Taylor v. Union Pacific Railroad Company

Filing 127

RULING denying 88 Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 7/28/2022. (EDC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOHNNY TAYLOR

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

18-1110-SDD-EWD

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, INC.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law1 filed by Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, Inc. (“Union Pacific”).
Plaintiff Johnny Taylor (“Taylor”) filed an Opposition.2 For the reasons that follow, the
Court finds that the Motion shall be DENIED.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 4, 2021, after a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of

Plaintiff Johnny Taylor, finding that Union Pacific terminated him in violation of the Federal
Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”).3 Union Pacific now renews the motion for judgment as a
matter of law that it originally made at trial, arguing that Taylor failed to establish that his
alleged protected activity was a contributing factor in his termination, as required by the
law, and that Union Pacific successfully demonstrated that it would have terminated
Taylor regardless of his alleged protected activity. Taylor counters that Union Pacific
misrepresents the relevant legal standards applicable to his claim and that the jury’s
findings were reasonable and well-supported by the evidence and the law. Having

1

Rec. Doc. No. 88.
Rec. Doc. No. 97.
3
Rec. Doc. No. 73.
2

reviewed the briefs and the evidence cited by the parties, the Court is not persuaded that
judgment as a matter of law is supported by the record.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
a. Judgment as a Matter of Law
The Court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only if it “finds that

a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party
on that issue.”4 Thus, “[a] motion for judgment as a matter of law ... in an action tried by
jury is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict.”5
“Motions for judgment as a matter of law should be granted only if ‘the facts and
inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court
believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict.’”6 “On the other hand,
if ‘there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality
and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment
might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied.’”7 For these motions,
the Court “consider[s] all of the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving
all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”8 Further,
as the Fifth Circuit has explained:
“We are wary of upsetting jury verdicts[.] ... It is not our charge to decide
which side has the more persuasive case. For, “it is the function of the jury
as the traditional finder of the facts, and not for the Court, to weigh

4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695, 699 (5th
Cir. 1995)).
6
College Network, Inc. v. Moore Educ. Publishers, Inc., 378 Fed. Appx. 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Brown v. Bryan Cty., 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000)).
7
College Network, 378 Fed. Appx. at 407 (quoting Brown, 219 F.3d at 456).
8
Brown, 219 F.3d at 456 (citing Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996)).
5

conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of
witnesses.”9
b. Analysis
Having carefully considered the matter, the Court finds that the instant Motion
should be denied. Union Pacific raises several arguments, none of which in the Court’s
view undermine the reasonableness of the jury’s verdict. It is useful at this juncture to set
forth the elements that Taylor was bound to prove at trial to succeed on his FRSA
retaliation claim. It was Taylor’s burden to demonstrate “by a preponderance of the
evidence that “(1) []he engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer knew that []he
engaged in the protected activity; (3) []he suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and
(4) the protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable action.”10 The parties
agree on the applicable standard up to that point, but Union Pacific’s first argument for
judgment as a matter of law calls for this Court to “follow the law of the Second, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits and . . . require Taylor to establish” an additional element or factor,
namely, that Union Pacific terminated him with “a discriminatory or retaliatory motive.”11
As Taylor correctly points out,12 the issue of whether to apply this additional burden was
discussed during trial with respect to the jury instructions, and the Court declined to apply
the “higher” standard, following instead the law of the Third, Ninth, and Federal Circuits,
which have not required FRSA plaintiffs to establish a discriminatory or retaliatory motive.
As Union Pacific notes in its brief, the Fifth Circuit has not addressed the issue.13 Union

9

Roman v. W. Mfg., Inc., 691 F.3d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 2012)(internal citations omitted); see also Hickson v.
Herbert, No. 13-580, 2017 WL 8793474, at *1–2 (M.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017).
10
Araujo v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2013)(quoting Allen v.
Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 475–76 (5th Cir.2008)).
11
Rec. Doc. No. 88-1, p. 3.
12
Rec. Doc. No. 97, p. 3-4.
13
Rec. Doc. No. 88-1, p. 2.

Pacific does not provide the Court with any reason (apart from its own preference) to
abandon the law used to instruct the jury and, after the verdict, impose an additional
burden on Taylor beyond proving his prima facie case.
Secondly, Union Pacific argues that, even under the “lower” standard prescribed
by the Third, Ninth and Federal Circuits and applied by the jury, Taylor did not present
sufficient evidence to establish that his protected activity was a contributing factor to his
termination. Specifically, Union Pacific contends that Taylor failed to show temporal
proximity between his protected activity and his termination, and that the evidence at trial
showed that other employees engaged in the same protected activity as Taylor but were
not terminated.14 The Court disagrees. There was ample evidence introduced at trial for
a reasonable jury to conclude that Taylor’s termination was close enough in time to
instances of his protected activity to find causation.15 The Court also rejects Union
Pacific’s argument that because other employees were not terminated for engaging in
protected activity, it would be unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Taylor was.
Evidence of how other employees were treated is of questionable relevance to Taylor’s
claim, especially when viewing the issue in the light most favorable to Taylor, here the
non-movant.
Lastly, Union Pacific seeks judgment as a matter of law because it believes that it
proved at trial, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same
adverse employment action against Taylor even if he had not engaged in protected
activity. The jury disagreed, finding that “no,” Union Pacific did not prove such.16 At the

14

Rec. Doc. No. 88-1, p. 4.
See Taylor’s brief at Rec. Doc. No. 97, p. 17 et seq and attendant citations to the trial transcript.
16
Rec. Doc. No. 73, p. 1.
15

summary judgment stage in this case, the Court rejected Union Pacific’s argument that
Taylor’s refusal to sign the Performance Improvement Plan was an independent basis for
terminating him and was somehow separable from his protected activity.17 At trial, Taylor
argued that “the proposed PIP was itself retaliatory [and] would be used to justify his
termination.”18 The jury apparently found this interpretation of the evidence more credible
than the one offered by Union Pacific, and the Court will not disturb that credibility
determination. Likewise, as the Court held in denying summary judgment, the railroad’s
evidence that Taylor was insubordinate was subject to multiple interpretations. The jury
found in favor of Taylor, and Union Pacific has not demonstrated that their finding was so
manifestly wrong or unsupported by evidence that the extraordinary remedy of judgment
as a matter of law is merited. Overall, the Court concludes that the jury had a legally
sufficient basis to find for Taylor. Therefore, this motion must be denied.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, Union Pacific’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a

Matter of Law19 is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 28th day of July, 2022.

S

________________________________
SHELLY D. DICK
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

17

See Rec. Doc. No. 48, p. 24.
Rec. Doc. No. 97, p. 29.
19
Rec. Doc. No. 88.
18