Rozier v. Prudential Insurance Co of America et al

Filing 80

MEMORANDUM RULING re 56 CROSS-MOTION Seeking Interpleader Relief MOTION to Dismiss With Prejudice MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Prudential Insurance Co of America, 28 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Malcolm Dale Harrington, 32 MOTION to Remand filed by Judith Ann Huthnance Rozier. Signed by Judge Robert R Summerhays on 9/14/2020. (crt,Jordan, P)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

JUDITH ANN HUTHNANCE ROZIER

CASE NO. 1:19-CV-00577

VERSUS

JUDGE SUMMERHAYS

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE CO OF
AMERICA ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

MEMORANDUM RULING
The current matters before the Court are (1) the Motion to Remand [ECF No. 32] filed by
Plaintiff Judith Ann Huthnance Rozier (“Plaintiff”), (2) Defendant Malcolm Dale Harrington’s
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 28] (the “Harrington Motion to Dismiss”); and (3) the
Cross-Motion Seeking Interpleader Relief and Dismissal with Prejudice (the “Prudential
Interpleader Motion” [ECF No. 56]) filed by The Prudential Insurance Company of America
(“Prudential”). Magistrate Judge Perez-Montes issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
regarding the Motion to Remand on July 17, 2020 and the parties have now responded to the R&R.
For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion to Remand [ECF No. 32]. The Court
further GRANTS the Harrington Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 28] and GRANTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART the Prudential Interpleader Motion [ECF No. 56].
I.
BACKGROUND
This case was originally removed from Alexandria City Court, Rapides Parish, Louisiana.
Plaintiff filed her petition (the “Complaint”) in City Court on March 15, 2018, and asserted claims

1

individually and as the Independent Executrix of the Succession of John S. Rozier, IV (the “Rozier
Succession”).1 Plaintiff asserted claims against both Prudential and Harrington as defendants.2
The Magistrate Judge’s R&R sets out the pertinent facts of the case: Plaintiff married John
Rozier (“Rozier”) on September 12, 1970 and they lived together as husband and wife until
Rozier’s death on November 5, 2018.3 Rozier was a Certified Public Accountant (“CPA”) who
worked with Harrington from November of 1982 until June 30, 2005.4 Rozier was insured under
a group policy issued by Prudential through the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(“AICPA”) Trust (the “Trust”).5 The Trust offered Rozier group life insurance benefits (the
“Policy”) in the amount of $50,000.00 (the “Death Benefit”), with premium payments to be made
monthly by the partnership established by Rozier and Harrington, known as “Rozier & Harrington”
(the “partnership”).6 Plaintiff alleges that the partnership made monthly premium payments for
group life insurance on behalf of Rozier since November of 1984, and that the partnership
continued to make payments as “Rozier, Harrington, & McKay” after the addition of Mark S.
McKay (“McKay”) as a partner.7 Plaintiff alleges that the partnership also made monthly premium
payments on behalf of Harrington until his withdrawal as a partner on June 30, 2005.8 The
partnership continued making monthly premium payments to the Trust until Rozier’s death on
November 5, 2018.9

1

ECF No. 1-1 at 5.
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 6.
6
ECF No. 1-1 at 6.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 7.
2

2

Plaintiff’s counsel notified Prudential of Rozier’s death and was informed by Prudential
that Plaintiff was not the beneficiary listed in the file; Prudential also allegedly refused to provide
the name of the beneficiary.10 Plaintiff contends that Prudential ultimately provided her with a
copy of a Group Insurance Enrollment and Record Card (“Enrollment Card”) dated November 15,
1984; this Enrollment Card identified Harrington as the beneficiary.11 Plaintiff alleges that the
“Signature of the Individual to be Insured” was not Rozier’s handwriting, and that the name and
address of the beneficiary were written in Harrington’s handwriting.12 Because the copy of the
Enrollment Card was a poor copy, Plaintiff submitted sworn evidence to Prudential’s claims
examiner requesting a legible copy to be examined by a forensic document examiner.13 On March
11, 2019, Plaintiff’s counsel received a letter from Prudential stating that the record keeper and
Prudential did not have the original Enrollment Card signed by Rozier.14 Prudential also advised
that, absent a court order, it would release the funds after 15 days to the listed beneficiary. 15
Plaintiff alleges that on June 30, 2005, the Trust was notified that Harrington withdrew from the
partnership and that coverage was no longer available to him.16 Plaintiff contends that when
Harrington withdrew from the partnership, all right, title, and interest in insurance proceeds
terminated.17
Plaintiff alleges that Rozier never designated Harrington as a beneficiary of the policy.18
Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that Rozier and Harrington made a “mutual mistake” in that they
did not intend for Harrington to benefit more than 13 years after he withdrew from the

10

Id.
Id. at 8; see also ECF No. 51-1 at 110.
12
ECF No. 1-1 at 8.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 9.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 11.
17
Id.
18
Id.
11

3

partnership.19 Plaintiff requests that the Policy and Enrollment Card be reformed to name Plaintiff
as beneficiary, either individually, or in her capacity as Independent Executrix of the Rozier
Succession.20
Prudential removed the case on May 3, 2019, asserting federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132.21 Prudential contends that the group life insurance policy
(G-51377) (the “Policy”) at issue is an employee welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA, and
that ERISA preempts any state law claims and provides the exclusive administrative and federal
remedies for resolution of claims relating to ERISA plans.22 Prudential contends that Plaintiff’s
causes of action fall within the scope of ERISA § 502(a)(1).23 Prudential answered the Complaint
and asserted a Counterclaim and Cross Claim in Interpleader, seeking to deposit the Death Benefit
with the Court and be dismissed.24 Plaintiff amended her Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”),
asserting causes of action for reformation of contract, enrichment without cause, payment of a
thing not due, and statutory payments under La. R.S. 22:901.25
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Rozier did not sign the enrollment card
designating Harrington as beneficiary, that Rozier did not designate Harrington as the beneficiary,
and that she, either individually or as executrix, is the sole beneficiary of the Policy.26
Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment reforming the enrollment card to delete
Harrington as the beneficiary and ordering that the proceeds due under the Policy be delivered to
Plaintiff.27 Plaintiff and Harrington, respectively, answered Prudential’s Counterclaim in

19

Id.
Id.
21
ECF No. 1 at 2.
22
Id. at 3.
23
Id.
24
ECF No. 7.
25
ECF No. 19.
26
ECF No. 19 at 14.
27
Id. at 15.
20

4

Interpleader.28 Harrington answered the Complaint and Amended Complaint.29 Plaintiff now
moves to remand the case on the grounds that the insurance policy at issue is not an “employee
benefit plan” under ERISA.30
Magistrate Judge Perez-Montes issued his R&R addressing the Motion to Remand on July
17, 2020. The R&R concludes that the plan at issue was governed by ERISA and that Plaintiff’s
claims are therefore completely preempted by ERISA. Accordingly, the R&R recommends that
the Court deny the Motion to Remand. Plaintiff has filed an objection to the R&R. In addition, the
Harrington Motion and the Prudential Interpleader Motion are presently before this Court. The
resolution of these Motions, however, are closely tied to the recommendations of the R&R.
II.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Federal Court Jurisdiction and ERISA Preemption.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only the jurisdiction granted
by Article III of the Constitution and conferred by statute.31 District courts have original
jurisdiction over cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”32
“[A] cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint
raises issues of federal law.”33 A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.”34
Here, Plaintiff purportedly asserts state law claims. Ordinarily a case asserting only state
law claims does not fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court and cannot be

28

ECF Nos. 11, 13.
ECF Nos. 14, 21.
30
ECF No. 32.
31
Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001).
32
28 U.S.C. § 1331.
33
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
34
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
29

5

removed. An exception to that rule is “[w]hen a federal statute wholly displaces [a] state-law cause
of action through complete preemption.”35 ERISA is a key example of a federal statute that “wholly
displaces” state law causes of action.36 Thus, removal was proper if Plaintiff’s claims against
Prudential are completely preempted by ERISA.37 The party invoking subject matter jurisdiction
in federal court has the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction.38 Here, Prudential bears that
burden. Subject matter jurisdiction must exist at the time of removal to federal court, based on the
facts and allegations contained in the complaint.39 “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it
involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.”40 The Court has “an
independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence
of a challenge from any party.”41 Jurisdictional facts are determined at the time of removal, not by
subsequent events.42 Remand is required “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”43
B. The R&R’s Recommendation on the Motion to Remand.
The Court first addresses the Magistrate Judge’s R&R and the recommendation that the
Motion to Remand be denied. The R&R concludes that ERISA completely preempts Plaintiffs’
claims and that the case was properly removed. As explained in the R&R, ERISA covers those

35

Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004) (quoting Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8
(2003)).
36
Id.
37
As explained by the Magistrate Judge, claims may be completely preempted or subject to “ordinary” or “conflict”
preemption under ERISA. Conflict preemption exists when ERISA provides an affirmative defense to state law claims
and involves ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 337 (5th Cir.
1999). Mere conflict preemption does not provide a ground for federal court jurisdiction. Id. As explained in the R&R
and here, this case does not involve conflict preemption.
38
St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Greenberg, 134 F. 3d 1250, 1253-54 (5th Cir. 1998).
39
Id. at 1253.
40
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583
(1999)).
41
Id.
42
See La. v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 746 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 2014).
43
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

6

employee plans that qualify as welfare benefit plans, pension benefit plans, or both.44 An employee
welfare benefit plan is defined as any plan or fund established or maintained by an employer or by
an employee organization, or by both, “for the purpose of providing for its participants or
beneficiaries ... benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, [or] death.”45 Life insurance
plans are included within the ambit of employee welfare benefit plans.46
The only contention here is whether the Policy “satisfies the primary elements of an ERISA
employee benefit plan – establishment or maintenance by an employer intending to benefit
employees.”47 The AICPA group insurance plan booklet (the “CPA Plan booklet”)48 describes the
plan benefits. The CPA Plan booklet includes an ERISA Statement stating that the plan benefits
provided by the Policy provide “insured benefits under your Employer’s ERISA plan(s).”49 The
Policy provides employee term life coverage. The CPA Plan booklet provides that the covered
classes are “[a]ll Employees classified as Proprietors, Partners, Firm Members, or Other
Employees of Type E, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, or N Included Employers with less than 10 eligible
Employees excluding Proprietors and Partners who enroll in Employee Term Life Coverage
Schedule #2A.”50 The CPA Plan booklet defines “Employee” as “[a] person employed by the
Included Employer; a proprietor or partner of the Included Employer. The term also applies to that
person for any rights after insurance ends.”51
The Magistrate Judge properly concluded that the Policy is an ERISA employee benefit
plan. In fact, numerous other courts which have examined this specific policy have concluded that

44

29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
46
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 144 (2001).
47
See House v. American United Life Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Meredith v. Time Ins. Co.,
980 F.2d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 1993)).
48
(ECF No. 51-1 at 1).
49
ECF No. 51-1 at 42.
50
ECF No. 51-1 at 3.
51
ECF No. 51-1 at 33.
45

7

it is governed by ERISA.52 Plaintiff continues to argue that the plan cannot be an ERISA plan as
it was not governed by ERISA at its inception since the only two participants were the partners of
the CPA firm themselves and no other employees.
However, as the Magistrate Judge correctly observes, an employee welfare benefit plan
can qualify as an ERISA plan even if it is not an ERISA plan at its inception. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)
defines “employee welfare benefit plan” and “welfare plan” as a plan “which was heretofore or is
hereafter established or maintained by an employer…to the extent that such plan…was established
or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise…” (emphasis added). That is precisely the case here: the
sponsoring CPA firm added employees to the firm and the plan shortly after it adopted the plan.53
Another court has specifically noted the disjunctive nature of the statute: “[t]he statute uses
the disjunctive word ‘or,’ requiring only that the plan either be ‘established or maintained’ as an
ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) It does not require...that the plan must be established and
continually maintained as an ERISA plan.”54 Another court faced a situation very similar to the
present case and held:
Thus, if the only two people covered by the plan are the owner and the spouse, the
plan does not provide coverage to any “employees” and the plan falls beyond the
reach of ERISA. See Cristantielli v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 113
F.Supp.2d 1055, 1059–60 (N.D.Tex.2000) (Solis, J.) In this case, while the
Corporation did purchase an individual disability policy for Plaintiff and his spouse,
it also purchased disability insurance for another employee, Pat Lane. Because the
Corporation purchased insurance for an employee in addition to Plaintiff and his
spouse, the plan became an ERISA plan. See Williams v. Wright, 927 F.2d 1540,
1545 (11th Cir.1991) (“[A] plan covering only a single employee, where all other
requirements are met, is covered by ERISA.”)
See Fisher, 842 F.Supp. at 399-401 (“The Court is satisfied that the Group Insurance Plan provided by AICPA
constitutes a “plan” under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).”); see also Woods v. Berry, Fowles & Co., CIV. 01-CV-37-B-C, 2001
WL 1602055, at *9 (D. Me. Dec. 14, 2001) (“I can only conclude that as a matter of law the AICPA plan established
or maintained by Berry, Fowles & Co. is governed by ERISA.).
53
See ECF Doc. 32-7 showing employee M McKay added in 1987, admitted in Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (ECF
Doc 32-7, pp. 2, 7.)
54
Nix v. United Health Care of Ala., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1369-1370, (M.D. Ala. 2001).
52

8

Plaintiff also argues, without citing any legal authority, that ERISA does not apply
because at the time the disability policy was established, Plaintiff was the sole
insured. ERISA defines an “employee welfare benefit plan” as “any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an
employer ...” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). This language does not require that the plan be
governed by ERISA at its inception. ERISA applies to any plan heretofore
established or maintained; in other words, established or maintained “up to this
time” by an employer to provide benefits to the employees. See Nix v. United
Health Care of Ala., Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 1363, 1369–70 (M.D.Ala.2001)
(discussing disjunctive nature of statute). In this case, the disability insurance at
issue was initially established to provide coverage for Plaintiff only, and therefore
was a non-ERISA plan at its inception. However, the Corporation subsequently
added an employee to the plan. Thus, the disability plan was maintained as an
ERISA plan once the employee was added, which was before the time Plaintiff filed
his claim.55
Even if the plan was not an ERISA plan at its inception, it is still governed by ERISA if it is later
“maintained as” an ERISA plan once non-partner employees are added. Furthermore, the relevant
regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b), does not require that the plan cover an employee or participant
at its inception since 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b) is worded in the present tense.56
The Magistrate Judge further concludes that Plaintiffs’ state law claims are completely
preempted by ERISA. Section 502(a) of ERISA completely preempts state law claims brought
under an ERISA plan. Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides a civil action for benefits under the terms of
a plan, to enforce or clarify rights to future benefits under a plan, or to enforce the terms of a plan.57
Section 502(a)(3) provides for injunctive and equitable relief. Here, the Magistrate Judge
concludes that Plaintiff’s claims for reformation, enrichment without cause, and payment of a thing
fall within section 502(a)(1)(B), and thus are completely preempted under section 502(a).58 The

55

Kerans v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 452 F. Supp. 2d 665, 674–75 (N.D. Tex. 2005),
Bates v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1058 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (noting that the use of present
tense was relevant).
57
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
58
Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Section 502, by providing a civil
enforcement cause of action, completely preempts any state cause of action seeking the same relief…”)
56

9

Court agrees. ERISA preempts state law claims “that have the effect of orally modifying the
express terms of an ERISA plan and increasing plan benefits for participants or beneficiaries who
claim to have been misled.” 59 Plaintiff’s claims here seek to recover benefits and otherwise clarify
or enforce rights under an ERISA plan. Specifically, she suggests that the beneficiary designation
was forged or, in the alternative, Rozier and Harrington did not intend for the designation to benefit
Harrington after Rozier’s withdrawal from the partnership. As a result of these claims, she seeks
equitable and monetary relief in the form of contract reformation and the recovery of benefits.
These claims fall squarely within the scope of ERISA section 502(a) and are completely
preempted.
In sum, the Magistrate Judge correctly ruled that the Policy is governed by ERISA and that
section 502(a) of ERISA preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims. 60 Because the Court has federal
question jurisdiction over the case based on ERISA preemption, the Court adopts the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation that the Motion to Remand be denied.
C. The Harrington Motion to Dismiss.
The Court next addresses the Harrington Motion to Dismiss, which is based on complete
preemption by ERISA. Because ERISA completely preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims, those
claims must be dismissed.61 In opposing dismissal, Plaintiff argues that preemption does not bar
her claims based upon the ERISA savings clause, which provides an exception to preemption with

59

Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 245 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Lee v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 894 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir.1990) and Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1295 (5th
Cir.1989)).
60
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
61
“If a state-law claim relates to an ERISA plan-whether asserted in state or federal court-ERISA supersedes state law
and the claim must be dismissed.” Cardona v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. CIVA309-CV-0833-D, 2009 WL 3199217,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2009) (citing Menchaca v. CNA Group Life Assurance Co., 331 Fed.Appx. 298, 2009 WL
2512859, at * 3-4 (5th Cir. Aug.18, 2009)).

10

regard to state laws that regulate insurance.62 The Magistrate Judge correctly rejected this
argument with respect to the Motion to Remand. Specifically, according to the Fifth Circuit:
[A]lthough the savings clause preserves a role for certain state laws that regulate
insurance, state claims that provide a separate vehicle for seeking benefits from an
ERISA plan remain preempted as such claims must be brought under ERISA's civil
enforcement provision (section 502). Otherwise the exclusivity and uniformity of
that federal remedy would be undermined. Davila, 542 U.S. at 217–18, 124 S.Ct.
2488 (“ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted in light of the congressional
intent to create an exclusive federal remedy in ERISA § 502(a).”).63
In this case, Plaintiff’s claims all seek to collect the benefits from the Policy. While she makes her
claims based upon a variety of legal arguments, they all seek the same ultimate outcome. The Court
therefore finds that all of Plaintiff’s state law claims are completely preempted by ERISA and must
be dismissed. The Harrington Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and all state law claims asserted
by Plaintiff are DISMISSED.
D. Prudential Interpleader Motion.
The Court turns next to the Prudential Interpleader Motion. Prudential seeks interpleader
relief as follows: (1) that it be permitted to deposit the amount due from the Policy into the registry
of the court; (2) that it be dismissed as a party; and (3) that it recover its attorney’s fees. Both
Plaintiff and Harrington consent to the first two requests for relief but oppose the request for
attorney’s fees.
Attorney’s fees and costs may be awarded to an innocent stakeholder who successfully
initiates a suit as an interpleader.64 However, federal courts have declined to award attorney’s fees
in circumstances where (1) the expense of litigating matters of a certain type is or should be

62

29. U.S.C. §1144(b)(2)(A).
Swenson v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 876 F.3d 809, 811–12 (5th Cir. 2017).
64
See Feehan v. Feehan, No. 09 CIV. 7016 DAB THK, 2011 WL 497852, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 09 CIV. 7016 DAB, 2011 WL 497776 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011).
63

11

considered as part of the normal cost of doing business for an insurance company,65 or (2) it would
be inequitable as a matter of policy to force the beneficiary to bear the cost of the insurance
company interpleading, either generally or when the stake is relatively small.66
Considering the record as a whole, the Court finds that both exceptions apply here given
the size of the death benefit involved ($50,000) and the inequity in forcing Plaintiff to bear the
cost of interpleading in light of the relatively small stake involved. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that an award of attorney’s fees and costs is not warranted. However, the Court will
grant the remainder of the cross motion filed by Prudential. Accordingly, the Cross-Motion
Seeking Interpleader Relief and Dismissal with Prejudice [ECF No. 56] is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART. Prudential is permitted to deposit the life insurance proceeds into the
registry of the court and all claims against Prudential will be DISMISSED once those funds are
received by the Court. Prudential’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules the objection filed by Plaintiff and adopts
the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. The Motion to Remand [ECF No. 32]
is therefore DENIED. Harrington’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 28] is GRANTED
and all state law claims against Harrington are DISMISSED. The Cross-Motion Seeking
Interpleader Relief and Dismissal with Prejudice [ECF No. 56] is GRANTED IN PART and

65

See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Israel, 354 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1965); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 966
F. Supp. 2d 97, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he Court adopts the view that ‘[c]onflicting claims to the proceeds of a
policy are inevitable and normal risks of the insurance business. Interpleader relieves the insurance company of
multiple suits and eventuates in its discharge. Accordingly [such actions are] brought primarily in the company's own
self-interest.’); Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kelling, 170 F. Supp. 2d 792, 796 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (“...[C]ourts have
found, on facts identical to those of the instant case, that insurance companies should not be compensated merely
because conflicting claims to proceeds have arisen during the normal course of business.”).
66
See Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kelling, 170 F. Supp. 2d 792, 796 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).

12

DENIED IN PART. Prudential is permitted to deposit the life insurance proceeds into the registry
of the court and all claims against Prudential will be DISMISSED once the funds are received by
the Court. Prudential’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED.
THUS DONE in Chambers on this 14th day of September, 2020.

Robert R. Summerhays
United States District Judge

13