Dodson v. Nichols et al

Filing 74

RULING AND ORDER granting 19 22 25 Motions for Sanctions as stated herein. On or before 10/15/2024, the above-named Defendants shall submit affidavits, along with any necessary supporting exhibits, documenting reasonable attorney's fees incurred in preparing their respective Motions for Sanctions. Signed by Judge Brian A. Jackson on 9/25/2024. (EDC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JACQUES DODSON, SR. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
WILLIAM EVERETT NICHOLS, ET
AL. NO. 22-00423-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER
This is a lawsuit which the Court sua sponte dismissed as "time barred" and
"obviously frivolous and vexatious." (Doc. 44 at 2-3). Now before the Court are three
motions seeking sanctions variously under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, (Docs.
19, 22, 25), Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, (Doc. 19), and 28 U.S.C.
1927, (Docs. 22, 25). Two of these, filed by Defendants Defendants James B.
Reichman, White Oak Servicing, LLC, and the Estate of Scott 0. Brame, (Doc. 22),
and Defendants Jack Brame and Red River Bank, (Doc. 25), seek sanctions against

only Plaintiffs attorney, Kathleen M. Wilson. The third, filed by Defendant Scott M.
Brame, seeks sanctions against both Dodson and Wilson. (Doc. 19). The Motions are
opposed. (Docs. 24, 73). For the reasons that follow, the Motions will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND
a. Plaintiffs Lawsuits
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that the above-named Defendants and
others committed civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), in connection with the foreclosure
in 2009 and sheriffs sale in 2010 of Plaintiffs property—the subjects of at least two

other lawsuits filed by Plaintiff against these same or similar Defendants over more
than a decade. (Docs. 1, 19 at 7).

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs lawsuit as time barred because Defendants
provided multiple letters, dating as far back as 2013, which explicitly mentioned the
possibility of a RICO lawsuit, and which were sent to some of the Defendants here by
an attorney who previously represented Plaintiff. (Doc. 44 at 1-2 (citing Petrobras
Am., Inc. v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 9 F.4th 247, 253 (5th Cir. 2021)

(describing that the statute of limitations is four years for civil RICO claims and "does
not accrue until a plaintiff discovers, or through reasonably diligent investigation
should discover, the injury")). As the Court explained in its dismissal order, "[i]t is
evident from these letters that Mr. Dodson knew about the possibility of a RICO claim
at least ten years ago and likely well before that." (Id. at 2). The Complaint itself was
completely bereft of any factual allegations that would suggest that Plaintiff could
not have reasonably discovered the alleged RICO violations more than ten years ago.
The statute of limitations was not the lawsuit's only problem, however. Final
judgments have issued on at least two other lawsuits alleging the same or similar

facts. In 2014, a pleading was filed by Plaintiff in the state court foreclosure action
that set forth what is essentially the same primary claim alleged in this suit and
[that] sought to add as defendants several of the same parties to this action." (Doc.

19 at 10 (citing Doc. 19-11)). That pleading was dismissed following a trial, and the
judgment became final when the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the

trial court's decision and no application for review was made to the Louisiana
Supreme Court. (Doc. 63 at 7:2-8:9).

In 2020, Dodson, initially proceeding pro se, filed a completely different lawsuit
in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, naming- the same Defendants as in this case, among others. (Doc. 19-20).

The petition there contained essentially the same allegations that Dodson set forth
in 2014 and here—that all Defendants committed fraud in connection with the
foreclosure and sheriffs sale of Plaintiffs property. (Id.). In fact, Dodson even

mentioned RICO in the 2020 petition, writing that "Plaintiff avers that there may be
a claim for damages pursuant to the RICO statute in that all parties colluded against
to [sic] intentionally deceive him and take his property." (Doc. 19-20 ^ 14). After that
case was removed to this Court on the basis of that allegation, Dodson voluntarily
amended the petition to remove the mention of RICO. (Doc. 19 at 12). The case was
remanded for lack of jurisdiction in March 2021. See Dodson v. Red River Bank, No.

CV 20-00290-BAJ-RLB, 2021 WL 806947, at *1 (M.D. La. Mar. 3, 2021) (Jackson, J.).
In its sua sponte remand order, this Court remarked that "[t]he fact that

Plaintiff has amended his petition to omit all RICO-related references and allegations
obviously reinforces the Court's conclusion that this claim lacks any foundation."

Dodson, 2021 WL 806947, at *1 n.2. Although Wilson never enrolled in the Middle
District case after removal, she represented Dodson in the state court action as early
as October 22, 2020. (See Doc. 19-32).

Back in the Nineteenth JDC, numerous defendants, including Reichman,
White Oak, Red River Bank, and Scott M.., moved to dismiss Dodson's claims. (Doc.
19-30 at 5). The trial court granted the motions and dismissed Dodson's claims

against those defendants, including the RICO allegations. (Id. at 6). During the
hearing the court questioned Dodson about Defendant Scott M., who is the son of the
deceased Defendant Scott 0. (Id.). "Dodson conceded that there were no allegations
in his petition or complaints against Scott M.," "explained that he 'got it confused'
and 'made an honest mistake,'" and that he "could 'let [Scott M.j out"' of the litigation.
(Doc. 19-30 at 6 n.3). Following the dismissal, the trial court denied Dodson's motion

for a new trial, (id. at 7), and the First Circuit affirmed the judgments of dismissal in
July 2022, (id. at 18).
In June 2022, as the Nineteenth JDC case remained pending against some
defendants, Wilson formally enrolled as Dodson's counsel prior to a hearing on a

motion to dismiss filed by a defendant that is not a party to the instant action. (Doc.
19-31 at 1). Wilson's enrollment at the time, just before the First Circuit affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of numerous defendants, strongly supports the inference that
she was aware that Dodson's RICO claims had been adjudicated.

Undeterred, Wilson filed the present lawsuit, alleging RICO violations on
Dodson s behalf. As noted above, the claims are obviously outside of the statute of

limitations. Additionally, because identical claims had already been adjudicated on
the merits at the state level two different times, Dodson's claims are barred under the

principle of res judicata, under which a final judgment on the merits of an action

"precludes parties . . . from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised" in
the prior action. Oreck Direct, LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 560 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Alien v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).
As explained above, there is no doubt that Dodson's RICO claims could have

been raised as early as 2013 and likely earlier, and indeed Dodson did raise the RICO
claim in the 2020 state court action. Those claims were dismissed by the trial court
and became final when Dodson failed to appeal the appellate court's decision
affirming the trial court judgment. Wilson acknowledges that Dodson's claims are

barred in her opposition to the Motions. (Doc. 73 at 1 ("Undersigned did not
completely inspect the [state court action, and] after realizing that the matter was
already litigated undersigned immediately attempted to withdraw . . . .")).
What's more, Dodson's Complaint is patently deficient with respect to its
factual allegations, which are entirely conclusory. Shockingly, Wilson appears to have

copied, at times whole cloth, the complaint from a 2007 RICO case filed in the Eastern
District of Louisiana. And Wilson seems to have done a poor job, often referring to

parties from. the 2007 case in her own filing and copying entire blocks of text from the
older case. Compare Doc. 1 ^ 71 ("RICO protects the legitimate 'enterprises' of
Plaintiff Able and the Board from defendants' employees, officers, managers, and
agents who have committed the unlawful acts described in the 'pattern of activity'
described below."), with Compl., Able Sec. & Patrol, LLC v. Louisiana, No. CIV.A. 07-

1931, (E.D. La. April 17, 2007) ECF No. 1 ^ 97 ("RICO protects the legitimate
'enterprises' of Claimant Able and the Board from defendants' employees, officers,

managers, and agents of who [sic] have committed the unlawful acts described in the

'pattern of activity' described below."); compare Doc. 1 ^ 78 ("With the Board, Rogillio
and the Corporate defendants as the enterprises, the person's existing separate and
distinct from them are the employees, officers and agents thereof."), with Compl.,

Able Sec. & Patrol, ECF No. 1 ^ 104 ("With the Board, Rogillio and the Corporate
defendants as the enterprises, the persons existing separate and distinct from them
are the employees, officers and agents thereof.").

b. The Motions for Sanctions
This case was filed on June 24, 2022. (Doc. 1). Within days, Wilson and Dodson
were notified of the issues described above and were urged to dismiss the case. (See

Doc. 19 at 8 ("Counsel for Scott M. first notified Wilson of these issues shortly after
the institution of this civil action via a telephone call on June 29, 2022.")). On August
9, counsel for Scott M. sent the draft IVtotion for Sanctions via email and certified mail

to Wilson, urging Dodson to dismiss the Complaint within 21 days. (Doc. 19 at 1).
Although Scott M.'s counsel did not receive a confirmation of receipt, (id.), Wilson
moved to withdraw one week later, (Doc. 7). Wilson's attempt to withdraw was
opposed by the same Defendants who ultimately moved for sanctions. (Docs. 9, 15,

16).
Scott IVI.'s counsel sent another warning that a motion for sanctions would be
filed, and this letter was received on August 29. (Doc. 19 at 1-2). Attorneys for Jack
Brame, Red River Bank, Reichman, White Oak, and Brame Estate sent similar
warnings, with proposed Motions for Sanctions attached, on September 16. (Docs. 22-

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3 at 3; 25-1 at 2). All three M-otions for Sanctions were filed more than 21 days after
Wilson received the warning letters. (Docs. 19, 22, 25). Neither Wilson nor Dodson
dispute this. (Docs. 24, 73).
On February 7, 2023, Wilson moved to voluntarily dismiss the case, (Doc. 30),
and the action was dismissed with prejudice, (Doc. 31). Soon after, however, Dodson,
now proceeding pro se, moved for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal, explaining

that the motion to dismiss had been filed without his knowledge or consent. (Doc. 34
at 1). A hearing on the motion for reconsideration was held on October 16, and was
attended by Wilson, Dodson, and counsel for Defendants. (Doc. 42). Following the
hearing, the Court granted the motion for reconsideration but immediately sua sponte
dismissed the case with prejudice. (Doc. 44). Dodson has since appealed the dismissal.
(Doc. 47). 1

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
a. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides, in pertinent part,
(b) By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating itan attorney or unrep resented party certifies that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:

1 "As a general rule the effective filing of a notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction from the
district court to the court of appeals with respect to all matters involved in the appeal."
Cordova v. Univ. Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 92 F.4th 266, 275 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub
nom. Mire v. Univ. Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., No. 23-1192, 2024 WL 2805773 (U.S. June 3,2024)
(citations omitted). Nonetheless, an "exception is that . . . the district court retains
jurisdiction to entertain and resolve a motion requesting attorney's fees or sanctions. The
basis for this exception is that attorney s fees/sanctions are matters collateral to the merits
of the action." Id.

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(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(c)(l) If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court

determines that Rule ll(b) has been violated, the court may impose an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated
the rule or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation
committed by its partner, associate, or employee.

The purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in the district court, and to
spare innocent litigants and overburdened courts from the filing of frivolous lawsuits.
Cotter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990).
Courts judge compliance with Rule ll's standards under an objective
reasonableness standard, evaluating the circumstances as they existed at the time

the challenged filing was signed by the lawyer or litigant. Id. at 1024. In light of the
objective standard of reasonableness applied under Rule 11, an attorney's subjective
good faith is not enough to immunize him from sanctions based on a Rule 11 violation.
Thomas v. Cap. Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988). In deciding a
motion under Rule 11, courts within the Fifth Circuit are required to determine

whether the signatory has complied with the affirmative duties imposed under the
rule. Id. at 875. District courts have wide latitude to impose sanctions under Rule 11
as district court rulings under Rule 11 are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Whitehead

v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 2003). District courts possess
discretion in determining the nature of the appropriate sanction. Thomas, 836 F.2d
at 876,877.
All three Motions seek sanctions under Rule 11. Defendant Scott M.'s Motion
also seeks sanctions under Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1. (Doc. 19). The

M.otions filed by Defendants Jack Brame and Red River Bank, (Doc. 25), and
Defendants Reichman, White Oak, and Brame Estate, (Doc. 22), also seek sanctions
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Because the Court finds that sanctions are appropriate under
Rule 11, it will not also impose sanctions under Rule 3.1 and § 1927. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Meta 1 Coin Tr., No. 1:20-CV-273, 2020 WL 1931852, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Apr.

21, 2020) (declining to impose duplicative sanctions because it would be "ineffective").
Defendants argue that sanctions are warranted under Rule ll(b)(l) because
this "frivolous lawsuit was filed for improper purposes, namely to harass and

needlessly increase the cost of litigation, (Doc. 19 at 22); under Rule ll(b)(2) because
when this lawsuit was filed, Wilson "knew that the claims and other legal contentions

contained in the RICO Complaint were not warranted by existing law or by any
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for

establishing new law," (Doc. 19 at 15); and under Rule ll(b)(3) because "Wilson and
Dodson also knew that the factual contentions contained in the RICO Complaint did
not have evidentiary support and were not likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." (Doc. 19 at 20).

b. Rulell(b)(l)
The Court finds that sanctions are appropriate under Rule ll(b)(l) against
Dodson and Wilson because improper purposes motivated the filing of this lawsuit.
Given Dodson s multiple lawsuits in state court over identical or near-identical claims
regarding the same foreclosure and sheriffs sale of Dodson's property, as well as

Wilson and Dodson's knowledge of the costs of litigation, it is evident that this lawsuit
could only have been brought for the improper purpose of escalating costs for
Defendants. Wilson asserts that this lawsuit was not filed to harass or for another
improper purpose. (Doc. 73 at 1). But based on the extensive history of Plaintiffs
apparent vendetta against Defendants, his numerous losses in state court, Wilson's
own involvement in Plaintiffs 2020 state court case, and the remarkably deficient
nature of the Complaint filed here, Wilson's conclusory claim rings false. Moreover,
Dodsons previous acknowledgement that Scott M. was improperly named in the
second state court case, and by extension improperly named in the first state court
case, further convinces the Court that this lawsuit was filed to harass Scott M., in

addition to the other Defendants.
Final judgments have issued twice on Plaintiffs claims in state court, and
Wilson was involved in the second of those cases. Wilson was therefore aware, or
should have been aware, of both final judgments. Considering the present lawsuit

against this backdrop demonstrates that it was filed for the improper purpose of
continuing to prolong costly and meritless litigation.

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c. Rule ll(b)(2)
The Court finds that sanctions are also appropriate against Wilson2 because
the claims made in the Complaint are not warranted under existing law, which

violates Rule ll(b)(2). As explained above, Dodson's RICO claims are time barred
and precluded by res judicata. Dodson knew, and Wilson knew, or should have
known, that the RICO claims, whether characterized as RICO claims or not, had

been adjudicated twice already in state court, and that the statute of limitations on
those claims had long since run.

d. Rule ll(b)(3)
The Court finds that sanctions are appropriate against Wilson and Dodson

under Rule ll(b)(3) because the factual contentions contained in the RICO Complaint
did not have evidentiary support and were not likely to have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. Dodson, through
numerous attorneys and on his own, has had more than 11 years to investigate this
matter, yet his claims have been repeatedly dismissed on the merits. Additionally, as

the Court explained when remanding the second lawsuit, "[t]he fact that Plaintiff. .
. amended his petition to omit all RICO-related references and allegations obviously
reinforces the Court's conclusion that this claim lacks any foundation." Dodson v. Red
River Bank, No. CV 20-00290-BAJ-RLB, 2021 WL 806947, at *2 (M.D. La. Mar. 3,
2021). In its sua sponte dismissal order here, the Court explained that "[t]hose words

2 "Monetary sanctions may not be imposed against a represented party for violation of Rule

ll(b)(2)." Marlin v. Moody Nat. Bank, N.A., 533 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. ll(c)(5)(A)).

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should have served as a siren, loudly alerting Ms. Wilson and Mr. Dodson against
filing this obviously frivolous and vexations case." (Doc. 44 at 3). Instead, of course,

Dodson and Wilson did file this lawsuit.
That Wilson named Scott M. as a party despite Dodson's acknowledgment on

the record in the Nineteenth JDC that Scott M. had been mistakenly included in prior
lawsuits reinforces the Court's conclusion that Wilson failed to conduct a reasonable

prefiling investigation.
While monetary sanctions are improper against a party for a violation of Rule

ll(b)(2), "they may be awarded against a party [for a violation of ll(b)(3)] when a
court determines factual contentions lacked evidentiary support." Marlin v. Moody
Nat. Bank, N.A., 533 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2008). Based on the foregoing reasons
and description of the history between the parties, and particularly because Dodson's
claims have been adjudicated as baseless on the merits two different times in state
court, the Court finds that the Complaint's factual contentions lacked evidentiary
support.

Further, for the above reasons and because the Complaint included entire

paragraphs from the 2007 Eastern District RICO case, and she failed to even change
the names of the parties, the Court must conclude that Wilson was not diligent in her
pre-suit investigation and instead was flagrantly negligent, if not entirely reckless,

in her failure to properly investigate Plaintiffs claims.
The Fifth Circuit has developed a series of factors to help determine whether
an attorney has made an investigation into the facts sufficient to satisfy the duty

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imposed under Rule 11 (b)(3). Heisler v. Kean Miller, LLP, No. CV 21-724, 2021 WL
5919507, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2021) (citing Childs v. State Farm Mnt. Auto. Ins.

Co., 29 F.3d 1018 (5th Cir. 1994)). The factors are: (1) the time available to the signer
for investigation; (2) the extent of the attorney's reliance upon his client for the
factual support for the document; (3) the feasibility of pre-filing investigation; (4)
whether the signing attorney accepted the case from another member of the bar or

forwarding attorney; (5) the complexity of the factual and legal issues; and (6) the
extent to which development of the factual circumstances underlying the claim
requires discovery. Id. Each factor leads to the conclusion that Wilson failed to satisfy

her duty under Rule ll(b)(3).
Because the statute of limitations had run years before, there was no urgency
whatsoever with respect to Wilson's pre-suit investigation. Because of the
overwhelming record evidence that Plaintiffs claims were invalid, it appears that

Wilson only relied on Dodson himself as support for the Complaint, and likely
completed no, or very little, independent investigation. Indeed, Wilson concedes that
she "did not completely inspect" the second state court lawsuit before filing this one,

essentially admitting an ll(b)(3) violation. (Doc. 73 at 1). Because Plaintiffs claims
have been litigated multiple times in state court, the records of his prior claims are

public, making any investigation easy. Additionally, Wilson's obligation to investigate
thoroughly was enhanced by the complexity of the RICO statute. See Chapman &
Cole v. Itel Container Int'l B.V., 865 F.2d 676, 685 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[A]n attorneys
responsibility to conduct a reasonable prefiling investigation is particularly

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important in RICO claims."). Finally, because Plaintiffs claims are legally invalid,
both as time barred and because they have been previously adjudicated, no discovery
was necessary to develop the claims.
For these reasons, the Courts finds that Wilson did not make reasonable use

of the ample available opportunities to investigate Plaintiffs claims.
d. The Constitutional and Statutory Prerequisites to the
Imposition of Sanctions
Rule 11 sanction decisions must comport with due process. Heisler, 2021 WL

5919507, at *7 (citing Childs, 29 F.3d at 1027). The Court must ensure that notice
and an opportunity to be heard have been afforded before Rule 11 sanctions may be

imposed. Id. (citing Childs, 29 F. 3d at 1027). The requirement of an opportunity to
be heard is generally satisfied by "[s]imply giving the individual accused of a Rule 11
violation a chance to respond through the submission of a brief." Id. (citing Spiller,
919 F.2d at 347). Due process concerns are satisfied in this case because both Wilson
and Dodson were afforded notice and an opportunity to respond.
Second, Rule ll(c)(2) requires that a party serve a motion for sanctions on the

opposing party at least 21 days before it is filed with the district court. "If, and only
if, the 'challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial' is not 'withdrawn or
appropriately corrected' within the 21-day period may the motion then be filed" or
presented to the court. Margetis v. Fnrgeson, 666 F. App'x 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. ll(c)(2)). As explained above, all three Motions satisfied the
21-day requirement.

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e. Nature of the Sanctions

Having described the conduct that violates Rule ll(b), and having found that
the constitutional and statutory prerequisites are satisfied, the issue now becomes
what the appropriate sanction is here. Once a violation of Rule 11 has been found,

the district court is vested with considerable discretion in tailoring an appropriate
sanction to further the purposes of Rule 11—namely, punishment, deterrence, and
compensation. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 968 F.2d 523, 533 (5th Cir.
1992). The rule's language allows for an award of attorney's fees and other expenses
"if imposed on motion," as is the case here. Marlin, N.A., 533 F.3d at 379. An award
of attorney fees is limited to "part or all of the reasonable attorney s fees and other
expenses directly resulting from the violation." Fed. R. Civ. P. ll(c)(4). Under the
circumstances present here, the Court finds that an award of the fees incurred by

Defendants in filing the Motions for Sanctions will serve the purposes of Rule 11
adequately.

The Court writes further to specifically admonish Plaintiffs counsel, Kathleen
M.. Wilson, for her careless and unprofessional handling of this matter. Any future

violations by Wilson of the Court's Local Rules, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
or the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct (as adopted by this Court in Local
Rule 83(b)(6)) will result in the institution of disciplinary proceedings against her
according to the procedure set forth in Local Rule 83(b)(12).

III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Scott M:. Frame's Motion for Sanctions
(Doc. 19) be and is hereby GRANTED. Scott M.. Brame will be awarded sanctions
against Dodson and Wilson, totaling the reasonable attorney's fees expended in filing
his Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 19).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants James B. Reichman, White
Oak Servicing, LLC, and the Estate of Scott 0. Brame's JVIotion for Sanctions (Doc.

22) be and is hereby GRANTED. These Defendants will be awarded sanctions
against Wilson, totaling the reasonable attorney's fees expended in filing their Motion
for Sanctions (Doc. 22).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Jack Brame and Red River
Bank's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 25) be and is hereby GRANTED. These
Defendants will be awarded sanctions against Wilson, totaling the reasonable
attorney's fees expended in filing their Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 25).
On or before October 15, 2024, the above-named Defendants shall submit
affidavits, along with any necessary supporting exhibits, documenting reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in preparing their respective Motions for Sanctions.

<^

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ^^ (Toy of September, 2024

(L.
JUDGE BRIAN A/ JACKSON

-A

UNITED STATE^ISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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