Reclaimed Goods L L C v. Frisard's Trucking Co Inc et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM ORDER re 5 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim with prejudice filed by Frisards Trucking Co Inc: IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff be given leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days. Absent the filing of an amended complaint, the court will issue a Report and Recommendation that the Motion to Dismiss be granted and the complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay on 6/7/2018. (crt,Williams, L)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
RECLAIMED GOODS, LLC
:
DOCKET NO. 18-cv-00522
VERSUS
:
UNASSIGNED DISTRICT JUDGE
FRISARD’S TRUCKING COMPANY,
INC., ET. AL.
:
MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is a Motion to Dismiss [doc. 5] filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by defendants, Frisard’s Trucking Company and Arch Insurance
(hereinafter “defendants”). The plaintiff in this matter, Reclaimed Goods, LLC (hereinafter
“plaintiff”) oppose the motion. Doc. 8.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636. For the reasons below, it is ORDERED that plaintiff be given leave to file an
amended complaint within thirty days. Absent the filing of an amended complaint, the court will
issue a Report and Recommendation that the Motion to Dismiss be granted and the complaint be
dismissed with prejudice.
I.
BACKGROUND
This matter arises from losses allegedly incurred by plaintiff from an interstate shipment
of used lockers from Georgia to Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. Doc. 1, att. 2. Specifically, plaintiff
alleges that Frisard’s negligently failed to properly stow and secure the used lockers prior to
transporting the lockers to Louisiana thereby causing damage during shipment. Id. at p. 2. On
February 26, 2018, plaintiff filed a petition for damages in the 14th Judicial District Court, Parish
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of Calcasieu, Louisiana, alleging negligence, praying for damages as a result therefrom as well as
judicial interest and costs. Id. at 2–3. Defendants subsequently removed the matter to this court,
asserting that federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, exists because plaintiff’s claims arise
under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. Doc. 1.
Defendants now bring the instant motion to dismiss, asserting that the Carmack
Amendment preempts plaintiff’s state law claims as a matter of law and that the petition should
therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Doc. 5, p. 1.
Plaintiff opposes the exclusivity of the Carmack Amendment, averring that the Carmack
Amendment does not preclude a state-law negligence claim. Doc. 8, pp. 1-2.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move for
dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. To
survive such a motion, “the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct 1955, 1974 (2007)). In other
words, the plaintiff must provide enough factual allegations which, taken as true, raise his right to
relief “above the speculative level.” Twombly 127 S. Ct. at 1965. The court’s task in evaluating a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is “not to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success,” but
instead to determine whether it is both legally cognizable and plausible. Billups v. Credit Bureau
of Greater Shreveport, 2014 WL 4700254, *2 (W.D. La. Sep 22, 2014) (quoting Lone Star Fund
V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)).
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III.
APPLICATION
Defendants claim that complete preemption of plaintiff’s claims under the Carmack
Amendment results in their failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Doc. 5, att. 1,
p. 1. Plaintiff maintains that the negligence claim is not precluded even considering the Carmack
Amendment’s express preemption of the state law claims. Doc. 8, p. 1.
The Carmack Amendment represents Congress’s intent to create a national scheme to
compensate for losses incurred in interstate shipment. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit holds that the
Carmack Amendment “provide[s] the exclusive cause of action for loss or damages to goods
arising from the interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier.” Hoskins v. Bekins
Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 778 (5th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). “[T]he Carmack Amendment
preempts any common law remedy that increases . . . liability beyond ‘the actual loss or injury to
the property,’ unless the shipper alleges injuries separate and apart from those resulting directly
from the loss of shipped property.” Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 382
(5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Thus, state-law claims against a carrier for negligence arising
from goods damaged or lost in interstate shipment are preempted by the Carmack Amendment.
See Hartley v. Don Farr Moving and Storage, 2017 WL 6395493, *3 (W.D. La. October 19, 2017);
Chisesi Bros. Meat Packing Co., Inc. v. Transco Logistics Co., 2017 WL 2189829, *4 (E.D. La.
May 18, 2017). Punitive damages and attorney’s fees are also not recoverable under the Carmack
Amendment, and preemption under this law precludes such claims. Morris, 144 F.3d at 382-83
(5th Cir. 1998); Accura Sys., Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 874, 876-77 (5th Cir.
1996); see, e.g., Royal Air, Inc. v. AAA Cooper Transp., Inc., 395 F.Supp.2d 436, 441 (W.D. La.
2005).
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Plaintiff maintains that the Carmack Amendment specifically contemplates the availability
of a state-law negligence claim. However, “[w]hen the federal statute completely pre-empts the
state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if
pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.” Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson,
123 S.Ct. 2058, 2063 (2003). Furthermore, the Carmack Amendment broadly defines
transportation as including “. . . storage, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of
passengers and property.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(23)(B). Failure to properly stow and secure the
lockers during shipment thereby causing damage falls squarely within this broad definition.
Consequently, plaintiff’s state law negligence claim arising from the improper securing is
preempted by the Carmack Amendment.
Plaintiff fails to show any other claim falling outside of the statute’s broad definition or
any justification for enlarging the carrier’s liability and defendants have succeeded in showing that
plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief on the state law grounds presented. Accordingly, the suit
should be dismissed as requested under Rule 12(b)(6).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff be given leave to file an amended complaint within thirty
days of the signing of this order. Any amended complaint should address only a claim under the
Carmack Amendment and should not attempt to state any state law negligence claim. Absent the
filing of an amended complaint, the court will issue a Report and Recommendation that the Motion
to Dismiss be granted and the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
Any state law claims
proposed in the amended complaint will be subject to a Report and Recommendation suggesting
those complaints should be dismissed with prejudice.
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THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 7th day of June, 2018.
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