Jackson v. Pierre et al

Filing 105

RULING granting 36 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; 38 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; 44 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; 20 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; 22 Motion to D ismiss for Failure to State a Claim; and 24 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. All of Jackson's federal claims against Defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Jackson's state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 9/27/2019. (EDC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DOROTHY JACKSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

18-603-SDD-RLB

JOHN PIERRE, RAY L. BELTON, ANN A.
SMITH, PATRICK D. MAGEE, CURMAN L. GAINS,
DONALD R. HENRY, LEON R. TARVER, II,
JOHN L. BARTHELEMY, LEROY DAVIS,
DOMOINE RUTHLEDGE, ARMOND DUNCAN,
RANI WHITFIELD, ALFREDA DIAMOND, VIRGINIA
LISTACH, WINSTON DECUIR, JR., AND THE BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS FOR THE SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY
AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE
RULING
This case arises out of the termination of Plaintiff Dorothy Jackson (“Jackson”)
from her position as a tenured professor at the Southern University Law Center. The
matter is before the Court on the following motions:
1) the Motion to Dismiss1 filed by the Board of Supervisors of Southern University
and Agricultural and Mechanical College (“the Board”) and Board members
Domoine Rutledge, Leon R. Tarver, II, Curman L. Gains, Leroy Davis, Donald
R. Henry, John L. Barthelemy, Armond Duncan, Rani Whitfield, and Ann A.
Smith (collectively, “the Board Members”);
2) the Motion to Dismiss2 filed by Defendant, Dr. Ray L. Belton (“Belton”), the
President-Chancellor of Southern University and A&M College;

1

Rec. Doc. No. 20. Plaintiff Dorothy Jackson filed an Opposition at Rec. Doc. No. 57.
Rec. Doc. No. 22. Jackson filed an Opposition at Rec. Doc. No. 56, to which Belton filed a Reply at Rec.
Doc. No. 76.

2

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3) the Motion to Dismiss3 filed by Chancellor John Pierre (“Pierre”);
4) the 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss4 filed by Alfreda Diamond (“Diamond”) and
Virginia Listach (“Listach”);
5) the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim5 filed by Winston DeCuir, Jr.
(“DeCuir”); and
6) the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)6 filed by Patrick D.
Magee (“Magee”).
For the reasons that follow, all of Defendants’ Motions shall be GRANTED.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Until the termination that gave rise to this action, Jackson was a tenured professor

at the Southern University Law Center (“SULC”) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.7 Part of
Jackson’s role at SULC was to serve as “a managing/supervising attorney at the Southern
Elder Law Clinic.”8 After SULC received a grant to provide legal services to the elderly in
the community, Jackson began providing “elderly workshops” in the Baton Rouge area,
“designed to educate the elderly about options in handling their affairs.”9 Jackson alleges
that one such workshop took place on June 29, 2016, at a Council on Aging site on Florida
Boulevard in Baton Rouge. That day, Jackson met Helen Plummer (“Plummer”), who,

3

Rec. Doc. No. 36. Jackson filed an Opposition at Rec. Doc. No. 58, to which Pierre filed a Reply at Rec.
Doc. No. 80.
4
Rec. Doc. No. 37. Jackson filed an Opposition at Rec. Doc. No. 77, to which Diamond and Listach filed a
Reply at Rec. Doc. No. 81.
5
Rec. Doc. No. 38. Jackson filed an Opposition at Rec. Doc. No. 79, to which DeCuir filed a Reply at Rec.
Doc. No. 91.
6
Rec. Doc. No. 44. Jackson did not file an opposition to this motion as required by Local Rule 7(f). However,
the motion will be granted on the merits for the reasons given herein.
7
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 6.
8
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 8.
9
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 8.

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about a week later, had Jackson prepare her will and “indicated that she wanted Professor
Jackson to act as attorney for her succession.”10 Jackson complied, designating herself
as the attorney for the succession. After Plummer died on March 2, 2017, Plummer’s
granddaughter, who was not named in the will, withdrew more than $300,000 from
Plummer’s bank account without authorization. In coordination with the executrix of
Plummer’s estate, Jackson filed a restraining order and injunction to recover those
assets.11 Jackson alleges that “as a result of the Injunction Petition,” someone – possibly
Plummer’s disinherited granddaughter – “filed a number of complaints against Professor
Jackson, including a complaint with the Southern University Law Center”12 which “alleged
that Professor Jackson unduly influenced Ms. Plummer in connection with the drafting
and/or execution of her will.”13
Jackson claims that once the complaints against her began receiving media
attention, Defendants “conspired and entered into an agreement to cause the unlawful
termination and loss of [her] tenured professorship.”14 Chancellor Pierre sent Jackson a
letter on April 20, 2017, informing her that she was being placed on paid administrative
leave of absence while a confidential matter was investigated.15 On August 14, 2017,
Chancellor Pierre sent Jackson another letter, stating that “[b]ased on allegations made
by the family members of Helen Plummer, the Southern University Law Center has the
following charges against . . . Professor Dorothy Jackson: (1) she engaged in conduct

10

Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 10.
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 11.
12
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 12.
13
Id.
14
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 13.
15
Rec. doc. No. 1, p. 13.
11

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seriously prejudicial to the Southern University Law Center and the Southern University
System; (2) she engaged in unethical and/or immoral behavior; (3) she failed to perform
duties in a professional manner.”16 A hearing before the investigatory committee was set
for November 17, 2017.17 After the hearing, the committee allegedly recommended a “one
year suspension without pay, revocation of tenure, and a demotion.”18 But, Jackson
alleges, Chancellor Pierre “overruled the investigatory committee [and] recommended
termination.”19 Jackson appealed the termination to the Personnel Committee of
Southern’s Board. Her appeal was denied.20
Jackson filed this lawsuit on June 5, 2018, bringing the following claims against
Defendants: (1) violation of due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) conspiracy to
violate Jackson’s right to due process, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986; (3)
intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law; (4) violation of state law due
process pursuant to the Louisiana Constitution; (5) abuse of rights; and (6) state law
conspiracy. Jackson prays for reinstatement of her tenured professorship, declaratory
and injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.21
Defendants urge these motions to dismiss, arguing that all of the claims against
them should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because Jackson has failed to state
a claim. Jackson disagrees, arguing that her Complaint clearly states a claim that her
constitutional rights were violated. The arguments advanced by Defendants in their

16

Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 17.
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 22.
18
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 25.
19
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 25.
20
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 32.
21
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 47.
17

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respective motions overlap entirely and are substantively similar, if not identical. The
Court will address the arguments in turn.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Jackson’s Federal Claims
1. Individual Capacity Claims
In her Complaint, Jackson specifies that all of the so-called “Individual Defendants”

– namely, John Pierre, Ray L. Belton, Ann A. Smith, Patrick D. Magee, Curman L. Gains,
Donald R. Henry, Leon R. Tarver, II, John L. Barthelemy, Leroy Davis, Domoine Rutledge,
Armond Duncan, Rani Whitfield, Alfreda Diamond, Virginia Listach, and Winston DeCuir,
Jr. – are sued in their individual capacities.22 Though the Individual Defendants have filed
separate Motions to Dismiss, either individually or in small groups, all of those motions
advance the argument that Jackson has failed to state a claim with respect to her 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The Court will address Jackson’s § 1983 claims in turn.
a. Procedural Due Process – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Defendants contend that all of Jackson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims should be
dismissed because she “has failed to plead any deprivation of her constitutional rights.”23
With respect to procedural due process specifically, Defendants maintain that Jackson
“was provided with more than adequate protections of notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to her termination.”24 On the contrary, argues Jackson, her Complaint “clearly
establishes a violation”25 of her right to due process.

22

Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 1. The only exception to individual capacity is the Board itself, which is made
defendant in its official capacity (See infra, p. 20).
23
Rec. Doc. No. 35, p. 7.
24
Rec. Doc. No. 35, p. 9.
25
Rec. Doc. No. 57, p. 9.

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Jackson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim hinges on her allegation that Defendants
engaged in “the taking of her property without due process of law.”26 Indeed, the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “No State shall . .
. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”27 It is well
settled that “due process” is not a fixed concept; instead, it is “flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”28 A court’s inquiry into what
process is due in a given situation requires an analysis of the “interests at stake in a given
case.”29
Thus, to know whether Jackson has plausibly alleged a violation of her
constitutional right to procedural due process, this Court is bound to assess the interests
at stake in Jackson’s case and determine what process, exactly, she was due. The Fifth
Circuit has examined the issue of procedural due process protections in the context of
employment actions involving tenured public university professors and concluded that a
professor is entitled to:
(1) be advised of the cause for his termination in sufficient detail so as to
enable him to show any error that may exist; (2) be advised of the names
and the nature of the testimony of the witnesses against him; (3) a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in his own defense within a reasonable
time; and (4) a hearing before a tribunal that possesses some academic
expertise and an apparent impartiality toward the charges.30
In this case, Jackson’s own allegations demonstrate that some process was, in fact,
provided to her. The question before the Court is whether Jackson has stated a plausible

26

Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 33.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
28
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
29
Babin v. Breaux, 587 Fed. Appx. 105, 110 (5th Cir. 2014)(citing Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 33435 (1976)).
30
Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985).
27

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claim that the process she received did not comport with constitutional standards due
process.
As to the first two prongs of procedural due process in the tenured professor
context, requiring that Jackson be advised of the cause of her termination in “sufficient
detail” and be apprised of the names and nature of the testimony of any witnesses against
her, her Complaint contains allegations that she was provided with the following:


“a letter from Defendant Pierre . . . indicating that she had been placed on paid
administrative leave of absence while a confidential matter was investigated . . .
the investigation would be concluded by August 15, 2017”;31



“a copy of a 21 page excerpt from the Report”32 that resulted from the investigation;



a meeting with Chancellor Pierre “to discuss the investigation”;33



a letter from Chancellor Pierre stating that, “[b]ased on allegations made by the
family members of Helen Plummer, the Southern University Law Center has the
following charges against . . . Professor Dorothy Jackson: (1) she engaged in
conduct seriously prejudicial to the Southern University Law Center and the
Southern University System; (2) she engaged in unethical and/or immoral
behavior; (3) she failed to perform duties in a professional manner.”34



A copy of the full report from SULC’s investigation, after the 19th Judicial District
Court allegedly ordered that it be disclosed to Jackson in August 2017;35



A memorandum from the investigatory committee dated September 19, 2017

31

Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 13, ¶ 38.
Id. at p. 16, ¶ 49.
33
Id. at ¶ 50.
34
Id. at p. 17, ¶ 55.
35
Id. at p. 19, ¶ 58-60.
32

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“which addressed the charges levied against Professor Jackson”;36


A teleconference with Board Attorney Winston DeCuir before Jackson’s hearing in
which DeCuir “purportedly provided Professor Jackson with specifics as to the
charges.”37
Jackson contends that these communications were insufficient to provide due

process for several reasons. First, she alleges that the above-listed communications
“were not meaningful, but rather were just a sham.”38 In fact, she alleges, the
communications were deliberately vague because “part of the conspiracy was to mislead
her as to what she was actually alleged as having done wrong.”39 When Jackson found
the provided notice insufficient, she allegedly made “numerous requests for a copy of ‘the
allegations made by the family members of Helen Plummer’”40 and “numerous requests
for more specific charges,”41 but SULC refused to honor them. Jackson also alleges that
at the November 17, 2017 termination hearing, “accusations of violations of computer
input policies and outside employment policies were presented into evidence, even
though these accusations were never made to Professor Jackson at prior discussions
with Defendant Pierre, or put in the charges against her.”42
For their part, Defendants contend that the notice provided to Jackson was more
than sufficient under relevant Fifth Circuit precedent. Specifically, Defendants cite

36

Id. at p. 20, ¶ 64.
Id. at p. 22, ¶ 72.
38
Rec. Doc. No. 58, p. 6.
39
Rec. Doc. No. 58, p. 7.
40
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 18.
41
Id.
42
Rec. Doc. No. 58, p. 7.
37

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Pastorek v. Trail,43 wherein the Fifth Circuit considered whether the Louisiana State
University Medical School violated the procedural due process rights of a tenured
professor when it terminated him. The plaintiff, a tenured professor and obstetriciangynecologist, argued that, although the Medical School had provided him with notice, it
did not “give him notice of the ‘actual reasons’ for his termination.”44 Therefore, he said,
“he did not have an opportunity to respond to ‘the reasons which actually motivated [the
Board]’ to terminate him.”45 The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument, reasoning:
Prior to terminating appellant, [the chancellor] sent a letter informing him of
the decision to institute termination proceedings. The letter informed
appellant of the charges and requested a written response. These facts are
not disputed. This procedure gave appellant notice of the charges and an
opportunity to tell “his side of the story.” Therefore, Appellant received the
notice and opportunity to be heard that due process requires.46
The Fifth Circuit found a single letter to be sufficient notice in Pastorek, even over the
plaintiff’s contention that the letter did not reflect the “actual charges” against him. If a
single letter is sufficient notice of termination proceedings to a tenured professor, then,
arguing a fortiori, the seven different forms of notice that Jackson alleges she received
over a period of months are also sufficient.
Additionally, the Court takes note of another Fifth Circuit case, Wells v. Dallas
Independent School District.47 There, considering the sufficiency of notice of termination
provided to an assistant superintendent of schools, the Fifth Circuit specifically held that
two provisions of the provided notice were acceptably specific “allegations of misdeeds

43

248 F.3d 1140 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at *4.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
793 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1986).
44

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in specific circumstances [that allowed the plaintiff] to prepare his defense.”48 Those
provisions read as follows:
At the hearing the Administration will present evidence with regard to the
following matters and charges forming the basis of your termination . . .
2.
Insubordination and disobedience in participating in the execution of
a management contract with the Foundation for Quality Education in direct
opposition and defiance of orders of the General Superintendent.
3.
Negligence and mismanagement by you in your agreement to terms
and conditions and execution of documents related to a pledge of retainage
by Maxwell Construction Company to the Merchant’s State Bank.49
These provisions are highly analogous to the written notice that was provided to
Professor Jackson in this case. By her own allegation, the notice that Jackson received
indicated that the allegations against her were “[b]ased on allegations made by the family
members of Helen Plummer,”50 which, like the Fifth Circuit-approved provisions above,
provided a general context or point of reference for the alleged misconduct. Jackson’s
notice also stated that she was charged with failure to perform duties in a professional
manner, unethical and/or immoral behavior, and conduct seriously prejudicial to the
Southern University Law Center.51 Those charges are no more or less specific than the
charges of negligence, mismanagement, insubordination, and disobedience that the Fifth
Circuit found sufficient in Wells.
In light of the above-reviewed Fifth Circuit precedent addressing what constitutes
“sufficient detail” in the context of the charges before terminating tenured professors, the
Court concludes that Professor Jackson has failed to state a plausible claim that the first

48

Id. at 683.
Id. at 682.
50
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 17
51
Id.
49

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two prongs of the relevant procedural due process analysis were not met by Defendants.
Although she does allege that certain charges were levied against her at the hearing that
had not been included in the notice, Jackson does not allege that those charges fell
outside the scope of what the notice did say – namely, that she would have a hearing to
address her conduct in connection with the Helen Plummer succession.
Jackson was given two opportunities to be heard on the charges against her: first,
at a November 2017 hearing before a faculty investigative committee, and then at her
appeal to the Board in January 2018.52 It is well-settled that “[t]he core requirement of
procedural due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”53 Specifically, the procedural due process requirements for tenured
professors enumerated by the Fifth Circuit include “. . . (3) a meaningful opportunity to be
heard in [her] own defense within a reasonable time; and (4) a hearing before a tribunal
that possesses some academic expertise and an apparent impartiality toward the
charges.”54
Despite receiving two hearings, Jackson alleges that her opportunity to be heard
was not meaningful because Defendants presented charges against her at the November
2017 hearing relating to outside employment and computer use policies that were not
previously mentioned in the written notice or in any other form of pre-hearing
communication. Yet, Jackson also alleges that, at the hearing, she:
proved through testimony that (1) no law professor was aware of any
outside employment policy; (2) no law professor had ever sought
permission to perform outside employment per the purported policy; and (3)
52

Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 71-74, 115-124.
Houston Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1175 (S.D.
Tex. 2017)(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).
54
Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985).
53

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Professor Jackson did not have privileges to input information into the Law
Clinic Computer System as claimed by Defendants.55
In other words, accepting Jackson’s allegations as true, she was able to present
testimony at the hearing in order to rebut the charges against her related to the alleged
violations of the University’s outside employment and computer use policies. Therefore,
Jackson does not state a claim that she lacked a “meaningful” opportunity to be heard,
because her own allegations demonstrate that she was, in fact, heard, and, in her own
estimation, “proved” what she set out to prove. It is somewhat puzzling for Jackson to
argue that she was unable to meaningfully respond to the charges against her due to
some perceived deficiency in the notice that she received, while simultaneously pleading
that she presented testimony that effectively rebutted those charges.
Related to her entitlement to an impartial panel with some academic expertise,
Jackson makes several allegations concerning the makeup of the faculty committee that
oversaw her termination proceedings. Specifically, Jackson alleges that the investigatory
committee was biased because Defendant DeCuir “impermissibly served as prosecutor
of the charges brought against [her] while at the same time acting as legal advisor to
Defendant, the Board, and the faculty committee.”56 However, the Fifth Circuit has held
that such a claim requires an allegation of “actual bias,”57 not merely an implied structural
conflict of interest that arises because the members of the committee are employed by
the university, and those employees serve on the committee that oversees the plaintiff’s
termination. To demonstrate impartiality, “[t]he record must support actual partiality of the

55

Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 24, ¶ 82.
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 34.
57
Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985)
56

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body or its individual members.”58 Here, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court
considers not the content of the record but the allegations in the Complaint. Jackson has
failed to plead any facts that could support a finding that DeCuir was biased against her,
by virtue of his role as counsel for SULC or for any other reason.
Further, with respect to the Fifth Circuit’s instruction that the panel members must
have “some academic expertise,” Jackson avers that “a majority of the members of the
faculty committee that sat in judgment of [her] had little or no legal experience dealing
with Wills and Successions. . .”59 In Jones v. Louisiana Bd. of Sup'rs of Univ. of Louisiana
Sys.,60 the Fifth Circuit held that a tenured economics professor’s due process right to a
panel with “some academic expertise” was satisfied when the panel in question was “a
committee comprising seven faculty members, including one faculty member from the
College of Business.”61 Jackson’s allegations on the composition of the panel are
relatively bare bones and conclusory; she does not plead facts that set forth the
composition of the committee that presided over the November 2017 investigatory
hearing in detail. At several places in her Complaint, Jackson does indicate that the
committee had seven members.62 Defendants Alfreda Diamond and Virginia Listach are
both alleged to have participated in the investigation;63 reading between the lines and
assuming that they were on the investigatory committee, the Court notes that both
Diamond and Listach were both law professors at SULC and, as such, surely comport

58

541 F.2d at 1079.
Rec. Doc. 1, p. 34.
60
809 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2015).
61
Id. at 235.
62
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 34.
63
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 14, ¶ 42.
59

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with the “some academic expertise” standard articulated by the Fifth Circuit. In fact,
Jackson herself describes Listach as her “supervisor.”64 Even if Diamond and Listach
were the only two law professors on the panel, a committee where two out of seven
members are law professors with legal expertise exceeds the one out of seven standard
that the Fifth Circuit upheld in Jones, as discussed above.
Paragraphs 83 through 124 of Jackson’s Complaint contain allegations that, in the
process of terminating her, Defendants violated various policies of the University and the
Law Center.65 The Fifth Circuit has firmly rejected the notion that a university’s violations
of its own procedural rules give rise to a constitutional due process violation. In Levitt, the
Fifth Circuit held that
There is not a violation of due process every time a university or other
government entity violates its own rules. Such action may constitute a
breach of contract or a violation of state law, but unless the conduct
trespasses on federal constitutional safeguards, there is no constitutional
deprivation.66
Jackson cannot assert a due process violation based on violations of internal SULC
policies where she fails to state a claim that the process she received was constitutionally
deficient. Overall, for the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Jackson has failed to
state a plausible claim that she suffered a procedural due process violation at the hands
of the Defendants.

64

Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 8.
Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 83 – 124.
66
Levitt at 1230.
65

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b. Substantive Due Process – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The substantive component of due process bars certain arbitrary government
actions, “even if their implementation is fair.”67 “In the case of the specific acts of
Defendants, ‘only the most egregious official conduct’ is arbitrary in the constitutional
sense.”68 “A public employer's decision to terminate a tenured employee's property
interest in continued employment is arbitrary or capricious if the decision ‘so lacked a
basis in fact’ that it may be said to have been made ‘without professional judgment.’”69
The terminated employee “must show that the decision was ‘made without a rational
connection between the known facts and the decision or between the found facts and the
evidence.’”70 Overall, “[t]he federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review
the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies . . . The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or illadvised personnel decisions.”71
Defendants argue that Jackson has failed to allege a substantive due process
violation in connection with her suspension and termination, noting the “absence of any
allegation that there was no factual basis to conclude the charges against Jackson were
meritorious.”72 In fact, Defendants argue, “[a]ccepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, she
herself has supplied numerous justifications in her Complaint for her suspension and

67

Id. (quoting Dismukes v. Hackathorn, 802 F.Supp. 1442, 1447 (N.D.Miss.1992) (citations omitted)).
Hess, 149 F.Supp.3d at 1043 (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46, 118 S.Ct.
1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)).
69
Mills v. Garcia, 650 F. App'x 873, 878 (5th Cir. 2016)(citing Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 819 (5th Cir.
1998)).
70
Id. (citing Lewis v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 665 F.3d 625, 631 (5th Cir. 2011)).
71
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976).
72
Rec. Doc. No. 22-1, p. 11.
68

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termination,”73 including “the fact that she designated herself succession attorney and
obtained Plummer as a private client through the Law Clinic;” the fact that Plummer’s
family lodged a complaint against her, accusing her of undue influence; and the fact that
the Plummer controversy “brought significant and negative media attention to herself, the
Law Center, and Law Clinic.”74
Jackson rejects Defendants’ contention that she has failed to state a substantive
due process claim, suggesting that their argument fails to take into account that this action
involves a “conspiracy to terminate a tenured professorship and ruin the plaintiff’s
professional and personal lives.”75 She devotes multiple pages of briefing to the argument
that she had a property interest in her continuing employment and that she was entitled
to due process with respect to her suspension and termination. As far as the Court can
discern, none of the parties dispute that due process applies to Jackson’s claims. What
Jackson fails to do is to plausibly allege that her suspension and termination “so lacked
a basis in fact” that it was arguably carried out “without professional judgment.”76 On the
contrary, as Defendants argue, her Complaint is rife with allegations that, accepted as
true as is required at the motion to dismiss stage, supply ample factual basis for the
actions of Defendants. Accordingly, the Court finds that Jackson has failed to state a claim
that her substantive due process rights were violated, and her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
shall be dismissed with prejudice. The Court finds that dismissal with prejudice is
warranted because granting leave to amend the complaint would be futile and

73

Rec. Doc. No. 35, p. 11.
Id. at p. 12.
75
Rec. Doc. No. 56, p. 4.
76
Mills v. Garcia, 650 F. App'x 873, 878 (5th Cir. 2016)(citing Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 819 (5th Cir.
1998)).
74

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inappropriate under the circumstances. This is not a case of the absence or deficiency of
allegations which an opportunity to amend might cure. To the contrary, Jackson’s own
allegations formed the basis for the Court’s conclusion that she received constitutionally
sufficient process in the course of her suspension and termination. Amending her
complaint to remove allegations would surely be in bad faith, and pleading more facts
would not change this Court’s conclusion that Jackson failed to state a plausible claim
that her constitutional rights were violated. Accordingly, her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims shall
be dismissed with prejudice.
c. Jackson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986 Claims
Jackson alleges that Defendants conspired against her to quiet the negative media
attention on SULC that arose out of the Helen Plummer controversy, and that this
conspiracy ultimately resulted in her termination. The conspiracy allegedly included filing
false or misleading reports to Southern about Jackson’s behavior in the Law Clinic,
withholding or providing partial and misleading information to Jackson about the charges
against her, and violating Southern’s own internal policies and procedures when
terminating her. Jackson alleges a conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and also
claims that Defendants are liable for failing to prevent said conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §
1986.
Congress passed what is now known as 42 U.S.C §1985 as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.77 Its primary purpose was to “combat the prevalent animus against [African
Americans] and their supporters.”78 Section 1985(1) provides a remedy for a conspiracy

77
78

United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, at 837 (1983).
Id. at 836.

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by two or more persons to “interrupt, hinder, or impede . . . the discharge of [a United
States officer’s] official duties.”79 Section 1985(2) applies to a conspiracy by two or more
persons to obstruct justice in a federal court.80 Finally, § 1985(3)—which is applicable to
this case—provides a cause of action for a conspiracy by two or more persons to deprive
one of “equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws.”81 In order for a § 1985(3) claim to succeed, the plaintiff must prove the following
elements:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either
injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States.82
Defendants state correctly that “a federal conspiracy claim is not actionable without
an underlying § 1983 violation,”83 and assert that, because Jackson has not stated a claim
under § 1983, her conspiracy claim necessarily fails. The Court agrees. It is well-settled
that § 1985 claims cannot stand on their own; an underlying § 1983 claim is required.84
Because the Court, supra, dismissed Jackson’s § 1983 claims for failure to state a claim,
her § 1985 claim must also be dismissed.
Defendants further assert that, even if the § 1983 claim stands, the § 1985
conspiracy claim still fails because Jackson failed to allege any class-based or race-

79

42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Id.
81
42 U.S.C.A § 1985.
82
United, 463 U.S. at 828–29 (1983) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971)).
83
Id. at p. 15.
84
In the Fifth Circuit, see, e.g., Pastorek v. Trail, 248 F.3d 1140 (5th Cir. 2001)(“A section 1983 plaintiff
may assert conspiracy claims, but such a claim is not actionable without an underlying violation of section
1983.”)(referencing Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1187 (5th Cir.1990)).
80

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based discriminatory animus.85 Jackson argues that the cases cited by Defendants are
not persuasive because they do not explain the animus requirement, nor do they discuss
“other bases on which a § 1985 conspiracy claim can be stated.”86 However, Jackson
herself cites United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610 v. Scott, where the
United States Supreme Court set forth that a § 1985 claim for depriving a person of their
“equal protection” or “equal privileges and immunities”87 must also show “some racial, or
perhaps

otherwise

class-based,

invidiously

discriminatory

animus

behind

the

conspirators’ action.”88 Thus, even if Jackson had successfully stated a claim under §
1983, her § 1985 claim does not survive because she does not allege that the conspiracy
against her was motivated by race- or class-based animus.
Further, 42 U.S.C. § 1986 provides a remedy for harm caused by persons who
had knowledge of and power to prevent a § 1985 conspiracy but neglected or refused to
prevent it. The Fifth Circuit previously held that a § 1986 claim is “interrelated” and
“dependent” on a § 1985 claim that shares the same cause of action.89 Because
Jackson’s § 1985 claim fails, so too must her § 1986 claim.90 Like dominoes, Jackson’s
failure to state a claim under § 1983 is fatal to her § 1985 claim, which in turn undermines
her § 1986 claim. Accordingly, all of Jackson’s conspiracy claims under §1985 and § 1986
shall be dismissed with prejudice.91 Amendment would be futile in light of the Court’s

85

Rec. Doc. 35, p. 15.
Rec. Doc. 57, p. 18.
87
42 U.S.C.A. § 1985.
88
United, 463 U.S. at 834 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102).
89
Dowsey v. Wilkins, 467 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1972).
90
See Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1184 (8th Cir. 1981) (A cause of action under § 1986 is dependent
on a valid claim under § 1985).
91
The Court does not reach the issue of Defendants’ asserted defense of qualified immunity, because none
of the federal claims survive the motions to dismiss.
86

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dismissal of Jackson’s §1983 claims.
2. Official Capacity Claims
Jackson’s Complaint specifies that the named defendants are all sued in their
individual capacities.92 But, also made defendant is the Board of Supervisors for the
Southern University Agricultural and Mechanical College, with no clear specification made
as to capacity. The Board and the Board Members, in their Memorandum supporting their
Motion to Dismiss,93 argue that any official capacity claims for monetary damages against
the Board “must be dismissed because both the Board and Board Members enjoy
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”94 However, in her Opposition,
Jackson states that she “has not asserted any claims against the Board Members in their
official capacities.”95 Therefore, the issue is moot with respect to the Board Members.
Jackson clarifies that her claims against the Board itself, however, are official
capacity claims. Those claims are not barred by sovereign immunity, she argues,
because she seeks only prospective injunctive relief, which falls within the Ex Parte
Young exception to Eleventh Amendment Immunity.96 Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court has often “found federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when that suit
seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to ‘end a continuing violation of federal
law.’”97 That is precisely what Plaintiff claims to be seeking; she cites Nelson v. Univ. of
Tex. At Dallas98 for the proposition that “a request for reinstatement” fits squarely within
92

Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 1.
Rec. Doc. No. 35.
94
Rec. Doc. No. 35, p. 6.
95
Rec. Doc. No. 57, p. 7.
96
Rec. Doc. No. 57, p. 7.
97
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 73, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996)(citing
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S., at 68, 106 S.Ct., at 426).
98
535 F.3d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 2008).
93

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the Ex Parte Young exception. Overall, the Court finds that Jackson’s argument has merit
and that this Court has jurisdiction over her official-capacity claims against the Board –
not the individual Board Members. Nevertheless, Jackson’s official-capacity claims
against the Board will be dismissed with prejudice in light of the Court’s finding, supra,
that Jackson failed to state a plausible claim that she suffered a constitutional violation
redressable under § 1983.
B. State Law Claims
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) states that the district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under § 1367(a) if it “has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.” Generally, a federal court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims when all federal claims are disposed of
prior to trial.99 A federal court should consider and weigh in each case and at every stage
of the litigation the principles of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity in
order to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.100 Furthermore, in deciding
whether to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims, the Court considers
several factors, including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state
law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the
state and federal claims.101 When the balance of factors indicates that a case properly
belongs in state court, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.102

99

Carnegie–Mellon, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
Id.
101
City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).
102
Carnegie–Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966)(emphasis added).
100

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The Court has considered the factors presented above and finds that the state law
claims asserted in this matter properly belong in state court. The dismissal of all of
Jackson’s federal claims gives rise to the situation contemplated by 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3), where the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
when the claims over which it had original jurisdiction have been dismissed. Accordingly,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.

All state law claims asserted in this matter are hereby dismissed without

prejudice.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the following Motions shall be GRANTED:


the Motion to Dismiss103 filed by the Board of Supervisors of
Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (“the
Board”) and Board members Domoine Rutledge, Leon R. Tarver, II,
Curman L. Gains, Leroy Davis, Donald R. Henry, John L.
Barthelemy, Armond Duncan, Rani Whitfield, and Ann A. Smith
(collectively, “the Board Members”);



the Motion to Dismiss104 filed by Defendant, Dr. Ray L. Belton
(“Belton”), the President-Chancellor of Southern University and A&M
College;



the Motion to Dismiss105 filed by Chancellor John Pierre (“Pierre”);



the 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss106 filed by Alfreda Diamond
(“Diamond”) and Virginia Listach (“Listach”);



the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim107 filed by Winston
DeCuir, Jr. (“DeCuir”); and

103

Rec. Doc. No. 20.
Rec. Doc. No. 22.
105
Rec. Doc. No. 36.
106
Rec. Doc. No. 37.
107
Rec. Doc. No. 38.
104

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

the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)108 filed by
Patrick D. Magee (“Magee”).

All of Jackson’s federal claims against Defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Jackson’s state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on September 27, 2019.

S

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

108

Rec. Doc. No. 44.

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