Rohrs v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM RULING re 6 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Air Products & Chemicals Inc. For the reasons stated, the court finds no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay on September 22, 2014. (crt,Benoit, T)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

KEITH HELMET ROHRS

:

VS.

:

AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS,
INC.

:

DOCKET NO. 2:14-cv-660

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendant Air
Products and Chemicals, Inc. (hereinafter Air Products). For the reasons set forth below, the
motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 14, 2010, plaintiff Keith Rohrs (hereinafter Rohrs) agreed to grant Air Products
rights of way, use, and servitude over his property for the installation of an underground pipeline.
As part of that agreement Air Products agreed to restore the surface of the property following
construction. Doc. 6, att. 1. Since Rohrs raised livestock on his property the contract provided
that:
During the construction period only… [Air Products] agrees to the following:
(i)

To reimburse [Rohrs] the cost of boarding the livestock for a period of
thirty (30) days. 1 If the construction period exceeds thirty (30) days,
[Air Products] will reimburse [Rohrs] for the costs of the additional

1

There is apparently no dispute that Air Products paid Rohrs this initial 30-day sum “up front,” and thus all that
remains for this court to consider is the amount owed for the period exceeding the first thirty days of construction.
Doc. 6, att. 7, p. 2.
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boarding of the livestock post-construction, upon submission of
boarding receipts.
…
Doc. 6, att. 1, pp. 3-4.
Construction on the pipeline and the subsequent restoration of Rhohrs’ property began in
February of 2012 and ended in September 2012. Due to drainage issues Rohrs was not satisfied
with the restoration work and notified Air Products of his concerns in October, 2012. Air
Products agreed to fix the issues, and this subsequent work was completed by Air Products on
November 7, 2012. Doc. 6, att. 4, pp. 1-2.
Throughout this period, Rohrs moved his livestock, namely goats, from their grazing area
on his property to the yard next to his home. Rohrs never removed the goats from his property
for boarding with a third party. They have remained at his home and under his care since
February, 2012. Doc. 8, p. 3. While Rohrs has provided Air Products with two quotes from
local contractors totaling $17,420 for the cost of repairs to the “holding area” where his livestock
are being held, the record indicates that he has yet to submit any receipts for boarding the
animals. Doc. 6, att. 8, pp. 18-19.
Still not satisfied with the work done to restore his property, Rhors brought suit in state
court in April of 2013. Among his claims is reimbursement for the costs of boarding his animals
since February, 2012. Doc. 6, att. 5, p. 2. Air Products filed a Notice of Removal on March 24,
2014. This motion for partial summary judgment was filed on April 24, 2014.

It seeks

dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for boarding costs.
In its memorandum in support of motion for partial summary judgment, Air Products
asserts that Rhors is not entitled to reimbursement for boarding because he has not submitted any
boarding receipts as the contract requires. They argue that the contract creates a conditional
obligation based on a suspensive condition yet to be fulfilled. Without fulfillment of that
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condition (the submission of boarding receipts), they claim no enforceable obligation exists.
Doc. 6, att. 10, pp. 6-7.
In opposition, Rohrs admits to not moving his livestock but claims that an “implied in
fact” contract arose between the parties because they never contemplated seven months of
construction. Rohrs states that had he known that the construction and restoration of his property
would last that long, he would have moved his animals offsite instead of keeping them on his
property. He argues that we must still determine (1) whether an implied contract was ever
formed and if so (2) what the terms of that contract were. Doc. 8, pp. 7-8. Furthermore, Rohrs
asserts that the parties never agreed to limit Rohrs’ damage claims with respect to boarding costs
and since the restoration of his property has not yet ceased, general damages are still owed
regardless of the submission of any boarding receipts. 2 Doc. 8, pp. 9-10.
II. LAW & ANALYSIS
According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a grant of summary judgment is
appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. PRO. 56(a). A dispute is said
to be “genuine” only where “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Dizer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-699, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24025, at *16 (W.D. La. Jan.
12, 2012) (citing Fordoche, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 463 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2006)). In ruling
upon a motion for summary judgment, the district court shall draw all inferences in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at *3 n.1 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (additional citation omitted)). However, “Rule 56[(a)]
mandates the entry of summary judgment…against a party who fails to make a showing
2

We decline to address this argument for general damages because we have not been asked to decide the property
restoration issue at this time. The motion for partial summary judgment only seeks resolution of the boarding
dispute.
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sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Webber v. Christus Schumpert Health Sys., No. 101177, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99235, at *14 (W.D. La. Sept. 2, 2011) (citing Patrick v. Ridge,
394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2004)). “The non-movant cannot preclude summary judgment by
raising ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.’” Cormier v. W&T Offshore, Inc., No. 10-1089,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53416, at *18-19 (W.D. La. Apr. 12, 2013) (citing Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
It is well-settled that the “laws of the several states…shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.” 28
U.S.C.A. § 1652 (West); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Here, we face dispute
over a contract granting a servitude and other real rights in immovable property located in the
state of Louisiana, and “[r]eal rights in immovables situated in this state are governed by the law
of this state.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3535. Thus we must apply Louisiana law to this case.
The Louisiana Civil Code declares that “[c]ontracts have the effect of law between the
parties, and the courts are bound to interpret them according to the common intent of the
parties.” La. C.C. arts. 1983 and 2045. (emphasis added). “If the words of a contract are clear,
unambiguous, and lead to no absurd consequences, the court need not look beyond the contract
language to determine the true intent of the parties” and “[w]hen a contract is not ambiguous or
does not lead to absurd consequences, it will be enforced as written and its interpretation is a
question of law for a court to decide.” American Deposit Ins. Co. v. Myles, 2000–2457, p. 5
(La.4/25/01), 783 So.2d 1282, 1286. See also Associated Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Carbone
Properties of Audubon, L.L.C., 2007–0120, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/11/07), 962 So.2d 1102, 1106;

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Abshire v. Vermilion Parish School Bd., 02–2881, p. 5 (La.2003), 848 So.2d 552, 555; citing La.
C.C. art. 2046.
The contract at issue between Rohrs and Air Products provides that Air Products would
reimburse Rohrs “for the additional boarding of the livestock…upon his submission of boarding
receipts.” Doc. 6, att. 1, p. 4. (emphasis added). We find this language unambiguous. There is
no evidence here to suggest that Rohrs has submitted any receipts to Air Products. Rohrs, in
fact, never boarded his animals. He simply moved them from one part of his property to another.
While he did provide Air Products with quotes for repairs to a “holding pen area,” we find those
quotes insufficient to meet the contractual obligation. Quotes are not receipts.
Even if the language of the contract were not clear other submissions in this case support
the conclusion that the parties intended receipts would be submitted. Rohrs stated in an affidavit
submitted in connection with his memorandum in opposition that “[the contract] provided that, if
the construction went beyond thirty (30) days, Air Products would pay additional boarding fees
to me, upon providing boarding receipts.” Doc. 8, att. 1, p. 2. The parties clearly contemplated
the deposit of the livestock with a third party, that boarding receipts would be provided for that
deposit, and that reimbursement would be conditioned on the submission of those receipts. Id.
Air Products correctly argues the contract between the parties created a conditional
obligation based on a suspensive condition. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1767. Suspensive
conditions suspend the effects of a contract until the occurrence of an uncertain event. If that
event never occurs, no contract is formed, and no obligation is ever created. Unkel v. Unkel, 29,
728 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/20/97), 699 So. 2d 472, 475. In this case, without the submission of
boarding receipts (the uncertain event) Air Products is not under any obligation to reimburse
Rohrs.

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We are not convinced by Rohrs’ arguments that there are unresolved factual issues over
the formation and terms of an implied contract. The 2010 contract was not implied. It was a
written document that explicitly provided for reimbursement upon the submission of boarding
receipts. Doc. 6, att.1, p. 4. (emphasis added). Rohrs recognized the existence of that contract
in his affidavit and indicated that he understood its terms. Doc. 8, att. 1, p. 2. Moreover, he has
admitted that he never boarded his animals and the record clearly indicates that he did not
provide receipts to Air Products. He is not entitled to reimbursement.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court finds no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment [doc. 6] is GRANTED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 22nd day of September, 2014.

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