Campbell v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc. et al
Filing
95
RULING denying 58 66 Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 1/28/2025. (EDC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DYLAN CAMPBELL
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
23-2-SDD-RLB
HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC. ET AL
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motions to Dismiss1 filed by Defendants
Larry Ruble and Larry Ruble Consulting, LLC (collectively, the “Ruble Defendants”).
Plaintiff Dylan Campbell (“Plaintiff”) filed a combined Opposition2 to both motions. The
Ruble Defendants filed a joint Reply.3 For the reasons that follow, the Motions will be
denied.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On or about November 14, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this personal injury action in the
19th Judicial District Court, East Baton Rouge Parish, State of Louisiana.4 Plaintiff sued
multiple parties in connection with injuries he allegedly sustained from a well explosion
and fire which occurred during his employment.5 Specifically, Plaintiff named the following
defendants in the original Petition: Helmerich & Payne, Inc. (“H&P Inc.”), Helmerich &
Payne Management, LLC (“H&P Management”), GeoSouthern Energy Corporation
(“GeoSouthern”), Huckaby Four JS, LLC (“Huckaby”), Jaqueline Huckaby Woodson
1
Rec. Docs. 58, 66.
Rec. Doc. 72.
3
Rec. Doc. 74.
4
Rec. Doc. 1-2.
5
Id. at p. 4.
2
Page 1 of 13
(“Woodson”), and SWN Production (Louisiana), LLC (“SWN”).6 In the original Petition,
Plaintiff alleged he was employed by H&P Inc. and H&P Management (collectively, the
“H&P Defendants”); that GeoSouthern “operated, managed and maintained” the well; that
SWN owned the well; and that Huckaby and Woodson (collectively, the “Huckaby
Defendants”) “owned the land on which the subject well was located.”7 The H&P
Defendants were later dismissed pursuant to a joint motion filed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41.8
On January 3, 2023, Defendants (with the exception of GeoSouthern) removed the
action to this Court on the basis of diversity subject matter jurisdiction.9 Although the
Huckaby Defendants shared Louisiana citizenship with Plaintiff, the removing Defendants
argued the Huckaby Defendants’ citizenship should be ignored because they were
improperly joined for the purpose of destroying complete diversity.10 Plaintiff moved to
remand, arguing the Huckaby Defendants were properly joined.11 On August 31, 2023,
the Court denied the Motion to Remand and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the
Huckaby Defendants without prejudice, finding no reasonable basis to predict Plaintiff
could recover against these defendants.12
On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint13 and
a second Motion to Remand.14 In the Motion for Leave to Amend, accompanied by
6
Id. at pp. 1–2.
Id. at p. 4.
8
Rec. Doc. 24.
9
Rec. Doc. 1.
10
Id. at p. 5.
11
Rec. Doc. 19.
12
Rec. Docs. 28, 29.
13
Rec. Doc. 40.
14
Rec. Doc. 41.
7
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Plaintiff’s proposed First Amended Complaint,15 Plaintiff sought to name several
additional defendants, including: Larry Ruble Consulting, LLC; Larry Ruble (collectively,
the “Ruble Defendants”); William A. Lipps, Inc.; and William A. Lipps (collectively, the
“Lipps Defendants”). The Ruble Defendants were alleged to be Texas citizens, while the
Lipps Defendants were alleged to be Louisiana citizens.16 On the same day of the filing
of the Motion for Leave to Amend, Plaintiff moved to remand on account of the anticipated
presence of the non-diverse Lipps Defendants in the action.17
Defendant SWN filed an Opposition18 to the Motion for Leave to Amend and the
second Motion for Remand. SWN argued Plaintiff sought to add the Lipps Defendants for
the sole purpose of destroying diversity and had no reasonable basis of recovery against
the Lipps Defendants.19 After considering the parties’ arguments and the allegations in
the proposed First Amended Complaint, Magistrate Judge Richard L. Bourgeois, Jr.
denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend with respect to the addition of the Lipps
Defendants, finding inter alia that “the absence of factual and legal support for any such
claim [against the Lipps Defendants] supports a conclusion that Plaintiff is seeking to add
them as non-diverse defendants for the purpose of destroying complete diversity.”20
Because Plaintiff was denied amendment with respect to the non-diverse Lipps
Defendants, the Motion to Remand was denied as moot.21
On June 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming the following
defendants: SWN; GEP Haynesville, LLC (“GEP); Iron Horse Tools, Inc. (“Iron Horse”);
15
Rec. Doc. 40-2.
Id. at pp. 4–5.
17
Rec. Doc. 41.
18
Rec. Doc. 46.
19
Id.
20
Rec. Doc. 47, p. 15.
21
Id. at p. 17.
16
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and the Ruble Defendants.22 Plaintiff alleges SWN hired the Ruble Defendants as
“company men or well site supervisors of the subject well site” to speed up production.23
Plaintiff lodges negligence and intentional tort claims against the Ruble Defendants in
connection with the explosion and resulting injuries.24
The Ruble Defendants filed the instant Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), which are virtually identical.25 The Ruble Defendants principally argue that
Magistrate Judge Bourgeois’ denial of Plaintiff’s request to add the Lipps Defendants to
the action should result in the dismissal of the claims against the Ruble Defendants
because “[t]he allegations against the Lipps Defendants and the Ruble Defendants are
essentially identical.”26 For this reason, the Ruble Defendants argue that the allegations
against them have “already been found deficient.”27 In response, Plaintiff argues the facts
alleged against the Ruble Defendants in the operative Amended Complaint are different
from those previously alleged against the Lipps Defendants in the proposed First
Amended Complaint and are sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion.28 Plaintiff also
argues there were “other considerations that weighed in favor of rejecting the Lipps
[D]efendants” that are not applicable to the Ruble Defendants.29
22
Rec. Doc. 48. Although Plaintiff entitled this document “Second Amended Complaint,” the Court will refer
to it as the “Amended Complaint” for purposes of clarity because it is the first and only amended complaint
that has been actually filed as a pleading in this case.
23
Id. at ¶ 18.
24
Id. at ¶¶ 39–44.
25
Rec. Docs. 58, 66.
26
Rec. Docs. 59, 66-1, pp. 9–10.
27
Id. at p. 7.
28
Rec. Doc. 72, p. 2.
29
Id.
Page 4 of 13
II.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-
pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”30 The Court
may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”31 “To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”32
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the
basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.”33 A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”34 However, “[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”35 In order
to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility
that the defendant has acted unlawfully.”36 “Furthermore, while the court must accept well-
30
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F. 3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F. 3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
31
Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F. 3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
32
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F. 3d at 205 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007)).
33
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (internal citations and brackets omitted).
34
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
35
Id.
36
Id.
Page 5 of 13
pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’”37 On a
motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.”38
In Canter v. Koehring Co.,39 the Louisiana Supreme Court articulated the following
four-part test to determine whether an employee may be individually liable to third
persons:
1. The principal or employer owes a duty of care to the third
person …, breach of which has caused the damage for which
recovery is sought.
2. This duty is delegated by the principal or employer to the
defendant.
3. The defendant officer, agent, or employee has breached
this duty through personal (as contrasted with technical or
vicarious) fault. The breach occurs when the defendant has
failed to discharge the obligation with the degree of care
required by ordinary prudence under the same or similar
circumstances—whether such failure be due to malfeasance,
misfeasance, or nonfeasance, including when the failure
results from not acting upon actual knowledge of the risk to
others as well as from a lack of ordinary care in discovering
and avoiding such risk of harm which has resulted from the
breach of the duty.
4. With regard to the personal (as contrasted with technical or
vicarious) fault, personal liability cannot be imposed upon the
officer, agent, or employee simply because of his general
administrative responsibility for performance of some function
of the employment. He must have a personal duty towards the
injured plaintiff, breach of which specifically has caused the
plaintiff's damages. If the defendant's general responsibility
has been delegated with due care to some responsible
subordinate or subordinates, he is not himself personally at
fault and liable for the negligent performance of this
responsibility unless he personally knows or personally
37
Taha v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 2012 WL 1576099, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 3, 2012) (quoting Southland
Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F. 3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)).
38
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
39
283 So. 2d 716 (La.1973).
Page 6 of 13
should know of its non-performance or mal-performance and
has nevertheless failed to cure the risk of harm.40
In the operative Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the explosion occurred in the
following manner:
On the date of the incident, Plaintiff was draining the flare line
between the gas buster and the flare stack because the flare
had gone out. As Plaintiff opened the drain valve, located at
the 90-degree elbow under the flare stack, the flare line
discharged a mixture of water and volatile material which was
then ignited by the flare igniter. Suddenly and without warning,
a fiery explosion ensued, and Plaintiff was covered with
burning material all over his body. As a result of the explosion
and flames, Plaintiff suffered burns to his hands, back, head,
face, and legs, and sustained injuries to other parts of his body
as well.41
Plaintiff alleges SWN hired several contractors, including the Ruble Defendants
and the (now non-party) Lipps Defendants, “to fast forward production.”42 According to
Plaintiff, the Ruble Defendants and William Lipps “oversaw the well site at the time of the
explosion,” and they “either knew, or should have known, of the dangerous conditions
with the equipment that caused the subject incident.”43 Plaintiff further alleges that one of
the reasons the explosion occurred was because SWN and the Ruble Defendants did not
rent a certain catch basin, “which was a critical piece of equipment reasonably known by
all Defendants to be necessary in order to control the flare stack.”44
Plaintiff also alleges that Larry Ruble was involved in instructing Plaintiff to open
the drain valve which led to the explosion:
The dangerous nature and manner of the work being
performed made it substantially certain that instructing
40
Id. at 721.
Rec. Doc. 48, ¶ 12.
42
Id. at ¶ 18.
43
Id. at ¶ 19.
44
Id. at ¶ 20.
41
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Plaintiff to open a valve on an extinguished flare stack would
cause an explosion. Defendant Larry Ruble, who was
responsible for supervising and inspecting the well site, knew
of the substantial dangers involved with sending the Plaintiff
near the extinguished flare stack to open a gas valve. Despite
knowing that an incident of this sort was substantially certain
to occur, Ruble proceeded with the instruction. The dangers
to Plaintiff and others on the well site in opening the valve of
the extinguished flare stack made the situation one where it
was not a question of “if” an incident would occur, but a
question of “when” it would occur.45
In their Motion, the Ruble Defendants make minimal effort to actually apply the
Canter factors to Plaintiff’s allegations. Instead, they rely heavily on the notion that
Magistrate Judge Bourgeois’ analysis in denying Plaintiffs’ amendment of the Complaint
with respect to the addition of the Lipps Defendants compels dismissal of the claims
against the Ruble Defendants because of the congruency of the allegations against both
sets of defendants.46
In finding the allegations against the Lipps Defendants in the proposed First
Amended Complaint insufficient to establish liability under Canter, Magistrate Judge
Bourgeois reasoned as follows:
Plaintiff fails to allege that any underlying personal duties were
delegated to the Lipps Defendants (as opposed to general
administrative duties with respect to the work site). At most,
Plaintiff alleges that the Lipps Defendants “knew or should
have known” about the underlying conditions that resulted in
the explosion. (See R. Doc. 40-2 at 10-11).47
Magistrate Judge Bourgeois continued:
Even if the Canter factors do not apply (on the basis that the
Lipps Defendants were contractors and not employees),
Plaintiff does not allege that Mr. Lipps was personally involved
in the underlying incident. At most, Plaintiff generally alleges
45
Id. at ¶ 44.
Rec. Docs. 59, 66-1, pp. 3–11.
47
Rec. Doc. 47, p. 12.
46
Page 8 of 13
that the Lipps Defendants knew or should have known that an
explosion would occur (and should have warned Plaintiff of
the dangerous situation) in light of “rainy conditions” on the
day of the incident, the “flare equipment” and “flare line” in
operation, and the “relighting protocol after a flare goes out.”
(R. Doc. 40-2 at 11). But the record indicates that Mr. Ruble
(and not Mr. Lipps) was the consultant present and on duty at
the time of the incident.48
Taking the facts alleged in the operative Amended Complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the Ruble Defendants’
motion should be denied. Magistrate Judge Bourgeois’ reasoning in disallowing Plaintiff’s
Motion to Amend with respect to the Lipps Defendants does not compel dismissal of the
Ruble Defendants. Significant portions of the analysis behind the Magistrate Judge’s
decision do not support dismissal of the claims against the Ruble Defendants. First, the
Magistrate Judge found the fact that Plaintiff contemporaneously filed the Motion for
Leave to Amend with the Motion to Remand suggested Plaintiff’s purpose in seeking to
add the non-diverse Lipps Defendants was to destroy diversity.49 Second, William Lipps
submitted an affidavit in which he declared he had no personal involvement in the
incident. The affidavit reads as follows, in pertinent part:
5. In connection with the execution of this Declaration, I
reviewed the attached First Report of lnjury or Illness, which
documents an incident on November 13, 2021, at 10:05 a.m.
at the Site involving Dylan Campbell. Apart from my review of
the First Report of lnjury or Illness for purposes of this
Declaration, I have no personal knowledge of any incident
involving Dylan Campbell, on November 13, 2021, or
otherwise. I do not have personal knowledge of the tasks
Dylan Campbell performed at the time of his alleged incident
or injury either. I was not on duty when the alleged incident
occurred and did not otherwise participate in the work in
progress at the time of the incident.
48
49
Id. at p. 13.
Id. at p. 9.
Page 9 of 13
6. More specifically, when I performed work in connection with
the Site, the only hours I ever worked were from 6:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m. Thus, I was not on duty during the daytime hours
when the alleged incident involving Mr. Campbell occurred on
November 13, 2021. Moreover, I did not supervise Mr.
Campbell; provide instruction to Mr. Campbell; inspect his
work; or otherwise oversee any of the operations ongoing at
the time of the alleged incident. In fact, I was asleep when the
incident occurred because my work shift ended hours earlier.
7. My daytime counterpart on November 13, 2021, was Larry
Ruble. Mr. Ruble’s work hours were from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00
p.m.
8. On November 13, 2021, and prior thereto, I did not have
knowledge of any complaints regarding or defects with
respect to the flare line or flare equipment at the Site.50
As stated in Lipps’ affidavit, the Magistrate Judge repeatedly noted that “the record
indicates that Mr. Ruble (and not Mr. Lipps) was the consultant present and on duty at the
time of the incident.”51 Lipps’ absence at the time of the incident was a significant factor
in the Court’s decision to reject the addition of the Lipps Defendants into this lawsuit.
Conversely, the Ruble Defendants do not dispute that Larry Ruble was present and on
duty at the time of Plaintiff’s injury. This distinction makes Plaintiff’s allegations against
the Ruble Defendants stronger than those proposed against the Lipps Defendants, and it
remains plausible at this stage that the Ruble Defendants bear responsibility.
The Ruble Defendants further argue that the Incident Field Report52 attached to
the Amended Complaint controverts Plaintiff’s allegation that Larry Ruble instructed
50
Rec. Doc. 46-2.
Rec. Doc. 47, p. 13. See also Rec. Doc. 40-2, pp. 446–448 (The Incident Field Report, indicating that
Ruble was the “GEP rig consultant” on duty at the time of the incident).
52
Rec. Doc. 48-6. The Court may consider this document because it is both attached to and referenced in
the Amended Complaint. See Sebelius, 635 F. 3d at 763.
51
Page 10 of 13
Plaintiff to open a gas valve leading up to the incident.53 The Ruble Defendants quote the
following portion of the Incident Field Report:
At or around 10am on Saturday 13 November, H&P Employee
Dillon Michael Campbell (Mr. Campbell) was instructed by
Chris Busby (H&P Driller) to drain the flare line between the
gas buster and the flare stack.54
Referencing this document, the Ruble Defendants argue: “The report does not indicate
that Ruble was involved in the incident at all, much less supervising or directing Plaintiff’s
work activities or operations. Ruble’s only involvement, per the post-incident report, was
after the events leading up to the incident and after Plaintiff’s injury had already
occurred.”55
The Court rejects the Ruble Defendants’ attempt to disprove Plaintiff’s allegations
with the Field Incident Report. First, the indication in the report that Chris Busby instructed
Plaintiff to drain the flare line does not establish that the Ruble Defendants had no role in
the incident, and it does not necessarily contradict Plaintiff’s allegations. Moreover, the
Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as true in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.56 In
the words of the Fifth Circuit, “a 12(b)(6) inquiry focuses on the allegations in the
pleadings, not whether a plaintiff actually has sufficient evidence to succeed on the
merits.”57 The Ruble Defendants’ use of the Field Incident Report as evidence of their lack
53
Rec. Docs. 59, 66-1, p. 10.
Rec. Doc. 48-6, p. 2.
55
Rec. Docs. 59, 66-1, pp. 10–11.
56
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F. 3d at 205 (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 369 F. 3d
at 467).
57
Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F. 3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Muhammad v. Dallas County Cmty.
Supervision & Corr. Dep't, 479 F. 3d 377, 379 (5th Cir.2007)).
54
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of involvement would be more appropriate in the context of a motion for summary
judgment than this Motion to Dismiss.58
Finally, the Ruble Defendants argue they cannot be liable based on jurisprudence
discussing the duties owed by one independent contractor to another independent
contractor.59 The Fifth Circuit has stated:
Independent contractors do not generally owe a duty to
protect the employee of another independent contractor
beyond the exercise of ordinary care that is owed to the public
generally. … One independent contractor owes another
independent contractor at least “the duty to refrain from gross,
willful or wanton negligence, and at the most the duty to refrain
from creating an unreasonable risk of harm or a hazardous
condition.”60
Further, “in determining whether one independent contractor owes a duty to another
independent
contractor’s
employee,
relevant
considerations
are
whether
one
independent contractor employs, shares a contract with, or supervises the other’s
employee.”61 Courts within this circuit have found that “one independent contractor owed
no duty to another independent contractor’s employee where it does not employ, share a
contract, or actually supervise the plaintiff.”62
58
The Court’s task on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to “assess the legal feasibility of [the] complaint, not to
weigh evidence which plaintiff offers or intends to offer.” Jenkins v. City of Westwego, No. CIV.A. 09-3033,
2009 WL 3062478, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2009) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. K–H Corp., 745 F. Supp. 899
(S.D.N.Y.1990)).
59
Rec. Docs. 59, 66-1, pp. 13–14.
60
McCarroll v. Wood Grp. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 561 F. App'x 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lafont v.
Chevron, U.S.A., 593 So. 2d 416, 420 (La. App. 1 Cir.1991) (emphasis added). See also 65 C.J.S.
Negligence, § 63(113) (1966) (“As between two independent contractors who work on the same premises,
either at the same time or one following the other, each owes to the employees of the other the same duty
of exercising ordinary care as they owe to the public generally”).
61
Fornah v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 737 F. App'x 677, 681 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing McCarroll, 561 F.
App'x at 410).
62
McCarroll, 561 F. App'x at 410 (citing Parker v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 2002 WL 461655 at *1 (E.D.
La. March 20, 2002)). See also Verdin v. Kerr McGee Corp., No. CIV. A. 95-1483, 1997 WL 39308, at *3
(E.D. La. Jan. 30, 1997); Skinner v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. CIV.A. 13-03146, 2015 WL 4253986,
at *7 (W.D. La. July 13, 2015).
Page 12 of 13
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff adequately alleges the Ruble Defendants
actually supervised his work, and also that they were personally involved in the events
leading up to the incident.63 Most notably, Plaintiff alleges that the Ruble Defendants were
involved in instructing Plaintiff to do the task he was undertaking at the time of his injury.64
Accordingly, the Ruble Defendants have failed to show that Plaintiff’s allegations taken
as true do not give rise to a plausible claim for relief.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motions to Dismiss65 filed by Defendants Larry
Ruble and Larry Ruble Consulting, LLC are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ___
2025.
28th day of _______________,
January
S
________________________________
SHELLY D. DICK
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
63
See Rec. Doc. 48, ¶¶ 18–25, 39–44.
See Rec. Doc. 48, ¶¶ 39–44.
65
Rec. Docs. 58, 66.
64
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