Leaumont v. City of Alexandria

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 11 Motion to Remand; denying 11 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen L Hayes on 9/26/13. (crt,Crawford, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

PATRICK V. LEAUMONT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-02397

VERSUS

JUDGE TRIMBLE

CITY OF ALEXANDRIA

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES
MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, is a
Motion to Remand [doc. # 11] filed by Plaintiff, Patrick V. Leaumont.1 For the reasons stated
below, the Motion is DENIED, and the associated request for costs is also DENIED.
Background
On July 12, 2013, Plaintiff, Patrick V. Leaumont, filed suit against Defendant in the
Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, State of Louisiana. [doc. # 1-2]. In brief,
Plaintiff contends that Defendant discriminated against him based on a perceived disability. Id.
In his state court Petition, Plaintiff alleges that the “actions by the [Defendant] are a violation of
LSA-R.S. 23:322 & 323 and for[sic] 42 USC § 12101, et seq., particularly § 12114.” Id. at 3.2
Defendant timely removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question

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As this is not a motion excepted in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), nor dispositive of any
claim on the merits within the meaning of Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this
ruling is issued under the authority thereof, and in accordance with the standing order of this
Court. Any appeal must be made to the district judge in accordance with Rule 72(a) and L.R.
74.1(W).
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LA . REV . STAT . ANN . §§ 23:322 , 23:323 and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101, 12114 are
hereinafter referred to as the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”) and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), respectively.

jurisdiction, contending that Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant violated the ADA gives this
Court jurisdiction. [doc. # 1]. In contrast, Plaintiff now moves to remand on the basis that the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. [doc. # 11]. Plaintiff avers that he does not assert any
federal claim. [doc. # 11-1, p. 6]. Plaintiff acknowledges that he cites the ADA in his Petition,
but argues that “[t]he reason for the mention of the Federal statutes in the [P]etition are because
those statutes set the standards that may be applied by the State court in interpreting Louisiana’s
Employment Discrimination Law.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that the reference to the ADA was
incidental. Id. at 5-6.
Briefing is now complete; the matter is before the Court.
Law andAnalysis
Federal law authorizes the removal to federal court of “any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). District courts have original jurisdiction in cases involving a “federal question,” i.e.,
cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 1331. The
party urging jurisdiction upon the district court bears the burden of demonstrating that the case is
one which is properly before that court. Jernigan v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th
Cir. 1993).
The presence or absence of a federal question necessary to support removal is governed
by the well-pleaded complaint rule, under which “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc.
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The well-pleaded complaint rule recognizes that the
plaintiff is the “master of the claim,” and a plaintiff may “avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive

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reliance on state law.” Id. To emphasize, a court will only consider “the claims in the state court
petition as they existed at the time of removal.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).
Here, it is clear that Plaintiff expressly and affirmatively alleges a violation of the ADA, a
statute that supports federal question jurisdiction. It is well-established that “[a] plaintiff who
has both federal and state causes of action may choose to ignore the federal claims and pursue
only the state claims in state court.” See Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S.
656, 663 (1961). But with that in mind, it is manifest that Plaintiff chose not to ignore his federal
claims; to reiterate, Plaintiff’s state court Petition stated that the “actions by the [Defendant] are a
violation of LSA-R.S. 23:322 & 323 and for 42 USC § 12101, et seq., particularly § 12114.”
[doc. # 1-2, p. 3]. In addition, Plaintiff’s prayer for relief does not limit itself to state court
remedies, but instead seeks damages, costs, and attorney fees “as provided by law.” [Id. at p.4].3
Thus, the Petition, on its face and at the time of removal, supports Defendant’s assertion that this
court has jurisdiction over this case.
Plaintiff’s contention that he only referenced the ADA to inform the Court that the ADA
sets the standards that may be applied in interpreting the LEDL is unavailing. [See doc. # 11, p.
6]. The Court cannot consider Plaintiff’s argument because the Court can only consider the
claims in the Petition as they existed at the time of removal; the Court cannot consider Plaintiff’s
re-characterization of his claim as put forth in his Motion to Remand. That said, the parties
dispute whether the original Petition–at the time of removal–alleges a federal cause of action on

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Cf. Wright v. La. State Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 2013 WL 5332294 at *4 (W.D. La.
September 23, 2013) (Where Plaintiff requested relief solely and specifically under state law).
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its face. Therefore, the Court must determine, without reference to subsequent filings by
Plaintiff, whether the Petition presents a federal question.
On this score, Plaintiff’s Petition does not state in any manner that the citation to the
ADA is merely for use in interpretation. Although courts have relied upon federal employment
discrimination law to interpret the LEDL, it is not uncommon for plaintiffs claiming employment
discrimination to allege violations of both the ADA and LEDL. See, e.g., Id.; O’Bear v. Global
Indus. Contractors, LLC, 2012 WL 1802432 at *2 (M.D. La. May 16, 2012); Antoon v. Woman’s
Hosp. Found., 2012 WL 1094715 at *3 (M.D. La. March 30, 2012). Thus, Plaintiff’s Petition, on
its face, in no way indicates that he was merely relying on the ADA for purposes of
interpretation.
Moreover, the cases Plaintiff cites in support of his Motion to Remand are inapposite.
Plaintiff cites to numerous courts that prohibited removal because the plaintiffs only incidentally
referenced federal law. [doc. # 11-1, p. 5, 6]. For example, in Wells v. City of Alexandria, 2006
WL 1210968 at *1 (5th Cir. May 5, 2006), the plaintiff never mentioned the ADA. Likewise, in
Hicks v. Jones, the plaintiff never mentioned any federal law whatsoever. Hicks v. Jones, 2010
WL 1731207 at *1 (W.D. La. Mar. 30, 2010). Here, in contrast, Plaintiff specifically alleged that
the Defendant violated the ADA. [doc. # 1-2, p. 3].
Further, Plaintiff cites to Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1988).
There, the plaintiff claimed he was fired because he refused to violate certain federal statutes; the
plaintiff did not allege any federal causes of action. In fact, even if the plaintiff in Willy had
sought relief under federal law, the federal statute at issue did not provide a private cause of
action. Id. Thus, “the district court could not have exercised jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] claim
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if he had originally brought it in federal court under those provisions.” Id. To distinguish,
Congress clearly intended the ADA to provide a private cause of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188.
Indeed, as Plaintiff intimates, the case law is replete with grants of motions to remand in
circumstances where the plaintiffs casually referenced federal law and elected to assert only state
law claims, even when the complaints stated facts that would support an ADA claim. But this is
not a case where the reference to federal law was casual, inadvertent, or vague. Unlike the cases
Plaintiff cites, Plaintiff did not stop short of invoking the ADA on its face. As “master of his
claim,” Plaintiff made a deliberate choice to proceed under the ADA. And to underline, he
cannot now disavow his federal claim in an effort to defeat removal, because the right of removal
is decided by the pleadings as they exist when the petition for removal is filed.
For all of that, Plaintiff also appears to argue that because he has not exhausted his
administrative remedies before filing his ADA claim, this Court does not have jurisdiction. [doc.
# 11-1, p. 3]. However, Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies does not defeat
federal question jurisdiction because “filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court . . . .” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). On the other hand, Plaintiff could be arguing that his failure to
exhaust evidences his intent to allege only state law claims. To the extent Plaintiff makes this
argument, it is likewise unavailing because plaintiffs file unexhausted ADA claims frequently.
See, e.g., Iturralde v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 512 Fed. Appx. 430 (5th Cir. 2013); Williams v. AT&T
Inc., 356 Fed. Appx. 761 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust is no more indicative of an
intent to allege only state law claims than it is indicative of a failed attempt to allege an ADA
claim.
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Finally, with due consideration given to Plaintiff’s averment “that this Court should
exercise its discretion and remand [P]laintiff’s claim under LSA-R.S. 23:322 and 323,” it is
manifest that this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. [See doc. # 11-1, p. 6].
A district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Plaintiff’s
ADA and state law claims are intertwined and, thus, form part of the same case or controversy
for purposes of supplemental jurisdiction.
In sum, Plaintiff made more than a nebulous reference to federal law. Plaintiff chose to
allege, specifically and unambiguously, that Defendant violated the ADA, and to seek relief
under all applicable law. Accordingly, removal was proper.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand [doc. # 11] filed by Plaintiff Patrick
V. Leaumont is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s associated request for costs is DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers, at Monroe, Louisiana, this 26th day of
September 2013.

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