Nairne et al v. Ardoin
RULING denying 149 Motion for Summary Judgment. (SWE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DOROTHY NAIRNE, et al
R. KYLE ARDOIN, in his capacity
as Secretary of State of Louisiana
Before the Court is a Joint Motion for Summary Judgment1 filed by Defendants, R.
Kyle Ardoin, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Louisiana; Attorney General
Jeff Landry on behalf of the State of Louisiana; and by the Legislative Intervenors Clay
Schexnayder and Patrick Page Cortez (collectively, “Defendants”).2 Plaintiffs, Dr. Dorothy
Nairne, Rev. Clee Earnest Lowe, Dr. Alice Washington, Steven Harris, the Louisiana
State Conference of the NAACP, and the Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed an Opposition,3 and Defendants filed a Reply.4 The parties
also submitted supplemental briefing.5 For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that
the Defendants’ Motion shall be DENIED.
Plaintiffs, a group of Black Louisianans and Louisiana nonprofit organizations, filed
the instant action on March 14, 2022, alleging that the 2022 redistricting plans for the
Louisiana House of Representatives and State Senate unlawfully diluted their votes in
Rec. Doc. 149.
Although Defendant Secretary of State Ardoin did not join in the Motion to Stay, the movants aver that he
was consulted and “consent[s] to the relief sought herein.” Rec. Doc. 61, p. 2.
Rec. Doc. 163.
Rec. Doc. 180.
Rec. Doc. 172; Rec. Doc. 173.
violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 10301. Four
Individual Plaintiffs and two Entity Plaintiffs remain in this matter. The four Individual
Plaintiffs, Dr. Dorothy Nairne, Rev. Clee Earnest Lowe, Dr. Alice Washington, and Steven
Harris, reside in House Districts 25, 60, 66, and 69 and Senate Districts 2, 16, and 29.6
Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute (“BVM”) and the Louisiana State
Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (the
“Louisiana NAACP” or “NAACP”) (collectively, the “Entity Plaintiffs”) serve as the two
Entity Plaintiffs to this matter. The Entity Plaintiffs describe themselves as “non-profit civic
engagement organizations working to empower Black political participation.”7 Defendants
move for summary judgment, arguing that the Entity Plaintiffs are unable to establish
standing to bring this suit.
Prior to filing the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants propounded
discovery on Plaintiffs, requesting the personal identifying information of the Louisiana
NAACP’s members. Plaintiffs objected to Defendants’ Interrogatory No. 3 for several
reasons, including that it sought “information protected by Plaintiff’s and its members’
First Amendment rights.”8 Defendants filed a Motion to Compel production of the
information, which was denied by Magistrate Judge Scott D. Johnson.9 Thereafter,
Defendants moved the Court for a review of the decision, claiming that the requested
membership information was relevant to the determination of whether the NAACP had
associational standing to pursue its claims.10 The Court agreed that associational
Rec. Doc. 163-1, pp. 2–3.
Rec. Doc. 163, p. 4.
Rec. Doc. 119-4, p. 9.
Rec. Doc. 132; Rec. Doc. 136.
Rec. Doc. 144.
standing had been challenged by Defendants and referred the Defendants’ Motion to
Compel a response to Interrogatory No. 3 back to the Magistrate Judge for
reconsideration.11 Plaintiffs were ordered to supplement the Answer to Interrogatory No.
3 by “providing both the name and address of the individual member(s) from the
challenged districts that the NAACP intends to offer at trial to establish associational
standing, or any other part of its claim.”12
After Plaintiffs provided the information as ordered, the parties were permitted to
file supplemental briefs relating to the associational standing issue in support or in
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.13 Therein, Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs’ supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 3 is untimely, prejudicial to
Defendants, and would be inappropriately considered by the Court.14 However, given the
history stated above, Defendants’ insistence on supplementation of this information, and
the Court’s Order compelling disclosure of the information, the Court rejects Defendants’
argument. Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 3 will be considered on
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”15 “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all
Rec. Doc. 158; Rec. Doc. 159.
Rec. Doc. 169, p. 2.
Rec. Doc. 170.
Rec. Doc. 172.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”16 A party moving for summary judgment “must ‘demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant’s
case.”17 If the moving party satisfies its burden, “the non-moving party must show that
summary judgment is inappropriate by setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence
of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.’”18 However, the
non-moving party’s burden “is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a
scintilla of evidence.”19
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”20 All reasonable factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.21 However, “[t]he court has no duty
to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the summary
judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate precisely
how this evidence supports his claim.”22 “Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific
facts . . . will not prevent an award of summary judgment; ‘the plaintiff [can]not rest on his
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008).
Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Par. Nursing Home, 246 F. Supp. 2d 488, 494 (M.D. La. 2003) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323–25 (1986)).
Rivera v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Morris v. Covan World Wide
Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075).
Pylant v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
allegations . . . to get to a jury without “any significant probative evidence tending to
support the complaint.”’”23
B. Article III Standing
“Article III standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite.”24 If a plaintiff lacks standing to
bring a claim, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.25 The party
seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of showing that standing existed
at the time the lawsuit was filed.26 Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’
jurisdiction to certain “cases” and “controversies.” “[N]o principle is more fundamental to
the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation
of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”27 “One element of the caseor-controversy requirement” is that plaintiffs “must establish that they have standing to
sue.”28 The United States Supreme Court has held that “the irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three elements”:29
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be
a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—
the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
Crenshaw-Logal v. City of Abilene, Tex., 436 F. App’x. 306, 308 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998); Xerox Corp. v. Genmoora Corp., 888 F.2d 345, 350 (5th Cir.
Whitmore v. Ark., 495 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1990); Chair King, Inc. v. Hous. Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507,
509 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogated by Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (2012).
The M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001); Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001); Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See, e.g., Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–493 (2009).
Raines, 521 U.S. at 818. See also Summers, 555 U.S. at 492–493; DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at
342; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.30
To establish Article III standing, an injury must be “concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent.”31 A particularized injury is one which “affect[s] the plaintiff in a
personal and individual way.”32 “Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat elastic
concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged
injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly
impending.”33 “Allegations of possible future injury” do not suffice.34
When standing is challenged at the pleading stage, “general factual allegations of
injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice” because on a motion to dismiss,
it is presumed that “general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary
to support the claim.”35 “When the defendant moves for summary judgment because of
lack of standing, however, the plaintiff must submit affidavits and comparable evidence
that indicate that a genuine issue of fact exists on the standing issue.”36
C. Standing of Parties
Defendants question whether the four Individual Plaintiffs will be able to prove their
standing at trial but do not move for summary dismissal of the Individual Plaintiffs’
claims.37 Instead, Defendants concede that the Individual Plaintiffs may proceed to trial
on their claims, where they will be put to their burden of proof.38 The question for summary
Id. at 560–61 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010).
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Whitmore v. Ark., 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (emphasis added).
Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Meadowbriar
Home for Child., Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1996); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
Id. (quoting Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1025 (5th Cir. 1991)).
Rec. Doc. 149-1, p. 17.
judgment, therefore, is whether the Entity Plaintiffs, BVM and the NAACP, have standing
When a plaintiff is an organization, “the standing requirements of Article III can be
satisfied in two ways. Either the organization can claim that it suffered an injury in its own
right or, alternatively, it can assert ‘standing solely as the representative of its
members.’”39 Organizational and associational standing are alternative paths for the
plaintiff organization to satisfy Article III standing. For example, “[e]ven in the absence of
injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its
members.”40 A plaintiff’s specific claims determine which one type of standing must be
satisfied, as it depends on who suffered the injury alleged and what relief is sought.41
Here, Plaintiffs concede that BVM does not have associational standing. Therefore, the
Court will begin its analysis by assessing the associational standing of the NAACP.
a. Associational Standing of NAACP
An organization has the associational standing necessary to bring suit on behalf
of its members when: “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit.”42 Because the organization’s members should
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 199 (2023)
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
Warth, 422 U.S. at 515 (“whether an association has standing to invoke the court’s remedial powers on
behalf of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought. If in a proper case
the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably
be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association
actually injured. Indeed, in all cases in which we have expressly recognized standing in associations to
represent their members, the relief sought has been of this kind.”).
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977).
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, “[t]he association must allege that its
members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of
the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members
themselves brought suit.”43 The relief sought, such as a declaration, injunction, or other
form of prospective relief, also must be for “the benefit of those members of the
association actually injured.”44 Defendants do not challenge the second and third
elements of associational standing, and the Court finds that the Louisiana NAACP
satisfies those elements.45
Turning to the first element, Defendants claim the NAACP is unable to prove that
its members would have standing to sue because the NACCP does not have “individual
members.” Rather, Defendants claim the Louisiana NAACP’s members are local NAACP
affiliate branches, which are separate legal entities.46 In response, Plaintiffs point to the
testimony and declaration of Louisiana NAACP President Michael McClanahan to explain
that individuals join a local NAACP affiliate branch, and, in turn, the local branches make
up the Louisiana NAACP.47 Plaintiffs further claim that per the NAACP’s bylaws,
individuals become national NAACP members when they join a local branch.48
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 342 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 511).
Warth, 422 U.S. at 515.
See Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Sup’rs v. Ruhr, 487 F. App’x. 189, 197 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Maintaining proportional
districts, protecting the strength of votes, and safeguarding the fairness of elections are surely germane to
the NAACP’s expansive mission.”). See also Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. Tex. through Paxton, 2151038, 2023 WL 4744918, at *4 n.7 (5th Cir. July 25, 2023) (“Participation of individual members generally
is not required when the association seeks prospective or injunctive relief, as opposed to damages.”).
Rec. Doc. 149-1, p. 7.
Rec. Doc. 163-1, p. 11.
Rec. Doc. 163-1, p. 11.
The Fifth Circuit has expressed that courts should “not exalt form over substance”
when assessing membership for associational standing.49 Accordingly, the individuals
who make up the branches of the Louisiana NAACP can be said to be “members” of the
NAACP for purposes of associational standing. This leaves the question of whether the
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.
The injury-in-fact inquiry requires the Plaintiffs to show the existence of at least
one NAACP member who is a black registered voter residing in each dilutive district that
could be redrawn into a new majority-black district. At the time the Motion for Summary
Judgment was filed, Plaintiffs had not disclosed the personally identifiable information of
the individual members to confirm they suffered a cognizable injury-in-fact as a result of
the challenged maps. However, they have since disclosed such information for ten
NAACP members.50 Defendants argue the disclosures are insufficient because, as they
aver, Plaintiffs are essentially challenging all 105 state House and 39 state Senate
Districts, yet “no evidence demonstrates that at least one identified member can claim
vote dilution in each challenged district.”51 Defendants are laboring under a
misapprehension of the law.
In the context of a vote dilution claim under Section 2, the relevant standing inquiry
is not whether Plaintiffs represent every single district in the challenged map but whether
Plaintiffs have made “supported allegations that [they] reside in a reasonably compact
area that could support additional [majority-minority districts].”52 The Fifth Circuit in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 129 F.3d 826, 828 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Hunt, 432 U.S.
Rec. Doc. 173-1.
Rec. Doc. 149-1, p. 6.
Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, 1:11-CV-0736 LEK/CFH, 2014 WL 316703, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014). See
also Perez v. Abbott, 267 F. Supp. 3d 750, 775 (W.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded,
138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (three-judge panel holding that “plaintiffs who reside in a reasonably compact area
Harding v. County of Dallas, Texas, explained that, “[i]n vote dilution cases, the ‘harm
arises from the particular composition of the voter’s own district, which causes his vote—
having been packed or cracked—to carry less weight than it would carry in another,
hypothetical district.’”53 Plaintiffs herein have pled such harm and supported the claims
with summary judgment evidence. Eight of the individuals identified in the Plainitffs’
Supplemental Response (those residing in HD 1, 25, 60, 65, and 68 and in SD 8, 17, and
38) reside in districts in which the Black population has allegedly been “cracked” by being
dispersed “into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority,” while two (those
residing in HD 34 and 101) reside in districts in which the black population has allegedly
been “packed” by being “concentrat[ed] into districts where they constitute an excessive
majority.”54 Either form of vote dilution is an injury sufficient to establish standing.
As the Fifth Circuit counsels, “[t]hat is enough.”55 Accordingly, the Court rejects
Defendants’ argument that the members of the NAACP, and therefore the organization
itself, lacks standing. Having found that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown standing
exists as to the NAACP, the Court turns to whether BVM has standing to proceed.
b. Organizational Standing of BVM
An organization “can establish standing in its own name if it ‘meets the same
standing test that applies to individuals.’”56 The organizational Plaintiffs must demonstrate
the same “injury-in-fact,” traceability, and redressability required of individual plaintiffs.
The Fifth Circuit has held that nonprofit organizations can suffer an Article III injury when
that could support an additional minority opportunity district have standing to pursue § 2 claims, even if they
currently reside in an opportunity district”).
Harding v. Cnty. of Dallas, Tex., 948 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2020).
Rec. Doc. 173, p. 4. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986).
Harding, 948 F.3d at 307.
OCA-Greater Hous. v. Tex., 867 F.3d 604, 610 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fowler, 178 F.3d at 356).
a defendant’s actions frustrate their missions and force them to “divert [ ] significant
resources to counteract the defendant’s conduct.”57 Organizational standing based on
resource diversion arises when “the defendant’s conduct significantly and ‘perceptibly
impair[s]’ the organization’s ability to [conduct] its ‘activities—with the consequent drain
on the organization’s resources . . . .’ Such injury must be ‘concrete and demonstrable.’”58
“Not every diversion of resources to counteract the defendant’s conduct, however,
establishes an injury in fact.”59
BVM’s Senior State Organizer Omari Ho-Sang submitted a declaration explaining
that BVM’s “core mission is to expand Black voter engagement and increase power in
marginalized, predominantly Black communities.”60 BVM “works primarily in Black
communities and other communities of color that face unique barriers to voting” and
“focuses on removing those barriers and increasing voter registration and turnout.”61 The
organization seeks to accomplish its “core mission” by “providing voter education and
encouragement, advocating for policies to expand voting rights and access, and providing
assistance and financial grants that enable its partner organizations to engage in on-theground efforts to mobilize voters.”62
Ho-Sang submits that when the Legislature first introduced the challenged maps,
“BVM shifted its efforts from educating and mobilizing voters and building capacity in its
community partners toward redistricting education and advocacy around S.B. 1 and H.B.
14.”63 Defendants argue that the harm suffered by BVM in the form of its “redistricting
N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, Texas, 626 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Rec. Doc. 163-4, p. 2.
Rec. Doc. 163-4, pp. 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Rec. Doc. 163-4, p. 6.
takeover and mobilization” efforts only occurred when the Louisiana legislature was
deliberating over the redistricting plans of S.B. 1 and H.B. 14, but before the challenged
plans were adopted.64 In other words, Defendants argue that BVM cannot show the harm
it suffered resulted from the enactment of the allegedly unlawful maps because the same
costs would have been expended had the legislature ultimately selected BVM’s desired
plans instead of the plans it now challenges.
However, BVM alleges that the harm it suffers is ongoing. Specifically, the nonprofit organization claims that as long as the allegedly unlawful maps remain in place,
BVM will need to continue diverting resources away from its core activities. The
organization claims that it will instead need to focus its efforts on engaging with elected
officials that represent black voters in the allegedly packed and cracked districts and
convincing black voters who believe the maps dilute their voting power that their votes
still matter. While the enactment of S.B. 1 and H.B. 14 are undeniably at odds with the
mission of BVM, “the presence of a direct conflict between the defendant’s conduct and
the organization’s mission is necessary—though not alone sufficient—to establish
The Fifth Circuit instructs that “concrete evidence” is required to show an
organization’s diversion of resources is a direct response to a defendant’s challenged
actions in order to satisfy the injury, traceability, and redressability prongs of Article III
standing.66 For instance, the organizational plaintiff in Association of Community
Organizations for Reform v. Fowler challenged Louisiana’s alleged lack of compliance
Rec. Doc. 149-1, p. 13.
Fowler, 178 F.3d at 361.
Tex. State LULAC v. Elfant, 52 F.4th 248, 255 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Tex. State Lulac v.
Torres, 22-809, 2023 WL 6377790 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2023).
with the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), which required the state to facilitate
voter registration at public aid offices.67 Concrete evidence was presented showing that
the organization had to concentrate its efforts in areas where households had low rates
of voter registration by regularly conducting registration drives in “welfare waiting rooms,
unemployment offices, and on Food Stamp lines.”68 The court found that this detailed
showing was sufficient evidence that the organization had “expended resources
registering voters in low registration areas who would have already been registered if
[Louisiana] had complied with the [public aid] requirement under the NVRA.”69
Notably, the Fifth Circuit also counsels that, “[n]ot every diversion of resources to
counteract the defendant's conduct, however, establishes an injury in fact.”70 The court
explained that “[t]he mere fact that an organization redirects some of its resources,” for
instance, to litigation and legal counseling, in response to actions or inactions of another
party “is insufficient to impart standing upon the organization.”71 In NAACP v. City of Kyle,
Tex., the Fifth Circuit found that the Home Builders Association of Greater Austin (“HBA”)
did not have organizational standing in a Fair Housing Act case where it alleged injury
based on a new city housing ordinance because the HBA failed to allege how the activities
it undertook in response to the challenged ordinance “differ[ed] from the HBA’s routine
The allegations here, however, assert a significant redirection of the organization’s
routine and customary operational efforts. BVM’s declaration explains that now that the
Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 360 (5th Cir.1999).
Id. at 361.
N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, Tex., 626 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir.2010).
maps have taken effect, BVM has had to shift its efforts “toward fighting against the effects
of voter dilution” in the parishes where the maps dilute the voting strength of black
voters.73 It also claims that it will devote time and resources to educating people on the
redistricting process and will have to “redouble its efforts to engage Black voters and
convince them that their vote matters.”74 BVM gives the specific example of diverting its
resources away from its core activities and toward developing an “accountability strategy”
to hold elected officials accountable, hosting a virtual freedom school to train BVM’s
partner organizations about how their representatives impact the community, and pushing
back on harmful changes made by elected officials who do not represent BVM’s
BVM has presented evidence demonstrating how the diversion of resources from
its broader voter registration and community empowerment initiatives and toward
protecting the representation and interests of its constituents “perceptibly impairs” its
“mission to achieve equitable political representation for Black voters across the entire
state.”76 As argued by BVM, “[i]t is the specific dedication of substantial resources to
activities that were not planned and that would not be conducted but for the challenged
redistricting plan that constitutes the injury, [which] is sufficient to establish injury-in-fact
for standing purposes.”77 Based on the summary judgment evidence presented, BVM has
raised a genuine issue of material fact that its purpose is in direct conflict with the allegedly
Rec. Doc. 163-4, p. 7.
Rec. Doc. 163-4, p. 8.
N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, Tex., 626 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2010). Rec. Doc. 163-4, p. 8–9.
Rec. Doc. 163, p. 21 (internal citations omitted).
unlawful maps. Accordingly, BVM has met the constitutional standing requirements for
purposes of defeating Defendants’ summary judgment Motion.
c. Statutory Standing
Defendants claim the Entity Plaintiffs lack statutory standing to bring a challenge
under § 2 of the VRA because § 2’s private right of action does not extend to
organizations. However, Defendants fail to cite any case in support of this position.78
Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, organizations and private parties have historically
been permitted to enforce § 2 of the VRA.79 Accordingly, Defendants’ argument is without
For the above-stated reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment80 is hereby
IT IS ORDERED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 14th day of November, 2023.
SHELLY D. DICK
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
Rather, Defendants rely on cases brought by candidates or local governments to argue that
organizational plaintiffs are not “aggrieved persons” within the meaning of the VRA. Such cases are
inapposite to the instant matter. See Rec. Doc. 149-1, pp. 13–17.
Veasey v. Perry, 29 F. Supp. 3d 896, 906–07 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election
Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Indianapolis Branch of the NAACP and the Marion County Democratic Central
Committee, among other organizations, were parties to the § 2 challenge of a photo identification law);
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (LULAC challenged Texas redistricting plan under § 2); Johnson v.
DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (The State Conference of NAACP Branches sued on a voter dilution
challenge under § 2); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (the Louisiana Voter
Registration/Education Crusade challenged voter dilution under § 2); LULAC v. City of Boerne, 675 F.3d
433 (5th Cir. 2012) (LULAC challenged voter dilution under § 2)).
Rec. Doc. 149.
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