Ledet v. State of Louisiana et al
Filing
44
RULING AND ORDER granting 5 24 Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' action be and is hereby DISMISSED. Final Judgment shall issue separately. Signed by Judge Brian A. Jackson on 3/25/2024. (EDC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUET
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MICHAEL LEDET CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL. NO. 23-00492-BAJ-EWD
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Christopher Eskew, Kim Bass, and Emily
Bishop's 12(b)(l) And 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5), which requests that
Plaintiffs' claims against Christopher Eskew, Kira Bass, and Emily Bishop be
dismissed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6), and
Defendant State of Louisiana's, through the Louisiana Department of Public Safety
and Corrections, 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24). Plaintiff
opposes both Motions. (Docs. 9, 27). Defendants have filed Reply Briefs. (Docs. 12,
29).
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants Motions are GRANTED and
Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED.
I. ALLEGED FACTS
In 2005, Plaintiff pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §2252(a)(4)(B). (Doc. 1 at U 46). This federal statute defines
a minor as "any person under the age of eighteen years" and the definition of "child
pornography" includes computer-generated images. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2256(1),
2256(8)(B). Plaintiff spent two years in federal prison, and was released in June 2007.
(Doc. 1 at IT 24).
There is no record of the age of the minor depicted in the pornographic
materials possessed by Plaintiff, nor is there a record of whether this minor was an
actual person or was computer generated. (Id. at ^ 19, 20).
Plaintiff was required to comply with registration and notice requirements
upon his release from federal prison under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA). (Id. at ^ 22). Plaintiff promptly registered as a Tier 1
offender once released. {Id. at ^ 23).
After Plaintiff registered with the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections (the "Department"), the registration period for Tier 1 offenders was
legislatively lengthened from 10 to 15 years. (Id. at ^ 25-26). Plaintiff timely
appeared for his periodic renewals at the Department after his registration in 2007,
and each time his registration form indicated that he was a Tier 1 offender. (Id. at ^
27). In 2014, a deputy at the registering sheriffs office informed Plaintiff that she did
not believe his Tier level was correct. (Id. at ^ 28).
Louisiana law requires that for those convicted as sex offenders under federal
law, the Department shall determine how long and how frequently a sex offender will
be required to register while residing in Louisiana. La. Stat. Ann.
15:542.1.3(B)(2)(a). The Department does so by "a comparison of the elements of the
offense of conviction or adjudication with the elements of the most comparable
Louisiana offense." Id. The Department's determination is to take place within sixty
days of receiving the certified copies of court records from the offender. Id.
Plaintiff was instructed to provide the court minutes and Bill of Information
from his federal conviction. (Doc. 1 at ^ 28). Plaintiff complied with that request, and
the Deputy thereafter changed Plaintiffs classification to that of a Tier 2 offender in
the Louisiana State Sex Offender and Child Predator Registry (the "Registry"). (Id.
at ^ 28-29).
A Tier 2 classification would require Plaintiff to comply with sex offender
registration requirements for 25 years, meaning Plaintiffs registration obligations
would end in 2032 rather than in 2022. {Id. at ^ 67). Defendants contend that they
changed Plaintiffs classification because the Louisiana law that most closely
corresponds with 18 U.S.C.A. §2252(a)(4)(B) is La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81.1, or the offense
of Pornography Involving Juveniles. (Id. at ^ 37). Offenders under this Louisiana
statute are subject to longer and more frequent registration periods. (Id.). However,
only actual victims that are sixteen and under qualify as "juveniles" for purposes of
La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81.1. (Id. at ^ 37, 47). La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81.1 and 18 U.S.C.A.
}2252(a)(4)(B) therefore differ in their requirements as to the age of the depicted
victim and as to whether the depicted victim must be a real person. (Id. at ^ 46-47).
The Department created documentation to support this Tier change after it
was enacted. (Id. at ^ 32). As part of this documentation, Defendant Kim Bass, a
Criminal Records Analyst employed by the Department at the time, created a "Tier
Classification Summary Sheet. {Id. at ^ 34). The purpose of this document was
ostensibly to compare the elements of the federal child pornography statute with its
Louisiana counterpart. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that Bass inaccurately described the
contents of the materials provided relating to his conviction by stating that the age
of the minor depicted in the pornography possessed by Plaintiff was "not applicable"
rather than unknown. (Id.). Bass also stated that the age element was satisfied for
both the Louisiana and federal child pornography statutes when those depicted were
under the age of seventeen. {Id. at ^ 38). It is uncontested that this was a
misrepresentation of the law, and Bass later testified that she knew this was not the
law when she created the Tier Classification Summary Sheet. (Id. at ^ 43). Defendant
Emily Bishop, a Criminal Records Analyst employed by the Department at the time
and the then supervisor of the Registry, signed off on this comparison and noted that
she "agreed" with Bass's statements and reclassification at the bottom of the Tier
Classification Summary Sheet. (Id. at ^ 40). Bishop later testified that she was aware
that Bass s description of the age elements for the Louisiana and federal child
pornography statutes was inaccurate at the time she signed the Tier Classification
Summary Sheet. (Id. at ^ 45). Defendant Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Eskew, at
that time a Lieutenant and the Deputy Director of the Registry, "adopted the
classification as his own and sent Plaintiff notice that his offender classification was
to be changed to Tier 2. (Id. at ^ 41).
II. PROCEDURAL BACKROUND
Plaintiff timely filed an administrative challenge to his Tier change, and a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was held. (Doc. 1 at ^ 42). The
ALJ affirmed that La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81.1 and 18 U.S.C.A. 2252(a)(4)(B) were
comparable, despite acknowledging that the age elements are different and that there
is no evidence that Plaintiff committed an offense under La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81.1. {Id.
at ^\ 48-51). The ALJ concluded that the age elements of the offense were irrelevant
since Plaintiff had failed to prove that the person depicted in the relevant
pornographic materials was over the age of sixteen. (Id. at ^ 52).
During this administrative proceeding, Plaintiff introduced testimony from
Emma Devillier, the Chief of the Sexual Predator Unit for the Louisiana Attorney
General's Office, to the United States House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security. (Id. at ^ 57). M.S. Devillier stated therein that in
instances where there are no adjudicated facts as to the victim's age in a child
pornography conviction originating under non-Louisiana law, any sex offender
classification above Tier 1 is violative of due process. (Id. at *\\ 58).
Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, which affirmed. (Id. at ^ 60). Plaintiff then
appealed this decision to the Louisiana First Circuit, which also affirmed. (Id. at ^
62). The Louisiana First Circuit concluded that the difference in the age elements as
between the state and federal child pornography statutes were not dispositive since
both had a common legislative purpose of protecting society from sex offenders. (Id.).
Plaintiff then filed a writ with the Louisiana Supreme Court, which declined to
exercise its supervisory authority. (Id. at ^ 63). Finally, Plaintiff sought review from
the Supreme Court of the United States, which denied certiorari in June 2019. (Doc.
5-1 at pg. 2).
Four years after the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Plaintiff lodged his
Complaint with this Court, and listed as Defendants the State of Louisiana, through
the Department, Lt. Col. Christopher Eskew, an employee of the Department, in his
personal capacity, Kim Bass, a former employee of the Department, in her personal
capacity, and Emily Bishop, a former employee of the Department, in her personal
capacity. (Id. at ^ 4-10). The Complaint contained three causes of action. (Id.). The
first cause of action (Claim One ), presumably brought against the Department, is
for violation of Plaintiffs right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. {Id. at pg. 19). The second cause of action ("Claim Two"), brought
against each Defendant, is for deprivation of Plaintiffs federally protected rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §1983. (Id. at pg. 25). The third cause of action ("Claim
Three"), again presumably brought against the Department, asserts that retroactive
application of the registration requirements for Tier 2 offenders violates Plaintiffs
right to due process. (Id. at pg. 31).
Plaintiff prays for compensatory and punitive damages with respect to his
§1983 claims, and for attorneys fees and costs with respect to each of his claims
above. (Id. at pg. 32). Plaintiff also prays for equitable relief in the manner of an order
declaring that La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff
because, as construed by Louisiana courts, it concludes that La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81.1
and 18 U.S.C.A. 2252(a)(4)(B) are comparable, and an injunction mandating the
Department restore Plaintiffs Tier 1 offender status. In response, Defendants Bass,
Eskew, and Bishop filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6), (Doc. 5), to which Plaintiff responded. (Doc. 9). Defendants filed
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a reply to Plaintiffs response. (Doc. 12). The Department has subsequently filed a
separate motion to dismiss under 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6), (Doc. 24), to which Plaintiff
has responded, (Doc. 27).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
a. Rule 12(b)(l)
Under Rule 12(b)(l), "[a] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate
the case." Home Builders Ass n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010
(5th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may
be established based on 1) the complaint alone, 2) the complaint supplemented by the
undisputed facts evidenced in the record, and 3) the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts plus the court s resolution of disputed facts. Williamson v. Tucker,
645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). "The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(l) motion to
dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d
158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) {citing M^cDaniel v. United States, 899 F. Supp. 305, 307 (E.D.
Tex. 1995)). Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that
jurisdiction does in fact exist. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Menchaca v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.1980)). "When a Rule 12(b)(l)
motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider
the Rule 12(b)(l) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits."
Ramming, 281 F.3d. at 161 (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam)). "Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove
any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief." Ramming,
281 F.3d. at 161 (citing Home Builders Ass n of Miss., Inc., 143 F.3d at 1010).
b. Rule 12(b)(6)
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against
the legal standard set forth in Rule 8, which requires "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense." Id. at 679. "[F]acial plausibility" exists "when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). When conducting its inquiry, the Court must "acceptQ all
well-pleaded facts as true and viewQ those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff." Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
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IV. DISCUSSION
a. Defendants Arguments
Defendants assert that the Court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs claims because of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. (Doc. 5-1 at pg. 6).
Defendants provide that in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. and District of Columbia
Appeals v. Feldman, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that "federal district
courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments."
Liedtke v. State Bar ofTex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994) {citing Rooker, 263 U.S.
413 (1923); Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). Further, state court judgments may not
be "modified] or reverse [d]" except when authorized by Congress. Truong v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Union Planters Bank Nat. Ass'n
v. Salih, 369 F. 3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Defendants also note that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine usually applies "only
when a plaintiff explicitly attacks the validity of a state court's judgment, . ..though
it can also apply if the plaintiffs federal claims are so inextricably intertwined with
a state judgment that the federal court 'is in essence being called upon to review the
state court decision.'" III. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16) {citing Weaver v. Tex. Cap.
Bank N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011)). Defendants highlight that even in cases
where a plaintiff does not raise a constitutional challenge in state court proceedings,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal court from hearing the constitutional
challenge when said challenge is inextricably intertwined with the state court
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decision. Hidtberg v. Louisiana, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998). A constitutional
challenge is inextricably intertwined" with a state court judgment when the district
court is essentially being asked to review the state court decision and the challenge
is not "separable from and collateral to" the merits of the state-court judgment. Id.
(quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 21 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citation omitted)).
Instead, state courts must resolve constitutional questions that arise during
proceedings and should the state trial court err, the "appropriate state appellate
court must correct it." Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chern. Grp., Inc., 355 F.3d 345,
350 (5th Cir. 2003). "Any subsequent recourse to federal court is limited to an
application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court." Id. (citing
Eooker, 263 U.S. at 416).
Applying this law to the facts here, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim is
inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment that upheld his classification
change from a Tier 1 to a Tier 2 level sex offender. (Doc. 5-1 at pg. 8). Defendants note
that Plaintiffs requested relief in both the state court proceedings and the present
action was to invalidate the change in Tiers, and that Plaintiff in both instances has
argued that his receiving a Tier 2 classification was an error. (Id.). Defendants
thereby conclude that Plaintiffs federal claims are inextricably intertwined with the
state court judgment, and that the Court lacks jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine. (Id. at pg. 11). Defendants also note that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars as-applied constitutional challenges, which they allege is precisely the
10
sort of challenge made by Plaintiff here. (Doc. 12 at pg. 2). Defendants point to
Boudreaux v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. as support for that position. 2019 WL
4752067.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs Claim Two should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Broadly, Defendants deny
that Plaintiff has suffered a constitutional injury as a matter of law. (Doc. 5-1 at pg.
13). Defendants also present different arguments in support of dismissal on behalf of
each Defendant.
As to Defendants Eskew and Bishop, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs §1983
claims should be dismissed since such claims impermissibly rely upon principles of
respondeat superior to establish liability. (Id. at pg. 17).
As to Defendant Bass, Defendants assert that qualified immunity bars
Plaintiffs claims. (Id. at pg. 15).
As to the Department, Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, the
Department is not a person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 and that therefore
Plaintiff fails to state a claim. (Doc. 24-1 at pg. 7).
Finally, regarding Claim Three, Defendants alternatively contend that federal
and Louisiana state courts have continually held that retroactive application of sex
offender registration requirements does not violate state or federal constitutions.
(Doc. 5-1 at pg. 19). Accordingly, Defendants conclude that each of the claims put
forward in Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed for either lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.
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Should the Court disagree with Defendants as to the arguments against
Claims One and Three above, the Department additionally argues that all of
Plaintiffs claims are only actionable under 42 U.S.C.A. §1983, and that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits the Court from exercising jurisdiction. (Doc. 24-1 at pg. 4).
Because the Court finds Defendants' other arguments to be dispositive, the Court
does not reach a conclusion on this issue.
b. Plaintiffs Arguments
Plaintiff, in response, argues first that this action does not fall within the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine's purview. Plaintiff states that he accepts the finality and
validity of the state court ruling as to the construction of statutes at issue (namely
that the state and federal child pornography statutes are comparable), but that
nevertheless La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is unconstitutional as applied to him. (Doc.
9 at pg. 2). Plaintiff argues that the Louisiana child pornography statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him because there was no determination or admission
that Plaintiff violated La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81.1. (Id. at pg. 4).
Plaintiff argues that this distinction makes the issues in the present action
separable from those addressed in state court proceedings. (Id. at pg. 2). Plaintiff
further asserts that the issue of the constitutionality of La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 as
applied to him was not addressed in state court. {Id. at pg. 3). According to Plaintiff,
this Court can now properly decide on constitutionality of the La. Stat. Ann.
15:542.1.3 as applied because the state courts have construed the statute at issue.
(Id. at pg. 4 (citing Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941))).
12
Plaintiff also asserts that his constitutional claims could not have been adjudicated
in the state court proceedings since such proceedings began with an administrative
hearing, where constitutional arguments could not have been entertained, and that
the subsequent Louisiana state courts were accordingly confined in their jurisdiction.
(Doc. 9 at pg. 6).
As to Defendants' arguments to Claims Two and Three, Plaintiff asserts that
Defendants erroneously rely on an improperly heightened pleading standard to
conclude that his claims should be dismissed, that he has alleged sufficient factual
allegations to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and that retroactive application of
the registration requirements violates Louisiana law. (Doc. 9). Plaintiff also opposes
the Department's alternative argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars the
Court from exercising jurisdiction, (Doc. 27), and concludes that Defendants' IVtotions
should be summarily denied.
c. Analysis
Considering the Parties' arguments, the Court determines the following: As to
Claim One, the Court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For
Claim Two, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Regarding
Claim Three, the Court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and
alternatively Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, Defendants' Motions will be GRANTED. Further discussion is below.
i. Claim One
Plaintiff claims that the issue of the constitutionality of La. Stat. Ann.
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15:542.1.3 as applied to him is distinct from the issues addressed in the state court
proceedings. The Court disagrees. The Fifth Circuit clarified in Burciaga v. Deutsche
Bank National Trust Company that a Rooker-Feldman analysis involves four
elements: 1) a state court loser, 2) alleging harm caused by a state-court judgment,
3) that was rendered before the district court proceedings began, and 4) the federal
suit requests review and reversal of the state-court judgment." 871 F.3d 380, 384 (5th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Houston v. Venneta Queen, 606 Fed.Appx. 725, 730 (5th Cir. 2015)
(citation omitted)). When conducting this analysis, the Court may look to the
"essentials" of a plaintiffs complaint. Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 318
(5th Cir. 1994).
Here, Plaintiff is a state court loser and alleges constitutional injuries caused
by Louisiana state court decisions, issued well before the present proceedings began,
that upheld Plaintiffs classification as a Tier 2 offender. Plaintiff strongly denies
that he is asking the Court here to review and reverse the decisions of the Louisiana
state courts, insisting instead that his present claims are distinct from those at issue
in the state court proceedings, but that denial is contradicted by Plaintiffs argument
as to why La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is unconstitutional as applied to him. (Doc. 9 at
pg. 4). Plaintiff argued throughout the state court proceedings that the federal and
state child pornography statutes were not comparable, and now argues that La. Stat.
Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is unconstitutional as applied to him because the state and federal
child pornography statutes are not comparable. (Id.). In order for the Court to find in
Plaintiffs favor, it would have to contradict the judgment of the Louisiana state
14
courts as to the comparability of the state and federal offenses. Plaintiffs claim "is,
therefore, 'inextricably intertwined' with th[ose] judgment[s]," and each of the
elements set forth in Burciaga is satisfied. Batista v. Carter, 796 Fed. App'x 209, 210
(5th Cir. 2020).
Further, constitutional issues that arise within state court proceedings must
be decided by the state court, and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to raise such
issues in that forum. Hoescht, 355 F.3d at 350; Batista, 796 Fed. App'x at 210.
Plaintiff did so. In the section of Plaintiffs petition for writ ofcertiorari entitled "M.r.
Ledet raised the due process issues at every level of the state proceedings
below," Plaintiff acknowledged that while administrative tribunals have limited
jurisdiction, constitutional issues may be raised when such tribunals make
conclusions of law as to the proper construction of a state statute. Ledet v. Louisiana
Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 2019 WL 1972721, at *13-15 (emphasis in
original). Plaintiff then noted that he "raised the due process issues in that context;
that is, that the agency s interpretation and application of the statute
creates constitutional issues, and that in deciding the matter, the administrative
tribunal cannot give the statute a construction that would create a constitutional
problem." Id. at *14 (emphasis added). Plaintiff further states that the alleged due
process issues were "extensively" addressed in Plaintiffs post-hearing brief to the
administrative tribunal, and were included in Plaintiffs briefs to the Louisiana
district court, the Louisiana First Circuit, and the Louisiana Supreme Court. Id. at
14-15. Based on this material and on the plain language of La. Stat. Ann. § 49:978.1,
15
which states that a district court may reverse or remand a decision by an
administrative tribunal should such decision be "in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions," it is apparent that the due process claims brought by Plaintiff
here were before the presiding courts throughout the state proceedings.
Should state courts err in deciding constitutional issues, "[a]ny subsequent
recourse to federal court is limited to an application for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court." Hoechst, 355 F.3d at 350. As noted above, Plaintiff,
presumably cognizant of this rule, submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court several years ago, which was denied, after Plaintiffs
application for a writ of certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court was also denied.
Ledet, 2019 WL 1972721, at *21. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies
to Claim One of Plaintiffs Complaint, Plaintiff exercised his only recourse to federal
court for such claims years ago, and this Court thereby lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the issue of whether La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is unconstitutional
as applied to Plaintiff.
Lastly, Plaintiff forcefully argues that Defendants mislead the Court in their
briefings as to whether as-applied challenges to state statutes are prohibited by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 20 at pg. 3). Here, it is Plaintiff who misreads the
relevant precedent. As-applied constitutional challenges are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine. Truong, 717 F.3d at 382 {citing Doe v. Fla. Bar, F.3d 1336, 1341-
42 (llth Cir. 2011); Kastner v. Tex. Bd. of L. Exam rs, 408 Fed. App'x 777, 779 (5th
16
Cir. 2010)).1 IVIoreover, they are barred for good reason. An as-applied constitutional
challenge of a state statute, by its very nature, relies on the facts at issue in the state
court proceedings and attacks the conclusions of the relevant state courts. Plaintiff
confuses the holdings of Tniong and Skinner, which both instead hold that facial
constitutional challenges to state statutes are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Truong, 717 F.3d at 382; Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532-33 (2011).
Plaintiff has expressly argued that La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is unconstitutional as
applied. (Doc. 1 at pg. 19). Accordingly, and because Claim One of Plaintiffs
Complaint does not raise a facial challenge to the constitutionality of La. Stat. Ann.
15:542.1.3, the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over said claim due to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Claim One is therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
ii. Claim Two
The Court now turns to Plaintiffs § 1983 claims. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 allows a
plaintiff to request relief against every person who, under color of law, deprives said
plaintiff of their rights secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States.
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). To state a § 1983 claim,
' See also Nunu v. Texas, No. 21-20446, 2022 WL 820744, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2022), cert. denied,
143 S. Ct. 209, 214 (2022) (outlining that facial challenges to state statutes are permitted, but
challenges to the "application of a state statute are not); Krasniqi v. Enoch, 24 F.3d 237 (5th Cir.
1994) (stating that only general challenges to state statutes do not contravene Rooker-Feld?nan);
Alvarez v. Att'y Gen. for Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1263 (llth Cir. 2012) (concluding that an as-applied
challenge by plaintiff to state procedures was barred by Rooker-Feldman); Scheer v. Kelly, 817 F.3d
1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (plaintiffs as-applied constitutional claims were barred by RookerFeldman).
17
plaintiffs must plead '"two—and only two—allegations . . . First, the plaintiff must
allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege
that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or
territorial law.'" Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gomez
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive
him of his due process rights by reclassifying him as a Tier 2 offender pursuant to La.
Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 and by constructing and relying on a misleading Tier
Classification Summary Sheet to support said reclassification. (Doc. 1 at ^ 98, 107).
For the reasons outlined in the Claim One analysis above, the Court is foreclosed
from considering whether Plaintiffs reclassification as a Tier 2 offender pursuant to
La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is unconstitutional. The Court will analyze Plaintiffs §
1983 claims against each Defendant separately.
The Department is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983, and so Plaintiffs
1983 claims against the Department fail as a matter of law. See Will v. M.ichigan
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Eskew are based solely on Eskew adopting
the reclassification of Plaintiff as a Tier 2 offender. (Doc. 1 at If 41). The Court is
barred from considering whether this reclassification was unconstitutional by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional
injury with respect to Eskew, and Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Eskew fail as a
matter of law.
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Alternatively, Plaintiffs claims against Eskew fail because they are based
solely on Eskew s role as a supervisor to Defendants Bass and Bishop. A supervisory
official may only be held liable under § 1983 when "(I) [the official] affirmatively
participates in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) [the official]
implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional
injury." Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Prot. & Reg. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008).
Further, "[i]n order to establish supervisor liability for constitutional violations
committed by subordinate employees, plaintiffs must show that the supervisor
act[ed], or fail[ed] to act, with deliberate indifference to violations of others'
constitutional rights committed by their subordinates." Pena v. City of Rio Grande
City, 879 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446
(5th Cir. 2011)) (emphasis in original). [D]eliberate indifference is a stringent
standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or
obvious consequence of his action." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).
Plaintiff has not alleged that Eskew affirraatively participated in any acts that
causally resulted in Plaintiffs alleged constitutional injuries. Plaintiff only stated
that Eskew "adopted" Defendants Bass and Bishop's reclassification of Plaintiff as a
Tier 2 offender. (Doc. 1 at ^ 41). Further, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that
pertain to whether Eskew disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action"
in approving the reclassification of Plaintiff. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty.,
Okl., 520 U.S. at 410. It was neither known nor obvious that reclassification of
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Plaintiff as a Tier 2 offender was unconstitutional, as demonstrably proven by the
resulting decisions of the Louisiana state courts, and Plaintiff did not allege that
Eskew believed otherwise. (Doc. 1). Therefore, because Plaintiff pursues a § 1983
claim against Eskew purely under a theory of vicarious liability, Plaintiffs claims
against Eskew alternatively fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
As to Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Defendants Bass and Bishop, the Court
again reminds Plaintiff that it lacks jurisdiction to determine whether reclassifying
Plaintiff as a Tier 2 offender pursuant to La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is
unconstitutional. The only other injury alleged by Plaintiff is that the Tier
Classification Summary Sheet prepared by Bass and signed by Bishop misstated the
applicable law and noted that the victim's age was "not applicable" rather than
unknown. (Doc. 1 at ^ 34-39). The Court cannot consider Plaintiffs argument that
the Tier Classification Summary Sheet deprived Plaintiff of his due process rights
insofar as it led to him being reclassified as a Tier 2 offender, (Id. at ^ 107), since such
an argument presupposes that Plaintiffs reclassification was unconstitutional.
Instead, to present cognizable § 1983 claims against Bass and Bishop, Plaintiff must
identify what due process rights were harmed by the Tier Classification Summary
Sheet, standing alone.
Plaintiff has not done so. Plaintiff argues that Defendants Bass and Bishop
maintained a false public record contrary to La. Stat. Ann. § 14:133 through the
creation and use of the Tier Classification Summary Sheet to support Plaintiffs
reclassification. (Id. at ^ 100-105). However, even assuming that this is true and
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that Bass and Bishop did maintain a false public record contrary to Louisiana law,
Plaintiff must still identify what due process right is violated by the misleading
statements as to the victim's age and the erroneous description of the federal and
state child pornography statutes, in and of themselves. Plaintiff has not done so,and
a review of relevant case law shows that courts in similar situations have held that
false assertions or reports, by themselves, are not violative of any constitutional
rights. See Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 297 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that detainee had
no constitutional right to be free from falsifies or inaccuracies in an after-the-fact
police report); Collins v. King, 743 F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that inmate's
claim that he was improperly charged with things he did not do, standing alone, did
not constitute a deprivation of due process). Finding that Plaintiff has not sufficiently
identified what constitutional right was abridged by the Tier Classification Summary
Sheet itself, and that case law on the issue fails to provide support for Plaintiffs
claims that false assertions in similar situations are standalone constitutional
violations, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Bass and Bishop
fail as a matter of law.
Additionally, and in the alternative, even were the Court to consider Plaintiffs
argument that the misleading Tier Classification Summary Sheet deprived him of his
constitutional rights by supporting the allegedly erroneous decision to reclassify
Plaintiff as a Tier 2 offender, the facts in Plaintiffs Complaint do not support that
the Tier Classification Summary Sheet had any impact on Plaintiffs initial
reclassification or the upholding thereof. Plaintiff notes in his Complaint that the
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Tier Classification Summary Sheet was developed after Plaintiff was reclassified by
an unidentified Deputy in the state registry, that the ALJ knew the age elements for
the relevant statutes did not match when he affirmed the Department's
reclassification, and that the Louisiana First Circuit was also aware that the age
elements did not match when they affirmed the ALJ s determination. (Doc. 1 at ^
29, 50, 62). Based entirely on the facts alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff has failed
to provide facts sufficient to allow the Court "to draw the reasonable inference" that
Defendants Bass and Bishop are liable for the alleged constitutional injury of
Plaintiffs reclassification as a Tier 2 offender. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Based on all of the above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against
each Defendant fail as a matter of law, and such claims are therefore DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
iii. Claim Three
Claim Three of Plaintiffs Complaint argues that the retroactive application of
La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is violative of due process. (Doc. 1 at pg. 31). While Claim
Three is styled as a distinct cause of action, it is essentially a variation of Claim One.
Plaintiff argues that La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3, as construed by Louisiana state
courts, is unconstitutional as applied to him. (Id. at ^ 114). In Claim One, Plaintiff
argued that La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is unconstitutional as applied to him because
of the content of the state and federal child pornography statutes. (Id. at ^ 74). Here,
Plaintiff argues that La. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1.3 is unconstitutional as applied to him
22
because of when it was applied. (Id. at If 114). As noted above, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars as-applied constitutional challenges. Truong, 717 F.3d at 382.
Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Claim Three of Plaintiffs Complaint
and such claims are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs Claim Three may be dismissed for failure to state a
claim. Plaintiffs arguments in support of Claim Three differ from those in Claim One
in that they rely on the Louisiana constitution. (Doc. 9 at pg. 14). La. Civ. Code Ann.
art. 6 states that "[i]n the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws
apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively
and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary." Plaintiff
has provided no Louisiana case law to support his position that changes to sex
offender registration requirements are substantive laws. (Doc. 9 at pg. 15). To the
contrary, Louisiana appellate courts have routinely held that retroactive applications
of altered sex offender registration requirements are constitutional. See State v.
Trosclair, 2011-2302 (La. 5/8/12), 89 So. 3d 340; State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 20000172 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So. 2d 735; Smith v. State, 2010-1140 (La. 1/24/12), 84 So. 3d
487; State v. BUliot, 2012-0174 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/12), 104 So. 3d 113. Further, the
argument advanced by Plaintiff here was directly addressed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, which concluded that it "lacks merit." Davidson v. State, 2020-00976
(La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 1021, 1024 n.l. Accordingly, the Court concludes in the
alternative that retroactive changes to sex offender registration requirements do not
violate La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 6, and that Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a
23
claim upon which relief can be granted.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motions (Docs. 5, 24) be and are hereby
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' action be and is hereby
DISMISSED.
Final judgment shall issue separately.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this *^' day of M'arch, 2024
^
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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