Broussard v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and A & M College et al

Filing 77

RULING AND ORDER...IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion in Limine [doc. 63]; Defendants' Supplemental Motion in Limine [doc. 67] and Plaintiff's Motion in Limine [doc. 64] are each SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART, as set forth in the attached Ruling and Order. Signed by Judge Brian A. Jackson on 7/19/2021. (PJH)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MYRA BROUSSARD CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF NO. 19-00 52 7-BAJ-RLB

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
AND A & M COLLEGE, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court are three motions in limine: Defendants Motion In Limine
(Doc. 63); Defendants^ Supplemental Motion In Limine (Doc. 67); and
Plaintiffs Motion In Limine (Doc. 64). Each motion is opposed. For reasons to
follow, each motion be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND
This is an employment dispute. As stated in the Court s May 25, 2021 Order
denying Defendants motion for summary judgment (Doc. 71, the "Summary

Judgment Order"), the parties agree to nothing, save that Defendants employed
Plaintiff in some capacity at some undefined term.

The Summary Judgment Order sets forth the relevant factual and procedural
background, and is incorporated by reference here. A four-day trial is set to begin on

August 9, 2021, where the jury will weigh the evidence supporting Plaintiffs'
remaining claims of defamation, discharge in violation of due process, unpaid wages
in violation of La. R.S. § 23:631, and arbitrary demotion in violation of La. R.S.

17:443(A).
Now the parties have submitted multiple motions in limine, seeking to limit or

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exclude all manner of evidence from trial.

II. ANALYSIS
At the outset, it bears reminding that motions in limine are not favored.

Virtually any objection to the admissibility of evidence can and should
be handled in the old-fashioned way, to wit: counsel objecting at the time
the evidence is offered, thereby allowing the Court to rule on the
objection in the context of the trial. In Umine relief is warranted only in
unusual situations, such as a matter so explosive or so incendiary that

sustaining an objection in the routine way may not be sufficient to
overcome the risk of undue prejudice.
Louis Vuitton Malletier v, Eisenhauer Rd. FleaMfzt., Inc., No. ll-cv-124, 2012

WL 13034079, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2012) (Hudspeth, J.); accord United States v.
Smiths No. 18-cr-118, 2019 WL 4281908, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 2019) (Watkins,
J.) ("Motions in limine are not favored under the law.") D'Alton v. City of Billings, No.
OS-cv-159, 2006 WL 8431820, at *1 (D. Mont. Oct. 17, 2006) (Anderson, M.J.)
( pVTjotions in, limine are not favored, and questions of admissibility should generally
be resolved as they arise at trial. Unless the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any
purpose, or the mere attempt to introduce the evidence at trial will infuse the trial
with undue and incurable prejudice, the Court should defer ruling until the time of
trial, so that questions involving foundation, relevancy, and prejudice may be
considered in the context of all the other evidence.").
Here, the parties seek dozens of pretrial evidentiary rulings. Almost
universally, the evidentiary issues presented are pedestrian, and certainly not "so
explosive or incendiary" as to require pretrial relief.

Against this backdrop, the Court considers the specific items contained in the
parties motions. The Court addresses Defendants' motions first, followed by

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Plaintiffs motion.
A. Defendants Motions
i. Untimely-disclosed evidence

Defendants seek to exclude Plaintiffs Exhibits 93 and 94 (listed in the Joint
Pretrial Order), and Plaintiffs witness Johnny Shoptaugh {not listed in the Joint
Pretrial Order), contending that this evidence was not timely identified under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule ) 26. Defendants further contend that Exhibits
93 and 94 are not relevant to Plaintiffs claims.
a. Mr. Shoptaugh will be excluded from Plaintiffs casein-chief
According to Plaintiff, Mr. Shoptaugh is a ULS employee and possesses
firsthand knowledge of Interim Superintendent Westbrooks motivations for
demoting and terminating Plaintiff at the May 22, 2019 meeting. Plainly, such
testimony is relevant to Plaintiffs claims. Still, however, the Courts pretrial order
instructions prohibit trial testimony from witnesses not listed in the parties' jointly
submitted Pretrial Order, absent good cause shown. 1 Mr. Shoptaugh does not appear

among Plaintiffs witnesses listed on the Joint Pretrial Order, Plaintiff has not moved
to amend the Joint Pretrial Order to include Mr. Shoptaugh, and Plaintiff has not
demonstrated good cause to add Mr. Shoptaugh over Defendants' objection.

Accordingly, the Court will exclude Mr. Shoptaugh from providing testimony in
Plaintiffs case-in-chief.

1 Pretrial Order Instructions In Civil Matters Before Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson, at § III(J),
available at: https://www.lamd.uscourts.£ov/sites/default/files/forms/PretrialOrderInstructi
onsInCivilMattersBefore Chief JudseBrianA Jackson. D df.

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On the other hand, as noted by Plaintiff, under Rule 26(b)(3) witnesses used
solely for impeachment do not have to be disclosed prior to trial. DnJze v. Performance

Food Grp., Inc., 594 F. App'x 829, 831 (5th Cir. 2014). As such, the Court will reserve
ruling on the admissibility of Mr. Shoptaugh's testimony for impeachment purposes.

b. Exhibits 93 and 94 will be admitted to the extent they
are relevant to Plaintiffs claims
Exhibit 93 is an August 25, 2020 Accreditation Report authored by LSU, and
is a public record. Exhibit 94 is a March 2017 Report of the External Review Team
for LSU Laboratory School, and is likewise a public record. Defendants complain that
Plaintiff only identified these exhibits in her amended discovery responses, submitted
on August 31, 2020, after the July 8, 2020 final discovery deadline. Defendants
further contend that these exhibits are not relevant because "Defendants readily
concede that ULS is an excellent school." (Doc. 63-1 at 4).

Rule 26(e) specifically requires a party to supplement its disclosures and
discovery responses "in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material
respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known- to the other parties
during the discovery process or in writing." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). The Rule's "basic
purpose is to prevent prejudice and surprise" at trial. Reed v. Iowa Marine & Repair

Corp., 16 F.3d 82, 85 (5th Cir. 1994).
Here, Defendants cannot credibly claim that they are prejudiced or surprised
by the Exhibits, despite having been identified for the first time after discovery closed.
Plaintiff supplemented her discovery responses to identify these additional Exhibits

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nearly one year before trial, thus affording Defendants ample opportunity to respond.

Equally important, Defendants authored these Exhibits and are therefore well-aware
of their contents.2 Defendants' objection to the timeliness of these Exhibits is
overruled.

Without more information, and without having been provided copies of
Exhibits 93 and 94, the Court has no basis to determine whether these Exhibits are
relevant or not. The Court will reserve ruling on the relevance of Exhibits 93 and 94.
ii. Defendants' treatment of Frank Rusciano

Next, Defendants seek to exclude all evidence tending to show that Plaintiff
and Frank Rusciano were treated differently following "the Cub Care debacle,"
including that Plaintiff was demoted and terminated, whereas Mr. Rusciano was
allowed to take two years' paid leave, and then return to employment at ULS.

Defendants argue that any such evidence is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial
because Plaintiff has not alleged a claim for disparate treatment." (Doc. 63-1 at 7).
Plaintiff concedes that she has not alleged a stand-alone claim of disparate treatment,

but nonetheless argues this evidence is relevant (and not unduly prejudicial) to her
claim of reprisal under La. R.S. § 23:967, because it shows that Defendants' decision
to terminate her employment was motivated by pretext. (Doc. 69 at 5-6).

Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in

3 Further, and in any event, these Exhibits are public records, and therefore subject to judicial
notice, which may occur "at any stage of the proceeding." Fed. R. Evid. 201; see Swindol v.

Aurora Flight Scis. Corp., 805 F.3d 516, 519 (5th Cir. 2015) (taking judicial notice of public
records available on official websites under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2)).

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determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible,

Fed. R. Evid. 402, but may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading
the jury," Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Plainly, evidence is not relevant—and is therefore inadmissible—if it relates
only to non-existent claims. Plaintiff does not allege a claim of disparate treatment,
and her claim of reprisal has since been dismissed with prejudice. As such, evidence

regarding Mr. Rusciano s fate at ULS following the Cub Care debacle cannot be
admitted in support of any such claims.

This is not the end of the inquiry, however, because Plaintiff also maintains a
viable defamation claim, to which Defendants have raised a defense of qualified
privilege. As explained in the Court s July 8, 2021 Order denying Defendants' motion
for summary judgment. Defendants invocation of qualified privilege requires a
determination of whether the privilege was abused, which [in turn] requires that the
grounds for abuse—malice or lack of good faith—be examined." Kennedy v. Sheriff of

E, Baton Rouge, 2005-1418 (La. 7/10/06), 935 So. 2d 669, 682. The summary judgment
evidence shows that Plaintiff and Mr. Rusciano were equally involved in "the Cub
Care debacle, (Defendants' words). If Defendants treated Mr. Rusciano more
favorably afterwards, such treatment would tend to show that Defendants'

defamatory statements against Plaintiff were motivated by malice or bad faith. As
such, evidence regarding Mr. Rusciano's treatment is relevant, and not unduly

prejudicial because it merely provides the appropriate context within which to

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evaluate Plaintiffs defamation claim. Defendants' objection is overruled.

iii. Evidence ofULS athletic camps
Defendants also seek to exclude all evidence of "summer camps hosted at ULS

by athletic coaches," arguing that Plaintiff should not be allowed to compare "the
creation of Cub Care LLC to other camps run by athletic coaches." (Doc. 63-1 at 7-8).
Defendants insist that any such comparison is inappropriate because Louisiana law

expressly allows public employees to contract with their employers to provide athletic
coaching, but would forbid a public employee from contracting with her employer to
provide school after-care services. (Id. at 8). "Accordingly, the set up and structure of

a camp run by an athletic coach is governed by a rule that was not applicable to Cub
Care/ and information regarding coach s camps is irrelevant, [and] has the potential
to be confusing and/or prejudicial." (Id. at 9).
Plaintiff responds that she intends to present evidence and testimony related
to how other camps were run at LSU and/or LSU Lab in support of her claim for
defamation, namely as to the elements of falsify and fault, which are separate

elements that stand apart from any consideration of whether Cub Care LLC's
corporate structure ran afoul of Louisiana law. (Doc. 69 at 6-7).

Again, Defendants' objection will be overruled. Plaintiff has maintained
throughout these proceedings that she organized Cub Care LLC with ULS's express
permission and approval. LSLTs September 28 Audit reflects the same, stating that
Superintendent Smith approved" Plaintiffs additional compensation, and that
Plaintiff thereafter conducted her actions vis-a-vis Cub Care <([w]ith the assistance of
the Superintendent's Office." (Doc. 58-10 at 39). Thereafter, however, the September

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28 Audit alleges that Plaintiff surreptitiously schemed to line her own pockets by
withholding student funds after ULS denied her request for additional compensation.
This blatant contradiction—i.e., that Plaintiff conducted herself with the full support
and approval of ULS administration and at the same time secretly conspired to
violate ULS policy and Louisiana law—is at the heart of Plaintiffs defamation claim.
Evidence that Defendants regularly contracted with employees to provide "coach's

camps at ULS supports Plaintiffs assertion that Defendants encouraged Plaintiff to
organize Cub Care LLC with a similar structure. The same evidence tends to show

that Defendants' subsequent accusations that Plaintiff acted covertly and in her own
self-interest were false and malicious. As such, the evidence is relevant, and, again,

not unduly prejudicial or confusing because it provides the appropriate context within
which to evaluate Plaintiffs defamation claim. Defendants' objection is overruled.
iv. Evidence relating to Plaintiffs replacement at ULS
Defendants seek to exclude evidence relating to Plaintiffs replacement as
elementary principal, contending that "[hjirings ... subsequent to LSLTs notice ofnon-

renewal to Plaintiff have no bearing on Plaintiffs claims." (Doc. 63-1 at 9). Plaintiff
responds that such evidence is related to her reprisal claim and her due process claim,

because it "tends to make the fact that LSU did demote and terminate her more
probable." (Doc. 69 at 8).
Again, evidence is not relevant if it relates only to nonexistent claims. As such,

this evidence cannot be admitted to support Plaintiffs failed reprisal claim. Yet,
again, however, this is not the end of the analysis, because Plaintiffs due process
claim also requires proof that she was discharged. See Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake,

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Miss., 449 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2006). Notably, Defendants have challenged this
specific element, asserting in their summary judgment papers that Plaintiff was not
discharged, and was merely non-renewed. Evidence that Plaintiff was replaced
plainly supports her claim that she was discharged from her role as elementary
principal. Defendants' objection is overruled.

v. Plaintiffs medical records
Defendant seeks to exclude evidence of Plaintiffs medical history since her
termination, arguing that "Plaintiff should not be permitted to refer to her medical
records or to testify regarding any medical issues she has experienced when
Defendants have never had the opportunity to review these records." (Doc. 63-1 at 9).

Plaintiff responds that she timely identified her medical records as required by Rule
26, but objected to production of the same without a protective order, and thereafter
submitted a proposed protective order for Defendants' approval. "Defendants never
responded," and failed to make any additional inquiry regarding these records. (Doc.

69 at 20-21). Plaintiff states that she "intends to produce these records" to Defendants
on the July 30, 2021 deadline to exchange exhibits, and further asserts that
Defendants are not prejudiced by these exhibits as they are limited to the issue of
damages." {Id. at 21).

The Court will not exclude Plaintiffs medical records. First, these records are
obviously relevant to Plaintiffs' damages, which may account for adverse health
consequences resulting from Defendants actions. See, e.g., Cluse v. H & E Equip.

Servs., Inc., 2009-574 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/31/10), 34 So. 3d 959, 971 (affirming that
damages awards for defamation may include compensation for "humiliation,"

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"embarrassment," and "mental distress"), writ denied, 2010-0994 (La. 9/17/10), 45 So.
3d 1043. Moreover, Defendants are reminded that <([d]iscovery is, in large part, a selfpolicing process." Pendlebnry v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 04"cv"80521, 2005 WL

8156155, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2005) (Seltzer, M.J.). Here, Plaintiff timely
identified her medical records, and thereafter objected to their production absent a
protective order. Plaintiff even proposed a protective order for Defendants'
consideration. At that point, it was incumbent upon Defendants to make the next

move. Instead, Defendants did nothing, and appear to have forgotten the issue until
Plaintiff included her medical records among her Exhibits in the Pretrial Order.
Exclusion of evidence under Rule 37 is a severe sanction, not justified by the
record here, which shows that the ball was plainly in Defendants' court. Still,
Defendants are obviously entitled to review this evidence sufficiently in advance of
trial to prepare their defense. See Bankston v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., No. CV 03-577"

A-M2, 2005 WL 8155221, at *2 (M.D. La. Oct. 17, 2005) (Noland, M.J.) ("The Federal
Discovery Rules, by design, are calculated to prevent trial by ambush, (quoting

Shelak v. Wizite Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1978)). As such, Plaintiff shall
immediately produce to Defendants all medical records she intends to rely on at trial.
vi. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 40, 51-56, 61,62,63,76,78, 79,86,89,
90, 95, 97
Defendant seeks to exclude Plaintiffs' Exhibits 40, 51-56, 61, 62, 63,76,78, 79,
86, 89, 90, 95, 97, on the basis that they are irrelevant to Plaintiffs' remaining claims.3

3 Further, Defendants' seek an order allowing them to redact portions of their own exhibit,
Defendant's Exhibit 13. Defendant's request is contingent on the (non) availability of a
witness to testify at trial. The Court will reserve ruling on Defendants' objection until it is

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Plaintiff offers no opposition to Defendants' arguments regarding Exhibits 62,
63, 95, and 97. [TJhe Court will not speculate on arguments that have not been
advanced, or attempt to develop arguments on [Plaintiffs] behalf." Gray v. City of
Denham Springs, No. 19-cv-00889, 2021 WL 1187076, at *5 (M.D. La. Mar. 29, 2021)
(Jackson, J.) (alterations omitted and quotation marks omitted). Defendants'
objections to Exhibits 62, 63, 95, and 97 will be sustained as unopposed, and these
Exhibits will be excluded from trial.
The Court is satisfied based on the present showing that Plaintiffs Exhibits
40, 51-56, 62, 76, 78, 79,86,89, and 90 are relevant to Plaintiffs remaining claims of
defamation, discharge in violation of due process, unpaid wages in violation of La.

R.S. § 23:631, and arbitrary demotion in violation of La. R.S. § 17:443(A). Accordingly,
Defendants' objections will be overruled as to these Exhibits, without prejudice to
Defendants' right to re-assert specific objections should cause arise at trial.

vii. Plaintiffs deposition errata sheet
Next, Defendants object to Plaintiffs deposition errata sheet, arguing that it
makes substantive changes that are inconsistent with Plaintiffs deposition
testimony. Specifically, Defendants object that, at her deposition, Plaintiff testified
that she did not take Cub Care documents home, but then submitted an errata sheet
stating that she did take documents home, and only returned them to ULS after she
met with auditors. (Doc. 63-1 at 13-14). Defendants argue that "Plaintiffs original
answers [should] remain a part of the record," (Doc. 63-1 at 14), so that they may

determined whether or not the witness will appear at trial.

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"question Plaintiff about the change in testimony" on cross-examination, (Doc. 75 at

6).
Rule 30(e) allows a deponent to review a deposition transcript and (<[i]f there
are changes in form or substance, to sign a statement listing the changes and the
reasons for making them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e); Gonsalez v. Fresenius Med. Care N.

Am., 689 F.3d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 2012). As noted recently by this Court, authorities
are split regarding the proper interpretation of Rule 30(e):
A majority point to Rule 30(e)'s plain terms and therefore permit
deponents to make changes that contradict the original answers given,
even if those changes are not supported by convincing explanations, as

long as the deponent complies with the instructions provided within the
rule itself for making such changes. A substantial and growing minority,

however, hold that Rule 30(e) is to be used for corrective, and not
contradictory, changes. A vision animates this school: if a deponent can

freely revise their testimony afterward, the deposition has become a
take home examination, and its utility as a discovery device wholly
forfeited.

United States v. Louisiana, 196 F. Supp. 3d 612, 677-78 (M.D. La. 2016) (deGravelles,
J.) (quotation marks omitted; citing authorities), vacated on, other grounds, 2017 WL
4118968 (M.D. La. Aug. 21, 2017).
To date, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has not addressed the
scope of permissible substantive corrections to a deposition under Rule 30(e). District
courts within the Fifth Circuit have varied in their approaches, with some adopting
the majority view described above, and others adopting the minority" view. See id,
at 677-78; see also Reilly v. TXU Corp., 230 F.R.D. 486, 487 (N.D. Tex. 2005)

(discussing authorities).
Based on the present record, and faced with a split of authorities and no clear

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guidance from the Fifth Circuit, the Court determines that Defendants should be
allowed to question Plaintiff regarding her revisions "so that the reasons for her
changes can be subjected to proper scrutiny." See Louisiana, 196 F. Supp. 3d at 678.

Plaintiffs errata sheet plainly contradicts her deposition testimony, and calls into
question Plaintiffs credibility. In any other circumstance, this would be an obvious
point of cross-examination. Accordingly, Defendants' objection is sustained, and

Plaintiffs errata sheet and the original version of her deposition transcript will be
allowed to remain in- the trial record. E.g., Hernandez v. Rush Enterprises, Inc., 336
F.R.D. 534, 536 (E.D. Tex. 2020) ("Hernandez's errata sheet will be allowed to remain
in the trial record, along with the original version of the transcript.").

viii. The ULS cheerleading squad survey
Defendants seek to exclude evidence of a prior survey conducted by Interim

Superintendent Westbrook regarding the ULS high school cheeiieading program,
contending that it is wholly unrelated to Plaintiffs claims." (Doc. 67-1 at 3). Plaintiff
counters that the survey is relevant to her reprisal claim because it supports her

allegation that her termination was pretextual. (Doc. 69 at 15). Having dismissed
Plaintiffs reprisal claim, the Court will exclude evidence of the cheerleading survey.
ix. Interim Superintendent Westbrook's previous

application for the principal position at ULS
Defendants seek to exclude evidence of that, in 2006, Interim Superintendent

Westbrook applied for a principal position at ULS, but was passed over in favor of
Plaintiff. (Doc. 67-1 at 3-4). Again, Plaintiff responds that such evidence is relevant
to her reprisal claim because it shows that Interim Superintendent Westbrook

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harbored a grudge, and fired her for illegitimate reasons. Again, Plaintiffs reprisal
claim has been dismissed, the Court will exclude evidence of Interim Superintendent
Westbrooks prior job application.
x. ULS s admission criteria and practices
Defendants seek to exclude any reference to ULS's admissions criteria,

asserting that Plaintiff intends to criticize the admissions process solely to "inflame
the jury and/or embarrass." (Doc. 67-1 at 5-6). Plaintiff responds that ULS's

admissions process is fair game because many of the parent complaints that allegedly
resulted in her termination specifically referenced the admissions process. The Court

is satisfied based on the present showing that this evidence is relevant to Plaintiffs
remaining claims of discharge in violation of due process and arbitrary demotion in
violation of La. R.S. § 17:443(A). Accordingly, Defendants' objections will be
overruled, without prejudice to Defendants' right to re-assert specific objections

should cause arise at trial
xi. Defendants delivery the IMay 22, 2019 non-renewal

letter to Plaintiff
Finally, Defendants seek to exclude evidence related to "the manner in which

[Plaintiff] received the notice of her nonrenewal as principal of the University Lab
School. (Doc. 67-1 at 5). This objection verges on the absurd. Plainly, the "manner"

in which Plaintiff received notice of her demotion and termination is relevant to her
claims of discharge in violation of due process and arbitrary demotion. Defendants'
objection is overruled.

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B. Plaintiffs Motion
i. Evidence relating to Defendants reasons for demoting
and terminating Plaintiff
Plaintiff seeks to exclude "any testimony or evidence relating to [Defendants']
alleged legitimate, non-retaliatory reason(s) for plaintiffs demotion/termination,
including an alleged teacher survey and/or email complaints from parents and other
faculty." (Doc. 64-1 at 1-2). Plaintiff complains that she has not received "the contents
of the responses resulting in the teacher survey results, and, further, has received

only 4 of 25 "complaint" emails. {Id. at 3-4). As such, Plaintiff argues that she has had
no ability to test Defendants' alleged reasons for her termination, and would be
prejudiced if this evidence is admitted at trial. (Id. at 5).
Notably, Defendants do not contest Plaintiffs assertions regarding the missing
emails. (See Doc. 70 at 3-5). Still, Defendants argue that they should be allowed to
present evidence that emails and complaints from parents and teachers and the

results of the survey certainly formed the motivation for [Plaintiffs termination]."
(Doc. 70 at 4).
As an initial matter, the Court is deeply troubled by Defendants production of
emails (or lack thereof). Indeed, the Court has previously addressed precisely this
issue. In its September 28, 2020 Order granting Plaintiffs motion to compel, the
Court unambiguously ordered Defendants to produce "any and all emails relating to

complaints concerning Plaintiff from parents and teachers of the LSU Lab School,"
(Doc. 47 at 5), and further ruled that "[t]o the extent [Defendants reasons for
Plaintiffs termination] are supported with documentary evidence, those materials

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must be provided Plaintiff, (Doc. 47 at 9-10). Apparently, Defendants disregarded
this direct Order. Disregarding a Court order is sanctionable conduct.4
In any event, the challenged emails and survey results relate exclusively to
Defendants non-retaliatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff, and therefore are

relevant only to Plaintiffs reprisal claim. Again, Plaintiffs reprisal claim has been
dismissed. As such, the Court will exclude all evidence related to the teacher survey
and email complaints that allegedly formed Defendants' non-retaliatory reasons for

terminating Plaintiff.5
ii. Additional objections to evidence relating to
Defendants' reasons for demoting and terminating

Plaintiff
Separately, Plaintiff seeks to exclude (1) the teacher survey, (2) a spreadsheet
summarizing parent complaint emails, and (3) Defendants' Exhibit 33—identified as
Emails constituting parent and teacher complaints to Westbrook between January
1, 2019, and March 31, 2019—on the basis that these documents contain hearsay,
and, further, are each derived from sources that were not produced during discovery.
(Doc. 64-1 at 6-10). For separate reasons explained above, the Court has already

ruled that the teacher survey, the parent complaint emails, and all related exhibits
are inadmissible because they are not relevant to Plaintiffs remaining claims. As

4 Separately, the Court shall require Defendants and Defendants counsel to show cause why
sanctions should not be imposed for violating of this Court's September 28 Order requiring
production of all evidence relating to Defendants reasons for terminating Plaintiff.
6 The Court will reconsider this ruling at trial, to the extent the trial record shows that the
teacher survey and complaint emails may be relevant to Plaintiffs claim of arbitrary
demotion (which requires an evaluation of the written reasons for Plaintiffs demotion, La.

R.S. § 17:443(A)).

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such, Plaintiffs objections here are overruled as moot.6

iii. Defendants' Exhibit 34, aLSU Audit working papers^
Plaintiff objects to Defendants' Exhibit 34—-identified as "LSU Audit working
papers—asserting that this document was never identified or produced in discovery,

despite being responsive to Plaintiffs discovery requests. (Doc. 64-1 at 11).
Defendants offer no counter-argument, and state only that "[o]nce the parties agree

to a joint exhibit list, the Defendants may agree to withdraw these documents." (Doc.
70 at 6).
Again, the Court will not speculate on arguments that have not been advanced,

or attempt to develop arguments on a party's behalf. Gray, 2021 WL 1187076, at *5
Plaintiffs objection to Exhibit 34 will be sustained as unopposed, and this Exhibit
will be excluded from trial.
iv. References to taxpayer monies in satisfaction of

judgment
Finally, Plaintiff seeks to preclude Defendants "from making any mention of
whether or not taxpayer monies are and/or would be involved depending on the
outcome of the jury's decision, on the basis that any such references would serve

only to inflame the jury and obscure trial of the claims in this case." (Doc 64-1 at 11).
Defendants respond that they "currently have no intention of addressing the fact that
taxpayer monies would be needed to satisfy any judgment," but nonetheless counsel

the Court to withhold ruling on any such issue depending on the nature of the

6 And again, the Court will reconsider this ruling at trial, to the extent the trial record shows
that the teacher survey and complaint emails may be relevant to Plaintiffs remaining claims.

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arguments presented. (Doc. 70 at 6).

If Plaintiff proves her case, and the jury determines that she is entitled to a
damages judgment, then, plainly, the quantum of damages should be determined
according to the facts of the case, not the source of the funds that will be used to pay
the judgment. It follows that any reference to taxpayer monies" funding a judgment
would be unfairly prejudicial. Plaintiffs objection is sustained.

III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion In Limine (Doc. 63),
Defendants Supplemental Motion In Limine (Doc. 67), and Plaintiffs IVEotion

In Limine (Doc. 64) are each SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN
PART, as set forth in this Order.

^

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this / I day of July, 2021

JUDGE BRIAN<4-^CKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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