Parkman v. W&T Offshore, Inc. et al

Filing 66

RULING denying with out prejudice 58 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's request for additional discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) is granted to a limited extent, as written. Signed by Judge John W. deGravelles on 1/10/2022. (LLH)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JASON PARKMAN

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 3:20-CV-883-JWD-EWD

W&T OFFSHORE, INC., ET AL

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY
BAKER HUGHES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Baker
Hughes Energy Services LLC (“BHES”). (Doc. 58.) It is opposed by plaintiff Jason Parkman
(“Plaintiff” or “Parkman”). (Doc. 62.) BHES filed a reply brief. (Doc. 63.) The Court has carefully
considered the law, facts in the record and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is
prepared to rule. For the reasons which follow, the motion is denied without prejudice.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a tort suit in state court on November 20, 2020 against various defendants

including BHES. (Doc. 1-1 at 4.) On December 29, 2020, the case was removed to this Court.
(Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that on August 25, 2018, he sustained serious injuries while working
on an “offshore drilling rig” off the coast of Louisiana. (Doc. 1-1 at 4, ¶ 1; id. at 5, ¶¶ 7-8; id. at
8, ¶ 21 (Petition); Doc. 1-1 at 16, ¶ 1 (affidavit of Plaintiff attached to Petition).) “Plaintiff brings
his claim under Louisiana law under the OCSLA.” 1 (Doc. 1-1 at 5, ¶ 2.)
Plaintiff names eight defendants including BHES and Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations
LLC (“BHOO”). He alleges that on the date of the accident, “[t]he named Defendants” held a
safety meeting to determine how to resolve an issue with equipment which was stuck downhole.
(Id. at 8, ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that “all Defendants” decided to lift Plaintiff via winch to the top
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Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq.

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of the rig to trouble shoot the problem. (Id.) Although “all Defendants” were supposed to be
monitoring the lift to ensure it was made safely, Plaintiff’s secondary harness got caught on
stationary rig equipment and yet “Defendants” continued to lift Plaintiff causing him serious
injuries, including paraplegia. (Id. at 8, ¶ 23.)
Plaintiff then specifies that BHES, BHOO and certain other Defendants were negligent
and grossly negligent in the following non-exclusive ways:
a. Unsafe work practices relating to lifting Plaintiff to trouble shoot the stuck drilling
equipment;
b. Unsafe work practices relating to planning the job in question;
c. Failure to perform an adequate JSA for the job in question;
d. Failure to perform an adequate hazard assessment for the job in question;
e. Failure to properly supervise the job in question;
f. Failure to have adequate policies and procedures for the job in question;
g. Failure to exercise stop work authority;
h. Failure to stop the job when Plaintiff’s harness was caught;
i. Failure to identify safer means to trouble shoot the stuck drilling equipment;
j. Failure to warn and advise Plaintiff of the risks relating to the job in question;
k. Failure to configure the rigging equipment in a safe manner to allow Plaintiff to be
lifted safely;
l. Failure to provide adequate safety equipment;
m. Failure to provide a safe working environment;
n. Instructing H&P workers to perform work in an unsafe manner;
o. Failure to warn Plaintiff of hidden dangers; and

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p. Other acts deemed negligent and grossly negligent.
(Doc. 1-1 at 9–10.)
II.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
BHES admits that BHOO “did provide services and personnel on H&P rig 107 on the date

of the subject accident and does not seek dismissal [of BHOO] from plaintiff’s suit by way of this
motion.” (Doc. 58 at 1.) However, as to BHES, it contends that it “provided no services or
personnel” on H&P rig 107 “on the date of the accident, August 25, 2018”, nor did it provide
services or personnel on H&P rig 107 or to the well or wells it was drilling for W&T Offshore,
Inc…at any time prior to the date of the plaintiff’s accident.” (Id.) These contentions are supported
by the Declaration of Angelina Craig, Senior Paralegal for Baker Hughes Company. (Doc. 58-3 at
¶ 9.)
In his opposition, Plaintiff “asks the Court to defer ruling on [BHES’s] motion until
Plaintiff can depose a Baker Hughes corporate representative and conduct targeted discovery to
assess the validity of [BHES’s] claims.” (Doc. 62 at 1.) Plaintiff bases his request on Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(d) which allows the Court to defer consideration of a Motion for Summary Judgment and
allow additional discovery “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues he “is not
in possession of evidence that he could put forth to refute or confirm [BHES’s] claims” and states
that he “is working on scheduling a Baker Hughes’ deposition early in early 2022 and hopes to
exchange discovery soon.” (Doc. 62 at 2.)
Pointing the Court to recent Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, BHES argues that Plaintiff has
utterly failed to meet his burden to show entitlement to the relief he seeks and specifically fails to
1) “explain how the discovery he proposes would preclude the entry of summary judgment against

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him”; 2) justify “why such discovery has not been or could not [have been] obtained earlier”, and
3) “set forth a plausible basis for believing the sought-after facts that would preclude summary
judgment actually exist.” (Id. citing, inter alia, Bin Hoa Le v. Exeter Financial Corporation, 990
F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2021); Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d 594, 601 (5th Cir. 2020).
III.

STANDARD
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the mover bears his burden of showing that there is no genuine
issue of fact, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts. . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986) (internal citations
omitted). The non-mover’s burden is not satisfied by “conclusory allegations, by
unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075(5th Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 475 U.S. at 587.
Further:
In resolving the motion, the court may not undertake to evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve
factual disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that
a reasonable jury drawing all inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party could arrive at a verdict in that party’s favor, the
court must deny the motion.
Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).
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On the issue of Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) request for discovery,
When a party requests a continuance of a summary judgment motion
to conduct discovery, the moving party must ... (1) ‘demonstrat[e]
... specifically how the requested discovery pertains to the pending
motion,’ and (2) ‘diligently pursue relevant discovery.’ ” [citing
Campbell Harrison & Dagley, L.L.P. v. PBL Multi-Strategy Fund,
L.P., 744 F. App'x 192, 197 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Wichita Falls
Off. Assocs. v. Banc One Corp., 978 F.2d 915, 919 (5th Cir. 1992))].
As to the first requirement, the party must explain “how the
additional discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact.
[quoting Krim v. BancTexas Grp., Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1442 (5th
Cir. 1993)].
Binh Hoa Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2021)
Stated another way,
Motions made under Rule 56(d) “are broadly favored and should be
liberally granted,” but a nonmovant “may not simply rely on vague
assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but
unspecified, facts.” [Am. Fam. Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v.
Biles, 714 F.3d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 2013)]. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). “Rather, a request to stay summary judgment
under Rule 56([d]) must set forth a plausible basis for believing that
specified facts, susceptible of collection within a reasonable time
frame, probably exist and indicate how the emergent facts, if
adduced, will influence the outcome of the pending summary
judgment motion.” Raby v. Livingston, 600 F.3d 552, 561 (5th Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d 594, 600–01 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2519, 209 L. Ed.
2d 551 (2021).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Applying the standard as articulated in Binh Hoa Le and Renfroe, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has set forth a plausible basis for believing that specified facts, susceptible of collection
within a reasonable time frame, probably exist and he has indicated how the emergent facts, if
adduced, will influence the outcome of the pending summary judgment motion. Specifically,
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Plaintiff wants to depose a corporate representative of BHES to test the accuracy of the facts set
out in the Declaration of Angelina Craig which support BHES’s motion. Although this deposition
could have been taken earlier, the Court notes that the deadline for fact discovery is March 1, 2022.
(Doc. 55.) The information produced at such a deposition would influence the outcome of the
motion by either confirming the accuracy of Ms. Craig’s Declaration or not.
Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Baker Hughes Energy Services LLC
(Doc. 58) is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff’s request for additional discovery under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(d) is granted to this limited extent. Plaintiff may take the 30(b)(6) deposition of Baker
Hughes Energy Services LLC limited to testing the facts set out in Declaration of Angelina Craig.
The deposition must be completed by February 15, 2021. It is expected that if the statements set
out therein are confirmed in the deposition, the re-filed Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf
of Baker Hughes Energy Services LLC will not be opposed or, alternatively, this defendant will
be dismissed voluntarily by Plaintiff.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 10, 2022.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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