Lejeune v. American Inter-Fidelity Exchange et al

Filing 62

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 41 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge James D Cain, Jr on 1/29/2025. (crt,Miletello, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
JEAN JOYCE LEJEUNE

CASE NO. 2:23-CV-01364

VERSUS

JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

AMERICAN INTER-FIDELITY EXCHANGE
ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is “Plaintiffs First Motion in Limine” (Doc. 41), wherein Plaintiff,
through counsel, moves to exclude the testimony, opinions, and report of Defendant
American Inter-Fidelity Exchange’s (“American”) expert, Richard V. Baratta.
BACKGROUND
On November 6, 2022, Plaintiff, Jean Joyce Lejeune, was the driver of a 2021
Toyota Camry, traveling west on I-10. Plaintiff alleges that as she was traveling, an 18wheeler-truck switched lanes and crashed into her vehicle. The parties dispute, which
vehicle deviated from their respective lane. Defendant, Moses Nganga Rugu, was the driver
of the 18-wheeler, Rivatex Transport, Inc. owned the truck and American was the insurer.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendant American has hired Richard V. Baratta and intends to qualify and tender
him as an expert in biomedical and/or biomechanical engineering to present testimony at
the trial of this matter. Plaintiff asserts that Baratta’s opinion is “bought and paid for” and
challenges the methodology of Baratta’s opinion. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that

Baratta is not qualified to render biomechanical or biomedical opinions, and his opinions
are not based upon sufficient facts or data.
The trial court serves as gatekeeper in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony, by making an initial determination of whether the expert’s opinion is relevant
and reliable. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. This gatekeeping function extends to all expert
testimony, whether scientific or not. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
147 (1999). Accordingly, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that the court must
consider the following three requirements on challenges to experts: 1) qualifications of the
expert witness; 2) relevance of the proposed testimony; and 3) reliability of the principles
and methodology on which the testimony is based. 1 The proponent of the expert testimony
bears the burden of proving its admissibility, by a preponderance of the evidence. Mathis
v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 459–60 (5th Cir. 2002).
The trial court has broad latitude in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony. Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004). Rejection of
expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule, and the court’s role as gatekeeper
“does not replace the traditional adversary system and the place of the jury within the
system.” Johnson v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 161, 165 (E.D. La. 2011);
Scordill v. Louisville Ladder Grp., LLC, 2003 WL 22427981, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 24,

The Daubert Court identified several additional factors for assessing whether the expert’s methodology is valid
and reliable, including whether the expert’s theory had been tested and subjected to peer review, the known or
potential error rate for the expert’s theory or technique, the existence and maintenance of standards and controls, and
the degree to which the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community. Moore v.
Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the same standards cannot be applied to all
possible fields of expertise. Accordingly, the Daubert analysis is necessarily flexible and fact-specific. Kumho, 526
U.S. at 150.
1

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2003). Instead, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Scordill, 2003 WL 22427981 at *3 (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
Here, Plaintiff initially claimed injuries at the scene, went to the emergency room,
and was released that same night. Plaintiff sought treatment eleven (11) days later and is
seeking over $1.8 million in future medical expenses. Defendant challenges the nature and
extent of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Defendant has retained Baratta to address what forces
and mechanisms might have been at play, or were non-existent, with respect to the incident.
Plaintiff argues that Baratta is not qualified because of his methodologies that formed his
opinions. Plaintiff does not appear to challenge Baratta as an expert biochemical engineer.
First, Plaintiff challenges Baratta’s review of the photographs, and argues that
Baratta is not an expert in interpretation of photographs. This argument is nonsensical to
the Court.

Experts commonly review photographs to form opinions. Plaintiff also

complains that Baratta relied on a Uniform Vehicle Traffic Crash Report, Autostats data,
Plaintiff’s deposition relative medical summary, but does not appear to challenge the use
of this information. Plaintiff complains that Baratta did not rely on the estimate of the
actual body-shop mechanic but relied on another repair estimate and challenges whether
the author of that estimate was qualified.
Plaintiff specifically challenges Baratta’s opinions because he did not rely on
statements made by Trooper Matthew Gaspard in his deposition, or statements made by
Defendant, Rugu. Also, Plaintiff challenges Baratta’s methodology because he did not
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inspect the accident scene, take measurements, determine the applicable “G-forces”
involved in the accident, take any “delta-v” presented, render mathematical computations,
measure crush damage, render or account for any methodology supporting his opinion,
personally inspect the subject vehicles, determine Plaintiff’s actual levels, determine the
angular approach of the alleged tortfeasor’s vehicle, weigh the vehicles involved,
determine the speed or impact speed, conduct any tests to determine reliability, determine
crush profiles, conduct or perform methodology to the facts, outline any of the principles
of engineering to the facts, indicate that his opinions have been subject to peer review,
and/or indicate whether his “methodology” is capable of being repeated.
Defendant remarks that Baratta’s report indicates that he relied and considered the
Uniform Crash report, body camera footage, relevant statements made to the investigating
officer, Plaintiff’s and the Officer’s depositions, damage photographs, an inspection of
Plaintiff’s vehicle, statistical data of Plaintiff’s vehicle, an EDR report for Plaintiff’s
vehicle, the Vehicle Control History report for Plaintiff’s vehicle, evaluation of that data
through sophisticated and industry accepted crash analysis programs, and Plaintiff’s
medical records.
Applying the principles of crash analysis to the facts of this case, and basing his
opinion on industry approved, peer-reviewed, and testable methods, Defendant argues that
a review of the relevant and accurate data will assist the trier of fact. The Court has
reviewed Baratta’s report and considered Plaintiff’s complaints and finds that they are
unfounded, lack specificity and authoritative support, and some are falsely presented to the
Court. Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint tends to bear on the weight of Baratta’s opinion
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rather than its admissibility. Furthermore, Plaintiff will be able to cross-examine Baratta
as to his opinions and how he arrived at them at the trial of this matter. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs First Motion in Limine (Doc. 41) to exclude the
opinion, report and testimony of Dr. Richard Baratta is DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 29th day of January, 2025.

_____________________________________________
JAME D. CAIN, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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