Brown et al v. Alcoa Inc et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM RULING denying 12 Motion to Remand in all respects. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay on 2/1/2016. (crt,FinnSld, P)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

PAUL BROWN, ET AL

:

DOCKET NO. 14-cv-3534

VERSUS

:

JUDGE MINALDI

ALCOA, INC., ET AL

:

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM RULING

This matter is before the court on remand following reversal of a Memorandum Ruling
denying plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Doc. 31. The district court remanded and instructed us to
determine if the “amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied between the compensatory
damages and injunctive relief sought.” Id. at 4. We allowed all parties the opportunity to brief
this issue and the matter now is ripe for ruling.
For the reasons set forth below, we find that defendants have set forth sufficient evidence
that plaintiffs’ claims will exceed $75,000 satisfying the requisite amount in controversy.
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [doc. 12] is hereby DENIED.
I.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts and procedural history of this case was set forth at length in our previous
memorandum ruling. Briefly, in their motion to remand plaintiffs contend that we lack subject
matter jurisdiction because they affirmatively pled that their damages were less than $74,500 and
waived any right to recover any sum over that amount. They also argue that they executed binding
affidavits and stipulations limiting their damages to less than $75,000.

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Notwithstanding these stipulations, defendants removed the case claiming that it is
“facially apparent” from the petition that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 because the
plaintiffs’ seek both compensatory damages and injunctive relief. Defendants maintain that the
stipulations and affidavits only refer to “damages” and that the injunctive relief sought is not
included in, and not limited by, those stipulations.
In our previous ruling we agreed with defendants. We found that plaintiffs’ petition
requests both compensatory damages and injunctive relief, that the language in plaintiffs’
stipulations only applies to compensatory damages, that plaintiffs’ compensatory damages equal
$74,500, and that the injunctive relief sought exceeds $500.01. Thus, we denied remand.
Plaintiffs appealed this ruling to the district judge who agreed that the value of the
requested injunctive relief “probably amounted to $500.01.” Doc. 31 p. 3. The district court
found, however, that there was no evidence submitted concerning the amount of compensatory
damages and noted that “the amount in controversy could be anywhere from $1 to $74,500.” Id.
The court remanded in order to resolve this issue. Thus, the only question before us is whether or
not defendants have shown that is more likely than not that the value of plaintiffs’ compensatory
damages is at least $74,500.
II.
LAW & ANALYSIS
Louisiana law forbids plaintiffs in state courts from pleading a specific numerical value of
damages. Gebbia v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir.2000) (citing La. Code
Civ. Proc. Art. 893). Therefore, when a case originally filed in a Louisiana state court is removed
to federal court on the basis of diversity, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. Id. (citing Lucket v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir.1999)). A defendant meets its burden if it shows that (1)
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it is “facially apparent” from the petition [that] the claims probably exceed $75,000 or if (2) the
defendant introduces other evidence to show the amount in controversy more likely than not
exceeds $75,000. See Klein v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 5685113, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov.
4, 2014) (citing Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.2002)).
“The required ‘demonstration concerns what the plaintiff is claiming (and thus the amount in
controversy between the parties), not whether plaintiff is likely to win or be awarded everything
he seeks.’” Robertson v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 2015 WL 9592499 * 2 (5th Cir.2015)(citing
Berniard v. Dow Chem. Co., 481 F. App’x 859, 862 (5th Cir.2010).
Even if a defendant meets this burden, remand is still proper if the plaintiff demonstrates
that it is legally certain that its recovery will not exceed the jurisdictional amount. De Aguilar, 47
F.3d at1409.
Defendants make two arguments in support of jurisdiction. They assert first that plaintiffs’
stipulations are dispositive admissions that their compensatory damages must be valued at
$74,500. They contend that the language in plaintiffs’ petition at paragraph 39 is a stipulation that
the recovery sought by each plaintiff equals $74,500 1. Thus, defendants conclude, since the court
has decided that the injunctive relief sought is valued over $500 the jurisdictional amount is
satisfied. Defendants alternatively argue that, if the stipulations are not dispositive of the amount
of plaintiffs’ compensatory damages, their various claims for money damages in their petition
make it facially apparent that the claims exceed or nearly exceed $75,000.

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Paragraph 39 of plaintiffs’ petition states in part, “each petitioner specifically waives, renounces, and forgoes that
portion of any judgment potentially awarded in each of petitioner’s favor for such damages that are in excess of the
stipulated recovery sought of $74,500.00.” Doc. 1, att. 2, p. 18. Emphasis added.
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In response plaintiffs maintain that it is not facially apparent that their compensatory
damages exceed $74,500. They point out that their stipulations affirmatively renounce an award
over $74,500 and assert that the stipulations have no relationship to the actual value of their claims.
In our prior Report and Recommendation we found that plaintiffs had affirmatively bound
themselves to compensatory damages less than $74,500 by including the stipulations in their
petition. See Doc. 21, p. 5. Thus, we reject defendants’ argument that the stipulations are
dispositive admissions that the compensatory damages must be valued at $74,500. However, we
do agree with defendants that, after reviewing plaintiffs’ petition and the allegations contained
therein, it is facially apparent that plaintiffs’ compensatory damages will more likely than not
exceed $74,500.
In paragraph 37 of their petition plaintiffs seek compensation for the following:
a.

Sufficient funds to conduct a complete scientific investigation of the
extent and nature of the contamination on their properties associated
with defendants generation, transportation, storage, handling, and
management of toxic and/or hazardous dusts, air pollutants, and/or
waste materials and products from the LCC Plant;

b.

All costs or restoring petitioners’ properties to their original
uncontaminated condition;

…
d.

Damages caused by the continued unauthorized and unpermitted
emission and deposition of toxic and/or hazardous dusts, air
pollutants, and/or waste material onto and in petitioners’ properties;

e.

Unjust enrichment damages for defendants[] continued
unauthorized use of petitioners’ properties as an unauthorized and
unpermitted disposal facility for its toxic and/or hazardous dusts, air
pollutants, and/or waste material;

f.

An award of stigma damages for diminution in property value
before, during and after restoration;

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g.

Any civil fruits derived from defendants continued illegal
trespasses;

h.

Continued damages for annoyance, discomfort and inconvenience
occasioned by nuisance created by defendants, including loss of full
use and enjoyment of petitioner’ properties.

Doc. 1, att. 2, ¶ 37, pp. 17-18. A review of prior cases in which similar damages were awarded
supports our conclusion that plaintiffs’ damages could certainly exceed the jurisdictional amount
necessary. For instance, plaintiffs seek to have “all properties, including soil if necessary, that
have been contaminated with toxic and/or hazardous dusts, air pollutants, and/or waste materials
from the LCC Plant’s aluminum production operations remediated to its original condition.” Id.
at ¶ 35, p. 17. Defendants cite to several cases in which this type of damage alone amounts to a
sum greater than or nearly equal to $74,500 2. The court is also aware, without the need for specific
evidence, of the great expense involved in remediation of contaminated property.
Also included in their seven areas of relief listed above is a claim for diminished property
value and stigmatization. Defendants again provide the court with case law showing a prior
judgment in the amount of $75,000 for loss in value, loss of use of property, and mental anguish
against a defendant who negligently allowed gasoline to seep on and contaminate plaintiffs’
property. See Monk v. La. Dep’t Envtl. Quality, 2012 WL 8021006 (4th La. Dist. Ct. 2/24/12).
We find it unnecessary to specifically address each and every one of the itemized claims
for compensation alleged by plaintiffs because it is abundantly clear that defendants have met their
burden of showing that it is more likely than not that plaintiffs’ compensatory damages pled in
their petition could exceed $74,500. As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Robertson v. Exxon Mobile
Corp., supra at *3, the court can make “common sense inferences about the amount put at stake

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See Simoneaux v. Amoco Prod. Co., 860 So.2d 560 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/03)(Plaintiff was awarded $375,000 to
remediate his contaminated property.), Dorsey v. Iberia Parish Gov’t, 2010 WL 3840340 (16th La. Dist. Ct.
7/7/10)(Plaintiff was awarded $72,525 to repair and replace a home contaminated by sewage.).
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by the injuries the plaintiffs claim.” Here, common sense tells us that the amount in controversy
is satisfied considering the potential cumulative money damages for the seven separate theories of
relief alleged in the petition.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [doc. 12] is hereby
DENIED in all respects.
THUS DONE this 1st day of February, 2016.

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