Griffin v. Louisiana et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM ORDER: Directing plaintiff to amend complaint. Pro Se Response due by 1/29/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay on 12/28/2017. (crt,Haik, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

LUCAS GRIFFIN
DOC # 195329

:

DOCKET NO. 17-cv-1155
SECTION P

VERSUS

:

UNASSIGNED DISTRICT JUDGE

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.

:

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court is the civil rights complaint [doc. 4] filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
plaintiff Lucas Griffin, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this matter. Griffin is
an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and is
currently incarcerated at the Calcasieu Correctional Center in Lake Charles, Louisiana.
I.
BACKGROUND
Griffin raises claims of police brutality against several officers, relating to events that
occurred before he was brought to the Calcasieu Correctional Center. See doc. 4, pp. 2–3. Namely,
he alleges that Corporal Treadway turned a dog loose on him, which bit him several times, and
that Officer Romero tased him in the back, attempted to drown him, and struck him repeatedly,
even after he was in handcuffs. Id. at 3. As defendants in this suit he names Corporal Treadway
and Officers Romero, Roberson, Tatum, Sawyer, and Fontenot, all of whom he alleges are
members of the Lake Charles Police Department. Id. In a previous, deficient complaint he also
mentioned that he intended to file suit against the State of Louisiana, the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s

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Office, and the Lake Charles Police Department. Doc. 1. In relief he seeks monetary damages and
requests that criminal charges be pressed against the officers. Doc. 4, p. 4.
II.
LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Frivolity Review
Griffin has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter. Accordingly,
his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides for sua sponte
dismissal of the complaint or any portion thereof if the court determines that it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Gonzalez v. Wyatt, 157
F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1998). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it is clear the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998). When
determining whether a complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, the court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true. Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 400
(5th Cir. 1995) (frivolity); Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d at 1025 (failure to state a claim).
B. Section 1983
Federal law provides a cause of action against any person who, under the color of law, acts
to deprive another person of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus the initial question is whether the plaintiff has alleged
that his constitutional rights have been violated. If no constitutional violation has been alleged,
there is no cognizable claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief. In order to hold the defendants
liable, a plaintiff must allege facts to show (1) that a constitutional right has been violated and (2)
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that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; that is,
that the defendant was a state actor. West v. Atkins, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254–55 (1988).
C. Rule 8
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
Under Rule 8, the complaint must allege “sufficient facts from which the court can determine
the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and from which the defendants can fairly appreciate
the claim made against them.” Bynum v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov’t, 2011 WL 6654985, at
*3 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2011) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Griffin must amend his complaint to
allege:
(1) A description of what each defendant did to violate his rights; 1
(2) the place and dates on which these events allegedly occurred;
(3) a specific statement of his damages/the basis of his claim for monetary
relief.
D. Theories of the Complaint
Griffin must also amend his complaint to correct deficiencies specific to the theories under
which he is seeking relief.
1. Improper parties
According to Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Louisiana law governs
whether defendants can be sued in this court. Under Louisiana law, an entity must qualify as a
“juridical person,” which is defined as “an entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a
corporation or partnership.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 24. Louisiana courts uniformly hold that sheriff’s

1

Specifically, Griffin has named Officers Roberson, Tatum, Sawyer, and Fontenot as defendants but has not alleged
any wrongdoing by them or that they were even present during the complained-of events. He should dismiss his claims
against these defendants if he cannot show a basis for their liability.

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offices or sheriff’s departments are not juridical entities. Sipes v. City of Monroe, 2017 WL
1282457 at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 28, 2013) (collecting cases). Additionally, police departments are
generally not juridical entities and the proper defendant is instead the municipality. Durall v.
Lafayette Police Dept., 2011 WL 6181387 at *1 n. 1 (W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2011); Evans v. City of
Homer, 2007 WL 2710792 at *4–*5 (W.D. La. Sep. 12, 2007).
Finally, under the Eleventh Amendment, the State of Louisiana enjoys sovereign immunity
from all suits, including those brought by its own citizens. See U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although
this immunity may be waived or abrogated, or even stripped under the Ex Parte Young exception
for suits seeking prospective injunctive relief against state employees, none of these exceptions is
applicable here. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 807 F.Supp.2d 570, 580–85
(N.D. Miss. 2011) (considering sovereign immunity exceptions in a § 1983 suit).
Accordingly, Griffin cannot state a claim on which relief may be granted against the State
of Louisiana, the Lake Charles Police Department, or the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office and
should dismiss his claims against all of these defendants. 2 He may, however, assert his claims
against the Lake Charles Police Department against the City of Lake Charles instead, if he meets
the requirements below.
2. Municipal Liability
Municipal liability attaches in a § 1983 suit where the governmental entity “is alleged to
have caused a constitutional tort through a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers,” as well as when the injury results
from an informal custom of the entity. Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 166

2

We also note that Griffin only alleges wrongdoing by individual officers of the Lake Charles Police Department, and
so even with juridical status/without the sovereign immunity bar, there would be no basis for holding either the state
or the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office liable.

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(5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). The municipality may not be held liable “merely for
employing a tortfeasor,” and the plaintiff is instead required to show three elements: a
policymaker, an official policy, and a resulting violation of constitutional rights. Id. at 167;
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, if Griffin wishes to hold
the City of Lake Charles liable in lieu of the Lake Charles Police Department, he must identify a
policy or custom and connect it to the alleged use of excessive force in his case.
3. Heck concerns
Under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Heck v. Humphrey, a plaintiff who has been
convicted of a crime may not use § 1983 to collaterally attack that conviction. 114 S.Ct. 2364,
2372 (1994). In other words, a plaintiff may not recover on a § 1983 claim that calls into question
the validity of a conviction unless that conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid,
or called into question by federal habeas corpus. Id. at 2372–73. Accordingly, certain convictions,
such as battery of an officer, may bar a plaintiff from bringing an excessive force claim based on
those same events. Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 100 Fed. App’x 321, 323 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing
Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996)); but see Thomas v. Pohlmann, 681 Fed.
App’x 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2017) (excessive force claim not necessarily undermined by battery of
an officer conviction, where plaintiffs alleged that the officers continued to use excessive force
after they had ceased their resistance).
From the scenario Griffin describes, it appears he was being arrested when the alleged
excessive force occurred and that he was subsequently incarcerated. Accordingly, he should amend
his complaint to state what charges were filed against him and what the disposition of those charges
is, in order for us to determine if Heck bars this suit.

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4. Improper relief
Griffin states that he wishes to have criminal charges pressed against the officers involved
in this suit. This court cannot grant such relief and Griffin should instead bring his request to a law
enforcement agency.
5. Statute of limitations
Finally, as mentioned above, Griffin failed to provide the date(s) on which the complainedof events occurred. Federal law governs when a § 1983 action accrues and the limitations period
begins to run, “but ‘state law supplies the applicable limitations period and tolling provisions.’”
Gonzalez v. Seal, 677 Fed. App’x 918, 921 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d
153, 156–57 (5th Cir. 1999)). Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, a § 1983 action accrues and the limitations
period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis
for the action. Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1423 (5th Cir. 1983). In Louisiana, the applicable
limitations period is the one-year period of liberative prescription governing delictual actions.
Hawkins v. McHugh, 46 F.3d 10, 12 (5th Cir. 1995); see LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492. Therefore
Griffin’s claims are subject to a one-year prescriptive period, running from the date of his alleged
beating. He must supply the date on which these events occurred, and any grounds for tolling in
the event that this action is untimely.
III.
CONCLUSION
Griffin’s pro se complaint is deficient as described above. Before this court can determine
the proper disposition of his action, he should be given the opportunity to remedy the deficiencies
or dismiss those claims that he cannot remedy. Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.
1998).
Accordingly,
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THE CLERK IS DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order to Griffin at his last address on
file.
IT IS ORDERED that Griffin amend his complaint within thirty (30) days of the filing of
this order to cure the deficiencies as outlined above, and dismiss the claims he is unable to cure
through amendment.
Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal of the claims above as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or dismissal of the action under Rule 41(b) or 16(f) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R. Co., 82 S. Ct. 1386 (1962).
Griffin is further required to notify the court of any change in his address under LR 41.3.
Failure to do so will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 28th day of December, 2017.

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