Carrier et al v. County Hall Insurance Co Inc et al

Filing 82

MEMORANDUM ORDER re 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Covenant Transport Solutions L L C. Signed by Judge James D Cain, Jr on 3/27/2024. (crt,Stewart, T)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
JERMAINE CARRIER ET AL

CASE NO. 2:22-CV-00937

VERSUS

JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

COUNTY HALL INSURANCE CO INC ET MAGISTRATE JUDGE CAROL B.
AL
WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 77] filed by defendant
Covenant Transport Solutions LLC (“Covenant”). The motion is regarded as unopposed.
I.

BACKGROUND
This suit arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on June 3, 2021, in Lake
Charles, Louisiana. Doc. 1, att. 2, ¶ 2. Plaintiff Kimberly Batiste was driving her vehicle
with plaintiff Jermaine Carrier riding as passenger. Id. A collision occurred between
plaintiffs and defendant Darrius Jackson, who was allegedly operating a Freightliner truck
on behalf of Covenant and defendant TDKD Logistics Corporation (“TDKD”), which was
hauling a trailer owned by defendant Dollar General Corporation (“Dollar General”). Doc.
33 at ¶ 2A. Plaintiffs brought suit in state court against the above-named defendants as well
as TDKD’s insurer, alleging that the accident was caused by Jackson’s negligence. Doc. 1,
att. 2, ¶ 5. Defendants then removed the suit to this court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Doc. 1.

Covenant filed a motion for summary judgment, showing that (1) it is a freight
broker that does not exercise control over motor carriers, (2) it relies on the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration to qualify carriers as having satisfactory safety ratings, and
(3) the carriers themselves select and supervise their own employees/drivers to transport
loads. Doc. 57, att. 3. Accordingly, it maintained that it could not be held liable for the
accident. Plaintiffs filed no response and the motion was regarded as unopposed. The court
granted the motion in part, dismissing the claims against Covenant based on vicarious
liability of Jackson and TDKD and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and management
of Jackson and TDKD. Docs. 72, 76. It denied the motion to the extent that it did not
address the remainder of plaintiff’s claims. Id. Covenant now brings a second motion for
summary judgment, seeking dismissal of plaintiffs’ remaining claims of liability based on
allegations that Covenant had “liability insurance or solvency” covering TDKD and
Jackson. Doc. 77; see doc. 33 (first amended complaint). Plaintiffs have once again filed
no response and the motion is regarded as unopposed.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Rule 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party is initially responsible for identifying
portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact.
Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). He may meet his burden by
pointing out “the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case.” Malacara

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v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003). The non-moving party is then required to go
beyond the pleadings and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To this end he must submit
“significant probative evidence” in support of his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v.
Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249 (citations omitted).
A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on
a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 150 (2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Clift v.
Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a genuine issue of material
fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).
III.
LAW & APPLICATION
Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a federal court sitting in
diversity jurisdiction applies the substantive law of the forum state. Cates v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 928 F.2d 679, 687 (5th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs alleged that Covenant, “being selfinsured and solvent, [was] providing coverage and insuring TDKD Logistics Corp. and
Darrius Jackson and the vehicle he was driving, which renders Covenant, liable in solido
with County and TDKD” for plaintiffs’ damages. Doc. 33, ¶ 8A. Covenant shows by

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affidavit from senior vice president George Yates that, while it had a commercial general
insurance and commercial auto liability-contingent policy providing $1,000,000.00 in
coverage, it at no time agreed to insure or self-insure TDKD or Jackson. Id. at ¶¶ 6–7.
Plaintiffs have provided no argument under Louisiana law for extending this coverage and
no other basis for holding Covenant liable for their injuries. The motion will therefore be
granted.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 77] will be
GRANTED and plaintiffs' remaining claims against Covenant Transport Solutions LLC
will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on the 27th day of March, 2024.

__________________________________
JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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