Osborne, et al v. Hooper et al

Filing 25

RULING AND ORDER granting 20 Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Hooper, Lavespere, LeBlanc, Oliveaux, and DPSC be and are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs additional claims remain pending. Signed by Judge Brian A. Jackson on 9/25/2024. (EDC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ELENA OSBORNE, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
TIM HOOPER, ET AL.

NO. 23-00701-BAJ-RLB
RULING AND ORDER

This is a civil rights wrongful death action. Plaintiff Elena Osborne and
Plaintiffs Les’daionne and Les’daiontae Osborne, her children, brought this suit
against, among others, Warden of Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) Tim Hooper,
LSP Medical Director Randy Lavespere, LSP Deputy Warden Ashli Oliveaux,
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPSC) Secretary James
LeBlanc, and DPSC itself, for the death in custody of Lester George, the father of
Les’daionne and Les’daiontae. Plaintiffs allege violations of Louisiana state law and
George’s Fourteenth Amendment and Article IV federal constitutional rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now before the Court is the above-named Defendants’ Rule
12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20). The Motion is opposed. (Doc. 22). For the
reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted.
I.

BACKGROUND

The following allegations are accepted as true for present purposes:
Lester George was serving a state prison sentence at LSP. (Doc. 1 ¶ 6). On at
least two occasions while incarcerated prior to his death, George was hospitalized

following drug use. (Id. ¶ 7). Drugs were readily available in George’s unit at LSP.
(Id. ¶ 11). Defendants were aware of the steady flow of drugs and failed to correct it.
(Id.). Due to Defendants’ failure to take steps to correct the drug problem, George had
access to drugs while in custody. (Id. ¶ 12). In August 2022, drugs containing fentanyl
were introduced to George’s unit. (Id. ¶ 13). Doe Defendants 1–5 failed to adequately
screen the individual who introduced the drugs. (Id. ¶ 15). Additionally, George’s unit
was understaffed with security personnel at the time. (Id. ¶ 18). George consumed
the drugs containing fentanyl, overdosed, and died at a local hospital on August 10,
2022. (Id. ¶ 19).
Plaintiffs brought suit against the above-named Defendants in their official
capacities as officers of DPSC, seeking monetary damages from them and from DPSC
itself. (Id. ¶ 4). 1 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the Eleventh Amendment “bars
all federal and state law claims brought” against them by Plaintiffs. (Doc. 24 at 1).
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred
by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.” In re FEMA Trailer
Formaldehyde Product Liability Litigation, 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012). Under
Rule 12(b)(1), “a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim.”

Plaintiff Elena Osborne amended her Complaint to add Les’daionne and Les’daiontae,
George’s children, as Plaintiffs. (Doc. 19).

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Id. (quotations omitted). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is
on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.
2001). When a court determines that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
an action, the action is dismissed without prejudice. See Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561
F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977). In determining whether the court has subject matter
jurisdiction, it may look at the complaint alone, the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts. Id. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion should be
granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Home Builders Ass’n of Miss.,
Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Ramming, 281
F.3d at 161.
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by private citizens against a nonconsenting state in federal court. Rozas v. Louisiana through Louisiana Workforce
Comm’n, No. CV 14-796, 2016 WL 1226788, at *2 (M.D. La. Mar. 28, 2016) (citing
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)). Louisiana has not waived its sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714
F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2013); La. R.S. § 13:5106(A). Even where the state itself is not
named as a defendant, “a plaintiff cannot avoid the sovereign immunity bar by suing
a state agency or an arm of a State rather than the State itself.” Richardson v. S.
Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 1997). A state’s sovereign immunity also precludes
actions against state officers sued in their official capacity. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
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Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).
Sovereign immunity is not limitless, however. Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 167–68 (1908), “a litigant may sue a state official in his official capacity if the
suit seeks prospective relief to redress an ongoing violation of federal law.” Williams
On Behalf of J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 736 (5th Cir. 2020). Put simply, Ex parte
Young only applies to prospective claims seeking future relief, and it applies only to
federal claims.
Here, Plaintiffs have brought state and federal law claims against an agency
of the state, DPSC, and numerous state officers in their official capacity. These claims
are for monetary damages from the death in custody of George. By definition, these
are not prospective claims. Because Plaintiffs bring claims under federal and state
law against a state agency and its officers in their official capacity, the Eleventh
Amendment bars Plaintiffs’ claims.
In their opposition, Plaintiffs fail to meaningfully contest these findings.
Instead, Plaintiffs point to other lawsuits that have sought injunctive relief against
DPSC, and argue that their Complaint, which also seeks “[a]ll other relief as appears
just and proper” to the Court, (Doc. 1 at 17), satisfies Ex parte Young’s requirement
for prospective relief. (Doc. 22 at 5). But Plaintiffs’ vague request for all “just and
proper” relief does not constitute a claim for prospective relief. Nor are other,
unconnected lawsuits relevant to the viability of Plaintiffs’ claims here. Moreover, the
gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claim is that Defendants failed to protect George, which
resulted in his tragic death in custody. No prospective relief can remedy George’s
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death. For these reasons, the Court finds that Ex parte Young does not apply to
Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ claims will therefore be dismissed. Garig v. Travis, No.
CV 20-654, 2022 WL 868519, at *8 (M.D. La. Mar. 22, 2022) (granting motion to
dismiss and rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to rely on Ex parte Young, because the
complaint sought monetary damages against the state officers in their official
capacity, not relief that was “declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in
effect”).
III.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
20) be and is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants Hooper,
Lavespere, LeBlanc, Oliveaux, and DPSC be and are hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiffs’ additional claims remain pending.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 25th day of September, 2024

______________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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