand the Fifth Circuit instructs the Court to “disaggregate”
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims from his personal-capacity claims. (Doc. 148 at p.
8). Point taken. This Court’s prior Order allowed Plaintiff to pursue his officialcapacity claims against multiple Defendants. This muddied the waters by creating
unnecessary redundancy. Official-capacity suits are “really suits against the
governmental entity”—here, DPSC, which is responsible for the conditions of
Plaintiff’s confinement at Rayburn (now) and EHCC (before). Goodman v. Harris
Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 2009). DPSC Secretary LeBlanc—who oversees both
Rayburn and EHCC—is the appropriate Defendant to respond to these claims. See
id. Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against all Defendants except DPSC Secretary
5
LeBlanc will be dismissed. As a result, all claims against Former DPSC Interim
Medical Director Dr. Pam Heard, current DPSC Medical Director Dr. John Morrison,
EHCC Assistant Warden Morgan LeBlanc, EHCC Assistant Warden Darryl
Campbell, and EHCC Food Manager Gail Levy are now dismissed, and these
Defendant will be dismissed from this action.2
In all other respects, the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims
(Counts 1 and 2) set forth in its October 26 Order remains unchanged. Now aimed at
the proper respondent—DPSC Secretary LeBlanc—these claims will benefit from
discovery.
Due to inartful pleading, a short explanation is required. When introducing the Parties, the
operative Second Amended Complaint states that Plaintiff pursues claims against Dr. Pam
Heard and Dr. John Morrison in their official capacities only. (Doc. 64 at ¶ 9). Thereafter,
however, Plaintiff includes Dr. Heard and Dr. Morrison as named Defendants to Count 4,
Plaintiff’s personal-capacity failure to supervise and train claim. (Id. at ¶¶ 92-94). Rather
than addressing this confusion in his Rule 12 briefing, Plaintiff simply omits Dr. Heard and
Dr. Morrison from his personal-capacity claims analysis. (Doc. 92 at pp. 18-23). This Court
has often admonished that it will not speculate on arguments that have not been advanced,
or attempt to develop arguments on a party's behalf. Buchicchio v. LeBlanc, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2023 WL 2027809, at *10 n.6 (M.D. La. 2023) (Jackson, J.). Under the Court’s Local Civil
Rules, Plaintiff has abandoned his personal-capacity claims against Dr. Heard and Dr.
Morrison. See id.
The mixed messages continue. In its introduction, the Second Amended Complaint
states that Plaintiff pursues Assistant Warden Morgan LeBlanc, Assistant Warden Darryl
Campbell, and Food Manager Gail Levy in their “official and personal capacities.” (Doc. 64 at
¶ 9). Thereafter, however, Plaintiff lists “Morgan LeBlanc,” “Campbell,” and “Levy” only
among the Defendants to Count 2, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim challenging the food
options available to diabetics. (Id. at ¶ 84). While the federal notice pleading standard is a
minimal bar, it requires at least that “defendants in all lawsuits must be given notice of the
specific claims against them.” Anderson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 554 F.3d 525, 528
(5th Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Plaintiff has failed to provide Defendants
Morgan LeBlanc, Darryl Campbell, and Gail Levy notice of any specific personal-capacity
claim(s) against them, and his prefatory references to these Defendants’ “personal capacities”
will be disregarded. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Rule 12 briefing also omits these Defendants from
its personal-capacity claims analysis, thus abandoning any such claims. Supra, Buchicchio,
2023 WL 2027809, at *10 n.6.
2
6
ii. Personal-Capacity Claims For Damages (Counts 3 And 4)
Defendants invoke qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims for damages.
(Doc. 84-1 at p. 16-22). Qualified immunity shields a government official from
individual liability for civil damages when the “official’s conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” City of Escondido, Calif. v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019).
Its purpose is to strike a balance “between the interests in vindication of citizens’
constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance of their duties” by
making it possible for government officials to “reasonably anticipate when their
conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 639 (1987) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)). Put differently,
“[q]ualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable
but mistaken judgments about open legal questions. When properly applied, it
protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quotation marks omitted).
The Fifth Circuit’s two-pronged test for qualified immunity asks (1) “whether
the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show
that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right
was ‘clearly established.’” Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190-91 (5th Cir.
2020). A court may analyze these prongs in either order, and resolve the case on a
single prong. Id. at 190. Importantly, “[a]lthough nominally an affirmative defense,
the plaintiff has the burden to negate the assertion of qualified immunity once
properly raised.” Collier v. Montgomery, 569 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 2009).
7
To determine whether a constitutional or statutory right was “clearly
established” at the time of the alleged violation, the Court looks for guidance from
controlling Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit authority. See McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). “[I]n the absence of directly controlling
authority, a ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ [from other Circuits] might,
under some circumstances, be sufficient to compel the conclusion that no reasonable
officer could have believed that his or her actions were lawful.” Id. (quoting Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 604 (1999)). “We do not require a case directly on point, but
existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Nonetheless, “[a] right is ‘clearly established’ only
if it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that
what he is doing violates that right.” Cunningham, 983 F.3d at 191 (quotation marks
omitted).
a. Deliberate Indifference (Count 3)
Consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s remand instructions, the Court re-evaluates
Plaintiff’s claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical need (diabetes)
against Defendants EHCC EMT Fallon Stewart, EHCC Master Sergeant Angel Horn,
EHCC Master Sergeant Rolanda Palmer, EHCC Sergeant Chermaine Brown, and
EHCC Sergeant Chameka Johnson.
1. EHCC EMT Fallon Stewart
Plaintiff alleges that beginning in August 2016, he repeatedly reported
textbook symptoms of undiagnosed diabetes to “EMTs handling the sick call station
at EHCC,” including to EMT Fallon Stewart. Specifically, Plaintiff complained of
8
tingling, pain, numbness and cracking skin on his feet; blurred vision; shakiness,
frequent urination; extreme thirst and fatigue; and rapid weight loss (sixty pounds
in just three months). (Doc. 64 at ¶¶ 22-25). Finally, on November 10, 2016, EHCC
medical personnel tested Plaintiff’s blood-glucose, which showed that his glucose had
risen to an eye-popping and “life-threatening level of nearly 900 mg/dl.” (Id. at ¶ 32).
The next day, EHCC medical personnel ordered EMT Stewart to deliver Plaintiff “to
the acute treatment unit to undergo immediate treatment” for diabetic ketoacidosis.
(Id. at ¶ 33). Inexplicably, EMT Stewart ignored this command, “and left [Plaintiff]
untreated and unaware of his potentially fatal condition.” (Id. at ¶ 34). Four days
later, EHCC personnel “finally transported [Plaintiff] via ambulance to University
Hospital in New Orleans to receive emergency treatment and to prevent him from
slipping into a diabetic coma.” (Id.at ¶ 34). “University doctors diagnosed [Plaintiff]
with diabetes and told him he should have been dead in light of his extremely high
glucose and A1C levels.” (Id. at ¶ 35).
First, did EMT Stewart violate a clearly established right? Yes. The Eighth
Amendment protects prisoners from “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Defendants concede that diabetes is a serious medical
need, and challenge only whether Plaintiff’s allegations establish deliberate
indifference. Albeit a “demanding standard,” deliberate indifference is satisfied upon
a showing “that officials acted with malicious intent—that is, with knowledge that
they were withholding medically necessary care,” by, for example, refusing treatment
or ignoring a prisoner’s complaints. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219-220. Plaintiff contends
9
that for months EMT Stewart knew of his reported complaints indicating
undiagnosed diabetes, and that on November 11, specifically, EMT Stewart knew
that Plaintiff’s blood-glucose had risen to a life-threatening level. Still, EMT Stewart
deliberately ignored a direct order to deliver Plaintiff to EHCC’s critical care unit,
leaving Plaintiff untreated for four days. Viewed in Plaintiff’s favor, these allegations
and the reasonable inferences drawn from them establish that EMT Stewart knew of
Plaintiff’s acute life-threatening condition—diabetic ketoacidosis—and intentionally
withheld medically necessary care, thus meeting the “deliberate indifference”
standard. Cf. Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 464 & n.25 (5th Cir. 2006) (“deliberate
indifference” satisfied based on prison nurse’s four-hour failure to treat inmate
complaining of severe chest pain despite knowing that inmate “had a history of
cardiac problems” (collecting cases)); accord Lewis v. Cain, No. 15-cv-318, 2021 WL
1219988, at *42 (M.D. La. Mar. 31, 2021) (Dick, C.J.) (“The Fifth Circuit holds that,
when a gatekeeper to emergency care knowingly disregards a prisoner's complaints,
he acts with deliberate indifference to that [prisoner's] medical needs.” (citing
authorities)).
Second, did existing precedent place the constitutional question beyond
debate? Again, yes. True, Plaintiff fails to direct the Court to controlling authority
stating squarely that a prison official’s intentional failure to respond to an inmate’s
diabetic ketoacidosis establishes an actionable Eighth Amendment medical
indifference claim. But “a case directly on point” is not required. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at
741. The real question is whether any reasonable official in EMT Stewart’s position
10
would know that deliberately withholding critical care in the face of an acute lifethreatening condition—be it diabetic ketoacidosis, heart attack, stroke, heat
exhaustion, a stab wound, or any of the myriad acute life-threatening conditions that
may arise in the prison context on any given day—violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Fifth Circuit has long warned
that a prison official withholding care in such situations will be open to personal
liability for damages. See, e.g., Easter, 467 F.3d at 464, n.25. Closer to the point, the
Fifth Circuit and an overwhelming consensus of other Circuits have also held that
withholding care to an inmate suffering from diabetes—even undiagnosed diabetes—
will result in an actionable claim for damages under the Eighth Amendment. E.g.,
Slay v. Alabama, 636 F.2d 1045, 1046 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb. 1981); see also, e.g., Scinto
v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 230 (4th Cir. 2016); Sours v. Big Sandy Reg'l Jail Auth.,
593 F. App'x 478, 486 (6th Cir. 2014); Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 420 (9th
Cir. 2003); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582–83 (3d Cir.
2003); Egebergh v. Nicholson, 272 F.3d 925, 927–28 (7th Cir. 2001); Hunt v. Uphoff,
199 F.3d 1220, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 1999); Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648
(8th Cir. 1999); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 857 (2d Cir. 1996); Carswell v. Bay
Cnty., 854 F.2d 454, 457 (11th Cir. 1988).
In short, EMT Stewart’s alleged deliberate withholding of medical treatment
in the face of Plaintiff’s diabetic ketoacidosis made it patently foreseeable that his
“conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
Plaintiff’s allegations overcome EMT Stewart’s qualified immunity defense.
11
2. EHCC Master Sergeant Angel Horn
Plaintiff’s allegations against Master Sergeant Angel Horn amount to the
following: after being diagnosed with diabetes, Plaintiff received his insulin and other
medication at EHCC “pill call.” Pill calls do not occur at regular times, and prisoners
are often “forced to stand in line for extended periods of time, including outdoors and
under harsh conditions,” making it all but impossible to “adhere to regular
medication regimens.” (Doc. 64 at ¶ 58). Master Sergeant Angel Horn is one of four
staff members that “manage” pill call, but she does not assist Plaintiff in determining
when to refill his prescriptions, which “causes lapses” in Plaintiff’s medication. (Id.
at ¶¶ 59-60). Master Sergeant Horn has ignored Plaintiff’s repeated complaints
regarding expired insulin. (Id. at ¶ 64). Going one step further, Master Sergeant Horn
has once “refused” to give Plaintiff insulin at pill call, and on several other occasions
has provided Plaintiff “the wrong medication.” (Id. at ¶¶ 64-66).
Here, again, did Master Sergeant Horn violate a clearly established right? Yes.
While failing to conduct pill calls at regular hours, failing to assist Plaintiff’s
medication management, and even providing Plaintiff “the wrong medication” may
be attributed to mere “negligence”—falling short of actionable deliberate
indifference—outright refusal to treat a known serious medical need establishes
“malicious intent” capable of sustaining an Eighth Amendment claim. Gibson, 920
F.3d at 219-20. Construing the allegations and inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, at least
once Sergeant Horn refused to provide him insulin despite knowing that he suffers
from diabetes. Plaintiff’s allegations establish a clear constitutional violation. Id.
And again, did existing precedent place the constitutional question beyond
12
debate? Yes, indeed. Here, in fact, the answer is abundantly clear. As indicated above,
for forty years the Fifth Circuit has held that deliberately withholding a diabetic
inmate’s insulin sufficiently states an actionable claim for “personal medical
mistreatment” under the Eighth Amendment. See Slay, 636 F.2d at 1046. And, of
course, this view has been echoed by a resounding chorus of Circuits in the decades
since. See, e.g., Scinto, 841 F.3d at 230; Sours, 593 F. App'x at 486; Lolli, 351 F.3d at
420; Natale, 318 F.3d at 582–83; Egebergh, 272 F.3d at 927–28; Hunt, 199 F.3d at
1223–24; Roberson, 198 F.3d at 648; Weyant, 101 F.3d at 857; Carswell, 854 F.2d at
457.
In sum, Master Sergeant Horn’s alleged deliberate refusal to provide
Plaintiff insulin to treat his diabetes made it patently foreseeable that her conduct
may give rise to liability for damages. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to overcome
Master Sergeant Horn’s qualified immunity defense.
3. EHCC Master Sergeant Rolanda Palmer and
Sergeant Chermaine Brown
Plaintiff’s allegations against Master Sergeant Rolanda Palmer and Sergeant
Chermaine Brown are indistinguishable from Plaintiff’s allegations against Master
Sergeant Horn, to the letter. (See Doc. 64 at ¶¶ 58-60, 64-66). Most relevant, Plaintiff
alleges that Master Sergeant Rolanda Palmer and Sergeant Chermaine Brown also
once “refused” to give Plaintiff insulin at pill call. (Id. at ¶ 65). Thus, the same
analysis and result applies here: by allegedly refusing Plaintiff his insulin, Master
Sergeant Palmer and Sergeant Brown exhibited malicious intent sufficient to
establish deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s diabetes, making it patently foreseeable
13
that their conduct may give rise to liability for damages, thereby scuttling their
qualified immunity defense at this stage.3
4. EHCC Sergeant Chameka Johnson
Finally, Sergeant Chameka Johnson. The allegations against Sergeant
Johnson are the same as those against Master Sergeant Horn, Master Sergeant
Palmer, and Sergeant Brown. (See Doc. 64 at ¶¶ 58-60, 64-66). But the same result
does not follow here. Why? Because as noted in Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss,
Sergeant Johnson is not listed among the named Defendants in the SAC. (Doc. 84 at
p. 1, n.1; see Doc. 64 at ¶ 9). Somehow, Plaintiff’s opposition blithely ignores this
deficiency, and even since filing his opposition Plaintiff has made no attempt to
correct it. The Fifth Circuit holds that “[a]n amended complaint supersedes the
original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint
specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading.”
King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff’s SAC did not incorporate
his earlier pleading(s), and so the SAC terminated Sergeant Johnson as a Defendant.
See, e.g., Damond v. LeBlanc, No. 12-cv-564, 2013 WL 3490734, at *1 n.2 (M.D. La.
July 9, 2013) (Brady, J), aff'd, 552 F. App'x 353 (5th Cir. 2014). Thus, Sergeant
Johnson must be dismissed.
It is of no concern at this stage that the same operative allegation—Defendants’ refusal to
give Plaintiff his insulin at pill call—sustains Plaintiff’s claims against Master Sergeant
Horn, Master Sergeant Palmer, and Sergeant Brown. For now, the Court’s analysis is cabined
by the allegations of the SAC, and, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the SAC alleges
that on at least one occasion each of these Defendants “refused to give him insulin.” (Doc. 64
at ¶ 65). Discovery will flesh out the extent to which each or all of these Defendants withheld
Plaintiff’s insulin. Of course, depending on what evidence turns up in discovery, these
Defendants may seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims again at summary judgment.
3
14
b. Failure To Supervise And Train (Count 4)
Consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s instructions, the Court also re-evaluates
Plaintiff’s “failure to supervise and train” claims (Count 4). Plaintiff pursues these
claims against Defendants DPSC Secretary James LeBlanc, former DPSC Medical
Director Dr. Raman Singh, EHCC Warden Timothy Hooper, EHCC Deputy Warden
Stephanie Michel, and EHCC Medical Director Dr. Preety Singh.4
A supervisory official who is not directly involved in a constitutional violation
may nonetheless be liable for his failure to adequately train or supervise his
subordinates, if such failures causally result in a constitutional injury. Buchicchio,
2023 WL 2027809, at *13-14. A failure to supervise and train claim requires the
plaintiff to show:
(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate
official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise
and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or
supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.
Goodman v. Harris Cty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009). In this context, “deliberate
indifference” means “a disregard for a known or obvious consequence of his actions.”
Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 186 (5th Cir. 2022)). This typically requires
showing a pattern of similar constitutional violations, permitting the inference that
the supervisory official deliberately chose policies causing violations of constitutional
rights. Id.
Importantly, “[a] failure to train action requires an underlying constitutional
As explained, supra n.2, the SAC also includes former DPSC Medical Directors Dr. Heard
and Dr. Morrison as Defendants to Count 4, but Plaintiff omits these Defendants from his
personal-capacity claims analysis, thus abandoning any such claims.
4
15
violation.” Graham v. Hodge, 619 F. App'x 394, 395 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Kitchen v.
Dallas County, Tex., 759 F.3d 468, 483 (5th Cir. 2014)). Here, as set forth above, the
only remaining actionable and relevant underlying constitutional violations are those
alleged against Defendant EMT Stewart (for having deliberately withheld critical
acute care), and Defendants Master Sergeant Horn, Master Sergeant Palmer, and
Sergeant Brown (for having refused to administer Plaintiff’s insulin at pill call).
Accordingly, the Court references these underlying violations only when assessing
Plaintiff’s failure to train and supervise claims.
1. DPSC Secretary James LeBlanc
Starting at the top, with DPSC Secretary LeBlanc. Did Secretary LeBlanc
personally violate a clearly established constitutional right, opening the door to
individual liability for damages? Not here. Why? Because implicit to the first element
of an actionable failure to supervise and train claim is that the alleged supervisor
actually supervised or trained the offending subordinate. See Goodman, 571 F.3d at
395. But Plaintiff does not allege that Secretary LeBlanc is involved in the day-today supervision and training of EMT Stewart, Master Sergeant Horn, Master
Sergeant Palmer, or Sergeant Brown. And common sense dictates that Plaintiff
cannot allege the Secretary’s involvement at EHCC at such a granular level, where
the Secretary’s actual role requires him to administer a Department that oversees
dozens of facilities, thousands of employees, and tens of thousands of inmates.
Plaintiff’s personal-capacity claim against Secretary LeBlanc must be dismissed at
the first prong of the Fifth Circuit’s qualified immunity analysis—for failure to allege
that Secretary LeBlanc violated a clearly established right—without need to consider
16
whether existing precedent placed the constitutional question beyond debate.5
2. Former DPSC Medical Director Dr. Raman
Singh
The same goes for former DPSC Medical Director Dr. Raman Singh. Here,
again, Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Singh was involved in the day-to-day training
and supervision of EMT Stewart, Master Sergeant Horn, Master Sergeant Palmer,
or Sergeant Brown, and common sense dictates that he was not, given his elevated
role at DPSC. Plaintiff’s personal-capacity claim against Dr. Singh must be dismissed
at the first prong of the Fifth Circuit’s qualified immunity analysis, and Dr. Singh
must be dismissed from this action.
3. EHCC Warden Timothy Hooper
EHCC Warden Timothy Hooper is certainly closer to the action—within the
same facility anyway. As such, Plaintiff’s allegation that Warden Hooper “failed to
properly train and supervise” EMT Stewart, Master Sergeant Horn, Master Sergeant
Palmer, and Sergeant Brown is at least plausible. (Doc. 64 at ¶¶ 40, 93-94). Still,
however, Plaintiff has not alleged a viable failure to supervise and train claim
because there is nothing in the SAC to establish a pattern of similar constitutional
The Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s personal-capacity failure to train and supervise claim
against Secretary LeBlanc should not be confused with its analysis of Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims against Secretary LeBlanc, which allege unconstitutional policies and
practices resulting in the delay and denial of insulin and other medications, and
inappropriate food options for diabetics. First, “an unconstitutional failure to train is not the
same as an unconstitutional failure to adopt policies; each is a distinct theory of Monell
liability.” Buchicchio, 2023 WL 2027809, at *14 (citing authorities). Second, Secretary
LeBlanc’s personal involvement obviously is not required for Plaintiff to prevail in his official
capacity claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, which are, in fact, claims against DPSC.
Goodman, 571 F.3d at 396. Third, the qualified immunity analysis does not apply to
Plaintiff’s official capacity claims. See Owen v. City of Indep., Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
5
17
violations involving EMT Stewart (or the others) that would permit the inference that
Warden Hooper deliberately chose policies causing violations of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186. In this regard, even Plaintiff’s
invocation of the litigation in Lewis et al. v. Cain et al., No. 15-cv-318 (M.D. La.) to
establish a “pattern, practice and/or custom” of indifference to serious medical needs
is unavailing because that litigation focused on medical treatment provided at the
Louisiana State Penitentiary, not EHCC. See Lewis v. Cain, No. 3:15-CV-318, 2021
WL 1219988 (M.D. La. Mar. 31, 2021) (Dick, J.). The same is essentially true of Van
Nortrick v. Lavespere, No. 18-cv-0534, 2019 WL 852121 (M.D. La. Feb. 22, 2019) and
Banks v. LeBlanc, No. 16-cv-649, 2019 WL 4315018 (M.D. La. Aug. 27, 2019), the
additional litigation identified and noticed in the Court’s prior Order.
Thus, again Plaintiff’s personal-capacity claim against Warden Hooper must
be dismissed at the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, and Warden
Hooper must be dismissed from this action.
4. EHCC Deputy Warden Stephanie Michel and
EHCC Medical Director Dr. Preety Singh
Finally, EHCC Deputy Warden of Medical Care Stephanie Michel and EHCC
Medical Director Dr. Preety Singh. These Defendants’ titles permit a plausible
inference that they supervise and train EMT Stewart, Master Sergeant Horn, Master
Sergeant Palmer, and Sergeant Brown. And, as above, Plaintiff alleges that these
Defendants “failed to properly train and supervise” EMT Stewart, Master Sergeant
Horn, Master Sergeant Palmer, and Sergeant Brown. (Doc. 64 at ¶¶ 40, 93-94). But,
again, the SAC contains nothing to establish a pattern of similar constitutional
18
violations, thereby permitting the inference that Deputy Warden Michel and Dr.
Singh deliberately chose policies causing violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiff’s personal-capacity failure to train and supervise claims against Deputy
Warden Michel and Dr. Singh must also be dismissed at the first prong of the
qualified immunity analysis, and these Defendants must be dismissed from this
action.
C. Amendment
As set forth in this Court’s prior Order, Plaintiff has already amended his
complaint twice, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that amending a third
time would sufficiently address the additional deficiencies identified herein. As such,
the Court will dismiss the additional Counts and Defendants identified herein
without permitting Plaintiff the opportunity to amend again.
III.
CONCLUSION
In sum, as a result of the Court’s original Order (Doc. 136), and this Order
under the Fifth Circuit’s guidance on remand,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ collective Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 84)
is GRANTED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s official-capacity constitutional
claims (Counts 1 and 2) be and are hereby DISMISSED IN PART. Counts 1 and 2
may proceed against Defendant DPSC Secretary LeBlanc, only.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s personal-capacity constitutional
claims alleging deliberate indifference (Count 3) be and are hereby DISMISSED IN
PART. Count 3 may proceed against Defendants EMT Stewart, Master Sergeant
19
Horn, Master Sergeant Palmer, and Sergeant Brown, only.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s personal-capacity constitutional
claims alleging failure to train and supervise (Count 4) be and are hereby
DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s state law claims (Counts 6, 7,
and 8) be and are hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following Defendants be and are
hereby DISMISSED from this action: Dr. Raman Singh; Dr. Pam Heard; Dr.
John Morrison; Warden Timothy Hooper; Deputy Warden Stephanie Michel;
Assistant Warden Morgan LeBlanc; Assistant Warden Darryl Campbell; Dr.
Preety Singh; Gail Levy; Polly Smith; Elizabeth Gauthreaux; Jonathan
Travis; and Sergeant Chameka Johnson.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in all other respects, Defendants’ Motion
To Dismiss (Doc. 84) be and is hereby DENIED. In sum, the following Counts against
the following Defendants remain:
Counts 1 and 2, alleging official-capacity Eighth Amendment claims
against Defendant DPSC Secretary James LeBlanc;
Count 3, alleging personal-capacity Eighth Amendment claims against
Defendants EMT Fallon Stewart, Master Sergeant Angel Horn, Master
Sergeant Rolanda Palmer, and Sergeant Chermaine Brown; and
Count 5, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act, and Rehabilitation Act
Additionally, against Defendant DPSC.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and is hereby referred to the
Magistrate Judge for selection of a new trial date and, as necessary, entry of a revised
20
scheduling order.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 13th day of April, 2023
_______________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
21
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?