Jones v. Geo Group Inc et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 19 Motion for Recusal; denying 20 Motion to Amend. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay on 2/5/2018. (crt,Haik, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

PAUL C. JONES
D.O.C. # 403455

:

DOCKET NO. 17-cv-788
SECTION P

VERSUS

:

JUDGE WALTER

GEO GROUP INC., ET AL.

:

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court are a Motion for Recusal [doc. 19] and Motion to Amend [doc. 20] filed
in the instant suit by plaintiff Paul Jones who is proceeding pro se in this matter. Jones is an inmate
in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and is currently
incarcerated at Elayn Hunt Correctional Institute in St. Gabriel, Louisiana. See doc. 19, att. 3. His
complaint relates to events that occurred while he was incarcerated at Allen Correctional Center
in Kinder, Louisiana.
I.
BACKGROUND
Jones filed a civil rights suit in this court on June 19, 2017, and was granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Docs. 1, 4. Upon initial review of his complaint, however, we
determined that he was barred from proceeding IFP due to his history of filing at least three
complaints that were dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous or failing to state a
claim on which relief could be granted. Doc. 13, pp. 1–2. We also determined that Jones’s
allegations did not meet the exception, under § 1915(g), through which a prisoner might proceed
IFP despite his history of dismissals if he can show that he “is under imminent danger of serious

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physical injury.” Id. Accordingly, by order dated October 20, 2017, we rescinded our prior grant
of IFP status and ordered Jones to pay the full filing fee, $400, within twenty days. Id. at 3. Jones
was warned that failure to comply and pay the full filing fee would result in the pleadings being
stricken from the record. Id.
On November 29, 2017, the court received payment in the amount of $20.00 from Jones,
via transaction posted on November 17. See Unnumbered Docket Entry, November 29, 2017.
Jones then submitted two requests for documents, received on December 8, 2017. Docs. 14, 15.
On December 27, 2017, noting that Jones had not complied with our previous order by paying the
full filing fee within the allotted time period, we ordered that his complaint be stricken from the
record. 1 Doc. 17.
Jones now moves for our recusal, disputing our conclusion of no imminent danger in the
order rescinding his IFP status. Doc. 19; doc. 19, att. 1. He also seeks to amend his complaint in
order to “specify facts giving rise to [his] suit” and “identify[] other defendants involved.” Doc.
20, att. 1, p. 1. In his memoranda in support of these motions, he also provides his post-filing
transfer history, stating that he was transferred from Allen Correctional Center to Elayn Hunt
Correctional Center on June 26, 2017, then from Elayn Hunt Correctional Center to Dixon
Correctional Institute on August 14, 2017, then from Dixon Correctional Institute back to Elayn
Hunt Correctional Center on December 4, 2017. Doc. 19, att. 1, p. 3; doc. 20, att. 1, p. 3.
We first consider whether there is any basis for recusal and then whether Jones should be
allowed to reopen his case and amend his complaint.

1

This document was returned as undeliverable, ostensibly due to Jones’s transfer from Dixon Correctional Institute
to Elayn Hunt Correctional Center (described infra). Doc. 18. It will be resent.

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II.
LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Recuse
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, grounds for recusal include the judge’s bias or prejudice
concerning a party, personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, or when the judge’s
partiality “might reasonably be questioned.” Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir.
2003). “[T]he alleged bias must be personal, as distinguished from judicial, in nature.” United
States v. Scroggins, 485 F.3d 824, 830 (5th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, “[a]dverse judicial rulings
will support a claim of bias only if they reveal an opinion based on an extrajudicial source or if
they demonstrate such a high degree of antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Id.
Jones presents nothing other than his disagreement with our ruling in this matter, alleging
that it reflects a lack of competency and that we should thus be disqualified from handling his
case. 2 The ruling he challenges was a determination, made based on our consideration of other
decisions in this district and courts in the Middle District of Louisiana, that his unsubstantiated
assertions of imminent danger did not meet the exception set out under § 1915(g). Doc. 13, p. 2.
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to provide any valid basis for recusal and this motion is therefore
DENIED.
B. Motion to Amend/Reopen
We next consider whether the case should be reopened and whether Jones should be given
the opportunity to amend his complaint. Under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order on the following grounds: (1) mistake, (2)

2

He also seeks to incorporate his briefing on a motion for recusal which he claims he recently filed in a pending
habeas proceeding in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, Jones v. Cooley, No. 3:17cv-180 (M.D. La.). Doc. 19, att. 1, pp. 4–5. We can find no record of that motion, nor can we see what use his
arguments on the recusal of another judge would be to this matter.

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newly discovered evidence, (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party, (4)
the judgment is void, (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that was reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
In support of his motion, Jones expands on his “imminent danger” allegations. The only
new information appears to be that he has been placed on suicide watch at Dixon Correctional
Institute and Elayn Hunt Correctional Center. Doc. 20, att. 1, p. 4. He also submits a “Current
Patient Synopsis to Physician for Accurate Diagnosis and Proper Care,” and several exhibits
documenting allegations he has made at multiple facilities over the last several years of poisonings
and conspiracies against him. Doc. 20, atts. 3, 4. These allegations and exhibits, which have no
support outside of Jones’s personal beliefs, do not persuade us that there was any error in our
conclusion that Jones had not shown sufficient merit to his claims of imminent danger.
As noted supra, Jones had not received notice of our strike order at the time he filed this
motion. However, he had received this court’s order revoking his IFP status and warning him of
the consequences of not paying the full filing fee. By his own admission, Jones’s transfer from
Dixon Correctional Institute to Elayn Hunt Correctional Center did not occur until December 4,
2017, well after his November 9, 2017 deadline for paying the filing fee in order to prevent having
his pleadings stricken. He provides no excuse for his failure to comply, and so we see no
justification for allowing him to reopen the case. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.
III.
CONCLUSION
For reasons stated above, both motions are DENIED.

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THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 5th day of February, 2018.

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