Stutsman Construction, LLC v. Adair
Filing
11
OPINION dismissing 1 APPEAL FROM BANKRUPTCY COURT. Bankruptcy Court case number 22-10249. The Order of the Bankruptcy Court denying Appellants Motion for Enlargement and Extension of Time to File Proof of Claim is AFFIRMED, and this appeal is dismissed. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 9/28/2023. (SWE)
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 1 of 13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
STUTSMAN CONSTRUCTION, LLC
APPEAL CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
ROSS ADAIR, ET AL
22-664-SDD-RLB
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the appeal filed by Stutsman Construction, LLC
(“Stutsman”). Appellant-Creditor Stutsman appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s order
denying Stutsman’s request for an extension of the deadline to file proof of a claim in the
underlying Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, No. 22-10249, in the Middle District of
Louisiana.
For the reasons set forth below, the ruling and order of the Bankruptcy Court
denying Stutsman’s Motion for Enlargement and Extension of Time to File Proof of Claim
is AFFIRMED.
I.
Factual and Procedural History
On May 24, 2022, Debtor-Ross Shaun Adair (“Adair”) filed for protection from his
creditors under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to Federal Bankruptcy
Procedure Rule 2002(a), notice of the case and corresponding deadlines was issued by
the clerk and mailed to all parties on June 11, 2022.1 The Section 341 creditors meeting
1
Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, pp. 12–13.
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 2 of 13
was set for July 18, 2022 and the deadline for creditors to file proofs of claim was set for
August 2, 2022.2
Due to a calendaring error by Adair’s counsel, neither Adair nor Adair’s counsel
appeared for the July 18, 2022 creditors meeting. The bankruptcy trustee requested
dismissal of the case, pursuant to Local Rule 2003-1.3 Assuming dismissal would be
granted, Stutsman’s counsel cleared the remaining deadlines from his calendar and did
not file a proof of claim by the August 2nd deadline.4
Adair filed a Motion to Reschedule the creditors meeting on July 20, 2022.5 The
trustee objected to rescheduling the creditors meeting, in part because she had not yet
received required documentation from Adair. The Bankruptcy Court set Adair’s Motion to
Reschedule the Creditor’s Meeting for Hearing on August 17, 2022.6 By July 29, 2022,
Adair submitted the requested documents to the trustee and filed them in the record, upon
which the trustee reset the creditors meeting.7
By Notice issued on July 29, 2022, the trustee re-set the creditors meeting for
August 8, 2022.8 The notice resetting the meeting was silent regarding the proof of claims
filing deadline. There is no dispute that all parties received notice of the resetting on July
29, 2022—four days before the proof of claims deadline.9
2
Id.
Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, p. 69; Bankr. M.D. La. R. 2003-1(d).
4
Rec. Doc. No. 3; p. 2; Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, p. 67; Rec. Doc. No. 6, p. 2.
5
Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, p. 59; Rec. Doc. No. 6, p. 6.
6
Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, p. 63.
7
Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, p. 64. It is unclear, from the record and the briefs provided by Appellant, whether the
trustee rescheduled the creditors meeting on July 18, 2022, or July 29, 2022, but it is not disputed that the
trustee’s Amended Section 341 Meeting Proceeding Memorandum resetting the meeting was issued to all
parties by July 29, 2022. The disparity is of no consequence to this appeal. Compare Rec. Doc. No. 3-1,
p.64, and Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, p. 107, with Rec. Doc. No. 3, p. 8.
8
Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, p. 64.
9
See Rec. Doc. No. 6, p. 2.
3
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 3 of 13
Stutsman, Adair, and counsel appeared at the August 8th creditors meeting. The
next day, on August 9th, Stutsman filed an out-of-time motion to extend its deadline to file
proof of its claim.10 Stutsman argued it was “surprised when a few days before the
deadline for filing [a proof of claim], an amending [sic] [Rule] 341(a) meeting was filed and
[Stutsman] received that notice instead of receiving a dismissal of the case.”11 Stutsman’s
counsel explained that he did not file a proof of claim by the August 2nd deadline because
he believed the trustee’s previous request for dismissal would be granted.12
Stutsman’s Motion to Extend was heard on September 14th. The court
acknowledged that Stutsman was seeking an extension based on the trustee’s request
for dismissal. Stutsman argued this constituted excusable neglect and sought an
extension pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Pioneer Investment Services v.
Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership.13 After hearing arguments of Stutsman, Adair,
and the trustee, the court denied Stutsman’s Motion to Extend because neither of the
conditions of Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) or (B) were applicable to Stutsman’s request:
Stutsman does not argue under Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) that the
debtor failed to timely file a list of creditors' names and
addresses required by Bankruptcy Rule 1007(a). In fact, the
debtor had filed the required list. Nor does Stutsman contend
that Rule 3002(c)(6)(B) applies in that the notice was sufficient
and was not mailed to a foreign address.
So neither of the conditions in 3002(c)(6) are applicable.
Thus, Stutsman has not met the requirement under
Bankruptcy Rule 3002(6), 3002(c)(6) for extension of the
proof of claim deadline. Stutsman argues, understandably,
that the interests of justice support allowing it to file an
untimely proof of claim, but cites no law for that proposition.
That's Paragraph 4 of its motion, although in counsel's
10
Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, pp. 67–68.
Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, p. 67.
12
Id.
13
507 U.S. 380 (1993).
11
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 4 of 13
argument today he cites Pioneer. But the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure is straightforward on these undisputed
facts.14
Stutsman appeals this denial of its Motion to Extend.
In this appeal, Stutsman challenges not only the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of its
Motion to Extend but also the Bankruptcy Court’s setting of Adair’s Motion to Reschedule
the creditor’s meeting for hearing.15 Stutsman also challenges the bankruptcy judge’s
failure to automatically dismiss the case upon the trustee’s recommendation after Adair
missed the initial creditors meeting.
Stutsman argues that it was denied due process when the Bankruptcy Court
allowed the rescheduling of the Section 341(a) creditors meeting and allowed the
rescheduling to take place before the case could be dismissed on the trustee’s
recommendation.16 Stutsman also contends that its failure to meet the deadline to file its
proof of claim was due to excusable neglect, and the Bankruptcy Court should have
applied the Pioneer factors and granted its Motion to Extend.17 In its Reply, Stutsman
clarifies that it is not challenging the Bankruptcy Court’s authority to deny its Motion to
Extend but “rather the Bankruptcy Judge’s arbitrary and capricious ruling in allowing the
Debtor to avoid dismissal of the case…. [t]he Bankruptcy Judge abused his discretion by
setting the ex-parte motion [to reschedule the creditors meeting] for hearing.”18
14
Rec. Doc. No. 6, p. 8.
Notice of Appeal, Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, pp. 112–113; Rec. Doc. No. 3, p. 6.
16
Rec. Doc. No. 3.
17
Rec. Doc. No. 3.
18
Rec. Doc. No. 9.
15
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
II.
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 5 of 13
Law & Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Stutsman does not articulate a standard of review on any issue he raises.19 In fact,
Stutsman’s briefs and Adair’s brief are devoid of the applicable standards of review, in
derogation of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(a)(8)(B) and (b).20
Legal conclusions by bankruptcy courts are reviewed de novo, as are mixed
questions of law and fact.21 And “[d]ecisions concerning interpretations of the federal rules
of bankruptcy procedure are reviewed de novo.”22
The Court will address the standard of review that is applicable to each issue, in
turn.
B. Rescheduling of Creditors Meeting is Not Properly on Appeal
Stutsman’s first issue presented is “[w]hether due process was had in the
Bankruptcy Court allowing Creditor [sic] to reset Creditor’s meeting despite noncompliance with Local Rule 2003-1 (arbitrary and capricious).”23 The Court assumes this
is a typographical error as the trustee, not the creditor, reset the creditors meeting.24
19
Rec. Doc. No. 3. The Court, again, reminds Appellant’s counsel of his obligations under Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
20
Counsel is reminded of their obligation to comply with the Local Rules of this Court and the Bankruptcy
Court within this district and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, as attorneys admitted to the Bar of
the Middle District of Louisiana. The Court further directs Appellant’s counsel to review Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 28 in detail, as Appellant similarly failed to provide the content or substance of
the law and rules subject to his challenges on appeal, in violation of Rule 38 (f), and also failed to follow
Rule 28(c).
21
Matter of Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P., No. 22-10831, 2023 WL 2263022, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2023)
(citing In re Quinlivan, 434 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2005)).
22
In re Aboody, 223 B.R. at 37 (quoting In re William Cargile Contractor, Inc., 209 B.R. 435, 436 (B.A.P.
6th Cir. 1997).
23
Rec. Doc. No. 3.
24
The Court questions whether Stutsman has appellate standing to appeal this issue, but pretermits
consideration of this question sua sponte.
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 6 of 13
Stutsman argues that the bankruptcy judge treated the parties unequally for
essentially the same transgressions. That is, Adair was allowed another opportunity to
attend the creditors meeting he missed due to a calendaring error, but Stutsman was not
allowed additional time to file a proof of claim for the same reason, a calendaring error.
Stutsman “made the same mistake as Debtor’s counsel” but was held to a “different,”
“higher standard” than Adair’s counsel.25 Stutsman insists the Bankruptcy Court setting
Adair’s Motion to Reschedule for hearing improperly and arbitrarily afforded time for the
rescheduling of the creditors meeting before the hearing. As a result, Stutsman argues,
Adair was unfairly allowed to avoid dismissal.
Stutsman failed to present any authority to support its position.
Nonetheless, Stutsman’s request must be denied because he did not properly
appeal this issue. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require the filing of a notice
of appeal from the specific action challenged before the Bankruptcy Court in order to seek
this Court’s review.26 Stutsman filed a notice of appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s denial
of its Motion to Extend the proof of claims deadline.27 Stutsman did not request or obtain
leave to appeal the trustee’s rescheduling of the creditors meeting.28 The order denying
Stutsman’s Motion to Extend does not touch on the propriety of the trustee’s rescheduling
of the creditors meeting.
Even if Stutsman had perfected this issue for appeal, 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) forecloses
this Court’s review of whether Stutsman was denied due process when the creditors
25
Rec. Doc. No. 3, p. 12.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003 (2023); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004 (2014).
27
Rec. Doc. No. 3, p. 6.
28
The Court does not determine whether a Stutsman could have requested leave from this action of the
trustee, and whether that would lead to a contrary result on appeal to this Court.
26
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 7 of 13
meeting was reset or whether the rescheduling violated Local Rule 2003-1’s rescheduling
procedures. District courts have appellate jurisdiction over orders, decrees, and
judgments “of bankruptcy judges” under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Section 158(a) is explicitly
limited to certain actions taken by bankruptcy judges—not the recommendations of, and
scheduling done by, trustees. The record is clear that the trustee rescheduled the
creditors meeting before the bankruptcy judge heard or had the opportunity to rule upon
Adair’s Motion to Reschedule.29 Accordingly, the Court finds the clear, unambiguous
language of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) precludes its review of the trustee’s rescheduling of the
creditors meeting.
C. Reliance Upon Trustee’s Initial Request for Dismissal
In its second challenge, Stutsman asks this Court to consider “[w]hether Creditor
was denied due process as a result of reliance on local Rule 2003-1(d) and assertions by
the Trustee regarding dismissal of the Chapter 13 case (again, arbitrary and
capricious).”30
Stutsman argues it was treated unfairly and unequally by the Bankruptcy Court as
compared to Adair. As set forth above, Stutsman assumed the trustee’s request for
dismissal would be granted, and its counsel prematurely removed the proof of claim
deadline from his calendar without receiving an order of dismissal.31 Stutsman’s counsel
claims his error and Adair’s counsel’s error are the same.32 Stutsman contends the
Bankruptcy Court owed it the same remedy Adair was afforded—an extension of time
29
See, e.g., Rec. Doc. No. 3-1, pp. 63–64.
Rec. Doc. No. 3, p. 6.
31
Rec. Doc. No. 3, pp. 11–12.
32
Rec. Doc. No. 3, pp. 11–12.
30
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 8 of 13
and rescheduled deadline—and the denial of its Motion to Extend violated Stutsman’s
due process rights.33
Stutsman also argues that, “under normal circumstances,” the trustee’s request for
dismissal should and would have been granted “but for the Bankruptcy Judge allowing
the case to remain open” and allowing Adair to “interrupt dismissal.”34 According to
Stutsman, failure to dismiss the case automatically upon the trustee’s recommendation
violated Local Rule 2003-1(d). Stutsman again fails to provide any authority to support its
argument.
Bankruptcy Court Local Rule 2003-1(d) provides for discretionary dismissal in the
event a debtor misses the mandated creditors meeting in a Chapter 13 case: “[a] debtor's
failure to attend the meeting of creditors may be grounds for the immediate dismissal
of a voluntary bankruptcy case or other appropriate sanction.”35 According to the plain
language of this rule, dismissal was not immediately mandated because of Adair’s failure
to attend the initial creditors meeting. Further, dismissals on request of a trustee in a
Chapter 13 case are contested matters that afford a debtor notice and an opportunity to
be heard before an order of dismissal by the bankruptcy judge.36
Bankruptcy Court Local Rule 2003-1(d) makes clear that dismissal was within the
bankruptcy judge’s discretion and any reliance on the trustee’s recommendation to the
contrary would be unreasonable. Nonetheless, this issue is not properly on appeal
because it is not the subject of the notice of appeal filed with the Bankruptcy Court—the
same deficiency in Stutsman’s first challenge. Stutsman’s request is denied.
33
Rec. Doc. No. 3; Rec. Doc. No. 9.
Rec. Doc. No. 3, pp. 10–11.
35
Bankr. M.D. La. R. 2003-1(d) (emphasis added).
36
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 (2013); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1017 (2008); 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(c) (2010).
34
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 9 of 13
D. Denial of Motion to Extend
Finally, the Court turns to the only justiciable appeal issue raised by Stutsman: the
denial of its Motion to Extend.
As mentioned above, the Pioneer Court set forth factors to be considered in
determining whether a creditor’s failure to timely file a proof of claim is due to “excusable
neglect” and thus justify an extension under Rule 9006(b) of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.37 Stutsman prays this Court will
find the Pioneer factors applicable and find the Bankruptcy Court committed error when
it denied Stutsman’s Motion to Extend.38
Adair argues that the Pioneer factors are not applicable in Chapter 13 cases, such
as this one, and are not applicable to Stutsman’s requested enlargement of the deadline
to file proof of claims.39
The Bankruptcy Court did not analyze the Pioneer factors, relying solely upon the
strict confines of Rules 9006 and 3002(c) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.40
Rule 9006(b) addresses the extent to which bankruptcy judges can extend
deadlines provided under the Bankruptcy Rules. “Generally, bankruptcy courts may
extend upcoming deadlines ‘for cause shown’ and may excuse noncompliance with past
deadlines ‘where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.’”41 This general
rule is inapplicable to some deadlines, including, specifically, those delineated by Rule
3002(c) and applicable to proof of claim filing deadlines.42 Bankruptcy courts “may enlarge
37
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 389.
Rec. Doc. No. 3.
39
Rec. Doc. No. 7.
40
Rec. Doc. No. 6.
41
Matter of Ward, 978 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1) (2016)).
42
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(3); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c) (2022).
38
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 10 of 13
the time for taking action under Rule[]…3002(c)…only to the extent and under the
conditions stated in th[at] rule.”43 Rule 3002(c), in turn, provides that in a
chapter 13 case, a proof of claim is timely filed if it is filed not
later than 70 days after the order for relief under that chapter
or the date of the order of conversion to a case under chapter
12 or chapter 13…. [and] [o]n motion filed by the creditor
before or after the expiration of the time to file a proof of claim,
the court may extend the time…. if the court finds that: (A) the
notice was insufficient under the circumstances to give the
creditor a reasonable time to file a proof of claim because the
debtor failed to timely file the list of creditors' names and
addresses required by Rule 1007(a); or (B) the notice was
insufficient under the circumstances to give the creditor a
reasonable time to file a proof of claim, and the notice was
mailed to the creditor at a foreign address.44
Finding that Stutsman did not meet the criteria of either ground for extension under
Rule 3002(c)(6), the bankruptcy judge denied Stutsman’s Motion to Extend based on the
Rules.45
i.
Standard of Review
“Whether the ‘excusable neglect’ standard is applicable in Chapter 13 cases is a
question of law.”46 Thus, this Court reviews the bankruptcy judge’s decision not to
consider the Pioneer factors on Stutsman’s’ Motion to Extend de novo.
ii.
Pioneer is Not Applicable to Stutsman’s Motion to Extend
The Pioneer Court did not squarely address whether the excusable neglect
standard it applied to a Chapter 11 case also applies in Chapter 13 cases, but it did
explain that “[t]he “excusable neglect” standard of Rule 9006(b)(1) governs late filings of
43
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(3).
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c).
45
Rec. Doc. No. 6.
46
See In re Aboody, 223 B.R. 36, 37 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Smartt Const. Co., 138 B.R. 269,
271 (D. Colo. 1992)).
44
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 11 of 13
proofs of claim in Chapter 11 cases but not in Chapter 7 cases because Subsection (b)(3)
of Rule 9006 excludes such instances.47 Rule 9006 sets forth the general rule allowing
courts to extend deadlines in bankruptcy cases upon a showing of “excusable neglect,”
but this standard does not apply in all cases.48 In dicta, the Pioneer Court explained that
Subsection (b)(3) excludes certain actions from the excusable neglect standard, including
Rule 3002(c) that exclusively governs the filing of proofs of claims in Chapter 7 cases.
The time-computation and time-extension provisions of Rule
9006, like those of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, are
generally applicable to any time requirement found elsewhere
in the rules unless expressly excepted. Subsections (b)(2)
and (b)(3) of Rule 9006 enumerate those time requirements
excluded from the operation of the “excusable neglect”
standard. One of the time requirements listed as excepted in
Rule 9006(b)(3) is that governing the filing of proofs of claim
in Chapter 7 cases. Such filings are governed exclusively by
Rule 3002(c). By contrast, Rule 9006(b)(1) does not make a
similar exception for Rule 3003(c), which, as noted earlier,
establishes the time requirements for proofs of claim in
Chapter 11 cases. Consequently, Rule 9006(b)(1) must be
construed to govern the permissibility of late filings in Chapter
11 bankruptcies.49
Although the Pioneer Court did not explicitly hold that the excusable neglect
standard does not apply to Chapter 13 cases, its reasoning in finding that extensions of
time governed by Rule 3002(c) are explicitly excluded from the general excusable neglect
standard is instructive.50 Today, Chapter 13 cases are exclusively governed by Rule
3002(c), and, thus, fall within Rule 9006(b)(3)’s specific exceptions to the excusable
neglect standard.51 Thus, the deadline to file proofs of claims in Chapter 13 cases are
47
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 389.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1).
49
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 389 n.4 (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(3)); In re Coastal Alaska Lines, Inc., 920
F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1990); see Advisory Committee's Note accompanying Rule 9006(b)(1)); see also
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(3).
50
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 388–390 n.4.
51
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(3).
48
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 12 of 13
exempt from the excusable neglect standard of Rule 9006(b) and, thus, the Pioneer
factors are inapplicable to this case.52
Further, although the Fifth Circuit Court has not decided this issue, there is a
significant body of case law from other courts that have found that excusable neglect and
the Pioneer factors to not apply in Chapter 13 cases.53
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court lacked discretion to enlarge the time to file a proof
of claim unless the situation fell within one of the enumerated exceptions within Rule
3002(c)’s rigid time limits for creditors’ proof of filing claims.54 Although bankruptcy courts
are granted certain equitable powers “to ‘carry out’ the provisions of the Code,” they
cannot use them to “override explicit mandates of other sections of the Bankruptcy Code”
or the Bankruptcy Rules.55 The Bankruptcy Court lacked authority to extend Stutsman’s
deadline beyond Rule 3002(c)(6)’s explicit parameters to consider whether Stutsman’s
52
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c).
See, e.g., Jones v. Arross, 9 F.3d 79, 81 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that excusable neglect standard applies
only in Chapter 11 cases); In re Hogan, 346 B.R. 715, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (for discussion of
Pioneer and holding that bankruptcy court does not have discretion to allow creditor’s late-filed claims for
“excusable neglect” pursuant to Rules 3002(c) and 9006(b)); In re Aboody, 223 B.R. at 37 (discussing
Pioneer and explaining that excusable neglect standard “should logically be inapplicable to the filing of a
proof of claim in Chapter 13” cases).
54
See, e.g., In re Sunland, Inc., 536 B.R. 920, 926 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2015); In re Coastal Alaska, 920 F.2d at
1432 (court had no equitable discretion to extend time limit established by Rule 3002(c)); In re S.A. Morris
Paving Co., 92 B.R. 161, 163 (Bankr. W.D. Va.1988) (court lacks equitable power to enlarge time for filing
proof of claim unless one of six situations in Rule 3002(c) exists); In re Jemal, 496 B.R. 697, 701 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y 2013).
55
Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014) (“It is hornbook law that § 105(a) ‘does not allow the bankruptcy
court to override explicit mandates of other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.’”) (quoting 2 Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶ 105.01[2], p. 105–6 (16th ed. 2013)); see also Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S.
197, 206 (1988); see, e.g., Raleigh v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 24–25 (2000); U.S. v. Noland, 517
U.S. 535, 543 (1996); SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improv. Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940); In re Sunland, 536 B.R.
at 926; In re Scrivner, 535 F.3d 1258,1265 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Section 105(a) does not empower courts to
create remedies and rights in derogation of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.”); In re Combustion Eng’g,
Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[E]quitable powers emanating from § 105(a) . . . are not a license
for a court to disregard the clear language and meaning of the bankruptcy statutes and rules.”) (quoting In
re Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616, 620–21 (2d Cir. 1999))); see also Off. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey,
832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); In re Etzel, 2004 WL 2044093, at *3 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) (“The
Court cannot use its equitable powers under § 105(a) to circumvent the plain language of the Bankruptcy
Code or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.”).
53
Case 3:22-cv-00664-SDD-RLB
Document 11
09/28/23 Page 13 of 13
actions constituted excusable neglect under the Pioneer factors. In any event, the Court
does not find the creditor’s counsel’s assumption of dismissal excusable neglect. Neglect
is the inadvertent failure to do or not do something. Counsel for Stutsman made the
conscious decision to remove deadlines from his calendar on an erroneous ill-advised
assumption. This is not excusable neglect—it is a bad decision.
Accordingly, the Court need not address Stutsman’s detrimental reliance claim.
The Bankruptcy Court’s denial of Stutsman’s Motion to Extend the proof of claim
deadline under Rule 3002(c)(6) was proper and is, hereby, AFFIRMED.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Order of the Bankruptcy Court denying
Appellant’s Motion for Enlargement and Extension of Time to File Proof of Claim is
AFFIRMED, and this appeal is dismissed. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ___
28th day of September, 2023.
S
________________________________
SHELLY D. DICK
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?