Slaughter v. Torres, III
Filing
69
RULING AND ORDER granting 59 Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 59) filed by defendant, Beauregard Torres, III, is GRANTED, and all claims by Plaintiff against Defendant are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 03/14/2023. (KDC)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ADRIAN SLAUGHTER
VERSUS
BEAUREGARD TORRES, III
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 18-362-JWD-EWD
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO
DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (DOC. 59)
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. 59) filed by defendant, Beauregard Torres, III, (“Defendant”). Plaintiff Adrian Slaughter
(“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. (Doc. 61.) Defendant has filed a reply. (Doc. 65.) Oral argument
is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the
arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons,
Defendant’s motion is granted.
I.
Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
A. Allegations of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 58)
The following facts are taken from the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Doc. 58.
They are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion, with reasonable inferences drawn in favor
of Plaintiff. Thompson v. City of Waco, Tex., 764 F.3d 500, 502–03 (5th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff is an African-American male and former employee of the Pointe Coupee Parish
Sheriff’s Office (“PCPSO”). (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant was, at all times relevant to this suit, the Sheriff
of Pointe Coupe Parish. (Id. ¶ 5.)
In early March 2017, Defendant learned that Plaintiff wanted to run for Sheriff, and
Defendant then accused Plaintiff of “filing false work time records.” (Id. ¶¶ 15–18.) Defendant
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refused to provide documentation for the accusation and tried to force Plaintiff to quit. (Id. ¶¶ 20–
24.) Plaintiff refused. (Id. ¶ 25.)
Around March 23, 2017, Defendant arrested Plaintiff and charged him with sixteen counts
alleging payroll fraud and malfeasance in office. (Id. ¶ 26.) On March 31, 2017, Plaintiff was
terminated from the PCPSO. (Id. ¶ 29.)
Plaintiff asserts two counts in the SAC: (1) discrimination on the basis of race and/or
disparate treatment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (and possibly Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”)), 1 and (2) false arrest. (SAC ¶¶ 38–63, Doc. 58.)
As to disparate treatment, Plaintiff points to “Renee Thibodeaux, a white officer, employed
in school resource, who is situated similarly to Plaintiff in rank and file, works straight days and
takes vacation time to work at the same hospital that Plaintiff was accused of working at while on
the clock with the Sheriff’s Office.” (Id. ¶ 30.) According to the SAC, “Thibodeaux has never
been accused of filing false time records or engaging in any kind of malfeasant conduct,” nor has
he been questioned about his ability to work at the hospital, nor has he been criminally accused
like Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 31–32.) Plaintiff also alleges that he recorded a conversation of other white
officers complaining about Defendant hiring Plaintiff and other minorities “in commanding
capacities,” that he brought this to Defendant’s attention, and that Defendant did nothing in
response. (Id. ¶¶ 33–36.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant relied upon false and unverified
information presented to him to accuse Plaintiff of filing false work time records,” and other
similarly situated white officers were not subjected to criminal or administrative liability. (Id. ¶¶
39–44.)
Title VII is not listed in Count I, but the statute is mentioned in the Damages portion of Plaintiff’s SAC. (Compare
SAC ¶¶ 38–44, Doc. 58, with id. ¶ 68.)
1
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As to false arrest, Plaintiff claims that Defendant knew the criminal charges were false
because other white officers were engaged in the same conduct yet were not prosecuted. (Id. ¶ 46.)
Despite this, “Defendant caused Plaintiff to be falsely charged with a criminal offense.” (Id. ¶ 47.)
Plaintiff details all of the local and national media coverage to which he was subjected because of
his arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 54–59.) Further, while Defendant turned his purported findings over to the
Attorney General’s (“AG’s”) office, he “failed to advance the case” with that office, and the case
was ultimately dismissed because Defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify.
(Id. ¶¶ 53, 60–63.)
B. The Court’s Prior Ruling
Defendant previously moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 44.) On March
22, 2022, this Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Slaughter v. Torres, 592 F.
Supp. 3d 515 (M.D. La. 2022), Doc. 57. In sum, the motion was granted in that all of Plaintiff’s
claims were dismissed, except those under § 1983 against Defendant in his official capacity. Id. at
531. In that one respect, the motion was denied without prejudice. Id. Because the Court’s
reasoning in that ruling will be particularly relevant to its analysis of the instant motion, a detailed
discussion is warranted.
Relevant here, the Court began by determining whether to consider certain documents
which the parties attached to their motion and opposition, including Defendant’s Arrest Warrant
and Affidavit of Arrest and including documents obtained by Plaintiff’s counsel from the AG’s
office. See id. at 520–21. The parties attach the same documents to the instant motion and
opposition, (compare Doc. 44-3, with Doc. 59-2; compare also Doc. 46–1, with Doc. 61-1), so the
analysis applies again with equal vigor. In the prior ruling, this Court explained:
Defendant moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc.
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44.) In support of his motion, Defendant attaches as Exhibit A five
pages of documents from Plaintiff's state court proceedings for the
criminal charges, including the affidavit and warrant for Plaintiff's
arrest. (Doc. 44-3.) Defendant argues that the Court may consider
Exhibit A because these documents were incorporated into the
Amended Complaint by reference and concern matters of which the
Court may take judicial notice. (Doc. 44-2 at 3–4.) Plaintiff objects
to consideration of Defendant's exhibit, ostensibly because the
substance of Defendant's arguments that rely on Exhibit A are not
referenced in the Amended Complaint, though Plaintiff's position is
unclear from his opposition. (See Doc. 46 at 3.)
Plaintiff similarly attaches 119 pages of documents as Exhibits 1, 2,
and 3 to his opposition. (Doc. 46-1.) These exhibits include
documents from the Attorney General's Office, such as responses to
a public records request for file materials from its investigation of
Plaintiff, correspondence with defense counsel, and a press release.
(See id.) Defendant does not object to Plaintiff's exhibits in his reply.
(See Doc. 47.)
Preliminarily, the Court must determine whether to consider the
parties’ respective exhibits. In general, pursuant to Rule 12(d), “[i]f,
on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)[,] . . . matters outside the pleadings
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(d); see also United States v. Rogers Cartage Co., 794 F.3d
854, 861 (7th Cir. 2015). There are some exceptions to this standard,
however. On a motion to dismiss, the court may consider “the
complaint, its proper attachments, ‘documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice.’ ” Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P'ship v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir.
June 12, 2018) (quoting Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th
Cir. 2011)).
As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[i]f the district court does not
rely on materials in the record, such as affidavits, it need not convert
a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.” U.S. ex rel.
Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 798 F.3d 265, 275 (5th Cir. 2015)
(citing Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 372 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995)).
“[T]he mere submission [or service] of extraneous materials does
not by itself convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for
summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd.
v. Norfolk S. Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)). A district
court, moreover, enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether to treat
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a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. See St. Paul
Ins. Co. v. AFIA Worldwide Ins. Co., 937 F.2d 274, 280 n.6 (5th Cir.
1991).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized a limited exception to the general
rules under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) and related
jurisprudence. The Fifth Circuit has approved district courts’
consideration of documents attached to a motion to dismiss, when
such documents are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are
central to the plaintiff's claim. See Werner v. Dept. of Homeland
Sec., 441 F. App'x 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2011); Scanlan v. Texas A&M
Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003); Collins v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Court notes that some of the documents attached as exhibits are
not referenced in the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and are not
necessary for this Court to decide the present motion. Nevertheless,
the Court will consider the parties’ exhibits, as they are public
records of which the Court may take judicial notice. See Frampton
v. City of Baton Rouge/Par. of E. Baton Rouge, No. 21-CV-362JWD-SDJ, 2022 WL 90238, at *6 n.67 (M.D. La. Jan. 7, 2022)
(taking judicial notice of Court document as matter of public record
in ruling on motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6)) (citing Fetty v. La. State Bd. of Priv. Sec. Exam'rs, CV No.
18-517-JWD-EWD, 2020 WL 448231, at *8 (M.D. La. Jan. 28,
2020); Duncan v. Heinrich, 591 B.R. 652, 655 n.2 (M.D. La. 2018)).
As such, the Court will not convert Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6)
motion into a motion for summary judgment.
Slaughter, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 520–21.
The Court later dismissed Plaintiff’s false arrest claim based on the independent
intermediary doctrine, stating:
“Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil
liability in their individual capacity to the extent that their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights.” Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020), cert
denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1058 [ ] (2021) (quoting Cass v.
City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016)). “It shields ‘all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.’ ” Id. (quoting Thompson v. Mercer, 762 F.3d 433, 437 (5th
Cir. 2014)).
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To rebut Defendant's qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff must
establish “(1) that [Defendant] violated a federal statutory or
constitutional right and (2) that the unlawfulness of the conduct was
‘clearly established at the time.’ ” Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 383
(5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 294 (5th Cir.
2019)). “[The Court] can analyze the prongs in either order or
resolve the case on a single prong.” Id. (quoting Garcia, 957 F.3d at
600).
The Fourth Amendment right to be free from false arrest is clearly
established. See Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 206 (5th
Cir. 2009) (“The Fourth Amendment right to be free from false
arrest—arrest without probable cause—was clearly established at
the time of [the plaintiffs’] arrests.” (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 111–12 [ ] (1975)); Thomas v. Kippermann, 846 F.2d
1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1988)). But “[w]here an arrest is made under
authority of a properly issued warrant, the arrest is simply not a false
arrest. Such an arrest is not unconstitutional, and a complaint based
on such an arrest is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim.” Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1005 [ ] (1983).
“It is well settled that if facts supporting an arrest are placed before
an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the
intermediary's decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest,
insulating” the arresting officer. Curtis v. Sowell, 761 Fed. Appx.
302, 304 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456
(5th Cir. 1994)), overruled on other grounds by Castellano v.
Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Fifth Circuit
precedents have applied this rule “even if the arrestee was never
convicted of a crime.” Curtis, 761 Fed. Appx. at 304 (citing Buehler
v. City of Austin/Austin Police Dep't, 824 F.3d 548, 554 (5th Cir.
2016)). The Fifth Circuit has recognized, however, that this shield
against liability is not absolute:
There is an exception to the independent
intermediary rule “if the plaintiff shows that ‘the
deliberations of that intermediary were in some way
tainted by the actions of the defendant.’ ” Deville v.
Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 170 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th
Cir. 1988)). “[B]ecause the intermediary's
deliberations protect even officers with malicious
intent,” Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555, “a plaintiff must
show that the [officer's] malicious motive led the
[officer] to withhold relevant information or
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otherwise misdirect the independent intermediary by
omission or commission. McLin [v. Ard], 866 F.3d
[682,] 689 [(5th Cir. 2017)]. When analyzing
allegations of taint at the motion to dismiss stage, “
‘mere allegations of ‘taint,’ ” Cuadra v. Hous. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010)
(quotation omitted), “may be adequate to survive a
motion to dismiss where the complaint alleges other
facts supporting the inference.” McLin, 866 F.3d at
690.
Curtis, 761 Fed. Appx. at 304–05.
Here, the Amended Complaint does not allege that Defendant
deceived or withheld material information from the state court judge
who found probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. See Curtis, 761 Fed.
Appx. at 305. Rather, the Amended Complaint alleges that
“Defendant caused Plaintiff to be falsely charged with a criminal
offense,” and ultimately arrested in March 2017, even though
“Defendant knew that the charges leveled against Plaintiff were
false.” (See Doc. 41 at 6.) Yet these allegations, even when viewed
in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all inferences in
his favor, fail to establish that the state court judge's probable cause
determination was tainted by the Defendant's actions. In sum, the
state court judge's independent finding of probable cause for the
arrest warrant broke the chain of causation for Plaintiff's false arrest
claim. Consequently, the false arrest claim cannot serve as the basis
for a Section 1983 action against Defendant. Moreover, because
Plaintiff failed to establish the violation of a federal right, Defendant
is entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff's false arrest claim
against Defendant will be dismissed.
Slaughter, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 526–27.
Also pertinent here, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1981 and Title VII claims on the
grounds of waiver:
Plaintiff's opposition failed to respond to Defendant's arguments
regarding dismissal of any false arrests claim arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1981, or Section 1983; dismissal
of employment discrimination claims under Sections 1981 or 1983;
dismissal of any Title VII claims; and dismissal of the defamation
claims, whether brought under state tort law or Section 1983, as
time-barred.
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”The Fifth Circuit makes it clear that when a party does not address
an issue in his brief to the district court, that failure constitutes a
waiver on appeal.” JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Commerce & Indus., 336
F. Supp. 3d 620, 634 (M.D. La. 2018) (deGravelles, J.)
(quoting Magee v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 261 F. Supp. 2d 738, 748
n.10 (S.D. Tex. 2003)); see also United States ex rel. Wuestenhoefer
v. Jefferson, 105 F. Supp. 3d 641, 672 (N.D. Miss. 2015) (“This
failure to develop the relevant argument effectively represents a
waiver of the point.” (citing United States v. Dominguez-Chavez,
300 F. App'x 312, 313 (5th Cir. 2008); El-Moussa v. Holder, 569
F.3d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 2009))); United States v. Reagan, 596 F.3d
251, 254 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the defendant's failure to
offer any “arguments or explanation . . . is a failure to brief and
constitutes waiver”); JTB Tools & Oilfield Servs., L.L.C. v. United
States, 831 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that, “[t]o avoid
waiver, a party must identify relevant legal standards and ‘any
relevant Fifth Circuit cases’ ” and holding that, because appellant
“fail[ed] to do either with regard to its underlying claims, . . . those
claims [were] inadequately briefed and therefore waived”).
“By analogy, failure to brief an argument in the district court waives
that argument in that court.” JMCB, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 634
(quoting Magee, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 748 n. 10); Kellam v. Servs., No.
12-352, 2013 WL 12093753, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2013)
(“Generally, the failure to respond to arguments constitutes
abandonment or waiver of the issue.” (citations omitted)), aff'd sub
nom., Kellam v. Metrocare Servs., 560 F. App'x 360 (5th Cir.
2014); Mayo v. Halliburton Co., No. 10-1951, 2010 WL 4366908,
at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2010) (granting motion to dismiss breach
of contract claim because plaintiff failed to respond to defendants’
motion to dismiss on this issue and thus waived the argument).
Consequently, because Plaintiff failed to meaningfully oppose
Defendant's motions on the above-referenced issues, the Court will
grant Defendant's motions on those claims on the grounds of
waiver. See JMCB, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 634 (finding that the
operative complaint could be dismissed because plaintiff failed to
respond to the substance of defendant's arguments); Apollo Energy,
LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 387 F. Supp. 3d
663, 672 (M.D. La. 2019) (deGravelles, J.) (finding that policy
exclusion could apply because plaintiff failed to oppose insurer's
argument on the issue); see also Wuestenhoefer, 105 F. Supp. 3d at
672 (finding that relator waived argument as to how certain writeoffs fell within a particular provision of the False Claims Act).
Slaughter, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 529–30.
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Finally, the Court noted how, even if there were no waiver, the false arrest and Title VII
claims would be subject to dismissal:
Even if Plaintiff had not waived his false arrest claim, the Court
finds Defendant's argument regarding the independent intermediary
doctrine persuasive. (See Doc. 44-2 at 5–6, 9.) According to the
arrest documents attached with Defendant's motion, the facts
supporting Plaintiff's arrest were placed before an independent
intermediary, i.e., the state court judge. (Doc. 44-3 at 1.)
Consequently, this state court judge's decision to issue the warrant
broke the chain of causation for false arrest, and Plaintiff has not
alleged any facts to defeat application of the independent
intermediary doctrine. See Anokwuru v. City of Hous., 990 F.3d 956,
963–64 (5th Cir. 2021). . . .
Even if Plaintiff had not waived his Title VII claim, the Court notes
that dismissal of this claim would still be warranted. The Fifth
Circuit has repeatedly rejected individual liability under Title
VII. See Baldwin v. Layton, 300 Fed.Appx. 321, 323 (5th Cir. 2008)
(citing Ackel v. Natl'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 382 n.1 (5th
Cir. 2003)) (“Individuals are not liable under Title VII in either their
individual or official capacities.”); Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d
434, 448 (5th Cir. 2002) (“This circuit has held that there is no
individual liability for employees under Title VII.”). Moreover,
under Title VII, a private plaintiff must exhaust his administrative
remedies by timely filing a charge with the EEOC and receiving a
right-to-sue notice before seeking relief from the Court. Taylor v.
Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2002); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Yet the Amended Complaint does not
reflect that a Charge of Discrimination was filed with the EEOC
before Plaintiff filed suit, as Defendant correctly notes in his original
memorandum. (See Doc. 44-2 at 10.)
Slaughter, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 530 nn.3-4.
II.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the Supreme Court explained:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only
“ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’ ”
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Id. at 93 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Interpreting Rule 8(a) and Twombly, the Fifth Circuit explained:
The complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter
(taken as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that
discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.
“Asking for [such] plausible grounds to infer [the element of a
claim] does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal [that the elements of the claim
existed].”
Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 545) (emphasis added by Lormand)).
Later, in In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC., 624 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2010), the
Fifth Circuit explained:
To avoid dismissal [under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)], “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 [ ] (2009) (quoting [Twombly, 550 U.S. 544]). To be
plausible, the complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 [ ]. In deciding whether the complaint states a valid claim
for relief, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. [Doe v.
MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)] (citing [Hughes
v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001)]). We do
not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual
inferences, or legal conclusions.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d
776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d
690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940 (“While
legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they must
be supported by factual allegations.”).
Id. at 210.
Analyzing the above case law, our brother in the Western District stated:
Therefore, while the court is not to give the “assumption of truth” to
conclusions, factual allegations remain so entitled. Once those
factual allegations are identified, drawing on the court's judicial
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experience and common sense, the analysis is whether those facts,
which need not be detailed or specific, allow “the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, Twombly, 555 U.S. at 556,
[ ]. This analysis is not substantively different from that set forth in
Lormand, supra, nor does this jurisprudence foreclose the option
that discovery must be undertaken in order to raise relevant
information to support an element of the claim. The standard, under
the specific language of Fed. Rule Civ. P. 8(a)(2), remains that the
defendant be given adequate notice of the claim and the grounds
upon which it is based. This standard is met by the “reasonable
inference” the court must make that, with or without discovery, the
facts set forth a plausible claim for relief under a particular theory
of law provided there is a “reasonable expectation” that “discovery
will reveal relevant evidence of each element of the claim.”
Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257; Twombly, 555 U.S. at 556 [ ].
Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Oceanografia, S.A. De C.V., No. 10-177, 2011 WL 938785, at *3 (W.D.
La. Feb. 9, 2011) (citation omitted).
Afterward, in Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2011),
the Fifth Circuit explained:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim for relief is plausible on its face when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. A claim for relief is implausible on its face when the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct.
Id. at 796 (cleaned up).
Finally, in Thompson v. City of Waco, Texas, the Fifth Circuit recently summarized the
Rule 12(b)(6) standard as thus:
We accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view all facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. We need not, however, accept
the plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. To survive dismissal, a
plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Our task, then, is to determine whether the plaintiff stated
a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the
plaintiff's likelihood of success.
764 F.3d at 502–503 (cleaned up).
III.
Discussion
A. Parties’ Arguments
1. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support (Doc. 59-1)
Defendant urges dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. (Doc. 59-1 at 20.) As
to the false arrest claim, Defendant asserts that the independent intermediary doctrine applies;
“[t]he attached affidavit of arrest establishes that Defendant was not directly involved in the
decision to arrest Plaintiff because [ ] all possible criminal issues related to Plaintiff were given to
an independent decisionmaker to investigate and determine next steps.” (Id. at 10.) A Special
Agent with the AG’s office conducted the investigation, and a state court judge found the
information sufficient to obtain an arrest warrant. (Id.) Thus, the chain of causation was broken.
(Id.) The Court previously held that the last complaint did “not allege that Defendant deceived or
withheld material information from the state court judge who found probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff,” and nothing has substantially changed since the last ruling. (Id. at 10–11 (quoting
Slaughter, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 527).)
Defendant then turns to the § 1983 official capacity claim for false arrest. (Id. at 11.) After
laying out the elements of this claim, Defendant explains how Plaintiff has not identified a policy
or custom at issue, nor is there an underlying constitutional violation. (Id. at 11–13.)
Defendant next moves to Title VII. (Id. at 13–14.) These claims should be dismissed (1)
as waived, (2) for failure to exhaust, and (3) because individual liability is not allowed. (Id. at 13–
14.)
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Finally, as to § 1981, Defendant contends that the claims should be dismissed (1) as
waived; (2) because a § 1981 claim for damages requires a claim under § 1983, and Plaintiff does
not assert such a claim; (3) there is no individual capacity claim against a government official, and,
in any event, Plaintiff has not overcome qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff has not shown that,
“but for his race,” he would not have suffered any administrative or criminal ramifications. (Id. at
14–17.) On this last point, allegations of discrimination fail because (a) Plaintiff’s claim that
Thibodeaux was of comparable rank and file are conclusory; (b) Thibodeaux engaged in different
conduct by using vacation time to work at the hospital; and (c) the SAC itself indicates that Plaintiff
was terminated because he was going to run against Defendant in the Sheriff’s race. (Id. at 17–19.)
There is also no official capacity claim under § 1981 because, inter alia, Plaintiff must show
moving-force causation, and he has failed to do so. (Id.)
2. Plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. 61)
Plaintiff begins his opposition by asserting that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
Defendant is barred from urging positions which this Court already rejected. (Doc. 61 at 1–2.)
Defendant has offered no new arguments to those previously advanced and denied by the Court.
(Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff next states that Defendant improperly relies on documents beyond the scope of
the SAC. (Id. at 3.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant relies on the AG’s report, but “the
uncorroborated allegations in the [AG’s] report should be discounted, no – ignored completely –
because Sheriff Torres pled the Fifth Amendment which choked the life out of the [AG’s]
investigation.” (Id.) Defendant himself signed most of the time sheets in the AG’s documents,
which shows a lack of due diligence, and the last two pages show that the AG’s office determined
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that “No further action is needed.” (Id. at 3–4.) Further, other exhibits show that the only reason
the AG did not pursue the claim because Defendant refused to testify. (Id. at 4–5.)
To prevail in his claim for qualified immunity, plaintiff meets his
burden because Torres’ actions were clearly and unambiguously
prohibited so much so that reasonable official would know his
actions violate the law. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
Again, the conduct complained about is the intentional act of
making false claims about timesheets he approved, reporting the
false allegations to the Attorney General, staging a public
“spectacle” arrest scene, then refusing to testify to give credibility
to the claims. Such actions are wanton, reckless and should strip
defendant from any all immunity.
(Id. at 5.) Plaintiff then points to other times in the exhibits where Defendant’s use of the Fifth
was “fatal to the State’s prosecution.” (Id. at 5–6.)
Plaintiff next highlights the fact that a party pleading the Fifth in a civil case can lead to
disqualification of his testimony or an adverse inference. (Id. at 6–8.) Plaintiff finally closes:
In conclusion, for the reasons set forth above, Adrian Slaughter
respectfully requests this Court deny Sheriff Torres’ second motion
to dismiss amended complaint because there is no one who is
prepared/qualified to back up the allegations. Torres invoked his 5th
amendment right of silence, leaving the unsupported claims and
scurrilous allegations hanging against plaintiff for the rest of
plaintiff’s life.
(Id. at 8.)
3. Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 65)
Defendant replies that issue preclusion does not apply. (Doc. 65 at 1.) Defendant is not
asserting arguments that this Court rejected, and, in fact, the Court previously granted its motion
almost in full. (Id. at 1–2.)
Next, Plaintiff essentially waived opposition to Defendant’s motion. Defendant submitted
a twenty-page brief specifically addressing “Section 1983 individual capacity false arrest claims;
Section 1983 official capacity false arrest claims; Title VII claims; and Section 1981 employment
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discrimination claim. Plaintiff fails to meaningfully address these arguments.” (Id. at 2.) Just as
the Court granted Defendant’s last motion in large part on the grounds of waiver, so too should
this motion be granted for that reason. (Id. at 2–3.)
Defendant then argues that Defendant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right has no
bearing at this stage. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant was under investigation and
caused the Attorney General to dismiss the charges “are not relevant to this Court’s determination
as to whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against Defendant for false arrest
under Section 1983 or for employment discrimination under Section 1981 or Title VII.” (Id. at 3–
4.) Plaintiff’s claim of false arrest remains fatally deficient, and he has not overcome qualified
immunity. (Id. at 4–5.) Plaintiff’s case law about adverse inferences is inapposite, and, in any
event, Defendant has not invoked his Fifth Amendment right in this case. (Id. at 5–6.)
Likewise, the fact that Defendant’s accusation about the time sheets cannot be corroborated
because of Defendant’s pleading the Fifth is irrelevant to the question of whether Plaintiff stated a
viable claim. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff’s premise is flawed. There is no evidence that others at the
Sheriff’s Office could not explain the reasons and basis for reporting
the alleged fraudulent payroll activities to the authorities. In
addition, the burden of proof at a criminal trial is not the same as the
burden of proof in this civil matter as to Plaintiff’s claims for false
arrest. Defendant’s invoking his Fifth Amendment right not to
testify at Plaintiff’s criminal trial has no bearing on Defendant’s
motion to dismiss.
(Id.) For all these reasons, Defendant states that his motion should be granted, and Plaintiff’s
claims should be dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 7.)
B. Law and Analysis
Having carefully considered the matter, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion in full.
The Court begins with two preliminary points.
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First, Plaintiff asserts that issue preclusion and the Court’s prior rejection of Defendant’s
arguments prevent the Court from dismissing Plaintiff’s claims at this stage. Putting aside the fact
that an interlocutory order like the Court’s prior ruling “may be revised at any time before the entry
of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b), here, Plaintiff completely misrepresents the substance of the Court’s prior ruling. Contrary
to Plaintiff’s position, and as demonstrated above, it was the Defendant who prevailed in the last
motion, almost completely. See Slaughter, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 531. Thus, on the question of issue
preclusion, Plaintiff is wrong as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.
Second, Plaintiff has failed to meaningfully oppose or respond to the substance of any of
Defendant’s arguments made in the instant motion. Rather, as reflected above, Plaintiff devotes
most of his briefing to the AG’s documents and Fifth Amendment, both of which are largely
irrelevant to the present motion. (See Doc. 61.) Accordingly, on this ground alone, Defendant’s
motion could be granted, and Plaintiff’s claims could be dismissed as waived. See Slaughter, 592
F. Supp. 3d at 529–30 (collecting authorities on waiver).
Even putting this aside, most of Plaintiff’s claims would be subject to dismissal on the
merits anyway. As to the false arrest claim made against Defendant in his individual capacity,
both parties submit in their exhibits the Warrant of Arrest and Affidavit of Arrest, (Doc. 59-2 at
1–3; Doc. 61-1 at 29–31), which this Court can consider, Slaughter, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 520–21,
and these documents show (a) that a Special Agent with AG’s office laid out the facts supporting
Plaintiff’s arrest to an independent intermediary, and (b) that a warrant was issued by that neutral
state court judge based on those facts. (See Doc. 59-2 at 1–3; Doc. 61-1 at 29–31.) Further:
There is an exception to the independent intermediary rule if the
plaintiff shows that the deliberations of that intermediary were in
some way tainted by the actions of the defendant. Because the
intermediary's deliberations protect even officers with malicious
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intent, a plaintiff must show that the officer's malicious motive led
the officer to withhold relevant information or otherwise misdirect
the independent intermediary by omission or commission.
Slaughter, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 527 (quoting Curtis, 761 F. App’x at 304–05 (cleaned up)). Here,
Plaintiff does not allege any non-conclusory facts, even on information and belief, from which the
inference can be made that the information presented by the AG’s Special Agent to the state court
judge was somehow tainted by any conduct of Defendant. (See SAC ¶¶ 45–63, Doc. 58.) 2 Without
more, this false arrest claim fails. See Slaughter, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 526–27, 529–30 n.3.
Likewise, any § 1983 claim made against Defendant in his official capacity must also be
dismissed. In short, any such claim falls without an underlying constitutional violation. See id. at
528 n.2 (collecting cases); see also Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 648–49 (5th Cir. 2013)
(finding that official capacity “claims fail without an underlying constitutional violation” (citing
Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because [plaintiff] has alleged no
constitutional injury attributable to the Officers, [plaintiff] has failed to state a claim that a City
policy was the moving force behind a violation of his constitutional rights.”))).
Similarly, even if Plaintiff had not waived his Title VII claim, that cause of action would
be subject to dismissal too. Again, Plaintiff (1) has no claim for individual liability under Title
VII, and (2) did not establish that he exhausted his administrative remedies. See Slaughter, 592 F.
Supp. 3d at 529–30 n.4.
Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim presents a closer call for a few reasons. First, the SAC is lacking
in proper comparators. In particular, Thibodeaux is the only comparator specifically named in the
SAC, though the allegation that Thibodeaux “is situated similarly to Plaintiff in rank and file” is
In fact, Plaintiff’s exhibits show that other officers interviewed by the AG’s office investigators also raised issues
about Plaintiff potentially committing payroll fraud, (see Doc. 61-1 at 16–21), and the Affidavit of Arrest included an
accounting of “the times when Slaughter collected wages from the Sheriff’s Office while working at the hospital,” (id.
at 30).
2
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somewhat conclusory. (SAC ¶ 30, Doc. 58.) In any event, Thibodeaux is alleged to have used his
vacation time to work at the hospital. (Id.) But Plaintiff was criminally accused of not using his
leave time to work at the hospital during the work day. (See Doc. 59-2 at 2–3.) While comparator
analysis is typically more appropriate for the summary judgment stage than the motion to dismiss
stage, see Mitchell v. Darling Ingredients, Inc., No. 20-889, 2022 WL 458397, at *7–8 (M.D. La.
Feb. 4, 2022) (deGravelles, J.) (collecting authorities), “a plaintiff must still allege sufficient facts
to ‘nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,’ ” Papa v. Cap. One Nat'l
Ass'n, No. 21-1589, 2022 WL 906402, at *2 (W.D. La. Mar. 28, 2022) (quoting Cicalese v. Univ.
of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2019)). Here the SAC is glaringly deficient in
this area. That is to say, on the face of the SAC, when stripped of its conclusions, and by Plaintiff’s
own admission, the two do not appear to be similarly situated.
Second, Plaintiff “must initially plead . . . that, but for race, [he] would not have suffered
the loss of a legally protected right,” and the Court doubts whether the SAC “contains sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face under the butfor causation standard.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009,
1019 (2020) (cleaned up). Reading the SAC as a whole, Plaintiff was terminated, not but-for race,
but rather because Defendant learned Plaintiff wanted to run against him in the Sheriff’s race. (See
SAC ¶¶ 15–18. Doc. 58.) 3 While this conduct is petty, underhanded, and deplorable, it is not
necessarily protected by § 1981.
3
Again, Plaintiff specifically alleges:
In early March 2017, Defendant became aware of Plaintiff’s interest in running
for Sheriff of Pointe Coupee Parish as a challenger to Defendant. . . . Defendant
has run with no opposition for the past two terms of his service. [ ] Shortly after
learning of Plaintiff’s interest in running for Sheriff, Defendant called Plaintiff
into his office and accused Plaintiff of filing false work time records.
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Nevertheless, the Court need not resolve this question. Given the fact that Plaintiff
completely failed to mention his § 1981 claim in his opposition, much less respond to Defendant’s
arguments about the claim, (see Doc. 61), the Court deems it waived under the above precedent.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim is also dismissed. See Slaughter, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 529–30
(citing, inter alia, JTB Tools & Oilfield Servs., 831 F.3d at 601 (stating that, “to avoid waiver, a
party must identify relevant legal standards and any relevant Fifth Circuit cases” and holding that,
because appellant “fail[ed] to do either with regard to its underlying claims, . . . those claims [were]
inadequately briefed and therefore waived” (cleaned up)).
For all these reasons, Defendant’s motion will be granted in full. Each of Plaintiff’s claims
will be dismissed.
C. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff does not seek in the alternative another opportunity to amend. Should he do so,
the Court will deny such request.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) “requires a trial court to grant leave to amend freely,
and the language of this rule evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.” Jones v. Robinson
Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). However, “[l]eave to amend is
in no way automatic, but the district court must possess a ‘substantial reason’ to deny a party's
request for leave to amend.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d
368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones, 427 F.3d at 994 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). The Fifth Circuit further described the district courts' discretion on a motion to amend
as follows:
The district court is entrusted with the discretion to grant or deny a
motion to amend and may consider a variety of factors including
(SAC ¶¶ 15–18, Doc. 58 (emphasis added).) Similarly, Defendant allegedly called a press conference and alerted local
media in advance of Plaintiff’s arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 54–55.)
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“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . ., and futility of
the amendment.” [Jones, 427 F.3d at 994] (citation omitted). “In
light of the presumption in favor of allowing pleading amendments,
courts of appeals routinely hold that a district court's failure to
provide an adequate explanation to support its denial of leave to
amend justifies reversal.” Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. and Indent.
Co., 376 F.3d 420, 426 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). However,
when the justification for the denial is “readily apparent,” a failure
to explain “is unfortunate but not fatal to affirmance if the record
reflects ample and obvious grounds for denying leave to
amend.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
In addition, the Fifth Circuit has made clear that “[d]enying a motion to amend is not an
abuse of discretion if allowing an amendment would be futile.” Id. (citing Briggs v. Miss., 331
F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003)). An amendment would be deemed futile “if it would fail to survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Id. (citing Briggs, 331 F.3d at 508).
Having carefully considered the matter, the Court will not allow Plaintiff another
opportunity to amend the operative complaint. First, as stated above, “repeated failures to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed” is a factor to consider when granting or denying
leave to amend, as is undue delay. Id. (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff had the benefit of the
Court's ruling on Defendant’s original motion to dismiss, yet Plaintiff failed to cure the deficiencies
of the last complaint. Second, even putting this aside, further amendment would be futile; Plaintiff
has shown, through his failure to properly amend, that he simply lacks viable claims and has no
further allegations to make. Consequently, Plaintiff will be denied any leave to amend, and his
claims will be dismissed with prejudice. See Apollo Energy, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London, 387 F. Supp. 3d 663, 679 (M.D. La. 2019) (deGravelles, J.) (denying leave to
amend when plaintiff should have had notice of issue from court's ruling on original motion to
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dismiss, and when further amendment would be futile); Skinner v. Ard, 519 F. Supp. 3d 301, 321–
22 (M.D. La. 2021) (deGravelles, J.) (same).
IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 59) filed
by defendant, Beauregard Torres, III, is GRANTED, and all claims by Plaintiff against Defendant
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 14, 2023.
S
JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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