Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District v. Reynolds Metal Co

Filing 440

MEMORANDUM RULING granting in part and denying in part 358 Motion to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay on 4/7/2022. (crt,Jones, P)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

LAKE CHARLES HARBOR &
TERMINAL DISTRICT

:

CASE NO. 2:17-CV-01114

VERSUS

:

JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

REYNOLDS METAL CO.

:

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, is a Motion
to Compel Discovery Responses filed by Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District (“the
District”).1 The District seeks to compel responses to certain requests in its second set of requests
for production, which it propounded to Lonza Group Ltd. and Lonza America, Inc. (collectively,
“Lonza”). Doc. 358. Lonza opposes the motion. Doc. 387. The briefing deadlines have run, and
this matter is now ripe for determination. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED
IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
This matter concerns immovable property owned by the District, which the District leased
to Defendant Reynolds Metal Company (“Reynolds”) and its predecessors in interest, starting in
1967 (the “Leased Premises”). The lease agreements allowed the lessee to conduct aluminum
manufacturing on the Leased Premises. Doc. 387, pp. 3-4 (quoting Doc. 254, att. 4). The District

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The Motion to Compel was filed on February 17, 2022, 60 days before trial.

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alleges that Gulf Coast installed a solid waste dump on the Leased Premises, into which hazardous
and other wastes were placed until its closure in 1984. Doc. 12, pp. 6-7.
Before Reynolds assumed the relevant lease agreements in 1983, the Leased Premises had
been leased first by Gulf Coast Aluminum (“Gulf Coast”) and then by Consolidated Aluminum
Corporation (“Consolidated”). The District alleges that Defendant Lonza is successor in interest
to the parent corporation of Gulf Coast and Consolidated, who were lessees of the Leased Premises
during the period that the solid waste dump was in operation. Doc. 12, pp. 1-4.
II.
THE DISPUTED REQUESTS
Through the motion to compel, the District seeks to compel Lonza to provide answers to
discovery requests concerning the handling of solid and hazardous wastes. The motion concerns
Requests 6-11 of the District’s Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents to Lonza.2
Doc. 358, att. 2. As summarized by the District, “Requests 6 and 7 seek to discover Lonza’s own
policies and procedures for handling hazardous and non-hazardous waste;”3 “Requests 8 and 9
seek to discover Lonza’s knowledge about the hazards posed to humans and the environment by
the specific wastes that were dumped into the Solid Waste Landfill;”4 and “Requests 10 and 11
seek to discover Lonza’s past experience with environmental cleanups of other sites contaminated
with one or more of the Constituents of Concern that were found in the Solid Waste Landfill.”5
The requests read as follows:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NUMBER 6:
Please produce all documents relating to Lonza’s past and present policies,
practices or procedures applicable to the acquisition, use, transportation,

2

Propounded on September 23, 2021.
Doc. 358, att. 2, p. 3.
4
Id., p. 4.
5
Id.
3

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storage, management, spillage, leakage or disposal of any Hazardous
Materials at its current or former operations in North America.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NUMBER 7:
Please produce all documents relating to Lonza’s past and present
environmental or waste management policies, practices or procedures
applicable to its current or former operations in North America.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NUMBER 8:
Please produce all documents relating to the risks posed to humans or
ecological receptors by exposure to any of the Constituents of Concern.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NUMBER 9:
Please produce all documents relating to the environmental fate and
transport of any of the Constituents of Concern.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NUMBER 10:
Please produce all documents relating to any environmental assessment,
cleanup or remediation of soil, sediment, surface water or groundwater
undertaken, in whole or in part, by or on behalf of Lonza in North America,
which environmental assessment, cleanup or remediation involved one or
more of the Constituents of Concern.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NUMBER 11:
Please produce all documents relating to any environmental assessment,
cleanup or remediation of soil, sediment, surface water or groundwater
undertaken at any site in North America currently or formerly owned or
operated, in whole or in part, by or on behalf of Lonza, which
environmental assessment, cleanup or remediation involved one or more of
the Constituents of Concern.
Doc. 358, att. 2, p. 2.
The District argues that the requested information is “directly related to the central issue of
the case—should Lonza be required to remediate the Solid Waste Landfill on the District’s
property?” Doc. 388, att. 2, p. 2. In particular, the District argues that this information is relevant
to Lonza’s arguments that “normal plant operations” involved dumping wastes into the solid waste
landfill. Doc. 388, att. 2, p. 3.
In opposition, Lonza argues that the requested information is both irrelevant and
disproportionate to the needs of this case. Lonza reframes the central issue in this case as whether
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La. Civ. Code art. 2683 requires Reynolds (not Lonza) to pay the cost of removing the Solid Waste
Landfill, under that article’s requirement that a lessee return a leased thing in the same condition
it was delivered to him, except for normal wear and tear. Doc. 387, p. 2. Put differently, Lonza
argues that the central question is whether a solid waste landfill constitutes “normal wear and tear”
for this type of lease, under La. Civ. Code art. 2683. Doc. 387, p. 3-4.
Lonza notes that the “sole basis for Lonza’s presence in this action is this Court’s prior
rulings that Lonza owes indemnity to Reynolds and Howmet.” Doc. 387, p. 2-3 (citing docs. 114,
247). Lonza’s suggests that its past policies and procedures are irrelevant to determining the extent
of its indemnity obligations to Reynolds and Howmet and irrelevant to the question of Reynold’s
obligations to the District. Lonza also argues that the requests are disproportionate to the needs of
the case “because they are unlimited in time and seek information about properties and/or policies
that are not the Solid Waste Landfill, or anything like the Solid Waste Landfill.” Doc. 387, p. 4.
After the District filed this Motion to Compel on February 19, 2022, Lonza served
supplemental responses on February 28, 2028.6 Lonza filed its opposition on March 8, 2022. The
District did not file a reply. Trial in this matter is set for April 18, 2022.
III.
LAW
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits the scope of discovery to
matters relevant to a claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. Relevant
information is defined as “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter
that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,

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In its Opposition memorandum, Lonza notes that the supplemental responses contain the affidavit Philip Blair, a
former plant manager of the aluminum facility, who attested to his personal knowledge as to the types of materials
that were disposed of into the Solid Waste Landfill and the Cathode Disposal Area, roughly outlining his
understanding of disposal policies for those two areas during his time at the Facility (1969-2003). Doc. 387, att. 2
(responses attached as Ex. 6 to Doc. 387).

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98 S. Ct. 2380, 2389 (1978); see also FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence as making a
fact of consequence in determining the action more or less probable). In explicitly defining the
scope of discovery in terms of both relevance and proportionality, Rule 26(b) is designed reinforce
the obligation of the parties to consider the proportionality factors in making discovery requests.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. The factors a court
should consider when determining proportionality are “the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The
court may limit discovery when:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can
be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the
information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule
26(b)(1).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Hebert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1649 (1979). Control of discovery
is limited to the trial court’s sound discretion. Van Duzer v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 582 F. App'x
279, 283 (5th Cir. 2014).
IV.
APPLICATION
The court disagrees with Lonza’s argument that the requested materials are wholly
irrelevant to the issues in this case.
A. Requests 6 & 7 – Waste management, storage, and disposal policies and procedures
Requests 6 and 7 pertain to Lonza’s “past and present policies, practices or procedures
applicable to the acquisition, use, transportation, storage, management, spillage, leakage or
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disposal of any Hazardous Materials at its current or former operations in North America” and
“Lonza’s past and present environmental or waste management policies, practices or procedures
applicable to its current or former operations in North America.” Doc. 358, att. 2, p. 2.
As Lonza explains it, the central issue in this case is whether this particular solid waste
landfill constitutes “normal wear and tear.” Lonza’s past policies and practices concerning the
disposal of solid waste could be relevant to that question, insofar as they may shed light on what
type of disposal practices are “normal” for this character of lease. The District notes that it expects
that Lonza’s policies for waste handling (responsive to Requests 6 and 7) may refute Lonza’s
argument that the operation of the solid waste landfill constitutes “normal wear and tear.” Doc.
385, att. 2. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel is GRANTED as to Requests 6 and 7, with the
limitation that the responsive documents should be limited in time to 1967-1984, the approximate
period the solid waste landfill was in operation.
B. Request 8 & 9 – Human and Environmental risks associated with the Constituents of
Concern
Requests 8 & 9 pertain to “risks posed to humans or ecological receptors by exposure to
any of the Constituents of Concern” and the “environmental fate and transport of any of the
Constituents of Concern.” Doc. 358, att. 2, p. 2.
In ruling on a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence, the District Judge recently held
that, “the District is entitled to provide evidence to show that ‘without remediation, the District
will receive no income from this property, will be forced to pay for remediation and financing
costs, ecosystem goods and services will continue to be lost, risks and damages to community and
human capital will continue.’ But ‘[w]ith restoration, the Port of Lake Charles can lease the subject
property and provide future benefits.’ Doc. 406 (quoting Batker Report, Doc. 360, att. 4, p. 10).

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Consistent with this ruling, we now determine that the District is entitled to discover any
information relevant to the cost of remediation, loss of “ecosystem goods,” and “risks and damages
to community and human capital.” We agree with Lonza, however, that the scope of the original
request is disproportionate to the needs of this case because it is not limited in time or geographic
scope. Therefore the Motion to Compel is GRANTED with respect to Requests 8 and 9, with the
limitation that Lonza is ordered to produce the subset of documents responsive to this request that
pertain specifically to the Leased Premises and its immediate environment.
C. Requests 10 & 11 – Environmental assessments and remediation
Requests 10 and 11 pertain to “any environmental assessment, cleanup or remediation of
soil, sediment, surface water or groundwater undertaken at any site in North America” either
undertaken by Lonza or at any facility “currently or formerly owned or operated” by Lonza. The
court agrees with Lonza that these requests are insufficiently limited in scope, such that production
of all responsive documents would not be proportional to the needs of this case and unduly
burdensome. Therefore, the Motion to Compel is DENIED as to Requests 10 and 11.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the Motion to Compel [doc. 358] is
GRANTED IN PART and that, unless either party first objects to the District Judge, Defendant
Lonza is ORDERED by noon on April 11, 2022, to:
•

to supplement its discovery responses and produce documents
responsive to Requests 6 and 7, with the limitation that the responsive
documents should be limited in time to 1967-1984, the approximate
period the solid waste landfill may have been in operation; and

•

supplement its discovery responses and produce documents responsive
to Requests 8 and 9, with the limitation that Lonza will produce the
subset of documents responsive to these requests that pertain
specifically to the Leased Premises and its immediate environment; and
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The Motion to Compel is otherwise DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 7th day of April, 2022.

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