Davis v. Granger et al

Filing 98

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 88 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay on 3/18/2014. (crt,Gregory, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

NOLAN C. DAVIS, SR.

:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-cv-1746

VSERSUS

:

JUDGE MINALDI

DANIEL GRANGER, ET AL

:

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court is the motion for a preliminary injunction, [doc. 88] filed by pro se
plaintiff Nolan C. Davis, Sr. (hereafter, “Davis”). Davis is an inmate in the custody of the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (hereafter, “LDOC”), and he is
incarcerated at Allen Correctional Center (hereafter, “ALC”) in Kinder, Louisiana. Named
defendants in this matter are: the GEO Group, Inc.; ALC Warden Terry Terrell; Assistant
Warden Keith Cooley; and Captain Daniel Granger (hereafter, collectively, “defendants”).
For the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for a preliminary injunction
is hereby DENIED.
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Davis claims that he is constantly exposed to high levels of Environmental Tobacco
Smoke (hereafter, “ETS”) at ALC, and that this exposure poses a serious risk to his health.
Doc. 88, p. 1. He also claims that his Eighth Amendment rights are being violated because the
defendants will not enforce the prison’s no-smoking policy or provide him proper medical care

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for his allergic reactions to ETS. 1 Id. Therefore, Davis moves the court to issue an order
directing that he be transferred out of ALC to a smoke-free facility. Id. at 1–2.
This is Davis’s third motion for injunctive relief, 2 and it differs from the earlier motions
only in the relief sought. Davis now requests to be transferred out of ALC entirely and into
another state prison rather than to a smoke-free unit within ALC itself. Doc. 88. Davis’s
arguments in support of the motion are essentially the same as those previously advanced. See
docs. 14, 21, 77, & 88.
II. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Preliminary Injunction Requirements
In order for the court to grant a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must prove (1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his case; (2) a substantial threat that failure to
grant the order will result in irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage
that the injunction will cause defendants; and (4) the injunction will not have an adverse effect
on the public interest. Women’s Med. Ctr. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 418–20 (5th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff must prove all four elements, and the failure to prove any one of the elements will result
in denial of the motion. Enterprise Intern, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana,
762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985). Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

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Defendants filed several affidavits in opposition to Davis’s motion for summary judgment [doc. 58] that dispute
these claims. Doc. 85, atts. 2–6. We are disposing of the motion for summary judgment trough separate ruling.
2
Davis first moved for an order directing defendants to transfer him to a different unit within ALC itself. Doc. 14.
He also requested an order requiring defendants “to arrange for an examination and a plan of treatment by a
qualified doctor.” Id. at 4. The undersigned denied Davis’s motion because the complaint was then still under
initial review. Doc. 18.
Davis then filed a second motion similar to the first. Doc. 21. The undersigned ordered Davis to provide a
written explanation of how and to what extent the second motion differed from the first or raised different issues.
Doc. 24. Davis timely complied with the order. Doc. 25. He explained that, although ALC officials had apparently
transferred him to a different unit, the amount of smoking in his new unit was “still unreasonable.” Id. at 2–3. He
also explained that ALC medical staff had only offered him saline solution in response to his complaints of allergic
reaction to ETS and that this lack of medical attention violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 4–6. The
undersigned denied the motion but noted that service on the defendants had been ordered on the same date and that
plaintiff could re-urge the motion once defendants had been served. Doc. 26.
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Procedure, the court may only issue a preliminary injunction upon notice to the adverse party.
FED. R. CIV. PROC. 65(a)(1).
Furthermore and because this action concerns prison conditions, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (hereafter, “PLRA”) imposes additional restrictions on the authority to grant an
injunction. The PLRA provides that “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to
prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). Thus, the PLRA prohibits an
order granting prospective relief or a preliminary injunction unless the court first finds that such
relief is: (1) narrowly drawn; (2) extends no further than necessary to correct the harm; and (3) is
the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(1)(A),
3626(a)(2).
B. Standard for Assessing Claims of Exposure to ETS
In Helling v. McKinney, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether
exposure to second-hand smoke violates a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993). First, the prisoner must show that he is being exposed to
unreasonably high levels of ETS. Id. at 35. In assessing that factor, the court must conduct an
inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that the smoke will actually
cause such harm. Id. at 36. The court must also “assess whether society considers the risk to be
so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such
a risk.” Id.
The second Helling factor is that prison authorities must act with deliberate indifference
to the prisoner’s health and safety. Id. “In evaluating deliberate indifference to ETS, the
following factors should be considered: the adoption of a smoking policy; the administration of

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that policy; and the realities of prison administration.” Callicutt v. Anderson, 48 F. App’x 916,
916 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 36-37).
C. Analysis
Based on the above standards, Davis is not entitled to injunctive relief. Davis’s factual
assertions regarding the non-enforcement of ALC’s no-smoking policy have been consistently
denied by the defendants and the appropriate vehicle for resolving this dispute will be through
summary judgment or trial. The question of whether and to what extent defendants have harmed
Davis by exposing him to ETS in violation of Helling “goes to the heart of the merits.” Samuels
v. Arnold, 2013 WL 2404008 at *2 (W.D. La. 2013) (prisoner who claimed exposure to
excessive levels of ETS not entitled to injunctive relief insofar as motion sought a judgment
without the need for a trial). Accordingly, as there remain disputed issues of fact, it would be
premature for the court to conclude that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits and grant a
preliminary injunction in his favor.
Moreover, the relief sought by Davis is inappropriate. “It is well-settled that prison
officials are given wide latitude in the day-to-day operations of the prison system, and the courts
will not interfere unless presented with substantial evidence of patently unreasonable conduct.”
Daughtry v. Denmark, 2008 WL 4965304 at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 18, 2008) (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979)); see also McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248, 1251 (5th
Cir. 1990) (“Prison officials should be accorded the widest possible deference in the application
of policies and practices designed to maintain security and preserve internal order.”). The
decision of where to house an inmate is unquestionably the prerogative of the State in which the
prisoner was convicted. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (“Confinement in any of
the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has

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authorized the State to impose.”). The contested assertions in Davis’s motion do not present the
court with substantial evidence of patently unreasonable conduct on the part of ALC.
Accordingly, the court will not interfere with the State’s authority regarding the institution in
which Davis is incarcerated. Such action would violate the general prohibition against judicial
interference with the internal operations of the prison system, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
547–48 (1979), as well as the dictates of the PLRA requiring that injunctive relief must be
narrowly drawn and extend no further than necessary to correct the alleged harm. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3626(a)(1)(A); 3626(a)(2).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Davis’s motion for preliminary
injunction, [doc. 88], be and the same is hereby DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 18th day of March, 2014.

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