Ford v. Monsour

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM RULING re 12 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Chadwick M Monsour, 12 MOTION to Stay filed by Chadwick M Monsour. Monsour's Motion for summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Ford's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Accordingly, Monsour's Alternative Motion to Stay is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Chief Judge Robert G James on 10/11/11. (crt,Yocum, M)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

DAVID R. FORD

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-1232

VERSUS

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

CHADWICK M. MONSOUR

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

RULING
Pending before the Court is Defendant Chadwick M. Monsour’s (“Monsour”) Motion for
Summary Judgment and Alternative Motion to Stay. [Doc. No. 12]. Plaintiff David R. Ford
(“Ford”) has filed an Opposition [Doc. No. 18] and Monsour has filed a Reply. [Doc. No. 19].
For the following reasons, Monsour’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and
his Alternative Motion to Stay is DENIED as moot. Ford’s Complaint [Doc. No. 1] is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I.

FACTS
Ford, a domiciliary of Mississippi, seeks a Declaratory Judgment from this Court for the

purpose of declaring that Monsour, a domiciliary of Louisiana, has no claims against Ford in a
Mississippi state court for alienation of affection and other torts.
Monsour and Mary Katherine Smith (“Smith”) were married in Louisiana in 2005 and
established their matrimonial domicile in Monroe, Louisiana, where it remained until they separated
1

in 2010. Monsour filed a Petition for Divorce in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Ouachita
Parish, Louisiana on June 22, 2010, alleging that Smith had committed adultery. A Judgment of
Divorce was entered on February 26, 2011.
Ford and Smith began a relationship during the summer of 2009. [Doc. Nos. 18-1, 18-2].
Ford is a resident of Madison County, Mississippi. [Doc. No. 1]. Smith characterized their
relationship as “romantic” and said that she initiated physical contact with Ford while in Florida in
August 2009. [Doc. No. 18-1]. Ford also stated that Smith initiated the contact in Florida. [Doc.
No. 18-2]. Ford asserts that, outside of meeting Smith at the Jackson, Mississippi airport for the
purpose of departing on a trip together, any physical contact he had with Smith in Mississippi took
place after Monsour moved out of the marital home in May, 2010. [Doc. No. 18, pp. 4-5].
On March 29, 2011, Monsour’s counsel sent Ford a letter advising him of Monsour’s claim
against him for alienation of affection under Mississippi law.1 The parties dispute the nature of
subsequent communications. Monsour characterizes them as “settlement negotiations with the
parties making offers and counteroffers.” [Doc. No. 12-1]. Ford contends he made a single
settlement offer to Monsour’s attorney with the stipulation that the offer was final. [Doc. No. 18,
p. 12].
On June 26, 2011, Ford filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in this Court seeking
relief in the form of an order declaring that, because Monsour and Smith were married and domiciled
in Louisiana, Louisiana law should govern the rights and benefits arising from their marriage, that
1

The Mississippi Supreme Court has described the tort of alienation of affection as
“where a husband . . . is wrongfully deprived of his rights to the ‘services and companionship and
consortium of his . . . wife . . .,’ he . . . has a cause of action ‘against one who has interfered with
his . . . domestic relations.’ ” Fitch v. Valentine 959 So.2d 1012, 1018 -19 (Miss. 2007) (citation
omitted).
2

a claim for alienation of affection is against the public policy of Louisiana, and that Monsour has no
colorable claim against Ford for alienation of affection under Mississippi law. [Doc. No. 1, pp. 4-5].2
On July 8, 2011, Monsour filed suit against Ford in Madison County, Mississippi alleging
Mississippi state law claims for alienation of affection, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. [Doc. No. 12].3

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence before the court shows “that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED R. CIV . P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the
outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence
is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
B.

Abstention

The Declaratory Judgment Act states that “[a]ny court of the United States, upon the filing
of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201

2

Ford also seeks relief in the form of an order declaring that Monsour has no claim
against him for interference with the marriage contract or for negligent infliction of emotional
distress and that he owes no duties or obligations to Monsour. He also seeks an award for
attorneys’ fees and costs.
3

Note that in the instant proceedings, Ford is the plaintiff and Monsour is the defendant,
whereas in the Mississippi proceedings, Monsour is the plaintiff and Ford is the defendant.
3

(emphasis added). In the Fifth Circuit, a district court considering whether or not to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action is bound by the standards articulated in
Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942). See Southwind Aviation, Inc. v. Bergen
Aviation Inc., 23 F.3d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1994). In Brillhart, the Supreme Court held:
Ordinarily, it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court
to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in
state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between
the same parties. Gratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive
disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided.
316 U.S. at 495. “Brillhart makes clear that district courts possess discretion in determining whether
and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise
satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 283
(1995). Additionally, “[i]f a district court in the sound exercise of its judgment, determines after a
complaint is filed that a declaratory judgment will serve no useful purpose, it cannot be incumbent
upon that court to proceed to the merits before staying or dismissing the action.” Id. at 288. “Unless
the district court addresses and balances the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the factors
relevant to the abstention doctrine on the record, it abuses its discretion.” Travelers Insurance Co.
v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Fed., 996 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).

III.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Ford seeks a declaratory judgment in this Court with the objective of barring Monsour from

proceeding against him in Mississippi state court. Monsour seeks summary judgment and dismissal
of the case on discretionary abstention grounds or, in the alternative, a stay of the instant proceedings
pending the outcome of the parallel Mississippi state court proceedings.
4

A.

Mandatory Abstention

The Fifth Circuit has mandated that district courts engage in a three-step inquiry when
considering an action for a declaratory judgment. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891,
895 (5th Cir. 2000). “First, the court must determine whether the declaratory action is justiciable.
Typically, this becomes a question of whether an ‘actual controversy’ exists between the parties to
the action.” Id. “Second, if it has jurisdiction, then the district court must resolve whether it has
‘authority’ to grant declaratory relief in the case presented.” Id. That is, if the court does not have
authority to grant declaratory relief, then abstention is mandatory. “Third, the court has to determine
how to exercise its broad discretion to decide or dismiss a declaratory judgment action.” Id.
With regard to the first step, Monsour does not dispute the justiciability of this action.
As for the second step, which addresses a district court’s authority to grant declaratory relief,
“[t]he Fifth Circuit has decided that when a state lawsuit is pending, more often than not, issuing a
declaratory judgment will be tantamount to issuing an injunction - providing the declaratory plaintiff
an end run around the requirements of the Anti-Injunction Act.” Travelers Insurance Co., 996 F.2d
at 776 (citation omitted). The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from granting “an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. §
2283. As a general rule, a district court does not have the authority to consider the merits of a
declaratory judgment action when (1) a declaratory defendant has previously filed a suit in state
court against the declaratory plaintiff; (2) the state and federal cases involve the same issues; and (3)
the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits the district court from enjoining the state proceedings. 996 F.2d
at 776.
5

Because Ford filed the instant declaratory judgment action before Monsour filed his suit in
state court, mandatory abstention is not warranted. Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Cureington, 10-0764,
2011 WL 1085661, at *6 (W.D. La. Feb. 18, 2011) (citing Travelers, 996 F.2d at 776).4
B.

Discretionary Abstention

If mandatory abstention is not warranted under the second prong of Orix, the court must
determine whether to exercise its discretion to abstain. The Fifth Circuit has set forth seven nonexclusive factors that a court must consider when determining whether to decide or dismiss a
declaratory judgment. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1994). The Trejo
factors include:
1) [W]hether there is a pending state action in which all of the matters in controversy
may be fully litigated, 2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit
filed by the defendant, 3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing
the suit, 4) whether possible inequities in allowing the declaratory plaintiff to gain
precedence in time or to change forums exist, 5) whether the federal court is a
convenient forum for the parties and witnesses, and 6) whether retaining the lawsuit
in federal court would serve the purposes of judicial economy...[7] whether the
federal court is being called on to construe a state judicial decree involving the same
parties and entered by the court before whom the parallel state suit between the same
parties is pending.

Id.
1.

Whether all of the matters in controversy may be fully litigated in the
pending state court action.

At issue is Ford’s liability for damages arising from his alleged breaches of Mississippi tort
law. Ford asserts that Monsour should have brought his claims as compulsory counterclaims in
response to the declaratory judgment suit in this Court. [Doc. No. 18, p. 13]. Monsour points out,
4

Since one of the three requisite factors for mandatory abstention is lacking, consideration
of the remaining factors is unnecessary.
6

however, that because Ford is already subject to personal and subject matter jurisdiction in
Mississippi, the state court may fully litigate all of the matters in controversy. [Doc. No. 12, pp. 67]. This factor weighs in favor of abstention because a Mississippi state court is capable of fully
litigating all of Monsour’s tort claims against Ford.
2.

Whether Plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of Defendant’s lawsuit.

Here, Ford filed suit in federal court before Monsour filed his action in Mississippi state
court. Monsour characterizes Ford’s filing as an attempt to win a race to the courthouse [Doc. No.
12-2, p. 5] while Ford characterizes Monsour’s later Mississippi filing as the construction of a
parallel proceeding for the sole purpose of creating grounds with which to argue for abstention.
[Doc. No. 18, p. 13].
The Fifth Circuit has rejected a strict chronological approach for this factor. Instead, the Fifth
Circuit requires “the court to consider whether the declaratory suit was filed in anticipation of a
lawsuit filed by the declaratory defendant . . . .” Travelers, 996 F.2d at 779 n.15.
Although the parties disagree about Ford’s motive for filing suit here, it is clear that Ford is
requesting this Court to issue an order declaring that Louisiana law and public policy bar Monsour
from seeking relief from Ford in a Mississippi state court. It is also clear that Ford knew Monsour
was contemplating a lawsuit, given the March 29, 2011 letter from Monsour’s attorney.
This factor weighs in favor of abstention – Monsour’s characterization that Ford filed suit
in this Court in anticipation of Monsour’s lawsuit is reasonable given the narrative constructed by
the filed pleadings. In fact, this Court recently found that a similar sequence of events supported a
finding of anticipatory filing. See Chevron, 2011 WL 1085661, at *7.
3.

Whether Plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing the suit.
7

In Travelers, the Fifth Circuit identified two impermissible uses of the Declaratory Judgment
Act: (1) filing suit in a race to obtain res judicata; and (2) seeking to thwart any advantage the
defendant may have gained by filing suit first in state court. 996 F.2d at 779. On the other hand, the
Fifth Circuit held that an appropriate application of the Declaratory Judgment Act is the use of the
federal forum as a means “to avoid multiple lawsuits in numerous different forums.” Id.
Ford argues that the instant action does not constitute forum shopping, citing SherwinWilliams Co. v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383, 399 (5th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that a desire
to avoid plaintiff-friendly state court juries is not an illegitimate reason to seek a declaratory action
in anticipation of a state lawsuit. [Doc. No. 18, pp. 15-16]. This reading of Sherwin-Williams is out
of context. In Sherwin-Williams, the Fifth Circuit enumerated two scenarios where seeking a
declaratory action in a federal forum is appropriate – to avoid multiple lawsuits in multiple courts
or to permit an out-of-state declaratory-plaintiff to avoid plaintiff-friendly state court juries through
the use of diversity jurisdiction. 343 F.3d at 399. Sherwin-Williams also discussed two scenarios
where the use of a federal forum would not be appropriate for pursuing a declaratory action – seeking
to change the applicable law or restricting the declaratory judgment defendant from filing a state
court action prior to the declaratory judgment, i.e., a race to res judicata. Id.
Here, Ford did not file a declaratory judgment action to avoid multiple lawsuits in multiple
courts, but to avoid a single lawsuit in a Mississippi state court. Ford, who is domiciled in
Mississippi, is not facing an unfriendly state court. It is unclear at this stage whether or not Ford is
seeking to change the applicable law through his declaratory judgment filing. It does appear that
Ford preemptively invoked diversity jurisdiction in order to restrict the declaratory judgment
defendant from filing a state court action, which is behavior that Sherwin-Williams forbids.
8

Accordingly, Ford’s pursuit of relief does not comport with any of the permissible reasons for
seeking a declaratory action in federal court that the Fifth Circuit described in Sherwin-Williams or
Travelers.
Here, the third factor of forum shopping weighs in favor of abstention. Ford is clearly
seeking a judgment in this Court for the purpose of shielding himself from state law claims in a
Mississippi court.
4.

Whether possible inequities in allowing the declaratory plaintiff to gain
precedence in time or to change forums exist.

Monsour alleges that allowing Ford to proceed with his declaratory judgment action would
be inequitable because Ford abruptly terminated settlement negotiations in order to preemptively
begin litigation in an out-of-state forum. [Doc. No. 12-1, pp. 8-9]. Ford argues that no inequity
arose from this action. Rather, he points out that it is impossible to create an inequity for Monsour
because Monsour resides in the Monroe forum. [Doc. No. 18, pp. 17-18].
If Ford did engage in forum shopping by filing suit in Monroe, then this factor weighs in
favor of abstention because the instant lawsuit would be an attempt by Ford to bar Monsour from
pursuing a remedy under Mississippi law.
Additionally, if Ford broke off settlement negotiations by filing the instant action as Monsour
alleges, and this Court declines to abstain, then Monsour would be penalized for attempting to settle
out of court. Accordingly, declining to abstain here could have a chilling effect on parties otherwise
inclined to seek settlement prior to engaging in litigation.
This factor weighs in favor of abstention, as this Court’s failure to abstain would prevent
Monsour from pursuing a remedy to which he may be entitled in a Mississippi court.

9

5.

Whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the parties and
witnesses.

Both Ford and Monsour recite lists of witnesses in favor of each party’s favored forum. Ford
points out that many of the witnesses identified by Monsour live in Vicksburg, which is roughly
equidistant from Monroe, Louisiana, and the Madison County Courthouse in Canton, Mississippi.
[Doc. No. 18, pp. 18-19; Doc. No. 12-2, pp. 9-10].
This factor is abstention neutral as it is inevitable that some of the witnesses will have to
travel from Canton to Monroe if this Court retains jurisdiction or from Monroe to Canton if this
Court abstains.
6.

Whether retaining the lawsuit in federal court would serve the purposes
of judicial economy.

Ford argues that retaining the federal court proceeding would better serve judicial economy
because it has progressed further in the litigation process than the Mississippi action. [Doc. No. 18,
p. 19] (noting that in the instant action, he has already served Requests for Admissions,
Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents on Monsour).
Monsour argues that this Court’s retention of the instant case would result in piecemeal
litigation because the same issues before the Mississippi state court are also before this Court. Such
piecemeal litigation runs the risk of inconsistent rulings and unnecessary duplication of judicial
resources. Monsour also points out that the Anti-Injunction Act precludes this court from issuing
an injunction of the parallel state court action. [Doc. No. 12-2, p. 11]. Although Ford does not
specifically request an injunction in his Complaint [Doc. No. 1], it is fair to characterize the
declaratory relief that he seeks as “an end run around the Anti-Injunction Act” that the Fifth Circuit
cautioned against in Travelers. 996 F.2d at 776.
10

Unlike the declaratory plaintiff in Sherwin-Williams (who faced multiple lawsuits based on
similar causes of action in state courts throughout Mississippi), Ford does not stand to benefit from
a ruling by this Court that would decide issues critical to his position in future suits by numerous
plaintiffs in multiple state court forums. 343 F.3d at 400.
Accordingly, this sixth factor weighs in favor of abstention because this Court’s failure to
abstain may result in piecemeal litigation that could result in inconsistent rulings. Additionally,
because the tort of alienation of affection is a cause of action in Mississippi, but not in Louisiana,
a Mississippi state court is better equipped to determine whether it applies to the parties involved
in this proceeding.5 Thus, judicial economy will be best preserved by allowing Mississippi state
courts to determine the outcome of the dispute here.
7.

Whether the federal court is being called on to construe a state judicial
decree involving the same parties.

This final Trejo factor is not applicable to the instant case because neither party is requesting
this Court to construe a state judicial decree.
Of the seven Trejo factors, five are in favor of abstention, one is neutral, and one is not
applicable. Accordingly, this Court will exercise its discretion to abstain from jurisdiction in Ford’s
request for a declaratory judgment.

5

This Ruling does not directly address Ford’s choice of law arguments; therefore, the
Ruling does not prejudice his ability to make those arguments in Mississippi state court.
11

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Monsour’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 12] is

GRANTED, and Ford’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment [Doc. No. 1] is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Accordingly, Monsour’s Alternative Motion to Stay [Doc. No. 12] is
DENIED AS MOOT.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 11th day of October, 2011.

12