Andrews et al v. Monroe et al
MEMORANDUM RULING re 144 MOTION for Order to Show Cause filed by USA, 170 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Brent Vidrine and 181 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings under FRCvP 12(c) and (d) filed by School Board City of Monroe. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 3/22/17. (crt,Crawford, A)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JIMMY ANDREWS, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 65-11297
JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES
MONROE CITY SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff United States of America’s (“the United States”) Motion
for Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 144]. The United States contends that Defendant Monroe City
School Board (“the School Board”) and Superintendent Brent Vidrine (“Dr. Vidrine”) failed to meet
deadlines and other requirements of the Consent Decree in effect and failed to take the required steps
to desegregate the District’s faculty. The United States moves the Court to order the School Board
and Dr. Vidrine to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. If the School Board and
Dr. Vidrine are found in contempt, the United States moves the Court to order them to pay a civil
fine of $100 per day for each day of noncompliance, to pay a civil fine of double that amount for
each calendar week of continued noncompliance, and to extend the deadline for the Carroll High
School Medical Magnet Program (“Medical Magnet Program”) applications for the 2016-17 school
year to at least one month after the District has cured its related noncompliance.
In response, the School Board filed a memorandum in opposition [Doc. No. 152] and a
“Motion for Relief under FRCvP 12(c) and (d).” [Doc. No. 181]. Dr. Vidrine filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 170].
For the following reasons, the United States’ Motion for Order to Show Cause is DENIED,
and Dr. Vidrine’s and the School Board’s motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
Procedural History Leading up to the Filing of the Motion for Order to Show Cause1
For more than 50 years, the School Board has operated the District under a desegregation
decree. On August 5, 1965, a Complaint was filed in the name of then-minor students, Jimmy
Andrews and Tommy Ray Robertson, by their mothers, against the City of Monroe (“the City”),
the Mayor, the members of the School Board, and the Superintendent. On September 17, 1965,
the Court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from operating a bi-racial school
On August 1, 1969, the Court issued a desegregation decree. Over the years, the original
desegregation decree has been modified numerous times.
On July 6, 1992, United States District Judge Tom Stagg granted the School Board’s
motion for unitary status in part and declared the District unitary in the areas of facilities,
extracurricular activities, and hiring and retention of teachers and administrators. Judge Stagg
denied the School Board’s motion in part, finding that the District was not unitary in the areas of
teacher and principal assignments, student assignments, and transportation.
On July 9, 1998, Benya Marshall (“Marshall”) and Annie Faye Harris (“Harris”) were
permitted to join the case as individual Plaintiffs.
Between 1998 and 2008, there were limited proceedings in this case, mainly addressing
certain zoning issues and the continued filing of status reports.
In 2008, the Court, on its own motion, began examining all remaining desegregation cases
on its docket. In this case, the United States and the School Board began working together to
The Court has previously detailed the complete procedural history. See [Doc. No. 106].
This Ruling focuses on the procedural history at issue.
reach a consent decree for the Court’s approval.
As a result, the parties submitted a proposed consent decree, which the Court approved on
March 30, 2010. [Doc. No. 16]. The March 30, 2010 Consent Decree was to be in effect for five
school years, or until June 30, 2014, when the parties were to “conduct a full evaluation of the
District’s compliance with the terms of [the Consent Decree] and with the Fourteenth Amendment
. . . . and applicable federal law to determine the District’s eligibility to request a declaration of
unitary status from this Court” in the remaining areas. Id. at p.7.
On June 18, 2012, the Court conducted a telephone status conference, at which time
[t]he Court raised the issue of the pending March 30, 2010 Consent Decree. Under
that Decree, a unitary status review is set to take place after June 30, 2014. However,
it is the intent of the Court that the parties take affirmative steps to address any issues
that would prevent a unitary status finding in 2014. As issues arise, the Court expects
the parties to attempt to reach an amicable resolution or to contact the Court for a
hearing to resolve the issues, rather than waiting to conduct a review in 2014. In the
upcoming June 30, 2012 status report, the Court expects the School Board to identify
and address any unresolved issues.
[Doc. No. 55].
On May 13, 2014, the Court issued a minute entry which stated as follows:
. . . The parties have not contacted the Court about unresolved issues, nor have they
requested a status conference on this topic. Accordingly, the Court anticipates that
the parties will file a joint motion for unitary status on or after June 30, 2014. If the
Department of Justice, the Monroe City School Board, or the individual Plaintiffs
have any remaining concerns about issues related to the Green factors, they must file
a motion for a status conference immediately.
[Doc. No. 75]. No motion was filed.
On July 22, 2014, the Court held a status conference with the parties and ordered the School
Board to file a motion for unitary status or the parties to file a status report by August 18, 2014.
However, in subsequent filings and status conferences, the School Board’s counsel reported that the
School Board had not authorized him to file a motion for unitary status. During this time, the United
States raised no concerns about the District’s desegregation efforts on the remaining Green factor
or the District’s compliance with the March 30, 2010 Consent Decree.
On June 15, 2015, another status conference was held, and the Court informed the parties that
it intended to conduct a sua sponte unitary status review. [Doc. No. 86]. The United States stated
that it did not intend to take any further action. The following day, the Court set a unitary status
hearing for September 21, 2015. [Doc. No. 87].
On September 8, 2015, at a pre-hearing conference, the United States raised concerns about
the District’s compliance with the March 30, 2010 Consent Decree for the first time since 2010.
[Doc. No. 97].
On September 21, 2015, the unitary status hearing was held as scheduled, and the Court took
evidence and heard the parties’ arguments. At the conclusion, the Court declared the District unitary
in the areas of transportation and student assignments. The Court found that the District had not
achieved unitary status in the area of “principal and teacher assignments and has not fully complied
with the March 30, 2010 Consent Order.” [Doc. No. 107].
Following the hearing, the parties were able to reach an agreement to amend the March 30,
2010 Consent Decree. The new Consent Decree was approved by the Court on December 11, 2015.
[Doc. No. 113].2 Sections V, VI, and VII of the 44-page document provide the substantive actions
the School Board agreed to take with regard to monitoring and oversight through the use of an
independent court monitor (“ICM”), teacher and principal assignments, equitable access to course
The December 11, 2015 Consent Decree provides that “[a]ll prior orders not inconsistent
herewith remain in full force and effect.” [Doc. No. 113, p. 34].
offerings, equitable access to specialized academic programs, and the Medical Magnet Program. “At
a minimum, th[e] Consent Decree [was to] remain in force until the conclusion of the 2016-17
school year,” but the parties “anticipate[d] that the District will be in a position to be declared unitary
by September 30, 2017.”3 Id. at pp. 33-34.
On January 12, 2016, by minute entry and at the request of the parties, the Consent Decree
was amended to extend the deadline for notifying the Court of the selection of the ICM to January
Two months later, the parties sought another amendment to the December 11, 2015 Consent
Decree, which was approved by the Court on March 24, 2016. [Doc. No. 133]. The amendment
extended and re-set a number of the deadlines in the December 11, 2015 Consent Decree, but the
substantive provisions remained the same.
On April 14, 2016, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion for an extension of a deadline,
and again amended the December 11, 2015 Consent Decree. [Doc. Nos. 140 & 141]. The
substantive provisions again remained unchanged.
On June 27, 2016, the United States filed the instant Motion for Order to Show Cause [Doc.
No. 144], contending that the School Board and Dr. Vidrine had violated the terms of the December
11, 2015 Consent Decree, as amended on January 12, 2016; March 24, 2016; and April 14, 2016.4
The December 11, 2015 Consent Decree, as amended, is at issue in the instant motions.
Any general reference by the Court to the “Consent Decree” refers to the December 11, 2015
The parties sometimes refer to “amendments” to the December 11, 2015 Consent
Decree, and sometimes refer to the amendments as “Amended Consent Decree,” “Second
Amendment Consent Decree,” etc. To avoid further confusion, as noted above, any reference by
the Court to the “Consent Decree” refers to the substantive provisions of the December 11, 2015
Consent Decree, as amended by the deadline extensions on January 12, 2016; March 24, 2016;
The United States moves the Court to order the School Board members and Dr. Vidrine to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for failing to meet the deadlines and cure their
noncompliance with Sections VI.A.2.i, VI.A.2.ii(2)(b), VI.A.2.iii, VI.D.1.i, VI.D.1.ii, VI.D.1.iv,
VI.C.1.v, and V.B.2 of the Consent Decree. The United States moves the Court to order the School
Board members and Dr. Vidrine to pay a civil fine of $100 per day for each day that they continue
to fail to comply with the Consent Decree and double that as a fine for each calendar week of
continued noncompliance.5 Finally, the United States moves the Court to order the School Board
and Dr. Vidrine to extend the deadline for the submission of applications for the Medical Magnet
Program for the 2016-17 school year to at least one month after the District has cured its related
The School Board filed a response. [Doc. No. 152]. The School Board contends that it acted
through Dr. Vidrine and his staff, that any failures were not the result of conscious refusal or
indifference, and that partial, if not total, compliance with the Consent Decree has been achieved.
The School Board argues further that civil contempt is not appropriate because neither it nor the staff
refused to comply, the Consent Decree is a lengthy document, the School Board was inexperienced,
Dr. Vidrine was inexperienced as a Superintendent, there has since been substantial compliance, and
everyone acted in good faith.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing on July 6, 2016. Testimony was taken regarding what
the Consent Decree provided for teacher and administrator assignment and related issues and where
and April 14, 2016.
The United States did not move for sanctions until a two-week period had passed, but
that time period is long over.
the parties stand with reference to compliance on those issues. The School Board and Dr. Vidrine
were ordered to provide a report to the Court and the United States on August 19, 2016, on the
assignment of teachers and administration (including Deans of Students) as of August 15, 2016. The
hearing was set to resume on September 19, 2016. However, on that date, Dr. Vidrine’s recently
enrolled counsel appeared and moved for a continuance. The Court granted the continuance and reset the hearing to October 12, 2016.
On October 10, 2016, two days before the reconvened hearing, Dr. Vidrine filed a Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 170]. Dr. Vidrine argues that the Court, even after finding
contempt, is required to exercise the least possible power to achieve compliance. Therefore, the
United States should have first proceeded against the District (i.e. the School Board as an entity)
before moving the Court to hold the individual School Board members and Dr. Vidrine in contempt.
Dr. Vidrine claims that the District is in “substantial compliance,” and, thus, the Court should not
impose individual coercive sanctions against him (or the individual School Board members).
On October 12, 2016, the United States, the School Board, and Dr. Vidrine entered certain
factual stipulations prior to the hearing. The Court then heard testimony from witnesses. At the
close of the hearing, the Court deferred ruling on the Motion for Order to Show Cause and took Dr.
Vidrine’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under advisement.
On October 18, 2016, the Court held a status conference with counsel. At the conclusion of
the conference, the Court ordered the District to file the school faculty rosters, summary
pages/threshold reports, declarations of Dr. Vidrine or the principals (or assistant principals, if
applicable), and any birth certificates under seal no later than October 25, 2016.
On October 13, 2016, the School Board filed a “Motion for Relief under FRCvP 12(c) and
(d)” [Doc. No. 181]. The School Board moves the Court to dismiss the United States’ Motion for
Order to Show Cause on the pleadings, or, alternatively, under Rules 12(d) and 56. The School
Board contends that the motion filed by the United States fails to describe or state a legally assertable
prima facie claim against the School Board or its individual members. The School Board contends
further that the evidence adduced in open Court shows that the School Board “yielded to and tasked
the Superintendent, as it is required to do by state law, to determine and implement all matters
regarding staff assignments, to compile and submit all information and data required for compliance,
to confirm the accuracy and completeness of the information and data, and to address errors.” Id.
at p. 2.
On October 25, 2016, Dr. Vidrine filed school faculty rosters, summary pages/threshold
reports, declarations, and birth certificates under seal. [Doc. No. 180].
On November 1, 2016, the School Board filed a response [Doc. No. 184] to Dr. Vidrine’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The School Board denies that it, as an entity, and the
individual members must be found in contempt before Dr. Vidrine can be found in contempt. The
School Board points out that, under La. Rev. Stat. 17:81A(3) & P, Dr. Vidrine had the absolute
authority to make the necessary staffing assignments required to desegregate the teachers and school
administrators. They argue further that efforts to disrupt the School Board by having a member
removed and attempts by others to intervene in this matter did not prevent Dr. Vidrine from
completing his tasks under the Consent Decree.
On November 14, 2016, the United States responded to Dr. Vidrine’s October 25, 2016
document/information production. The United States identified some apparent discrepancies in the
reports, as well as 25 teachers who did not identify their races. [Doc. No. 188]. Dr. Vidrine replied
there were no discrepancies, offered an explanation for the confusion on five teachers, pointed out
that some of the persons for whom surveys were requested are actually long-term substitutes, and
denied that the completion of additional surveys would be helpful. [Doc. No. 189].
On November 18, 2016, the Court held another status conference with counsel, at which time
the School Board and Dr. Vidrine were instructed to have the remaining surveys completed by
December 2, 2016. The United States was required to provide a list of any remaining deficiencies
to counsel for the School Board and Dr. Vidrine by December 9, 2016.
On December 8, 2016, the United States filed a Motion for Further Relief [Doc. No. 195].6
In this motion, the United States reiterates some of its earlier arguments contained in the Motion for
Order to Show Cause, as well as adding other arguments.
On December 13, 2016, the Court held another status conference with counsel. The Court
instructed the United States’ counsel to provide a list of all remaining current deficiencies to counsel
for the School Board and Dr. Vidrine by December 23, 2016. This list was to identify the United
States’ specific concerns, so that the District could take action as soon as possible to resolve the
concerns. The Court set a deadline of January 12, 2017, for the School Board and Dr. Vidrine to
respond. The Court set another telephone status conference for January 13, 2017.
On January 12, 2017, the School Board and Dr. Vidrine each filed opposition memoranda
to the United States’ Motion for Further Relief. [Doc. Nos. 198 & 199].
On January 13, 2017, the Court held another status conference with counsel. At the
conclusion of the conference, the Court instructed the United States to file a proposed order
which will address all remaining alleged deficiencies, in detail and with specificity,
This motion will be addressed separately.
no later than January 20, 2017. The School Board and Vidrine shall file a response
to the proposed order no later than January 27, 2017. The responses (1) shall address,
in detail and with specificity, any objections to the proposed order and the basis for
those objections, (2) shall state whether an evidentiary hearing is requested, and (3)
if an evidentiary hearing is requested, shall identify proposed witnesses and what
evidence such witnesses are anticipated to provide.
[Doc. No. 200].
On January 19, 2017, the United States filed its proposed order [Doc. No. 201].
On January 27, 2017, Dr. Vidrine and the School Board filed oppositions to the United
States’ proposed order, as well as their own proposed order. [Doc. Nos. 202 & 203].
Consent decrees are both contracts and legal instruments. United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 533
F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2008). Therefore,
Courts should not impose their own terms within a consent decree and should read
consent decree terms by their plain meaning. . . At the same time, consent decrees are
more than contracts. They are also enforceable judicial orders.
Id. at 286 (citations omitted). “[D]istrict courts have the power and ordinarily must hold parties to
the terms of a consent decree. . . [and] have wide discretion to enforce decrees and to implement
remedies for decree violations.” Id. That is, “while a district court generally lacks authority to
rewrite the terms of a consent decree, it has broad discretion to fashion equitable remedies to enforce
a consent decree in response to a party’s noncompliance.” Chisolm ex rel. CC v. Greenstein, 876
F. Supp. 2d 709, 720 (E.D. La. 2012) (citing EEOC v. Local 580, Int'l Assoc. of Bridge, Structural
& Ornamental Ironworkers, 925 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir.1991)). “These remedies ‘need not match
those requested by a party or originally provided by the court’s earlier judgment.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Alcoa, 533F.3d 278, 288 (5th Cir. 2008) (other citations omitted).
A party commits contempt when he violates a definite and specific order of the court
requiring him to perform or refrain from performing a particular act or acts with knowledge of the
court’s order. Travelhost, Inc. v. Blandford, 68 F.3d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1995); Martin v. Trinity
Industries, Inc., 959 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1992).
Contempt proceedings may be civil or criminal, and the fact that consent decrees can be
enforced as civil contempt does not allow the court to disregard the differences between criminal and
civil contempt or the differing protections which may attach.
The Fifth Circuit has explained the difference between civil and criminal contempt7 and the
effect on a party’s due process rights as follows:
[T]he initial touchstone for determining the due process rights of a sanctions
defendant lies in the characterization of the particular contempt as either “civil” or
Because civil contempt sanctions are viewed as nonpunitive and avoidable, fewer
procedural protections for such sanctions have been required. To the extent that such
contempts take on a punitive character, however, and are not justified by other
considerations central to the contempt power, criminal procedural protections may
be in order.
International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994); see
In this case, there are allegations of indirect contempt that occurred outside the Court’s
presence. Direct contempt that occurs in the court’s presence may be immediately adjudged and
sanctioned summarily, see, e.g., Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289(1888), and, except for serious
criminal contempts in which a jury trial is required, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 209-210
(1968), the traditional distinction between civil and criminal contempt proceedings does not
apply. Cf. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316 (1975).
also Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988) (in a contempt
action, as in any other, “criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been
afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings”).
“A contempt fine . . . is civil and remedial if it ‘either coerce[s] the defendant into
compliance with the court’s order, [or] . . . compensate[s] the complainant for losses sustained.’
Where the fine is not compensatory, it is civil only if the contemnor is afforded an opportunity to
purge.” Id. at 227 (quoting Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829) (other citations omitted).
A movant in a civil contempt proceeding bears the burden of establishing by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) a court order was in effect, (2) the order required certain conduct by the
respondent, and (3) the respondent failed to comply with the court’s order. American Airlines, Inc.
v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 228 F.3d 574, 581 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Clear and convincing
evidence is “that weight of proof which ‘produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101,
102 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). A party need not have acted willfully if he “actually failed
to comply with the court’s order.” American Airlines, 228 F.3d at 581 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Trailways,
Inc., 729 F.2d 1013, 1017 (5th Cir. 1984).
Judicial sanction for civil contempt may be employed to “coerce the defendant into
compliance with the court’s order and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.” United
States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947).
Specifically in the enforcement of decrees, the Fifth Circuit has instructed:
Courts have, and must have, the inherent authority to enforce their judicial orders and
decrees in cases of civil contempt. Discretion . . . must be left to a court in the
enforcement of its decrees. . . .
Cook v. Oschner Foundation Hosp., 559 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. at 303-304).
All Writs Act
To the extent that the United States moves the Court to find Dr. Vidrine in contempt, it does
so under the power of the All Writs Act which provides “power [to] a federal court to issue such
commands . . . as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders
it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained.” United States v. N.Y. Tel.
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). This power extends to non-parties
“when their conduct frustrates the court’s order.” Moore v. Tanigpahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 2013 WL
141791, at *6 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2013). (Citing N.Y. Tel., 434 U.S. at 174). In order for the district
court to act, three elements must be satisfied. “First, ‘the party seeking issuance of the writ [must]
have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.’” Id. (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (alteration in original)). “When alternative means of relief
are available, the court should not issue a writ.” Id. “Second, the party seeking the writ must meet
its ‘burden of showing that [its] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.’” Id. at *6-7
(quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “Third, assuming
the petition meets the first two requirements, a court should exercise discretion before issuing a writ
to ensure it ‘is appropriate under the circumstances.’” Id. at *7 (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381)
(citation omitted)). “Generally, a writ is appropriate when it addresses a direct affront to a district
court’s order.” Moore v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 507 Fed. App’x 389, 397 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing
United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 262-64 (5th Cir.1972) (finding an injunction under the All Writs
Act proper in the desegregation context to prevent a member of a militant group from intentionally
violating a court order denying his entry into a high school campus)); see also Valley v. Rapides
Parish Sch. Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 943 (5th Cir.1981) (upholding injunction under All Writs Act against
non-parties from interfering with desegregation order by permitting sham custodial arrangements
designed to enable parents and students to avoid compliance with court-ordered student assignment
The United States contends that the School Board and Dr. Vidrine violated the Consent
Decree as follows:
Failed to meet 90% of the deadlines set forth in the consent decree between
December 15, 2015, and June 6, 2016;
Failed to take required steps to desegregate the District’s faculty (a) by
reviewing the racial make-up and credentials of their faculty as set forth in
Section VI.A.2.i (b) by revising and finalizing the plan to desegregate their
faculty by persuading teachers and administrators to voluntarily transfer
schools as required by Section VI.A.2.ii(2)(b), and (c) by submitting a
mandatory faculty reassignment as required by Section VI.A.2.iii;
Failed to take required steps to improve the Medical Magnet Program;
Failed to take required steps to equalize access to specialized academic
Failed to comply with Section V.B.2 of the Consent Decree, which requires
the School Board to give the ICM the information and personnel she needs
to timely report information as required by sections VI.C.2, VI.D.2, and VII.
[Doc. No. 144-1].
After hearing testimony, reviewing the record in this matter, listening to the arguments of
counsel, and holding numerous status conferences, the Court finds that the School Board and Dr.
Vidrine failed to meet a number of deadlines and did not otherwise fully comply with all provisions
of the Consent Decree. This is certainly a disappointment and has necessitated the Court’s
involvement to a far greater extent than is usual in a desegregation case when only one Green factor
On the other hand, the Court recognizes that there were a number of years of inaction in this
case, during which time the United States affirmatively indicated that it would take no further action.
Further, as pointed out, the Consent Decree is extensive, a number of the School Board members
were new, and Dr. Vidrine was a new Superintendent (and thus inexperienced with desegregation
issues). It does not appear to the Court that the School Board (as an entity or the individual
members) or Dr. Vidrine flatly refused to comply with the Consent Decree and remaining
desegregation obligations, but, rather, was not focused on those obligations when faced with other
At this time, the School Board and Dr. Vidrine have made substantial efforts to comply with
the Consent Decree and address the remaining factor of teacher and administrator assignments.
Specifically, it appears to the Court that the School Board and/or Dr. Vidrine have now taken a
number of actions, including, but not limited to, the following:
Reviewed the racial makeup and credentials of their faculty;
Prior to the 2016-2017 school year, sent letters to teachers offering a $3,000 lump sum
payment as incentive to voluntarily transfer schools for a three-year commitment;
Reassigned teachers pursuant to a plan which brings all schools except for one into the
acceptable 15% +/- standard deviation;
Reassigned or promoted/demoted administrators in an effort to desegregate;
Either implemented or have taken proactive steps for the implementation of expert
recommendations for the Medical Magnet Program, including establishing a partnership
between the Medical Magnet Program and two hospitals, St. Francis and LSU-E.A. Conway8,
posting easily viewable and accessible information about the Medical Magnet Program on
the District and all high school websites, setting a date for construction on significant facility
upgrades to begin in June 2017, and posting a program director job description;
Posted the District-wide course offerings, including gifted and talented offerings, on the
District’s website and the registration handbook with District-wide course offerings on each
high school’s website;
Implemented all but 2 of the 35 recommendations made by the IDRA, and Dr. Vidrine has
been in further email communication with the IDRA;
Have worked with the ICM, so that she has been able to provide the Court with extensive
While the Court remains committed to overseeing the District’s complete compliance, based
on all of the circumstances, the Court finds that no civil coercive sanctions are warranted for the
remaining, limited areas of non-compliance. The remaining relief requested by the United States in
the instant motion is an extension of the deadline for the Medical Magnet Program applications for
the 2016-17 school year, which is moot. Finally, the United States did not request, and the Court
does not find appropriate, the initiation of criminal contempt proceedings for the District’s former
The District attempted to establish a partnership with Glenwood Regional Medical
Center as well, but was refused.
For the foregoing reasons, the United States’ Motion for Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 144]
is DENIED, and Dr. Vidrine’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 170] and the School
Board’s Motion for Relief under FRCvP 12(c) and (d) [Doc. No. 181] are DENIED AS MOOT.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 22nd day of March, 2017.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?