North Atlantic Security Company vs. Blache, et al
Filing
98
RULING AND ORDER granting in part 84 Motion in Limine. For the reasons set forth, above, the following are excluded from evidence at the trial of this matter: The portion of North Atlantic Exhibit 11 comprised of the May 2023 OIG Report; North Atl antic Exhibit 12, the Boards Response to the December 2023 OIG Report; Major Carl J. Saizan, Jr. as a witness; and North Atlantic Exhibit 7, Itemization of losses by NASC contracts. The motion is denied as to all other exhibits and testimony sought to be excluded. All other objections are reserved for trial. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder-Doomes on 1/28/2025. (JEG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY COMPANY
CIVIL CASE NO.
VERSUS
19-379-EWD
FABIAN BLACHE, ET AL.
CONSENT
RULING AND ORDER1
Before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion in Limine (“Motion”), filed by Defendant
Fabian Blache (“Blache”), which seeks to exclude testimony and exhibits listed on the Pretrial
Order by Plaintiff North Atlantic Security Company (“North Atlantic) relating to investigations
into Blache and Blache’s termination from employment, as well as North Atlantic’s lost profits.2
North Atlantic opposes the Motion.3 The matter is fully briefed and oral argument is not necessary.
As explained further, below, the Motion will be granted in part.
I.
BACKGROUND
North Atlantic formerly held a license to operate a private security business in Louisiana.
The license was granted by the Louisiana State Board of Private Security Examiners (“the Board”).
Pursuant to a successful contract bid with the Louisiana State Office of Procurement (“OSP”),
North Atlantic was awarded a contract in October 2017 to provide security services to several
Louisiana state agencies. In August 2018, Blache, the former Executive Secretary of the Board,
accused North Atlantic of committing regulatory violations which resulted in the revocation of
1
Based on the parties’ consent, this case was referred to the undersigned for all further proceedings and entry of final
judgment on September 16, 2019. R. Doc. 23.
2
R. Doc. 84; R. Doc. 78, pp. 6-9 (Pre-Trial Order). The Motion is technically deficient because it does not contain
the certificate of conference required by Local Civil Rule 5.2(h). However, as North Atlantic timely opposed the
Motion, it is ripe for resolution. R. Doc. 89. Blache has also filed a reply memorandum. R. Doc. 93.
3
R. Doc. 89.
North Atlantic’s license.4 North Atlantic sued Blache for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Louisiana state law arising out of Blache’s issuance of a cease and desist order to North Atlantic,
imposition of a $9,500 fine on North Atlantic, immediate revocation of North Atlantic’s private
security license without a vote by the Board or a hearing, and Blache’s notification of the
revocation to OSP, also before a Board hearing. North Atlantic alleged that the foregoing acts
violated its constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, right to be free of excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and similar provisions of the Louisiana Constitution.5
Following rulings on Blache’s dispositive motions and the Mandate of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,6 the only claim ripe for trial is North Atlantic’s claim for
monetary relief against Blache in his individual capacity for violation of North Atlantic’s due
process rights under Art. I, Sec. 2 of the Louisiana Constitution when Blache contacted OSP to
advise it that North Atlantic’s license had been revoked before a hearing by the Board on the final
revocation of the license.7 A four-day jury trial is set to begin on April 7, 2025.8
4
The history of this case has been recounted in other rulings. See e.g., R. Docs. 42, 63.
5
R. Doc. 25.
6
R. Docs. 42, 63, 68.
7
While the Court may (and, generally, should) decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims
have been dismissed, given the length of time this case has been pending, the Court will exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim in its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Hicks v. Austin Indep. Sch.
Dist., 564 Fed.Appx. 747, 748 (5th Cir. 2014).
8
The pretrial conference is set for February 18, 2025 and jury filings are due on March 24, 2025. R. Doc. 90.
2
II.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards on Motions In Limine
“It is well settled that motions in limine are disfavored.”9 “Motions in limine are frequently
made in the abstract and in anticipation of some hypothetical circumstance that may not develop
at trial.”10 “An order in limine excludes only clearly inadmissible evidence; therefore, evidence
should not be excluded before trial unless it is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.”11
“Instead, courts should reserve evidentiary rulings until trial so that questions as to the evidence
“‘may be resolved in the proper context.’”12 “When ruling on motions in limine, the Court
‘maintains great discretion [as to] evidentiary determinations.’”13 If the evidence is not clearly
inadmissible on all grounds, the better course is for the court to decline to rule in advance of trial
so that it will have the opportunity to resolve issues in context.”14
Blache seeks to exclude: (1) Any and all testimony regarding any investigation that Blache
is or may be subject to, including but not limited to investigations by the Office of State Inspector
General (“OIG”);15 (2) North Atlantic’s Exhibit 11 – “Both Louisiana Office of Inspector General
Report[s] on Blache and the agency’s conduct” and North Atlantic’s Exhibit 12 – “Letter
responding to OIG report” from the Board; (3) the testimony of Stephen B. Street Jr., Inspector
9
Lewis v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., No. 21-198, 2023 WL 8430364, at *2 (M.D. La. Dec. 4, 2023),
citing Auenson v. Lewis, No. 94-2734, 1996 WL 457258, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 1996) (citing Hawthorne Partners
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993))).
10
Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 784 (5th Cir. 1980) (superseded on other grounds).
11
Lewis, 2023 WL 8430364, at *2, citing Rivera v. Robinson, 464 F. Supp. 3d 847, 853 (E.D. La. 2020) (quoting
Auenson, 1996 WL 457258, at *1 (emphasis added).
12
Lewis, 2023 WL 8430364, at *2, citing Washington v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., No. 21-192, 2023 WL 2072083
at *1 (M.D. La. Feb. 17, 2023) (quoting Auenson, 1996 WL 457258, at *1).
13
Lewis, 2023 WL 8430364, at *2 (citations omitted).
14
Lewis, 2023 WL 8430364, at *2.
15
In Blache’s Memorandum, he expands this request to additionally seek to exclude evidence of investigations and
complaints. R. Doc. 84-1, p. 3.
3
General of the OIG; (4) the testimony of Major Carl F. Saizan, Jr., current Executive Director of
the Board; (5) North Atlantic’s Exhibit 7 – “Itemization of losses by NASC contracts”; (6) and the
testimony of Jabari Edwards or Antwann Richardson as to North Atlantic’s lost profits.16 As the
party objecting to the evidence, Blache bears the burden of showing that the evidence is
inadmissible.17
1. Relevance and Prejudice
Evidence must be relevant to be admissible.18 Evidence is relevant if: “(a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.”19 Relevant evidence is admissible unless the
United States Constitution, a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.20 “The court may exclude relevant evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”21
Evidence of a person’s character or trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. Evidence of “other” crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a person’s character to show that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character; however, it may be admissible for another
16
R. Doc. 84, pp. 1-3.
17
Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 608 F.3d 284, 295 (5th Cir. 2010).
18
Acadian Diagnostic Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Quality Toxicology, L.L.C., 965 F.3d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 2020), quoting
Fed. R. Evid. 402.
19
Fed. R. Evid. 401.
20
Fed. R. Evid. 402.
21
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
4
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.22
2. Hearsay
Hearsay is defined as “a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at
the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.”23 Hearsay is not admissible unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules
of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.24 After a party
properly objects to the admission of evidence as hearsay, the proponent of the evidence bears the
burden to show that the statement is not offered as hearsay or falls within an exception to the
hearsay rule.25
B. Exhibits and Testimony Regarding Investigations Into Blache
1. The OIG Reports and the Board’s Response
North Atlantic’s Exhibit 11 is comprised of a May 8, 2023 OIG Report (“May 2023
Report”) that summarizes an OIG “investigation into certain actions of the [Board] and certain
employees of the board after the board’s chief administrative officer, Fabian Blache III, was placed
on Administrative Leave in July of 2021”;26 and a December 18, 2023 OIG Supplemental Report
(“December 2023 Report”) that summarizes the OIG investigation into matters that were still under
22
Fed. R. Evid. 404.
23
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(1)-(2).
24
Fed. R. Evid. 802.
25
Dempster v. Lamorak Ins. Co., 487 F.Supp.3d 548, 552-53 (E.D. La. 2020) (citations omitted).
26
R. Doc. 78, p. 7 (PTO); R. Doc. 84-2 (May 2023 Report). Per the May 2023 Report, Blache was terminated as
Executive Secretary of the Board on September 21, 2021. R. Doc. 84-2, p. 6.
5
investigation at the time of the May 2023 Report.27 North Atlantic’s Exhibit 12 is the Board’s
December 13, 2023 email response to a draft of the December 2023 Report.28
a. Applicability of Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(iii) as to the Two Reports in
General
Blache acknowledges that the two Reports appear to be an exception to the hearsay rule
because they were prepared by OIG, a state agency; however, he contends that all of OIG’s legal
conclusions should be excluded because Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(iii) only excludes from hearsay
“factual findings” in legally authorized investigations set forth in state agency records.29 Blache
also argues that the two Reports should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403 because they are
highly prejudicial to him.30 North Atlantic contends that the Reports are not subject to exclusion
on the grounds of hearsay because they are reports from OIG, a state agency authorized to conduct
investigations, and the investigations involved civil matters. As such, they are admissible pursuant
to Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(iii) unless Blache shows that “the source of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of untrustworthiness” under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B), which Blache
has not shown in this case.31 North Atlantic argues that Blache’s only potential challenge to the
Reports is on the grounds of undue prejudice.32 Blache replies that, while the Fifth Circuit has not
27
R. Doc. 78, p. 7 (PTO); R. Doc. 84-3 (December 2023 Report).
28
R. Doc. 84-3, p. 23 (Appendix A to December 2023 Report).
29
Fed. R. Evid. 803 provides, in pertinent part: “The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless
of whether the declarant is available as a witness:…8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if: (A)
it sets out: … (iii) in a civil case,…factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and (B) the opponent does
not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”
30
R. Doc. 84-1, p. 5.
31
R. Doc. 89, pp. 6-8, citing La. R.S. 49:220.24 (authority of the Inspector General) and Menard v. Targa Resources
LLC, 523 F.Supp. 3d 882 (M.D. La. 2021); and p. 14, citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
North Atlantic contends that the OIG investigation of Blache involves a civil matter because criminal charges are no
longer possible for Blache’s potentially applicable crimes in light of the fact that he revoked North Atlantic’s license
in 2018, citing La. R.S. 14:134 (malfeasance in office is punishable with or without hard labor) and Code of Crim.
Proc. art. 572 (providing that felonies not necessarily punishable by imprisonment at hard labor must be brought within
four years of the commission of the offense). Blache does not contest this issue.
32
R. Doc. 89, p. 9.
6
ruled on this issue, other courts in this Circuit have held that legal conclusions are not admissible
as factual findings under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8), and thus legal conclusions in the Reports are subject
to exclusion.33 These general objections are addressed below in the context of the specific exhibits.
b. North Atlantic’s Exhibit 11-The May 2023 Report
The May 2023 Report summarizes the OIG’s investigation into overtime, bonus, and
annual leave payments to Blache and his replacement, Bridgette Hull (“Hull”); payments to Blache
for a conference in South Africa; Blache’s purported employment contract considered by the
Board; and the Board’s appointment of Hull to replace Blache as Executive Secretary. In addition
to his Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(iii) objections, noted above, Blache argues that all of these events
are unrelated to the due process client contact claim remaining in this case and are, therefore,
irrelevant.34 Blache also argues that North Atlantic should not be permitted to introduce the May
2023 Report because it is an attack on Blache’s credibility and character, it has no probative value,
and is prejudicial to Blache.
North Atlantic argues that pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2), evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, and acts can be offered for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.35 North Atlantic
argues that the May 2023 Report should come in to demonstrate Blache’s motive, as the May 2023
33
R. Doc. 93, p. 5, citing Warner v. Talos ERT LLC, No. 18-1435, 2022 WL 534311, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 22, 2022),
modified on reconsideration on other grounds, No. 18-1435, 2022 WL 19002352 (W.D. La. Dec. 15, 2022); and
Olivier v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 18-568, 2022 WL 3544300, at *2 (M.D. La. Aug. 18, 2022) (excluding legal
conclusions from reports about regulatory violations because “they do not fall within the Public Records exception to
the hearsay rule, FRE 803(8)”) (block quoted string cite omitted). Blache argues that Beech Aircraft Corp. does not
support North Atlantic’s position that legal conclusions in agency reports are admissible because the Supreme Court
left open the question of whether legal conclusions are admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). R. Doc. 93, p. 5.
34
R. Doc. 84-1; R. Doc. 84-2 (May 2023 Report). Blache hired Hull as an administrative coordinator receptionist,
and then as his administrative assistant. Upon Blache’s termination, the Board hired Hull to replace Blache as
Executive Secretary. R. Doc. 84-2, p. 6.
35
R. Doc. 89, pp. 11-12.
7
Report states that Blache improperly received overtime payments from the Board’s account, the
Board is self-funded by fees, and Blache’s termination for receiving the overtime payments “ties
directly with his systemic abuse of due process and unilateral acts.”36 Further, according to North
Atlantic, “Blache was motivated to commit unilateral systematic violations of due process and
illegally fine companies [despite a fine schedule] so he could illegally pay himself illegal overtime
and bonuses…” as evidenced by the Report, which the jury should see in order to determine
Blache’s liability. North Atlantic argues that the May 2023 Report should also come in to show
absence of mistake because Blache has asserted that his revocation of North Atlantic’s license was
an “honest mistake” due to an ambiguity in the law on unauthorized weapons.37
Blache replies that the May 2023 Report does not indicate the source of the funds used to
pay Blache’s overtime, and Blache did not assert “mistake” in connection with the temporary
revocation of North Atlantic’s license, or in connection with the client contact claim (or otherwise
in the Motion).38 Furthermore, Blache contends that North Atlantic’s arguments demonstrate that
it wants to use the Reports to unfairly prejudice Blache and attack his character, and North Atlantic
has not shown how the Reports will help prove Blache’s liability for contacting OSP.39
Blache repeatedly points out that the remaining claim in this case is for state law denial of
due process when Blache temporarily revoked North Atlantic’s license and contacted OSP. It must
be noted, however, that Blache’s notification of the “temporary revocation” to OSP could have
effectively operated as a de facto final revocation of North Atlantic’s license without the required
due process because the notification prompted the termination of North Atlantic’s contract without
36
R. Doc. 89, p. 12.
37
R. Doc. 89, p. 13.
38
R. Doc. 93, pp. 3-4.
39
R. Doc. 93, p. 3.
8
a Board hearing.
These circumstances potentially open the door to some of the evidence and
testimony Blache currently challenges. However, that is not the case with respect to the May 2023
Report, which concerns an investigation into internal personnel issues regarding Blache and his
replacement that have no bearing on the remaining denial of due process claim. Any motive by
Blache to be paid overtime is not sufficiently related to his actions in contacting OSP to report the
temporary revocation of North Atlantic’s license.40 Additionally, because the May 2023 Report is
of limited, if any, probative value as to the only remaining claim in this case, introduction of the
Report would only serve to unfairly prejudice Blache and to confuse the jury.41 As such, the May
2023 Report will be excluded from trial.42
c. North Atlantic’s Exhibit 11-The December 2023 Report
The December 2023 Report summarizes the OIG’s investigation into Blache’s revocation
of North Atlantic’s license (“Subpart I”), and investigation into Blache’s unilateral revocation of
the license of a firearm instructor; imposition of a six-figure fine on each of two licensed security
companies; attempted fine on a supermarket; contract with a California company to operate as the
40
North Atlantic’s argument that Blache’s motive in levying fines against North Atlantic was driven by Blache’s
desire for overtime payments is too speculative to show motive.
41
Because the May 2023 Report is excluded on these grounds, Blache’s hearsay objection is not reached.
42
Attached as Appendix A to the May 2023 Report, is the Board’s April 11, 2023 letter and Attachment “A” to the
letter. It does not appear that North Atlantic seeks to introduce at trial either the Board’s April 11, 2023 letter and/or
its Attachment “A.” The parties’ briefing refers to North Atlantic’s Exhibit 12 as being comprised of the Board’s
December 13, 2023 response to the December 2023 Report (addressed below), and the PTO also only vaguely refers
to Exhibit 12 as “Letter responding to OIG report.” R. Doc. 78, p. 7. However, to the extent that North Atlantic may
attempt to introduce the Board’s April 11, 2023 letter and/or Attachment “A,” only the portion of Attachment “A,”
relating to the Board’s implementation of “processes” undertaken regarding license revocation, cease and desist
orders, etc., is even, arguably, relevant to the only remaining claim in the case (see, R. Doc. 84-2, pp. 21-22), and that
portion is likely subject to exclusion under Fed. R. Evid. 407 as subsequent remedial measures. North Atlantic has
not addressed use of this information at all, much less argued that it can come in for any of the permitted purposes
specified in Fed. R. Evid. 407. For clarity, the entirety of the May 2023 Report, including Appendix A, is excluded
from evidence at trial.
9
Board’s certified online training facility; and contract with an unqualified individual to perform
investigative work on behalf of the Board that was not performed (“Subpart II”).43
Addressing them in reverse order, Blache argues Subpart II should be excluded in toto
because it concerns matters that are irrelevant to this case and prejudicial to Blache. Blache then
argues that Subpart I’s findings relating to North Atlantic’s license “deals with license revocation
and subsequent Board actions, which are irrelevant here,” because the only remaining claim is for
denial of due process when Blache contacted OSP about the license revocation. Blache further
argues that the fact of OIG’s investigation into Blache is more prejudicial than probative, and the
December 2023 Report is subject to exclusion under Fed. R. Evid. 404 as impermissible character
evidence.44 However, and notwithstanding the foregoing as to Subpart I, Blache also notes that
“only a small portion of the OIG Report directly deals with the alleged client-contact and/or OSP’s
decision to terminate [North Atlantic’s] contract,” and concedes that if any part of the December
2023 Report is admitted, only that portion, consisting of 3 paragraphs, is relevant.45
North Atlantic responds that since Blache’s defense is that he mistakenly revoked North
Atlantic’s license, the December 2023 Report should come in as “a direct refutation of Defendant
Blache’s defense, as it details systematic due process violations, and should be admitted as lack of
mistake or absence of mistake evidence under FRE 404(b)(2) to assist the jury in its role as a fact
finder.”46 Blache replies that North Atlantic has not explained how the Reports are relevant to the
remaining claim in this case, and they unfairly prejudice Blache.47
43
R. Doc. 84-1, pp. 5-6; R. Doc. 84-3 (December 2023 Report).
44
R. Doc. 84-1, p. 5.
45
R. Doc. 84-1, pp. 5-6.
46
R. Doc. 89, pp. 13-14. See also, pp. 10-11 (“The jury should hear about how Defendant Blache systemically violated
other companies’ due process rights he regulated to determine whether this was intentional pattern of malicious
conduct or a simple confusion or mistake.”).
47
R. Doc. 93, p. 3.
10
Blache concedes that three paragraphs in Subpart I regarding Blache contacting OSP are
relevant to the remaining claim.48 The Motion will be denied as to those paragraphs of Subpart 1.
Additionally, while information of other wrong acts is inadmissible character evidence, it may be
admitted for other purposes. The Motion is also denied at this time as to remaining portion of
Subpart I regarding the OIG investigation into North Atlantic’s license, and all of Subpart II, which
could be relevant to show intent and/or a pattern of denial of due process to other similar licensees
and could also be relevant to Blache’s state law discretionary immunity defense. That defense does
not apply to governmental acts not reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives or to
acts or omissions that constitute intentional or reckless conduct.49 These portions of the Reports
will be evaluated in the context of their presentation, and objections are reserved to trial. The
parties are advised that this Court has also held that while factual conclusions in agency reports
are excluded from hearsay, legal conclusions in agency reports are not subject to Fed. R. Evid.
803(8)’s exclusion from hearsay and will not be permitted at trial because they risk confusing the
jury.50
48
R. Doc. 84-3, p. 10 as to the 2nd, 5th and 6th paragraphs on the page.
49
See, R. Doc. 78, pp. 4-5 (PTO), citing La. R.S. § 9:2798.1, which provides, in pertinent part, “B. Liability shall not
be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their
lawful powers and duties. C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section are not applicable: (1) To acts or omissions
which are not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or discretionary
power exists; or (2) To acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful,
outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.”
50
See, e.g., Olivier, 2022 WL 3544300, at *2, decided 34 years after Beech Aircraft Corp. As noted in Warner, analysis
of Rule 803(8) has evolved since Beech Aircraft Corp. was decided. 2022 WL 534311, at *3. Furthermore, Beech
Aircraft Corp. left open the issue of whether legal conclusions are admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (“We
emphasize that the issue in this litigation is whether Rule 803(8)(C) recognizes any difference between statements of
‘fact’ and ‘opinion.’ There is no question here of any distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘law.’ We thus express no opinion
on whether legal conclusions contained in an official report are admissible as ‘findings of fact’ under Rule 803(8)(C).”
Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 170, n. 13.
11
d. North Atlantic’s Exhibit 12 –The Board’s Response to a Draft of the
December 2023 Report
Exhibit 12 is a December 13, 2023 email (“Board’s Response”) from the current Executive
Secretary of the Board, Major Carl F. Saizan, Jr. (“Saizan”), in response to a draft of the December
2023 Report. In the Board’s Response, Saizan writes on his own behalf, and that of the Board, to
“express our acknowledgement and concurrence with the OIG draft report related…to Blache.”
Saizan notes that he and the Board “find no basis to dispute the facts presented” considering their
“limited personal knowledge regarding the investigation.” Saizan also states that “[w]e rely on the
accuracy of the information in the investigative draft report….”51
Blache argues the Board’s Response is subject to exclusion as irrelevant to the only
remaining claim because there is no indication that Saizan has knowledge of Blache contacting
OSP to advise it of the revocation of North Atlantic’s license. The Board Response is also hearsay
because it is merely an “acknowledgment and concurrence” with a draft of the December 2023
Report, and Saizan admits having only limited personal knowledge of the investigation. Further,
the Board’s “concurrence” with the report’s findings could lead the jury to presume Blache
engaged in wrongdoing and is unfairly prejudicial to Blache.52 North Atlantic contends that the
Board’s Response bolsters the trustworthiness of the December 2023 Report and should come in
to assist the jury in determining whether Blache mistakenly revoked North Atlantic’s license.53
The Board’s Response explicitly states that Saizan and the Board reviewed only a “draft
report,” and had only “limited knowledge regarding the investigation,” so they “rel[ied] on the
accuracy of the information” in the December 2023 Report. The Board Response’s
51
R. Doc. 84-3, p. 23 (emphasis added).
52
R. Doc. 84-1, pp. 6-7.
53
R. Doc. 89, pp. 14-15.
12
“acknowledgment” and “concurrence” with the December 2023 Report’s findings is based on
hearsay, and it is also unfairly prejudicial to Blache and could confuse the jury. As such, the
Motion will be granted, and the Board Response, North Atlantic’s Exhibit 12, will be excluded.
2. Witness Testimony Regarding the OIG Reports and the Board’s Response
a. Testimony of Stephen B. Street, Jr., Inspector General (“Street”) and/or
Nicole Compton
Blache seeks to exclude the testimony of Street, the nature of which is not defined in the
PTO, because Street has no personal involvement in any of the events at issue. Blache argues that,
to the extent North Atlantic intends to call Street to testify regarding the OIG investigations, the
testimony is irrelevant for the same reasons as the Reports; the testimony should be excluded as
hearsay due to Street’s lack of personal knowledge of the events, particularly the client contact
claim; and Street’s testimony would be unfairly prejudicial to Blache.54
In its Opposition, North Atlantic argues that testimony regarding the investigations should
come in under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) to prove Blache’s motive, intent, absence of mistake, etc.
because Blache contends that his revocation of North Atlantic’s license was a mistake.55 North
Atlantic clarifies that, following the release of the Reports (which was after the discovery
deadline), it learned the name of the investigator who actually conducted the investigations, Nicole
Compton (“Compton”), and she is available to testify regarding the Reports.56 Blache replies that
Compton is not listed as a witness on the PTO and should not be permitted to testify.57
Just as the May 2023 Report has been excluded from trial due to the risk of prejudice to
Blache and jury confusion since it is of limited probative value as to the only remaining claim in
54
R. Doc. 84-1, p. 7.
55
R. Doc. 89, pp. 10, 12-14.
56
R. Doc. 89, pp. 12-14.
57
R. Doc. 93, p. 2.
13
this case, the same is true of any testimony from Street or Compton about information contained
in that Report. Additionally, as to Compton, she was not listed by North Atlantic as a potential
witness on the proposed PTO that was submitted by the parties on July 15, 2024.58 It is not clear
from the briefing when North Atlantic learned of Compton’s involvement in the OIG
investigations, but the latest of the Reports is dated December 18, 2023. Fact discovery in this
matter has been closed for years and it would be unfairly prejudicial to Blache to allow Compton
to testify as to the Reports at this late date.
While Blache claims that Street has no relevant personal knowledge, Street’s name is on
the Reports, and it is not clear if North Atlantic agrees as to Street’s lack of knowledge because it
has not suggested that it will amend the PTO to remove Street as a witness. If Street has personal
knowledge of the OIG investigations and/or any portion of the December 2023 Report that may
be admitted at trial, Street may have relevant testimony. Therefore, Street will be permitted to
testify as to his personal knowledge of the information in the December 2023 Report (if any), and
objections to his testimony will be addressed at trial.
b. Testimony of Major Carl F. Saizan, Jr.
Blache argues that Saizan should be excluded as a witness because he was not employed
by the Board during the events at issue and was not privy to any relevant communications; he has
only limited personal knowledge of the OIG investigation; and Saizan’s purported concurrence
with the December 2023 Report would be unfairly prejudicial to Blache.59
In its Opposition, North Atlantic indicates that Saizan might be called to testify regarding
the Board’s Response, which should come in under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) to demonstrate
58
R. Doc. 78.
59
R. Doc. 84-1, p. 8.
14
Blache’s motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, etc.60 Saizan will not be
permitted to testify because the only topic North Atlantic indicated (in its Opposition
memorandum) that Saizan has personal knowledge to testify about is the Board’s Response, which
is excluded.
3. General Testimony and Evidence Regarding Investigations into Blache and His
Termination
Blache also generally seeks to exclude any testimony or documents, such as complaints or
lawsuits, relating to investigations of Blache or his termination by the Board pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b), which precludes the introduction of character evidence to prove that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with their character. Blache contends that testimony about
his termination would invite the jury to speculate that Blache engaged in wrongdoing, despite that
his termination is unrelated to this case, and testimony about investigations into his conduct would
be highly prejudicial to him.61
North Atlantic contends that this evidence is admissible pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2)
to prove motive, intent, lack of accident, or mistake, and should be permitted because Blache has
defended his actions in revoking North Atlantic’s license by arguing that it was an honest mistake.
North Atlantic argues that the jury should review evidence and testimony regarding Blache’s
termination and investigations into Blache’s conduct to show that Blache intentionally denied
North Atlantic’s due process rights, as well as the rights of other companies.62 Blache responds
that he argued the defense of “mistake” in connection with the meaning of “unauthorized weapon,”
but did not assert that defense as to the license revocation, which claim is no longer at issue, nor
60
R. Doc. 89, pp. 10-11, 14.
61
R. Doc. 84-1, pp. 3-4, citing four non-controlling Ninth Circuit cases.
62
R. Doc. 89, pp. 10-12.
15
in defense of the operative client contact claim. Blache further responds that North Atlantic’s
statement that the jury “will not give [Blache] the benefit of the doubt” demonstrates that North
Atlantic is attempting to use evidence of investigations and his termination to improperly attack
his character.63
This request overlaps somewhat with the requests to exclude the Reports and the testimony
of Street and Saizan, addressed above. The Motion is otherwise denied as to this in globo request
because it lacks specificity as to the substance of the potential testimony and exhibits to be offered
regarding the investigations into, and termination of, Blache, some of which could be relevant for
the reasons explained. Objections to specific testimony and evidence offered as to investigations
into Blache and his termination not otherwise addressed in this Ruling and Order will be addressed
in the context of its presentation at trial.
C. Exhibits and Testimony Regarding North Atlantic’s Itemization of Losses
North Atlantic’s Exhibit 7, referred to in the PTO as “Itemization of losses by NASC
contracts,” (“Itemization”) appears to be a spreadsheet containing alleged figures for the purchase
price of North Atlantic, and the company’s monthly and annual revenues, annual expenses, annual
“growth multiplier[s]” (ranging from 6% to 30%), annual net income, and projected total revenue
from 2018 to 2024, as well as profitability (i.e., $9,184,000, approximated as 3.5 times projected
2024 revenue (EBITDA) of $2,624,000).64 North Atlantic intends to call current North Atlantic
President Jabari Edwards and former North Atlantic President Antwann Richardson to testify at
trial about, inter alia, “contract losses.”65
63
R. Doc. 93, pp. 3-4.
64
R. Doc. 84-4.
65
R. Doc. 78, pp. 8-9.
16
Blache alleges that, while there are no cases addressing lost profits in a due process client
contact claim under state law, cases seeking lost profits generally are instructive. Under Louisiana
law, claims for lost profits must be proven with reasonable certainty and cannot be based on
conjecture and speculation, and “[a] claim for lost profits based solely on the testimony of the
injured party and unsubstantiated by other evidence does not constitute reasonable certainty.’”66
Blache argues that the Itemization is North Atlantic’s only document supporting damages, but it
is “not an itemization of losses or a summary, but rather numbers that have no basis in fact and are
nothing more than exaggerated speculation,” and contends that the numbers “do not add up.” In
particular, Blache alleges that the annual income and annual revenues figures are too close (e.g.,
2018 annual revenue of $960,000 and annual income of $936,960, despite annual expenses of
$384,000) with no explanation for the calculations; there is no evidence of how North Atlantic
would grow from 6% to 30% a year in a competitive market, where the contracts at issue are
subject to public bid laws and the lowest bidder is awarded the contract; and there is no explanation
or supporting evidence for how North Atlantic could be valued at $9,184,000. Blache contends
that North Atlantic failed to provide any supporting documentation for its figures, failed to offer
relevant evidence of past revenues and profits to compare to its alleged future damages, and failed
to show how the purchase price of North Atlantic is relevant. Blache contends that the Itemization
is also not a summary exhibit (presumably, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 1006)67 because it is not
66
R. Doc. 84-1, pp. 8-9, citing Team Contractors, LLC v. Waypoint NOLA, LLC, No. 16-1131, 2017 WL 4314599, at
*3 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2017) (citing Mac Sales, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 24 F.3d 747, 753 (5th Cir.
1994) (other citations omitted).
67
Fed. R. Evid. 1006, as currently in effect, provides: “The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to
prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court.
The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties
at a reasonable time and place. And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.”
17
supported by any evidence. For all these reasons, Blache seeks to exclude the Itemization as
unreliable, confusing, and speculative, or alternatively, as an improper summary exhibit.68
Blache also seeks to exclude the testimony of Edwards and Richardson as to lost profits,
arguing that they do not have sufficient knowledge to testify regarding lost profits and any such
testimony would be “pure speculation, and, to the extent their testimony would rely on Exhibit 7,
entirely unreliable. Louisiana law does not permit a claim for lost profits based on conjecture
and/or speculation.”69 However, Blache alternatively argues that they should be limited to
testifying as to lost profits that are based on evidence that shows lost profits with “reasonable
certainty.”70
North Atlantic maintains that to recover lost profits for a breach of contract, it must show
“(1) the loss was the proximate result of the breach; (2) the loss of profits caused by the breach
was within the contemplation of the parties because the loss was foreseeable or because the
defaulting party had knowledge of special circumstances at the time of contracting; and (3) a
sufficient basis exists for estimating the amount of lost profits with reasonable certainty.”71
According to North Atlantic, recovery of lost profits is not limited to lost profits stemming from
the underlying contract but could also include lost profits derived from “collateral undertakings,”
such as those that could have been realized from other profit making endeavors.72 Somewhat
disjointedly, North Atlantic similarly argues that it should be able to recover damages for loss of
earning capacity from “employment they hoped to obtain in the future” because the right to
68
R. Doc. 84-1, pp. 2-3, 8-10.
69
R. Doc. 84-1, p. 11, citing Team Contractors LLC, 2017 WL 4314599 at *3.
70
Id.
71
R. Doc. 89, p. 15, citing Standard Fed. Bank v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 265, 273 (Fed. Cl. 2004).
72
R. Doc. 89, p. 15, citing id.
18
conduct future business is a property right that North Atlantic was denied when its due process
rights were violated.73 North Atlantic maintains that loss of earning capacity refers to “…a persons’
potential,” “is available to all industries,” and “[d]amages for loss of earning capacity should be
estimated on [an] injured person’s ability to earn money, rather than what he actually earned before
the injury….”74 In support of this argument, North Atlantic specifically alleges that it aggressively
pursued the state security contracts it was awarded, and was going to use that award, as well as
North Atlantic’s reputation, “as a springboard to aggressively pursue and expand” its business into
other states and the private sector, but was foreclosed from doing so when Blache revoked its
license without due process because North Atlantic could no longer attract any business in any
state.75 Thus, North Atlantic is seeking to use the Itemization as evidence of loss of earning
capacity in addition to lost profits. North Atlantic contends that the Itemization demonstrates a
“clear profit loss, easily shown by the contract value analysis breakdown….”76 Furthermore,
North Atlantic argues that Edwards and Richardson should be permitted to testify regarding their
personal knowledge of the underlying contracts, their value and how they were acquired; future
potential contracts; and North Atlantic’s plans for growth, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 701 as lay
witnesses giving opinion testimony.77
73
R. Doc. 89, pp. 3-4, citing Banjavich v. Louisiana Licensing Bd. for Marine Divers, 111 So.2d 505 (La. 1959).
74
R. Doc. 89, pp. 5-6, citing Bland v. Green, 2019-0550 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/27/19), 363 So.3d 376 and Folse v. Fakouri,
371 So.2d 1120, 1124 (La. 1979).
75
R. Doc. 89, pp. 6, 16-17.
76
R. Doc. 89, pp. 15-16.
77
R. Doc. 89, pp. 16-17, citing Fed. R. Evid. 701, which provides, in pertinent part: “If a witness is not testifying as
an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue…” and citing Louisiana
Land and Exploration Co. v. Verdin, 95-2579 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 63, writ denied, 96-2629 (La.
12/13/96), 692 So.2d 1067 (in a possessory action, permitting lay testimony of the plaintiff property owner’s employee
under Fed. R. Evid. 701 about expected repair costs to property damaged by defendant because the employee had
fourteen years of experience with the same repairs and repair costs at other locations).
19
Blache replies that the Itemization is not clear and does not show a valuation of North
Atlantic’s contracts, nor does it make clear if it refers to North Atlantic’s contracts in states other
than Louisiana.78 Blache contends that North Atlantic did not seek loss of earning capacity
damages in its Amended Complaint, and it has not explained how a business can be permitted to
recover damages for loss of earning capacity because loss of earning capacity is “an ‘injured
person’s ability to earn money,’ not a business’s ability to earn money from an alleged due process
violation.”79 Blache argues that North Atlantic’s attempt to recover for loss of earning capacity
due to the final revocation of its license is an attempt to improperly seek damages on the license
revocation claim, which is not the remaining claim in this case.80 Regarding the witnesses, Blache
argues that Edwards and Richardson should not be permitted to testify regarding “[f]uture potential
contracts and unprovable ‘growth,’” and “speculative ‘rapid expansion into different security
markets’” because such lay witness testimony is too speculative in the context of lost profits, which
is prohibited, and their testimony cannot be the sole basis for such damages.81
1. Evidence of North Atlantic’s Future Lost Income is Admissible
Blache is correct that North Atlantic did not seek “loss of earning capacity” damages in its
Amended Complaint, and North Atlantic’s cited authority involves loss of earning capacity awards
to individuals, not businesses.82 North Atlantic does not cite any caselaw where a business was
78
R. Doc. 93, p. 6.
79
R. Doc. 93, p. 7.
80
R. Doc. 93, p. 2.
81
R. Doc. 93, pp. 6-7, citing Team Contractors, 2017 WL 4314599 at *3.
82
Folse, 371 So.2d at 1121 (awarded loss of earning capacity damages to a plaintiff bus driver injured in a motor
vehicle accident); Bland, 363 So.3d at 380-81 (reversing lower court grant of motion in limine excluding testimony
and opinion of expert regarding injured carpenter’s lost earning capacity); Banjavich, 111 So.2d at 515-16 (finding
unconstitutional statutes that created a governing board tasked with licensing commercial marine divers because they
vested arbitrary powers to the board and violated the constitutional property rights of the plaintiff marine divers to
engage in business). North Atlantic’s authority, Standard Fed. Bank, 62 Fed. Cl. at 273, is a U.S. Court of Federal
Claims that heavily relies on authority citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. North Atlantic has not shown
20
awarded “loss of earning capacity” damages, and it does not appear that Louisiana law recognizes
“loss of earning capacity” damages for businesses. However, North Atlantic does claim “loss of
income, past, present and future,” as an item of damages in the Amended Complaint.83 To the
extent North Atlantic can provide competent, non-speculative evidence of loss of future income,
such evidence is properly admissible at trial.
2. The Itemization Will Be Excluded
Plaintiff’s intended use of the Itemization is not clear.84 While Fed. R. Evid. 1006 permits
voluminous evidence that cannot be conveniently examined in court to be introduced in the form
of a chart or summary, “recognizing the possibility for misuse of summary charts, the Fifth Circuit
has cautioned that the trial judge must carefully handle their preparation and use.”85 A chart may
also be used as a pedagogical aid under Fed. R. Evid. 611(a)86 (though not admitted into evidence)
to summarize evidence presented to the jury if the chart is consistent with the evidence and not
misleading.87 While a Rule 1006 chart is evidence, a Rule 611(a) chart is not.88 Regardless of the
how a non-controlling case applying the Restatement Second of Contracts is relevant to the claims in this case arising
under Louisiana law.
83
R. Doc. 25, p. 6.
84
Plaintiff lists the Itemization as Exhibit 7 on the PTO, suggesting that it intends to use the chart as evidence. R.
Doc. 78, p. 6.
85
United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1984), citing Myers v. United States, 356 F.2d 469, 470 (5th
Cir., cert. denied, 384 U.S. 952 (1966).
86
Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) states: The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment
of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.” A district court has discretion to allow summary charts as demonstrative aids or pedagogical devices
under this rule. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 210 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2000).
87
United States v. Buck, 324 F.3d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 2003), citing Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 431
(5th Cir. 1985).
88
See, Pierce, 753 F.2d at 431.
21
intended use, appropriate evidence must support either type of chart. When a chart is misleading,
it should be excluded because its probative value is outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.89
Regardless of Plaintiff’s intended use, Blache is correct that the basis for the information
in the Itemization is unclear. North Atlantic has not provided any supporting documentation or
explanation for any of the figures provided, including the growth multiplier, alleged profitability
of the company, and profit loss. North Atlantic did not substantively address this argument. In the
trial court’s discretion, summary charts are only admissible under Rule 1006 when the following
factors are present: “(1) the charts are based on competent evidence before the jury; (2) the primary
evidence used to construct the charts is available to the other side for comparison in order that the
correctness of the summary may be tested; (3) the person who prepared the charts is available for
cross-examination; and (4) the jury is properly instructed concerning their consideration of the
charts.”90 Here, even if the other factors may be met, Blache has argued that the evidence used to
construct the charts has not been made available to him for comparison to test the correctness of
the chart. This information has also not been provided to the Court.91 Because the Itemization is
unreliable for lack of supporting documentation and/or explanation, which also renders it
prejudicial to Blache, it will be excluded from trial.
3. Testimony of Jabari Edwards (“Edwards”) and Antwaan Richardson
(“Richardson”)
Blache acknowledges that Edwards and/or Richardson may have personal knowledge of
the information referenced on the Itemization, such as North Atlantic’s annual income and
89
See, e.g., United States v. Crinel, No. 15-61, 2017 WL 490635, at *8 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2017) (excluding summary
chart with misleading information).
90
United States v. Solvay, No. 06-2662, 2016 WL 1258401, at *12 (S.D. Tex. March 31, 2016), aff’d sub nom., United
States ex rel King v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 871 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2017), citing United States v. Winn, 948 F.2d 145,
159 (5th Cir. 1991) (other citation omitted).
91
No exhibits listed in North Atlantic’s portion of the PTO would appear to support the information in the Itemization.
22
expenses. While this testimony is relevant to North Atlantic’s claim for lost profits, “[a] claim for
lost profits based solely on the testimony of the injured party and unsubstantiated by other evidence
does not constitute reasonable certainty.’”92 As with the Itemization, which will be excluded from
evidence, it is not clear what information North Atlantic would present to substantiate the
testimony of Edwards and/or Richardson on this issue. At most, North Atlantic lists “All Contracts
with clients” as an exhibit on the PTO.93 While this is vague as to what contracts North Atlantic
refers, it is possible that this additional information is sufficient to substantiate some of the
testimony of Edwards and/or Richardson. To the extent their testimony establishes a purported fact
with reasonable certainty,94 and it is not based on conjecture and speculation,95 it is admissible.
However, it is important to note a couple of potential limitations on this testimony. First, per the
OSP August 10, 2017 bid for the work: “Contract will become effective date of award for a period
92
Team Contractors, LLC, 2017 WL 4314599, at *3 (citing Mac Sales, Inc., 24 F.3d at 753 (other citations omitted).
93
R. Doc. 78, p. 6.
94
Louisiana Farms v. Louisiana Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 95-845 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/96), 685 So.2d 1086,
1105–06, writ denied, 97-0486 (La. 4/4/97), 692 So.2d 420, and writ denied, 97-0507 (La. 4/4/97), 692 So.2d 422 (in
a case seeking lost profits due to deprivation of property without due process, holding: “[B]road latitude is given in
proving lost profits because this item of damages is often difficult to prove and mathematical certainty or precision is
not required. See Fritscher v. Chateau Golf & Country Club, 453 So.2d 964 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 460 So.2d
604 (La. 1984); Lavigne v. J. Hofert Company, 431 So.2d 74 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1983). But, damages cannot be awarded
where lost future profits are based purely on conjecture and speculation. Graham [v. Edwards], 614 So.2d 811
[(La.App. 2 Cir.)]. The allowance of loss of profits as an element of damages is more liberal in tort actions than actions
for breach of contract. Barnett v. Jabusch, 94–819 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/95); 649 So.2d 1158; Haggerty v. March, 480
So.2d 1064 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1985); Dubois v. State Through Dept. Of Pub. Safety, 466 So.2d 1381 (La.App. 3
Cir.1985). The judge or jury has much discretion in the assessment of damages in tort cases. La. Civ. Code art.
2324.1.”).
95
6 Saul Litvinoff & Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, The Law Of Obligations § 4.9 (2d ed. 2023)
(“Even in actions for quasi-delictual, rather than contractual, damages, in spite of the more liberal approach to the
granting of recovery that prevails when profits have been lost because of a tort, Louisiana courts have never accepted
a party’s own estimation or projections as proof of profits allegedly lost. The self-serving and speculative testimony
of a party as to the profit he anticipated cannot sustain an award for the loss of such profit.”) (citing Young v. South
Central Bell Telephone Company, 412 So.2d 147 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1982) and F & F Transfer, Inc. v. Tardo, 425 So.2d
874, 876 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1983); Shreveport Laundries v. Red Iron Drilling Co., 192 So. 895 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1939);
and see Louisiana Farms, 685 So.2d at 1105–06, (“Damages in the nature of lost profits resulting from an offense or
quasi-offense must be proved with reasonable certainty, that is, that the loss of future profits is more probable than
not. Borden, Inc. v. Howard Trucking Co., Inc., 454 So.2d 1081 (La. 1983); Graham v. Edwards, 614 So.2d 811
(La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 619 So.2d 547 (La. 1993).”).
23
of twelve (12) months.” “Upon agreement of the State of Louisiana Agency and the contractor, a
term contract may be extended for 2 additional 12-month periods at the same prices, terms and
conditions. In such cases, the total contract term cannot exceed 36 months.”96 Thus, it appears that
North Atlantic’s contract was for a 12-month initial term, with an option to renew for 2 more terms
not to exceed 36 months total. While the specific date that North Atlantic was awarded the contract
is unknown, the bid date was August 10, 2017,97 and North Atlantic’s license was revoked on
August 14, 2018, with an effective date of August 31, 2018.98 This suggests that North Atlantic
had the contract for the majority of the initial 12-month term, which leaves a maximum of about
twenty-four months of revenue left on the contract of which North Atlantic was potentially
deprived, assuming North Atlantic can show that renewal of the contract was more than
speculative.99 Additionally, while North Atlantic has argued that its lost profits should not be
limited to only those profits stemming from the underlying contract but could also include lost
profits derived from “collateral undertakings,” such damages would have to be proven to a
reasonable certainty, which standard is not met solely through the testimony of Edwards and/or
Richardson. Further, North Atlantic’s own case law would require a showing that the “(1) the loss
was the proximate result of the breach; (2) the loss of profits caused by the breach was within the
contemplation of the parties because the loss was foreseeable or because the defaulting party had
knowledge of special circumstances at the time of contracting; and (3) a sufficient basis exists for
96
R. Doc. 50-4, p. 1, 4 (“Invitation to Bid”). See also, id. at p. 19 (contract awarded for an initial period not to exceed
12 months…at the option of the state and contractor, can be extended for 2 additional 12-month periods…total contract
time cannot exceed 36 months). The underlying contract is not in the record but is listed on the PTO by North Atlantic.
R. Doc. 78, p. 6.
97
R. Doc. 50-4, p. 1.
98
R. Doc. 63, p. 3 and R. Doc. 25, ¶ 15.
99
The contract was rebid on August 23, 2018. R Doc. 50-6, p. 1.
24
estimating the amount of lost profits with reasonable certainty.”100 This means that, under the test
North Atlantic asks this Court to adopt, in addition to reasonable certainty, it must also show that
Blache’s decision to contact OSP more directly caused (rather than was just a but-for cause of)101
the damages North Atlantic seeks to recover and that the loss(es) were foreseeable to Blache.
While this is a high hill and the Court is skeptical of North Atlantic’s ability to climb it,102 it cannot
be said at this point that the testimony of Edwards and/or Richardson would be inadmissible for
any purpose. Accordingly, the Motion will be denied as to their testimony at this time. Objections
to their testimony are reserved for trial.
III.
CONCLUSION
Blache’s Motion in Limine will be denied as to the portion of North Atlantic’s Exhibit 11
that is the December 2023 Report. Some of the December 2023 Report is directly relevant to the
remaining claim and other portions may also be relevant to that claim and/or Blache’s defenses;
however, the portion of Exhibit 11 that is the May 2023 Report will be excluded as any potential
relevance is outweighed by the potential prejudice to Blache. The Motion is denied as to Inspector
General Stephen B. Street, Jr. because he may have personal knowledge of the December 2023
100
R. Doc. 89, p. 15, citing Standard Fed. Bank, 62 Fed. Cl. at 273.
101
See, e.g., In re Complaint of ENSCO Offshore Co., 9 F.Supp.3d 713, 721 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (“Proximate cause is
more than “but for” causation….”).
102
See, 6 Saul Litvinoff & Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, The Law Of Obligations § 4.9 (2d ed.
2023) (“[T]he future profits lost by an established business may be regarded as reasonably certain when proved by a
record of past profits.” (citing McCormick, Damages 107 (1935) and White Haute, LLC v. Mayo, 9-CA-955 (La. App.
5 Cir. 3/23/10), 38 So.3d 944 (where the court held that a plaintiff’s claim that her new bar would be successful was
not a sufficient basis for awarding her lost future profits when she produced no documentation of the profits she
ordinarily earned at her former bar and when her explanation as to the greater profit she expected at her new bar was
vague and general.”). However, North Atlantic’s portion of the PTO does not seem to list any exhibit that appears to
contain evidence of past profits and, as noted above, the case law is clear that testimony of an injured party, which is
unsubstantiated by other evidence, does not constitute the reasonable certainty required to support a lost profits claim.
25
Report that is relevant to the remaining claim. OIG Investigator Nicole Compton is not listed as a
witness on the PTO and will not be permitted to testify.
The Motion will be granted as to North Atlantic’s Exhibit 12, the Board’s Response, which
is hearsay, and because Exhibit 12 is the only topic specified for Executive Secretary Major Carl
J. Saizan, Jr., his testimony will also be excluded. Other testimony and evidence offered regarding
investigations of Blache and his termination will be addressed in the context of its presentation at
trial.
The Motion will be granted as to North Atlantic’s Exhibit 7, “Itemization of losses by
NASC contracts,” because it contains confusing calculations, lacks explanation and supporting
documentation, and is prejudicial to Blache. The Motion will be denied as to the testimony of
current North Atlantic President Jabari Edwards and former North Atlantic President Antwann
Richardson. Edwards and Richardson will be permitted to testify regarding their personal
knowledge of lost profits, provided there is additional evidence introduced sufficient to
substantiate their testimony.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion in Limine, filed by Defendant Fabian Blache is
GRANTED IN PART. For the reasons set forth, above, the following are excluded from evidence
at the trial of this matter:
x
The portion of North Atlantic Exhibit 11 comprised of the May 2023 OIG Report;
x
North Atlantic Exhibit 12, the Board’s Response to the December 2023 OIG
Report;
x
Major Carl J. Saizan, Jr. as a witness; and
x
North Atlantic Exhibit 7, “Itemization of losses by NASC contracts.”
26
The Motion is DENIED as to all other exhibits and testimony sought to be excluded. All other
objections are reserved for trial.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, January 28, 2025.
S
ERIN WILDER-DOOMES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
27
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