Boyett et al v. Redland Insurance Co

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM RULING re 26 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Redland Insurance Co. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 12/11/2012. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

CLYDE BOYETT, ET AL

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-cv-00323

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

REDLAND INSURANCE CO.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendant, Redland Insurance Company (“Redland”) seeks summary judgment
dismissing the instant suit on the grounds that Louisiana’s uninsured/underinsured
motorist (“UM”) statute, Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1295, does not provide coverage
for the injuries sustained by Plaintiff Clyde Boyett [Record Document 26]. Plaintiffs, Clyde
and Annie Boyett, oppose this Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment [Record
Document 28].
For the reasons outlined below, the Defendant’s Supplemental Motion for
Summary Judgment [Record Document 26] is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
The material facts are not in dispute. The issues are purely questions of law. On
March 3, 2009, the Plaintiff Clyde Boyett was injured in North Carolina while assisting
in the loading of lumber and wooden beams onto a flatbed tractor trailer owned by his
employer, Boeuf River Ventures, Inc. (“Boeuf River”), and driven by Plaintiff. The

1

All material facts set forth in the statement required by Local Rule 56.1 to be served by
the moving party "will be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless controverted as
required by this rule." Local Rule 56.2.

1

Defendant Redland provided a policy of liability coverage, policy number RICTN0002889
issued in Louisiana, for the tractor trailer that Mr. Boyett was driving/loading.2 [See
Record Documents 1 and 26-1]. Thus, for purposes of our analysis, the tractor trailer is
the insured vehicle. Lee Simmons (“Simmons”), an employee of Carolina Lumber and
Brick, Ltd., was loading the insured trailer with a forklift when some portion of the load
fell, seriously injuring Mr. Boyett. Plaintiffs allege Simmons’ negligent operation of the
forklift caused Mr. Boyett’s injuries.
Plaintiffs make the following claims: that Redland provided UM coverage on the
Boeuf River tractor trailer; that the forklift constituted a “motor vehicle” within the
meaning of the UM statute; and that Redland therefore provided coverage for Boyett’s
injuries. It is undisputed that Boeuf River did not purchase UM coverage under the
instant policy; however, there is no written waiver by Boeuf River explicitly rejecting UM
coverage as required under Louisiana’s UM statute. [See Record Documents 26-1 and
28-1]. Defendant Redland argues that there is no statutory UM coverage in this case
because: (a) the accident did not occur in Louisiana; and (b) the forklift involved in this
accident does not qualify as an “uninsured motor vehicle” for purposes of Louisiana
Revised Statute 22:1295.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant Redland filed its original Motion for Summary Judgment seeking
dismissal on the grounds that the instant policy provided neither liability coverage nor

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As conceded by Plaintiffs and determined by this Court’s prior Order on Motion for
Summary Judgment [Record Document 21], the Redland policy at issue did not provide liability
coverage for the accident in question.

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UM coverage for the injuries sustained by Plaintiff, Clyde Boyett. [Record Document
17]. The Court granted the motion insofar as it pertained to coverage under the liability
portion of the policy but denied the motion as to whether the statutorily imposed UM
coverage applied to this case, reserving to the Defendant the right to re-urge the latter
issue. [Record Document 21].
Subsequently, the Court held a status conference and outlined the following
specific issues for the parties to address in the instant Supplemental Motion for
Summary Judgment [Record Document 26] and the opposition thereto [Record
Document 28]: (1) provide more information on the forklift at issue, specifically whether
it is titled and whether it is capable of being driven on the highway; (2) provide the
controlling definition of a motor vehicle for purposes of the UM statute, La. R.S.
22:1295; (3) discuss whether the forklift at issue is a motor vehicle for purposes of Title
22; (4) discuss whether Title 323 has ever been used to define a motor vehicle for
purposes of Title 22; (5) discuss the legal interpretation(s) of La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(iii)’s
statement that “uninsured motorist coverage shall apply to any liability insurance
covering any accident which occurs in this state and involves a resident of this state;”
and (6) provide the date that the aforesaid language was added to La. R.S.
22:1295(1)(a)(iii). [See Record Document 23].
As stated in the previously issued Memorandum Order [Record Document 21],
it is the Court’s position that whether or not there is UM coverage for the plaintiff’s

3

The Court mistakenly referred to Title 33 in the status conference minutes; however,
as the parties have noted, the intended reference was Title 32.

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injuries in this case is a two-part inquiry.

First, is UM coverage “read into” the

commercial liability policy issued in Louisiana as a result of the statutory mandate in La.
R.S. 22:1295, where there is no valid UM rejection and the accident occurred out of
state? If the answer to the first inquiry is yes, the second inquiry is whether or not that
coverage

is

afforded

to

Boyett’s

injuries

in

the

situation

where

the

uninsured/underinsured “motor vehicle” is a forklift.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs that a court “shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”4 In making its determination
as to whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court must draw all justifiable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986); Reid v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir.
1986).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those parts of the record that it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986); Lawrence v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309 (5th

4

Rule 56 was amended effective December 1, 2010. Per the comments, the 2010
amendment was intended “to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summaryjudgment motions and to make the procedures more consistent with those already used in
many courts. The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged.” Therefore,
the case law applicable to Rule 56 prior to its amendment remains authoritative, and this Court
will rely on it accordingly.

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Cir. 1999). A material fact is any fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To oppose, the non-moving party “must
go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts in the record showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir.
1996)(citations omitted); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 321-24.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Court notes that Louisiana law requires that UM coverage be
read into any automobile liability policy “unless validly rejected.” Gray v. American Nat.
Property & Cas. Co., 07-1670, p. 8 (La. 2/26/08); 977 So.2d 839, 845 (internal citations
omitted). As mentioned above, there is no valid rejection of UM coverage in this case.
Therefore, Louisiana law requires that we read UM coverage into the policy if the statute
applies to out-of-state accidents.
The Court, on its own, raised with counsel the issue of whether the statutorily
supplied UM coverage would apply to this out-of-state accident. Louisiana Revised
Statute 22:12955 provides, in pertinent part:
(1)(a)(I) No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or
issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle designed
for use on public highways and required to be registered in this state or as
provided in this Section unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental
thereto, in not less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the
policy, under provisions filed with and approved by the commissioner of
insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally
entitled to recover nonpunitive damages from owners or operators of
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness,

5

Louisiana’s UM statute was renumbered from La. R.S. 22:680 by Acts 2008, No. 415,
§1, eff. Jan. 1, 2009.

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or disease, including death resulting therefrom; however, the coverage
required under this Section is not applicable when any insured named in the
policy either rejects coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic-only
coverage, in the manner provided in Item (1)(a)(ii) of this Section.
...
(ii) Such rejection, selection of lower limits, or selection of economic-only
coverage shall be made only on a form prescribed by the commissioner of
insurance. The prescribed form shall be provided by the insurer and signed
by the named insured or his legal representative.
...
(iii) This Subparagraph and its requirement for uninsured motorist coverage
shall apply to any liability insurance covering any accident which occurs in
this state and involves a resident of this state.6

Historically, the purpose of the Louisiana UM statute has always been to promote
full recovery for damages by innocent automobile accident victims. Champagne v. Ward,
03-3211, p. 25 (La. 1/19/05); 893 So.2d 773, 788. The statute accomplishes this
objective by making UM coverage available for their benefit as primary protection when
the tortfeasor is without insurance and as additional or excess coverage when he is
inadequately insured. See Bosch v. Cummings, 520 So. 2d 721, 723 (La. 1988).
Defendant Redland contends that Louisiana does not provide statutory UM coverage in
this case, because the accident did not occur in Louisiana. In so arguing, Redland cites
La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(iii) (hereinafter “the amendment”) which provides that “[t]his
Subparagraph and its requirement for uninsured motorist coverage shall apply to any
liability insurance covering any accident which occurs in this state and involves a
resident of this state.” However, Plaintiff argues that the statute mandates UM coverage

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Subsection 1(a)(iii) was added to the UM statute by 1987 La. Acts No. 444.

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because the policy was issued in Louisiana, irrespective of where the accident may have
occurred. In this case, the accident occurred in North Carolina.
“There is scant case law specifically concerning the amendment; however, the
cases applying the amendment clearly reflect that the language added by Act 444 was
intended to extend geographically the scope of UM coverage beyond cases where the
policy was issued in Louisiana and the vehicle was garaged in Louisiana.” Nelson v.
Robinson, 44,059, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/22/09); 10 So. 3d 356, 359. As the Louisiana
Supreme Court explained in Champagne, the amendment expands the scope of the UM
statute to allow coverage for any accident occurring in the state of Louisiana and
involving a Louisiana resident. Id. (citing Champagne, supra, 893 So.2d 773). There,
the court held that cases involving a foreign policy may still fall under the ambit of the
UM statute; however, a choice-of-law analysis is required to determine which state’s law
should apply to the interpretation of the UM policy. Champagne, 893 So.2d at 786. In
our case, the Redland policy was issued in Louisiana; thus, the question of UM falls
within the realm of the introductory language in La. R.S. 22:1295. The relevant question
is whether the geographical limitation in the amendment applies with equal force when
the policy is issued in Louisiana as it does when a case involves a foreign policy.
It is true that “the statutes providing for UM coverage in the absence of a valid
rejection ... must be liberally construed, while the statutory exceptions to UM coverage
must be strictly construed.” Gray, supra, 977 So. 2d at 845 (internal citations omitted).
“Any exclusion from coverage must be clear and unmistakable.” Id. As the court
explained in Champagne:
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When interpreting a statute, all parts of a statute should be given effect, and
an interpretation making any part superfluous or meaningless should be
avoided. First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Beckwith Machinery Co., 94-2065 (La.
2/20/95); 650 So.2d 118. The lawmaker is presumed to have enacted each
law with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same
subject. Bunch v. Town of St. Francisville, 446 So.2d 1357 (La. App. 1 Cir.
1984). ... [W]hen the wording of a statute is clear and free of ambiguity, the
letter of the statute shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
its spirit. La. R.S. 1:4.
893 So.2d at 786.
Louisiana’s Third Circuit Court of Appeal decided a case involving residents of this
state and an accident in this state; however, the UM policy was issued in New
Hampshire. Willett v. Nat. Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 594 So.2d 966 (La. App. 3 Cir.
1992). Regarding the effect of the amendment on Louisiana’s UM coverage, the Willett
court stated:
“...[T]he statute as amended is no longer limited in its effect to only those
policies that are delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to
any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state. By the
amendment the statute additionally imposes [UM] requirements upon any
liability insurance covering any accident which occurs in this state and
involves a resident of this state.”
Id. at 969. When we consider the objective of the UM statute, in light of its introductory
language and the amendment which was intended to expand its scope, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the amendment is inapplicable to this case. The amendment
will only come into play where there is a foreign policy and each prong of the
conjunctive amendment is met. In such cases, a choice-of-law analysis is required in
accordance with Champagne, supra. Here, Louisiana law will operate to provide UM
coverage, based solely on the fact that the Redland policy was issued in this state.
Having determined that the UM statute reaches the facts of this case, we now
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turn our attention to whether or not the forklift may be considered an uninsured
“motor vehicle.” It is true that “UM coverage attaches to the person of the insured,
not the vehicle[.]” Howell v. Balboa Ins. Co., 564 So.2d 298, 301 (La. 1990).
However, that holding simply ensures that UM coverage is not made dependent upon
a relationship with an insured vehicle. Id. (emphasis added). In other words, “[UM]
coverage protects an insured without regard to whether the insured is in, or intends
to enter, the insured vehicle.” Hastings v. International Service Ins. Co., 490 So.2d
656, 659 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted). It has further been
established that Louisiana’s UM statute affords coverage to innocent automobile
accident victims without regard to the particular “class of vehicle.” Mednick v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 09-183, p. 5-6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/26/10); 31 So.3d 1133,
1136. However, again, this simply means that a UM policy may not exclude specific
types of motor vehicles, such as government-owned vehicles, from its definition of
uninsured vehicles. Id. Acknowledging these underlying principles, it is still
necessary to explore the definition of an uninsured “motor vehicle” as its use was
intended in Louisiana’s UM statute.
There is no definition of the term “motor vehicle” in the UM statute, as it is
used in reference to the uninsured motor vehicle. Instead, the statute only modifies
the term “motor vehicle” as it refers to the vehicle on which the liability policy has
been issued, with the following language: “any motor vehicle designed for use on
public highways and required to be registered in this state.” Here, we are asked to
determine whether the forklift qualifies as a “motor vehicle,” as the term is used
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without any modifying language.
The commonly accepted definition of “motor vehicle” is “an automotive vehicle
not operated on rails; especially: one with rubber tires for use on highways.”
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Eleventh Edition. Likewise, a forklift is “a
self-propelled machine for hoisting and transporting heavy objects by means of steel
fingers inserted under the load.” Id. In applying an exclusionary clause in a UM
policy, one Louisiana court has found that “[t]he forklift is clearly a vehicle designed
principally for use off of public roads.” Williams v. Western World Ins. Co., 96-751, p.
2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/11/96); 685 So.2d 529, 531. Another court, faced with a
business auto policy which excluded any “mechanical device,” found that “a forklift
fits within the generally prevailing meaning of the term ‘mechanical device.’” Dauthier
v. Pointe Coupee Wood Treating Inc., 560 So.2d 556, 558 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1990).
Significantly, the Court recognizes that these cases were interpreting policy language,
rather than the UM statute. Nonetheless, the Court finds the reasoning to be
instructive in determining whether this particular forklift should be included in the
term “motor vehicle.”
The Court likewise agrees that the definitions included in the Louisiana
Highway Regulatory Act, found in Title 32 of Louisiana’s Revised Statutes, do not
apply to considerations involving UM coverage. See Lee v. Davis, 04-966, pp. 5-6 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 2/15/05); 897 So.2d 753, 756. Similarly, Louisiana’s Third Circuit Court of
Appeal has acknowledged that “[t]here is no denial that the enactment of [the Title
32] definitions was for a purpose unrelated to insurance protection.” Thibodeaux v.
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St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 242 So.2d 112, 113 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1970). Although the
definitions provided in Title 32 do not apply directly to our interpretation of terms
used in the UM statute, Title 32 does “govern the operation of vehicles and
pedestrians upon all highways within this state[.]” La. R.S. 32:21. Thus, Title 32
lends itself to Louisiana’s interpretation of the term motor vehicle.
Louisiana requires, inter alia, that motor vehicles be operated under license
and registration, include proper safety equipment, bear an inspection tag, and
contain rearview mirrors. See La. R.S. 32:51, 53, and 354. It therefore seems
unavoidable that we must analyze the nature and use of the forklift in question, as it
relates to its design and intended mode of operation. Here, the parties agree that the
forklift in the present case is not titled. [See Record Documents 28 and 26-2].
Further, based on the parties’ assertions as well as photographs attached to the
instant motion, the forklift lacks any and all of the requisite safety equipment
mentioned above. [See Record Document 26-3]. The accident in question did not
occur on a public highway, nor does the Court find that this forklift was in any way
intended or designed principally for use on public highways. Instead, the forklift was
being used in the loading of lumber and wooden beams onto a flatbed trailer.
Applying the commonly accepted definition of “motor vehicle” to the specific forklift
at issue in this case, the Court finds that the statute’s intended reach would be
strained to include this piece of machinery as an uninsured motor vehicle.
“Uninsured motorist coverage is provided for by statute and embodies a strong
public policy. The object of such coverage is to provide full recovery for automobile
11

accident victims who suffer damages caused by a tortfeasor who is not covered by
adequate liability insurance.” Mednick, 31 So. 3d at 1136. Although we fully respect
the spirit of the UM statute, there must be limits to its application. “[W]hen the
wording of a statute is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of the statute shall not
be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Champagne, supra, 893
So.2d at 786 (citing La. R.S. 1:4). We can find no precedent for allowing a forklift,
clearly not designed for use on public highways and not included in commonly
accepted definitions of “motor vehicle,” to qualify as a motor vehicle under
Louisiana’s UM statute.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Louisiana law does not
mandate statutory UM coverage for the forklift involved in this case. Accordingly,
Defendant Redland’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment [Record
Document 26] is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims are hereby DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this 11th day of
December, 2012.

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