Migliacio v. City of Plaquemine, Louisiana et al

Filing 16

ORDER denying 7 Motion to Limit Discovery to the Issue of Jimmie Randle's Qualified Immunity. Signed by Magistrate Judge Richard L. Bourgeois, Jr. on 1/18/2019. (LLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHELIA MIGLIACIO

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
NO. 18-621-SDD-RLB
CITY OF PLAQUEMINE, LOUISIANA,
ET AL.

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Jimmie Randle’s Motion to Limit Discovery to the Issue of
Jimmie Randle’s Qualified Immunity (R. Doc. 7) filed on August 23, 2018. The motion is
opposed. (R. Doc. 9). Mr. Randle has filed a Reply. (R. Doc. 14).
I.

Background
On May 11, 2018, Sheila Migliacio (“Plaintiff”) initiated this civil rights action in state

court, naming as defendants City of Plaquemine, Louisiana and Jimmie Randle, individually and
in his official capacity as Board of Selectman. (R. Doc. 1-5). Defendants removed the action on
June 11, 2018. (R. Doc. 1). Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint, which adds Atlantic
Specialty Insurance Company as an additional defendant. (R. Doc. 12).
On June 15, 2018, City of Plaquemine and Mr. Randle filed an Answer to the Complaint,
in which Mr. Randle alleged “that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit for any claims
asserted against him in his individual capacity.” (R. Doc. 2 at 4).
On August 23, 2018, Mr. Randle filed the instant motion, which seeks to limit discovery
to the issue of his defense of qualified immunity. (R. Doc. 7). In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that
discovery should not be limited to the issue of qualified immunity because Mr. Randle has not

sought any relief regarding his alleged defense in a dispositive motion. (R. Doc. 9). In reply, Mr.
Randle argues that the limitation of discovery to the issue of qualified immunity is appropriate
even in the absence of a dispositive motion. (R. Doc. 14).
II.

Law and Analysis
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to issue a protective

order after a showing of good cause “to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)’s
“good cause” requirement indicates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to
show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of
fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134
F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
“Trial courts possess broad discretion to supervise discovery.” Landry v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 436 n.114 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “A trial court
has broad discretion and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions that may
dispose of the case are determined.” Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1987).
“The qualified immunity defense affords government officials not just immunity from
liability, but immunity from suit.” Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996)
(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985)). Qualified immunity shields
government officials from individual liability for performing discretionary functions, unless their
conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

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“One of the most salient benefits of qualified immunity is protection from pretrial
discovery, which is costly, time-consuming, and intrusive[.]” Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645,
648 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit “has established a careful procedure under which a district court
may defer its qualified immunity ruling if further factual development is necessary to ascertain
the availability of that defense.” Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. Under this procedure, “a district court
must first find ‘that the plaintiff’s pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the
defense of qualified immunity.’” Id. (citing Wicks v. Miss. State Emp't Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 994–
95 (5th Cir. 1995); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, (2009) (directing that a plaintiff must
“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face”—excluding statements that are “no more
than conclusions” which are “not entitled to the assumption of truth”)). “Thus, a plaintiff
seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that
defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. “After the
district court finds a plaintiff has so pled, if the court remains ‘unable to rule on the immunity
defense without further clarification of the facts,’ it may issue a discovery order ‘narrowly
tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim.’” Id. (citing Lion
Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1987).
Here, Mr. Randle seeks a protective order limiting discovery to the issue of his qualified
immunity, conceding that certain “factual questions” must be addressed prior to a ruling on the
qualified immunity defense. (R. Doc. 14 at 3). He has not, however, filed a motion seeking
dismissal of any of Plaintiff’s claims based upon that defense or otherwise presented any
arguments addressing the merits of his qualified immunity defense in light of the parties’

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allegations. In the absence of briefing on the actual allegations in this action, the Court finds it
inappropriate to issue any order addressing the limits of discovery with respect to Mr. Randle’s
qualified immunity. Issuing such a ruling without the benefit of an actual dispositive motion
(and associated briefing) addressing the allegations in this action would, in effect, require the
district court to reach certain dispositive conclusions regarding the parties’ allegations without
the benefit of argument. While the Court has the power to review the pleadings in the absence of
a motion, it will not risk running afoul of the Fifth Circuit’s procedure for determining the scope
of discovery, if any, to be conducted with regard to a qualified immunity defense.
At least one district court has expressly denied a motion to stay discovery until after the
filing of a dispositive motion addressing the issue of qualified immunity. See Scherbarth v.
Woods, No. 16-2391, 2018 WL 851344, at *5-6 (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2018) (“If there is no pending
motion to resolve whether qualified immunity applies, the Plaintiff’s interest in proceeding
expeditiously and the convenience of the court outweigh the burden to Defendants. The court
therefore denies without prejudice Defendants’ motion to stay discovery based on their qualified
immunity defense. If Defendants file a dispositive motion raising qualified immunity, they may
renew their motion to stay discovery pending its resolution.”). While Mr. Randle does not seek a
stay of all discovery in this action, the Court finds it appropriate to reserve any resolution on the
scope of discovery with regard to Mr. Randle’s qualified immunity defense until after a review
of the pleadings in light of an appropriate dispositive motion (or motion for a Rule 7 reply).
Following this procedure will ensure that the Court properly tailors any discovery allowed
regarding Mr. Randle’s qualified immunity defense. The Court will entertain any motion
seeking to limit or stay discovery at that time.1

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The Court further notes that a stay of all discovery in this action with the exception of discovery directed
to Mr. Randle’s qualified immunity defense may not be appropriate. This is not an action in in which the

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III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Jimmie Randle’s Motion to Limit Discovery to the

Issue of Jimmie Randle’s Qualified Immunity (R. Doc. 7) is DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 18, 2019.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

plaintiff is solely seeking to recovery from Mr. Randle in his individual capacity. In addition, Plaintiff is
also seeking to recover from City of Plaquemine, which, as a municipality, is not entitled to qualified
immunity. Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810
F.2d 1363, 1371-72 (5th Cir. 1987).

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